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El Mokhtâr al-Hikam wa-mahāsim al-kalim (Selección de sentencias y las más bellas palabras), escrito por el emir sirio-egipcio Abu’l Wafa al-Mubassir ben Fatik en torno a los años 1048-49, es una colección de sentencias morales atribuidas a filósofos y sabios de la Antigüedad. Este texto fue traducido al castellano y al latín, probablemente de forma simultánea y oral. El texto español recibió el nombre de los Bocados de oro. La versión latina, titulada Liber philosophorum moralium antiquorum, sirvió para que la obra de al-Mubassir se difundiera rápidamente por toda Europa a través de la ruta del saber que unía la Península Ibérica con el resto del continente. Tanto la obra de al-Mubassir como su traslación al castellano (los Bocados) y al latín (el Liber) denotan que el texto se vale de ciertas fuentes de la Antigüedad grecorromana, pero tamizadas a través de un filtro de pensamiento monoteísta (percibido como cristiano en las traducciones occidentales). Para ilustrar este fenómeno, el presente artículo identifica y analiza las fuentes —tanto pertenecientes a la tradición clásica grecorromana como contemporáneas al autor— que al-Mubassir utilizó para componer el capítulo dedicado a Sócrates. El artículo presta especial atención a las variaciones que han sufrido las fuentes grecorromanas al pasar al texto de al-Mubassir, debido al uso de tradiciones medievales (ya sean de origen árabe, siríaco o cristiano) que utilizó el autor para completar su texto., Depto. de Filología Clásica, Fac. de Filología, Ediciones Complutense, TRUE, pub

El presente trabajo ha sido llevado a cabo gracias a la obtención de una Ayuda Juan de la Cierva-formación (2017) concedida por el Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades y la consecuente incorporación en el Grupo de investigación “Historia y ontología del presente: la perspectiva hispana” (GIPEL) de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, dirigido por el Prof. José Luis Villacañas Berlanga., Throughout the philosophical tradition that stems from Plato, Socratic irony has represented an enigma that all interpreters of the Platonic dialogues have had to face from different points of view. In this article I aim to present the peculiar Straussian reading of Socratic irony. According to Leo Strauss, Socratic irony is a key element of Plato’s political philosophy, linked to the «logographic necessity» that rules his texts. I will therefore examine the genesis and the main features of Straussian hermeneutics. I will end the article by highlighting the relevance of the esoteric interpretation of Platonic thought as a conceptual tool that responds to the crisis of modern political philosophy., A lo largo de la tradición filosófica la ironía de Sócrates ha representado un enigma con el que han tenido que confrontarse, desde distintos puntos de vista, todos los intérpretes de los diálogos platónicos. En este artículo presentaremos la original lectura straussiana de la ironía socrática. Según Leo Strauss, la ironía de Sócrates es un elemento clave de la filosofía política de Platón, vinculado con la «necesidad logográfica» que gobierna sus textos. Examinaremos, por tanto, la génesis y los rasgos principales de la hermenéutica straussiana y, finalmente, destacaremos la relevancia de la interpretación esotérica del pensamiento platónico en tanto que herramienta conceptual para responder a la crisis de la filosofía política moderna., Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España), Depto. de Filosofía y Sociedad, Fac. de Filosofía, TRUE, pub

The prison before the prison is a nominal expression whose meaning concerns the so called (ancient and modern) accusation cultures. This kind of community considers the charged as guilty or already ethically condemned, even before a judgment.

Education has a vast history that has made it go through different epistemological, pragmatic, and ontological positions, which has enriched his theoretical and practical heritage. One of the sciences in which education has been based to reflect on its being and its doing is the philosophy. Specifically, one of these currents basis is the philosophical thought on dialogue, that has helped to strengthen the trend of dialogical education both from its contribution and from its criticism, aspects inherent to philosophical reflection. However, it is evident that this trend of education has not sufficiently considered the position of Socratic maieutic in its reflection. For this reason, this article aims to propose some elements for dialogical education from the study of Socratic maieutic, for which a qualitative approach and hermeneutic methodology is used. The main results of the research show that dialogical education broadens its horizon from the Socratic assumptions of maieutic in two aspects: in the first place, maieutic invites to recover the question and the ability to ask oneself, and, secondly, it demonstrates that knowledge, to be significant, must be a conquest and discovery of the student himself mediated by dialogue with himself, with others and with the other., La educación tiene una vasta historia que la ha hecho transitar por diferentes posturas epistemológicas, pragmáticas y ontológicas, situación que ha enriquecido su acervo teórico y práctico. La filosofía es, entre otras, una de las ciencias en las que se ha apoyado la educación parar reflexionar sobre su ser y su hacer. Especialmente, uno de estos sustentos actuales es el pensamiento filosófico sobre el diálogo, que ha ayudado a fortalecer lacorriente de la educación dialógica tanto desde su aporte como desde su crítica, aspectos inherentes a la reflexión filosófica. Sin embargo, es evidente que esta corriente de la educación no ha considerado lo suficiente la postura de la mayéutica socrática en su reflexión. Por ello, este artículo tiene como objetivo proponer unos elementos a laeducación dialógica desde el estudio de la mayéutica socrática, para lo cual se utiliza una metodología de enfoque cualitativo y de corte hermenéutico. Los principales resultados de la investigación muestran que la educación dialógica amplía su horizonte desde los supuestos socráticos de la mayéutica en dos aspectos particulares: en primer lugar, la mayéutica invita a recuperar la pregunta y la capacidad de preguntarse, y, en segundo lugar, demuestra que el conocimiento para ser significativo debe ser una conquista y un descubrimiento del propioestudiante mediado por el diálogo consigo mismo, con los otros y con lo otro.

