Search

Text in englischer, Abstracts in englischer und deutscher Sprache, In federal states, intergovernmental councils were the main institutions through which the federal government and the constituent units coordinated their responses to COVID-19. To examine whether peak councils assumed a leading role during the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure cross-sectoral as well as intergovernmental coordination, this article compares the role of two “peak councils”—the Conference of Premiers (MPK) in Germany and the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) in Switzerland—with sectoral councils in normal times and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis relies on an original database of more than 900 council outputs based on which we compare the level of activity, the publicity, the direction of action, and the bindingness of outputs. The findings show that MPK took a leading role during the pandemic, a role that was indeed unusual when compared to normal times, while KdK, which likewise does not play a leading role in normal times, did not during the pandemic either. Im Umgang föderaler Staaten mit der COVID-19-Pandemie spielten intergouvernementale Regierungskonferenzen eine zentrale Rolle. Anhand des Vergleichs der deutschen Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK) und der schweizerischen Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (KdK) mit den politikfeldspezifischen Minister- beziehungsweise Direktorenkonferenzen untersucht dieser Beitrag, inwiefern die MPK und die KdK während der COVID-19-Pandemie eine herausragende Rolle einnahmen, um so sowohl sektorenübergreifende Koordination als auch die Zusammenarbeit der Regierungsebenen sicherzustellen. Anhand eines eigens erhobenen Datensatzes von mehr als 900 Beschlüssen und Pressemitteilungen werden Aktivität, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Ausrichtung und die politische Bindungswirkung der Beschlüsse einer vergleichenden Analyse unterzogen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass der MPK während der Pandemie in der Tat eine zentrale, vom Normalmodus abweichende Bedeutung zukam. Innerhalb des schweizerischen Konferenzgefüges nahm di

Conditional grant programs are widely used in federal systems to address the tension between decentralized policy provision and territorial equity, given constraints on constituent units' ability to raise revenues. While enhancing their financial capacity, conditional grants are often seen as reducing constituent units' policy autonomy. Against this backdrop, this article examines the actual impact conditional grants have on the capacity and autonomy of a constituent unit. We analyze key milestones in the genesis and evolution of conditional grant programs in education and healthcare in Australia, Canada, and the United States. We find that the impact of conditional grants primarily depends on constituent units' size, fiscal capacity, and distinctiveness. Conditional grants are most beneficial to smaller and/or fiscally weaker constituent units but highly distinctive units suffer the most significant autonomy losses. If they are not to exacerbate centralization, conditional grants programs thus need to be sensitive to the preferences of the more distinctive constituent units.

In multilevel systems, (at least) two orders of government are responsible for crisis management. It is essential to understand how these systems deal with a major crisis such as COVID-19. Based on a review of the literature on crisis management in federal and other multilevel systems, this contribution discusses the advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation and intergovernmental coordination when it comes to the management of external shocks., En los sistemas multinivel, (al menos) dos órdenes de gobierno son responsables de la gestión de las crisis. Resulta esencial comprender cómo afrontan estos sistemas una crisis de gran envergadura como la de COVID-19. A partir de una revisión de la literatura sobre la gestión de crisis en sistemas federales y otros sistemas multinivel, este texto analiza las ventajas y desventajas de la descentralización y la coordinación intergubernamental cuando se trata de la gestión de choques externos.

Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch), The COVID-19 pandemic required prompt action from governments all over the world. In federal systems, it can be important or beneficial to coordinate crisis management between the various governments. The extent to which intergovernmental coordination occurred and the form it took (vertical or horizontal) varied across countries and regarding the measures taken. By examining the introduction and the subsequent easing of containment measures and the procurement of medical supplies in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, this article identifies the circumstances under which intergovernmental coordination occurs. Surprisingly, the existence of strong intergovernmental councils did not lead to closer intergovernmental coordination. Governments coordinated more intensively when jurisdiction was shared, problem pressure was high, and measures were(re-)distributive in nature. Vertical coordination was more likely when vertical intergovernmental councils existed and powers were shared.

In federal states, intergovernmental councils were the main institutions through which the federal government and the constituent units coordinated their responses to COVID-19. To examine whether peak councils assumed a leading role during the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure cross-sectoral as well as intergovernmental coordination, this article compares the role of two "peak councils" - the Conference of Premiers (MPK) in Germany and the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) in Switzerland - with sectoral councils in normal times and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis relies on an original database of more than 900 council outputs based on which we compare the level of activity, the publicity, the direction of action, and the bindingness of outputs. The findings show that MPK took a leading role during the pandemic, a role that was indeed unusual when compared to normal times, while KdK, which likewise does not play a leading role in normal times, did not during the pandemic either., Im Umgang föderaler Staaten mit der COVID-19-Pandemie spielten intergouvernementale Regierungskonferenzen eine zentrale Rolle. Anhand des Vergleichs der deutschen Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz (MPK) und der schweizerischen Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (KdK) mit den politikfeldspezifischen Minister- beziehungsweise Direktorenkonferenzen untersucht dieser Beitrag, inwiefern die MPK und die KdK während der COVID-19-Pandemie eine herausragende Rolle einnahmen, um so sowohl sektorenübergreifende Koordination als auch die Zusammenarbeit der Regierungsebenen sicherzustellen. Anhand eines eigens erhobenen Datensatzes von mehr als 900 Beschlüssen und Pressemitteilungen werden Aktivität, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Ausrichtung und die politische Bindungswirkung der Beschlüsse einer vergleichenden Analyse unterzogen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass der MPK während der Pandemie in der Tat eine zentrale, vom Normalmodus abweichende Bedeutung zukam. Innerhalb des schweizerischen Konferenzgefüges nahm die KdK hingegen keine herausgehobene Stellung ein - weder im Normalmodus noch zu Krisenzeiten.

Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch), The COVID-19 pandemic required prompt action from governments all over the world. In federal systems, it can be important or beneficial to coordinate crisis management between the various governments. The extent to which intergovernmental coordination occurred and the form it took (vertical or horizontal) varied across countries and regarding the measures taken. By examining the introduction and the subsequent easing of containment measures and the procurement of medical supplies in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, this article identifies the circumstances under which intergovernmental coordination occurs. Surprisingly, the existence of strong intergovernmental councils did not lead to closer intergovernmental coordination. Governments coordinated more intensively when jurisdiction was shared, problem pressure was high, and measures were(re-)distributive in nature. Vertical coordination was more likely when vertical intergovernmental councils existed and powers were shared.

The ability of federal states to manage the COVID-19 pandemic has created much debate. Federations differ considerably in the way they have been tackling the crisis, however. To shed light on how European federations (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) managed COVID-19, this paper distinguishes two dimensions of federal decision making: centralised/decentralised and unilateral/coordinated decision making. Drawing on official government documents and press reports, it examines decisions on the introduction of containment measures and their subsequent easing during the first wave. While Austria and Switzerland adopted a centralised approach, decentralised decision making prevailed in Germany. However, most decisions were coordinated between the governments at the federal and constituent unit level in Austria and Germany, in contrast to Switzerland where unilateralism prevailed. This difference in approaches can partly be explained by the distribution of powers. Political and economic factors also influenced the choice of crisis management strategies.

The ability of federal states to manage the COVID-19 pandemic has created much debate. Federations differ considerably in the way they have been tackling the crisis, however. To shed light on how European federations (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) managed COVID-19, this paper distinguishes two dimensions of federal decision making: centralised/decentralised and unilateral/coordinated decision making. Drawing on official government documents and press reports, it examines decisions on the introduction of containment measures and their subsequent easing during the first wave. While Austria and Switzerland adopted a centralised approach, decentralised decision making prevailed in Germany. However, most decisions were coordinated between the governments at the federal and constituent unit level in Austria and Germany, in contrast to Switzerland where unilateralism prevailed. This difference in approaches can partly be explained by the distribution of powers. Political and economic factors also influenced the choice of crisis management strategies.

Policy problems are an important source of change in federal systems. This chapter argues that federations’ performance depends on how federal actors find solutions to specific policy problems. Because the search for policy solutions may touch upon the basic interests of governments of a federation, robust performance can only be achieved if they find appropriate policy solutions and avoid federal conflicts at once. Drawing on their research on fiscal consolidation and the harmonisation of education policy, Braun and Schnabel develop an analytical model to evaluate federations’ performance in individual policy areas that stresses federalism’s dynamic character. In distinguishing four ways of governance in which federations tackle policy problems on their agenda (self-rule, arguing, bargaining, hierarchy), they explain why some federations seem to struggle more than others in achieving robustness even though all four governance modes have the potential to effectively solve policy problems as well as minimise federal conflicts.

"Typologies are widely used in research on federalism, e.g. to distinguish dual from cooperative or coming-together from holding-together federations. More general, ideal types, archetypes and categories are frequently used in political science research to define concepts and classify cases. As recently as in 2014, Filho et al. pointed out that Cluster Analysis is still hardly used when it comes to developing typologies in political science. Rather, political scientists rely on more intuitive methods or factor analysis. Our paper argues that Cluster Analysis is of great usefulness because it a) focuses on the relationship between cases and not variables and b) draws on empirical data when identifying the clusters. This paper proposes to apply this fruitful approach to the field of federalism to exemplify its major heuristic potential. Furthermore, we emphasize that testing the secondary validity is a crucial step. Our paper provides two original examples from comparative federal politics and public management that illustrate the strength of Cluster Analysis both in testing and generating hypotheses through the establishment of typologies. For both examples, the validity of the Cluster Analysis is tested by checking for correlations between the clusters and the distribution of power. Hence, the typologies established through Cluster Analysis not only define our respective dependent variables related to aspects of intergovernmental coordination within federations and the normative density of evaluation clauses in the Swiss federation, but also offer strong insights in issues of regional autonomy." (author's abstract)

Paul Anderson and Johanna Schnabel explain why recent proposals to reform UK intergovernmental relationships are a welcome development. They nevertheless warn that reformed structures alone will do little to change the lack of trust between the UK and devolved governments if not accompanied by a corresponding shift in attitude towards more constructive engagement.