The condemnation of Socrates by the city of Athens, as well as the compliance of the philosopher, are a constant ground in the research task of multiple academics. Before the most classical readings, which focus on the political response of a defeated Athens or on the instructive will of the wise, the interpretation of Socrates appears as a sacrificial victim. This article analyses the teaching around evil and ignorance, concepts inevitably linked by the Platonic literature, which is born from this interpretation., La condena de Sócrates por la ciudad de Atenas, así como el acatamiento del filósofo, son un terreno constante en la tarea investigadora de múltiples académicos. Ante las lecturas más clásicas, que ponen el foco en la respuesta política de una Atenas vencida o en la voluntad aleccionante del sabio, aparece la interpretación de Sócrates como víctima sacrificial. El presente artículo analiza la enseñanza en torno al mal y la ignorancia, conceptos inevitablemente hermanados por la literatura platónica, que nace de esta interpretación.

I lay out the charge of the “Socratic fallacy” as originally presented in Peter Geach’s 1966 paper, and discuss more recent presentations of the challenge in the form of the "Priority of Definition" principle. I advance the thesis that Plato’s Socrates is primarily committed to a methodological principle (not an epistemological one), the Principle of Controversy. Further, I identify two attendant assumptions (M and E) that are background commitments for Plato’s Socrates. Together these explain some of the inconsistencies or tensions some commentators have suggested in early platonic epistemology, and encapsulate the method and interests of the Socrates we see in the definitional dialogues.

Este artigo tem o objetivo de expor a contra doutrina dionisíaca ao otimismo a partir da discussão sobre a interpretação que o filósofo Friedrich Nietzsche faz de Sócrates no livro O nascimento da tragédia. Nossa discussão traz em perspectiva a crítica nietzschiana ao denominado socratismo estético, o qual coloca a filosofia socrática longe da sua proposta para o dionisíaco na arte. Para tanto, reconstruímos os argumentos de Nietzsche e investigamos o alcance dos mesmos, como também apresentamos as considerações de Paul de Man sobre a tensão emergente. Como conclusão, apontamos para a abrangência dos conceitos de pessimismo e otimismo dentro do escopo construído., This paper aims to expose the Dionysian contradoutrine to optimism from the discussion of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates in the book The Birth of Tragedy. Our discussion brings into perspective the Nietzschean critique of the so-called aesthetic Socratism, which places Socratic philosophy far from its proposal for the Dionysian in art. To this end, we reconstruct Nietzsche's arguments and investigate their scope, as well as present Paul de Man's considerations on the emerging tension. As a conclusion, we point to the scope of the concepts of pessimism and optimism within the constructed scope.

La búsqueda y el tratamiento de la valentía han sido llevados a cabo por Platón en numerosos diálogos, desde la temprana Apología hasta las Leyes, lo que indica la gran importancia que el filósofo ateniense concedía a esta cuestión. Por otro lado, la valentía es tratada en numerosos contextos diferentes —con diferentes interlocutores, diferentes temas y diferentes objetivos— que dan lugar a un nutrido número de aproximaciones a partir de las cuales cabe construir una visión bastante completa de lo que Platón entendía por valentía (andreía).

The condemnation of Socrates by the city of Athens, as well as the compliance of the philosopher, are a constant ground in the research task of multiple academics. Before the most classical readings, which focus on the political response of a defeated Athens or on the instructive will of the wise, the interpretation of Socrates appears as a sacrificial victim. This article analyses the teaching around evil and ignorance, concepts inevitably linked by the Platonic literature, which is born from this interpretation., La condena de Sócrates por la ciudad de Atenas, así como el acatamiento del filósofo, son un terreno constante en la tarea investigadora de múltiples académicos. Ante las lecturas más clásicas, que ponen el foco en la respuesta política de una Atenas vencida o en la voluntad aleccionante del sabio, aparece la interpretación de Sócrates como víctima sacrificial. El presente artículo analiza la enseñanza en torno al mal y la ignorancia, conceptos inevitablemente hermanados por la literatura platónica, que nace de esta interpretación.

Socratic questioning in coaching is a dialectic method, whose object is to bring to light the objective ‘truth’ behind a given matter, using questions that unveil what is implicitly known or disentangle the contradictions of a person’s beliefs. This method is central in cognitive-behavioral coaching, and is effectively used in therapeutic, educational, and leadership settings. Given its pragmatic focus, Socratic questioning has been applied on individuals’ specific challenges, goals, and behaviors. However, reflecting on the Socrates persona and the individual and societal challenges of the post-modern society, we suggest that this method could be re-interpreted to serve a twofold, hierarchical purpose in coaching. At the lower-level, and in the short-term, Socratic questioning’s goal is to unfold objective truths over given matters and to guide discovery in the interlocutors, as it helps coachees to overcome specific challenges. However, drawing upon a Third Generation Coaching perspective, we suggest a higher-order, long-term purpose of Socratic questioning. Third Generation Coaching claims that meaningful dialogues are collaborative and co-creative in nature, and emerge when moments of symmetry and resonance are experienced by the dialogue partners. Notably, Socrates practiced boêtheia (partnership) and maieutikós (midwifery) in his dialogues, clearly denoting his ethics’ collaborative and co-creative orientation. Accordingly, the high-order purpose of Socratic questioning is to create partnership, moments of symmetry, and resonance in the dialogue partners, which allows for meaning-making, self-reflection, shared-reflection, and shift in narrators’ perspectives. In this light, Socratic questioning helps fostering long-lasting, value-based personal growth in all dialogue partners.

This article focuses on presenting a new, though paradoxically old, way of understanding philosophy. This is philosophy as an art of living, the paradigmatic example of which can be found in the Socratic figure, that enigmatic character from the 5th century BC who had an impact on humanity not so much for his work than for his life and his way of philosophising. In this article, we will try to understand both the meaning and the value of his philosophy, on the basis of the historian Pierre Hadot's revitalisation of it. Finally, we will see how Philosophical Practice is making space in our times in order to recover this original spirit with which philosophy was born., Este artículo se centra en presentar una nueva forma, aunque paradójicamente antigua, de entender la filosofía. Se trata de la filosofía como arte de vivir, cuyo ejemplo paradigmático lo encontramos en la figura socrática, aquel personaje enigmático del siglo V a. C que impactó a la humanidad no tanto por su obra como por su vida y su forma de filosofar. En este artículo, trataremos de comprender tanto el significado como el valor de su filosofía, partiendo de la revitalización que ha hecho de la misma el historiador Pierre Hadot. Finalmente, veremos cómo la Práctica Filosófica se abre paso en nuestra actualidad con el fin de recuperar este espíritu originario con el que nació la filosofía.

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

Autorka ispituje zašto su određenim piscima komedije, i uopšte onima koji se u svojim spisima služe humorom, ljubitelji mudrosti, jedna od omiljenih i lakih meta. Pored toga, ovaj ogled ima za cilj da pokaže da se stoici, interpretirajući smeh, delom nadovezuju i na Platonove uvide iz Države. Ispostavlja se kako ni Platon ni stoici nisu preterano naklonjeni smešnom, uprkos tome što se služe humorom u svojim delima. Filozofi, naime, prema Platonovom i stoičkom sudu, treba da budu dostojanstveni i iznad poroka. Osim toga, filozofi treba žive u skladu sa svojom filozofijom. Upitno je, međutim, da li filozofi mogu, i da li uspevaju sasvim (ako uopšte) da zadovolje ove kriterijume. Štaviše, doksografska tradicija, ali i drugi pisci, ubeđuju da to nije slučaj, tako što ukazuju na svojevrsni raskorak koji, makar iz njihove perspektive, postoji između teorijske pozicije koju filozofi zastupaju, i načina na koji oni žive. Taj raskorak, koji može da se razume i kao greška, podstiče, izaziva, stavlja u pitanje, a naposletku i (do)vodi do (pod)smeha., In this paper, the author examines why comedy writers, and in general those who use humor in their writings, perceive the philosophers as one of their favorite and easy targets. In addition, we aim to show that the Stoics partially follow Plato’s insights from the Republic in their interpretation of laughter. Neither Plato nor the Stoics have been overly fond of the funny or excessive laughter, even though they use humor and some of the characteristics of comedy in their works. According to Plato’s and the Stoic’ opinion, philosophers should be dignified and reluctant to vice. Moreover, the philosopher should live virtuously and follow their philosophy. However, it is questionable whether philosophers can and whether they succeed in meeting these criteria. The doxographical tradition, including the other writers, is convinced that this is not the case by pointing out a kind of discrepancy that, at least from their perspective, exists between the theoretical position that philosophers advocate and the way they live. This discrepancy can be understood as a mistake. However, this discrepancy could encourage, challenge, question, and ultimately lead to laughter.

El presente artículo pretende mostrar: 1) que la praxis filosófica epicúrea, con sus postulados conceptuales, és en gran medida aceptada por Nietzsche y afines a él; 2) que ese reconocimiento hacia Epicuro tiene que ver con su modelo de vida eudemonista, presentista y menos intelectualizante que el socrático-platónico; 3) que, aun desde la concepción nietzscheana de una cierta filosofía griega en cuanto vía de decadencia antiartística, el quehacer epicúreo se considera un programa de afirmación vital, capaz de soslayar en parte el carácter opresivo de la racionalidad y de conciliar al ser humano con la felicidad y la plenitud corporales. Para ello, se esboza el tratamiento nietzscheano de Sócrates con su doble perspectiva; se estudia la propuesta de cuidado anímico que hizo el maestro de Platón, inspiradora de la filosofía helenística, cuando el griego se convierte en individuo y súbdito y se recluye en sí mismo; se investiga luego la presencia y la doble consideración de Epicuro en las obras de Nietzsche, y se analizan, por último, los rasgos notables del cuidado anímico epicúreo y su recepción valorativa por parte del filósofo alemán, tomando en consideración la filiación socrática y los puntos de convergencia o divergencia que muestran los programas filosóficos del tábano y del samio., Aquest article pretén mostrar: 1) que la praxi filosòfica epicúria, amb els seus postulats conceptuals, són en gran manera acceptats per Nietzsche i afins a ell; 2) que aquest reconeixement cap a Epicur té a veure amb el seu model de vida eudemonista, presentista i menys intel·lectualitzant que el socràtic-platònic; 3) que, fins i tot des de la concepció nietzscheana d'una certa filosofia grega com a via de decadència antiartística, el quefer epicuri es considera un programa d'afirmació vital, capaç de defugir en part el caràcter opressiu de la racionalitat i de conciliar l'ésser humà amb la felicitat i la plenitud corporals. Per fer-ho, s'esbossa el tractament nietzscheà de Sòcrates amb la seva doble perspectiva; s'estudia la proposta de cura anímica que va fer el mestre de Plató, inspiradora de la filosofia hel·lenística, quan el grec es converteix en individu i súbdit i es reclou en si mateix; s'investiga després la presència i la doble consideració d'Epicur en les obres de Nietzsche, i s'analitzen, finalment, els trets notables de la cura anímica epicúria i la seva recepció valorativa per part del filòsof alemany, prenent en consideració la filiació socràtica i els punts de convergència o divergència que mostren els programes filosòfics del tàvec i del de Samos., It is the aim of this paper to show: 1) that the Epicurean philosophical praxis, along with its conceptual postulates, are to a great extent accepted by Nietzsche and akin to him; 2) that this recognition of Epicurus has to do with his eudemonistic-hedonistic, present-centred model of life, which happens to be less intellectualizing than the Socratic- Platonic one; 3) that, besides Nietzsche's conception of a certain Greek philosophy as a path of anti-artistic decadence, the Epicurean endeavour is considered a programme of vital affirmation, capable of partially circumventing the oppressive character of rationality and of reconciling the human being with happiness and bodily plenitude. To this end, the Nietzschean treatment of Socrates is outlined, with its double dimension; afterwards, the Socratic psychotherapeutic proposal is studied; the presence and double consideration of Epicurus in Nietzsche's works is then investigated; finally, the notable features of Epicurean psychotherapy and the evaluative reception that Nietzsche makes of them are analysed, as well as the greater or lesser indebtedness and affinity with its Socratic origin.

Autorka ispituje zašto su određenim piscima komedije, i uopšte onima koji se u svojim spisima služe humorom, ljubitelji mudrosti, jedna od omiljenih i lakih meta. Pored toga, ovaj ogled ima za cilj da pokaže da se stoici, interpretirajući smeh, delom nadovezuju i na Platonove uvide iz Države. Ispostavlja se kako ni Platon ni stoici nisu preterano naklonjeni smešnom, uprkos tome što se služe humorom u svojim delima. Filozofi, naime, prema Platonovom i stoičkom sudu, treba da budu dostojanstveni i iznad poroka. Osim toga, filozofi treba žive u skladu sa svojom filozofijom. Upitno je, međutim, da li filozofi mogu, i da li uspevaju sasvim (ako uopšte) da zadovolje ove kriterijume. Štaviše, doksografska tradicija, ali i drugi pisci, ubeđuju da to nije slučaj, tako što ukazuju na svojevrsni raskorak koji, makar iz njihove perspektive, postoji između teorijske pozicije koju filozofi zastupaju, i načina na koji oni žive. Taj raskorak, koji može da se razume i kao greška, podstiče, izaziva, stavlja u pitanje, a naposletku i (do)vodi do (pod)smeha., In this paper, the author examines why comedy writers, and in general those who use humor in their writings, perceive the philosophers as one of their favorite and easy targets. In addition, we aim to show that the Stoics partially follow Plato’s insights from the Republic in their interpretation of laughter. Neither Plato nor the Stoics have been overly fond of the funny or excessive laughter, even though they use humor and some of the characteristics of comedy in their works. According to Plato’s and the Stoic’ opinion, philosophers should be dignified and reluctant to vice. Moreover, the philosopher should live virtuously and follow their philosophy. However, it is questionable whether philosophers can and whether they succeed in meeting these criteria. The doxographical tradition, including the other writers, is convinced that this is not the case by pointing out a kind of discrepancy that, at least from their perspective, exists between the theoretical position that philosophers advocate and the way they live. This discrepancy can be understood as a mistake. However, this discrepancy could encourage, challenge, question, and ultimately lead to laughter.

Tal y como reza la cita de la Apología platónica que encabeza estas líneas, ya el propio Sócrates habría advertido a sus jueces de que no le iban a tomar en serio al pensar que hablaba de forma irónica, en broma. Pues bien, en este trabajo de tesis doctoral, defenderemos que, hoy por hoy, esa advertencia sigue vigente; que sigue siendo necesario tomar a Sócrates en serio, pensar que no habló irónicamente y todo ello asumiendo expresamente los postulados de la hermenéutica gadameriana. Unos postulados a los que nos referimos en el apartado inicial: “Introducción y cuestiones metodológicas” y según los cuales cabe conocer, desde nuestro propio horizonte de praxis, lo que la tradición nos dice en su sentido propio y diferente, si bien hemos de ser conscientes de la posible aplicación de prejuicios no percibidos, ocultos, que pueden volvernos sordos a eso que la tradición nos dice., Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Doctorado en Filosofía

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

Decadence is typically associated with a fall from, or an opposition to, ideals of civilization. Western Civilization traditionally traces its roots to the culture of Ancient Greece. While theorists of periodicity from Vico to Nietzsche and Deleuze, to Hayden White and other contemporary scholars, associate decadence with excess, artificiality and over-indulgence, they also recognize that decadence often incorporates pre-civilized, base or “Other” tendencies. Paradoxically, decadence as a degeneration of an original culture’s values can also rejuvenate that culture’s core values through mutation so that a new version of the original culture arises. In literature, degeneration has also been associated with the master trope of irony. Throughout ages when language fails to capture reality, or reality and ideals clash in other ways, irony results. Self-consciousness, for example, is inherently ironic, and could be set in contrast to “Golden Age” literature, in which master tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche dominate. Perhaps one of the first instances of a decadent character in Western literature was Plato’s Socrates, whose irony appears throughout the Dialogues as dissembling. If this is one of Socrates’ key characteristics, could it be why philosophy has been categorized as pre- and post-Socratic? Here I examine how Socratic irony relates to degenerative aspects of Greek society; better determine what we mean by the “Western” tradition that is supposed to have begun during the fifth century; and suggest that a society, a literature, or an individual must encounter an affirmative or positive irony to turn from degeneration to regeneration.

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

Tal y como reza la cita de la Apología platónica que encabeza estas líneas, ya el propio Sócrates habría advertido a sus jueces de que no le iban a tomar en serio al pensar que hablaba de forma irónica, en broma. Pues bien, en este trabajo de tesis doctoral, defenderemos que, hoy por hoy, esa advertencia sigue vigente; que sigue siendo necesario tomar a Sócrates en serio, pensar que no habló irónicamente y todo ello asumiendo expresamente los postulados de la hermenéutica gadameriana. Unos postulados a los que nos referimos en el apartado inicial: “Introducción y cuestiones metodológicas” y según los cuales cabe conocer, desde nuestro propio horizonte de praxis, lo que la tradición nos dice en su sentido propio y diferente, si bien hemos de ser conscientes de la posible aplicación de prejuicios no percibidos, ocultos, que pueden volvernos sordos a eso que la tradición nos dice., Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Doctorado en Filosofía

El artículo se acerca a la pensadora Hannah Arendt a través de dos figuras presentes en su vida y en su obra: Rosa Luxemburgo y Sócrates. La infancia y adolescencia de Arendt transcurren en un ambiente de implicación política cuyo eje central era la admiración por la figura de Rosa Luxemburgo. Martha Arendt, madre de Hannah, fue la primera fuente de transmisión de los ideales de Rosa Luxemburgo a su hija, y dentro de estos ideales la libertad ocupaba un lugar central. Sócrates, por su parte, constituye para la autora el paradigma de la persona que piensa, que dialoga tanto consigo mismo como con los otros., The article approaches the thinker of Hannah Arendt through two figures present in her life and in her work: Rosa Luxemburg and Socrates. Arendt’s childhood and adolescence take place in an environment of political involvement whose central axis was admiration for the figure of Rosa Luxemburg. Marta Arendt, Hannah’s mother, was the first source of transmisión of Rosa Luxemburg’s ideals to her daughter, and within these ideals, freedom occupied a central place. Socrates, for his part, constitutes for the author the paradigm of the person who thinks, who dialogues both with himself and with others.

The article departs from the analysis about the problem of evil in Camus, in dialogue with the answers given by the Greek gnosticism and the Christianity. In this context we speak about the failure of the theodicies, example of what Camus considers the «metaphysical rebellion». Next, we think about two existential categories (time and silence) which constitute counter-arguments faced with the condemnation of the human nature from the most orthodox versions of the Christianity and the rationalist philosophies. Camus makes an anthropodicy speech whose main idea is a humanist, transforming rebellion, limited in its praxis and aspirations for moral values generated by itself, which confer a relative sense to the existence. The article ends with a reflection about education as a powerful resource of social transformation., El artículo parte del análisis camusiano del problema del mal, en diálogo con las respuestas dadas por el Gnosticismo griego y el cristianismo. En este contexto, se habla del fracaso de las teodiceas, ejemplificaciones de lo que Camus considera la «rebeldía metafísica». A continuación, se reflexiona sobre dos categorías existenciales (el tiempo y el silencio), que constituyen contraargumentos ante la condena de la naturaleza humana por parte de las versiones más ortodoxas del cristianismo y las filosofías racionalistas. Camus construye una antropodicea cuyo eje está en una rebeldía humanista y transformadora, limitada en su praxis y aspiraciones por valores morales que ella misma genera y que confieren un sentido relativo a la existencia. El artículo finaliza con una reflexión en torno a la educación como poderoso instrumento de transformación social.

El artículo se acerca a la pensadora Hannah Arendt a través de dos figuras presentes en su vida y en su obra: Rosa Luxemburgo y Sócrates. La infancia y adolescencia de Arendt transcurren en un ambiente de implicación política cuyo eje central era la admiración por la figura de Rosa Luxemburgo. Martha Arendt, madre de Hannah, fue la primera fuente de transmisión de los ideales de Rosa Luxemburgo a su hija, y dentro de estos ideales la libertad ocupaba un lugar central. Sócrates, por su parte, constituye para la autora el paradigma de la persona que piensa, que dialoga tanto consigo mismo como con los otros., The article approaches the thinker of Hannah Arendt through two figures present in her life and in her work: Rosa Luxemburg and Socrates. Arendt’s childhood and adolescence take place in an environment of political involvement whose central axis was admiration for the figure of Rosa Luxemburg. Marta Arendt, Hannah’s mother, was the first source of transmisión of Rosa Luxemburg’s ideals to her daughter, and within these ideals, freedom occupied a central place. Socrates, for his part, constitutes for the author the paradigm of the person who thinks, who dialogues both with himself and with others.

Tal y como reza la cita de la Apología platónica que encabeza estas líneas, ya el propio Sócrates habría advertido a sus jueces de que no le iban a tomar en serio al pensar que hablaba de forma irónica, en broma. Pues bien, en este trabajo de tesis doctoral, defenderemos que, hoy por hoy, esa advertencia sigue vigente; que sigue siendo necesario tomar a Sócrates en serio, pensar que no habló irónicamente y todo ello asumiendo expresamente los postulados de la hermenéutica gadameriana. Unos postulados a los que nos referimos en el apartado inicial: “Introducción y cuestiones metodológicas” y según los cuales cabe conocer, desde nuestro propio horizonte de praxis, lo que la tradición nos dice en su sentido propio y diferente, si bien hemos de ser conscientes de la posible aplicación de prejuicios no percibidos, ocultos, que pueden volvernos sordos a eso que la tradición nos dice., Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Doctorado en Filosofía

The article focuses on Nietzsche's philosophy of antagonisms to seek its formative repercussions considering art, science and education. The agonistic model present in Nietzsche's work is taken as the defining factor for assessing the subtleties of philosophical clashes, especially the dispute with Socrates. In the dispute dynamics, the power of praise, criticismand also self-criticism. This philosophical soil connects with the pedagogical soil, giving rise to methods of analysis and practice that configure a possible agonic education. In these terms, the educational dispute rescues vitality through the genealogical method that aims to discuss invention, discovery, explanation and interpretation considering the arrangement of concepts to contest their ontological immutability and generate new guidance in epistemological terms. Bewilling to think with Nietzsche, without necessarily abandoning Socrates, would imply reflecting on how the excess of fixity brought about by our pedagogical inventions has prevented more robust discoveries to make another education happen. It will be necessary, before all,to question the value of the truth that still reigns among us in order to bring the Nietzschean project of transvaluing all values to its final consequences., O artigo debruça-se sobre a filosofia dos antagonismos de Nietzsche para buscar suas repercussões formativas considerando a arte, ciência e a educação. O modelo agonístico presente na obra de Nietzsche é tomado como definidor para as apreciações das sutilezas dos embates filosóficos, especialmente a disputa com Sócrates. Na dinâmica da disputa,a potência do elogio, da crítica e também de uma autocrítica. Este solo filosófico conecta-se com o solo pedagógico,fazendo surgir métodos de análise e de prática que configuram uma possível educação agônica. Nestes termos,a disputa educativa resgata uma vitalidade por meio do método genealógico que visa discutir invenção, descoberta, explicação e interpretação considerando o arranjo dos conceitos para contestar sua imutabilidade ontológicae gerar nova orientação em termos epistemológicos. Mostrar disposição em pensar com Nietzsche, sem necessariamente abandonar Sócrates, implicaria refletir sobrecomo o excesso defixidez instaurada pornossas invenções pedagógicas têm impedido descobertas mais robustas para fazer acontecer outra educação. Será necessário antes questionar o valor da verdade que ainda reina entre nós para levar às últimas consequências o projeto nietzschiano de transvaloração de todos os valores., El artículo se centra en la filosofía de antagonismos de Nietzsche para buscar sus repercusiones formativas teniendo en cuenta el arte, la ciencia y la educación. El modelo agonista presente en el trabajo de Nietzsche se toma como un factor definitorio para la evaluación de las sutilezas de los enfrentamientos filosóficos, especialmente la disputa con Sócrates. En la dinámica de disputa, el poder de la alabanza, la crítica y también la autocrítica. Este suelo filosófico se conecta con el suelo pedagógico, dando lugar a métodos de análisis y práctica que configuran una posible educación agónica. En estos términos, la disputa educativa rescata la vitalidad a través del método genealógico que tiene como objetivo discutir la invención, el descubrimiento, la explicación y la interpretación considerando la disposición de los conceptos para impugnar su inmutabilidad ontológica y generar una nueva orientación en términos epistemológicos. Mostrar disposición para pensar con Nietzsche, sin abandonar necesariamente a Sócrates, implicaría reflexionar sobre cómo el exceso de fijación provocado por nuestros inventos pedagógicos ha impedido descubrimientos más sólidos para que otra educación suceda. Más bien, será necesario cuestionar el valor de la verdad que aún reina entre nosotros para llevar el proyecto nietzscheano de transvaluar todos los valores a sus últimas consecuencias.

The article intends to reach some philosophical outcomes that can be extracted from the interpretationsof the German philosophers J. G. Hamann and F. Nietzsche related to the figure of Socrates. Both paidattention to the problem of knowledge and the place of reason in Socratic philosophy, noting that his way ofthinking fostered relevant cultural reform programs. Although both their attitude towards the Greek andassessments are different, for both authors thinks in the ancient philosopher allowed them to outline acritical insight to their own time, and to performs the idea of philosopher from which they work, El artículo se propone examinar los rendimientos filosóficos a que pueden dar lugar las interpretaciones que realizan los filósofos alemanes J. G. Hamann y F. Nietzsche con relación a la figura de Sócrates. Ambas propuestas atienden al problema del conocimiento y al lugar de la razón en la filosofía socrática, advirtiendo que este modo de pensamiento alienta importantes programas de reformas culturales. Si bien en ambos casos la actitud frente al griego y su valoración es diferente, se sostiene que para los autores el reflexionar en torno al filósofo antiguo posibilita esbozar una crítica a su tiempo y moldear la figura del filósofo alrededor de la cual ambos enmarcan su producción intelectual.

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

In this work I aim to present an analysis based on Derrida’s reading of the Platonic Phaedrus in his essay La pharmacie de Platon. In three sections, Derrida elaborates on the concepts of phármakon, pharmakeus and pharmakós. However, it seems that the concept of phármakon is presented as a hierarchical phenomenon compared to the other two concepts. The richness of this term lies in its ambiguity and impossibility to be translated, since it has a double “nature”: that of poison and that of remedy. I am interested in showing that, despite the “undecidability”, polysemy and inability to be translated of the phármakon, there are reasons to think that the pharmakós, a word never used by Plato (and nevertheless not absent in his work) is the other side of the phármakon. The pharmakós is known as the “scapegoat” in ancient Greece. It is a subject who, as part of a communal Greek purification ritual, is expelled from the city in order to erradicate the evils that afflict it. I therefore seek to rescue the importance of the pharmakós, embodied in the character of Socrates, understood as a parasitic existence that, through the phármakon, is eliminated from the city., Este trabajo apunta a realizar un análisis a partir de la lectura de Derrida del Fedro platónico en su ensayo La pharmacie de Platon. En tres apartados, Derrida trabaja los conceptos de phármakon, pharmakeus y pharmakós. No obstante, pareciera que el concepto de phármakon se presenta como un fenómeno jerárquico frente a los otros dos términos. La riqueza de este concepto radica en su ambigüedad e imposibilidad para ser traducido, ya que cuenta con una doble ‘naturaleza’: la de veneno y la de remedio. Nos interesa mostrar que, a pesar de la indecibilidad, polisemia e intraducibilidad del concepto de phármakon, existen razones para pensar al pharmakós, concepto que Platón no utiliza en su obra, pero que no por eso se encuentra ausente, como la otra cara del phármakon. El pharmakós es conocido como el ‘chivo expiatorio’, aquel sujeto que, como parte de un ritual de purificación comunitaria propio de la religión griega, se expulsa de la ciudad para extirpar los males que la aquejan. Se busca, entonces, rescatar la importancia del pharmakós, encarnada en la figura de Sócrates, entendida como una existencia parasitaria que, por medio del phármakon, se elimina de la ciudad.

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

El artículo se acerca a la pensadora Hannah Arendt a través de dos figuras presentes en su vida y en su obra: Rosa Luxemburgo y Sócrates. La infancia y adolescencia de Arendt transcurren en un ambiente de implicación política cuyo eje central era la admiración por la figura de Rosa Luxemburgo. Martha Arendt, madre de Hannah, fue la primera fuente de transmisión de los ideales de Rosa Luxemburgo a su hija, y dentro de estos ideales la libertad ocupaba un lugar central. Sócrates, por su parte, constituye para la autora el paradigma de la persona que piensa, que dialoga tanto consigo mismo como con los otros., The article approaches the thinker of Hannah Arendt through two figures present in her life and in her work: Rosa Luxemburg and Socrates. Arendt’s childhood and adolescence take place in an environment of political involvement whose central axis was admiration for the figure of Rosa Luxemburg. Marta Arendt, Hannah’s mother, was the first source of transmisión of Rosa Luxemburg’s ideals to her daughter, and within these ideals, freedom occupied a central place. Socrates, for his part, constitutes for the author the paradigm of the person who thinks, who dialogues both with himself and with others.

Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad., The following paper contends that Plato’s philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato’s authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates’ dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city.

The article departs from the analysis about the problem of evil in Camus, in dialogue with the answers given by the Greek gnosticism and the Christianity. In this context we speak about the failure of the theodicies, example of what Camus considers the «metaphysical rebellion». Next, we think about two existential categories (time and silence) which constitute counter-arguments faced with the condemnation of the human nature from the most orthodox versions of the Christianity and the rationalist philosophies. Camus makes an anthropodicy speech whose main idea is a humanist, transforming rebellion, limited in its praxis and aspirations for moral values generated by itself, which confer a relative sense to the existence. The article ends with a reflection about education as a powerful resource of social transformation., El artículo parte del análisis camusiano del problema del mal, en diálogo con las respuestas dadas por el Gnosticismo griego y el cristianismo. En este contexto, se habla del fracaso de las teodiceas, ejemplificaciones de lo que Camus considera la «rebeldía metafísica». A continuación, se reflexiona sobre dos categorías existenciales (el tiempo y el silencio), que constituyen contraargumentos ante la condena de la naturaleza humana por parte de las versiones más ortodoxas del cristianismo y las filosofías racionalistas. Camus construye una antropodicea cuyo eje está en una rebeldía humanista y transformadora, limitada en su praxis y aspiraciones por valores morales que ella misma genera y que confieren un sentido relativo a la existencia. El artículo finaliza con una reflexión en torno a la educación como poderoso instrumento de transformación social.

Autorka ispituje zašto su određenim piscima komedije, i uopšte onima koji se u svojim spisima služe humorom, ljubitelji mudrosti, jedna od omiljenih i lakih meta. Pored toga, ovaj ogled ima za cilj da pokaže da se stoici, interpretirajući smeh, delom nadovezuju i na Platonove uvide iz Države. Ispostavlja se kako ni Platon ni stoici nisu preterano naklonjeni smešnom, uprkos tome što se služe humorom u svojim delima. Filozofi, naime, prema Platonovom i stoičkom sudu, treba da budu dostojanstveni i iznad poroka. Osim toga, filozofi treba žive u skladu sa svojom filozofijom. Upitno je, međutim, da li filozofi mogu, i da li uspevaju sasvim (ako uopšte) da zadovolje ove kriterijume. Štaviše, doksografska tradicija, ali i drugi pisci, ubeđuju da to nije slučaj, tako što ukazuju na svojevrsni raskorak koji, makar iz njihove perspektive, postoji između teorijske pozicije koju filozofi zastupaju, i načina na koji oni žive. Taj raskorak, koji može da se razume i kao greška, podstiče, izaziva, stavlja u pitanje, a naposletku i (do)vodi do (pod)smeha., In this paper, the author examines why comedy writers, and in general those who use humor in their writings, perceive the philosophers as one of their favorite and easy targets. In addition, we aim to show that the Stoics partially follow Plato’s insights from the Republic in their interpretation of laughter. Neither Plato nor the Stoics have been overly fond of the funny or excessive laughter, even though they use humor and some of the characteristics of comedy in their works. According to Plato’s and the Stoic’ opinion, philosophers should be dignified and reluctant to vice. Moreover, the philosopher should live virtuously and follow their philosophy. However, it is questionable whether philosophers can and whether they succeed in meeting these criteria. The doxographical tradition, including the other writers, is convinced that this is not the case by pointing out a kind of discrepancy that, at least from their perspective, exists between the theoretical position that philosophers advocate and the way they live. This discrepancy can be understood as a mistake. However, this discrepancy could encourage, challenge, question, and ultimately lead to laughter.

Plato emphasized the importance of physical education for soul development in his book ‘Phaedo’, which Socrates shunned for the same reason. Plato emphasized the physical component and the harmonious balance of the material and spiritual in his books ‘Republic’ and ‘Laws’. In his book ‘Politics’, Aristotle defined three elements of excellent education, the first of which was physical health. In this framework, sports and physical education should take precedence.

Plato emphasized the importance of physical education for soul development in his book ‘Phaedo’, which Socrates shunned for the same reason. Plato emphasized the physical component and the harmonious balance of the material and spiritual in his books ‘Republic’ and ‘Laws’. In his book ‘Politics’, Aristotle defined three elements of excellent education, the first of which was physical health. In this framework, sports and physical education should take precedence.

Autorka ispituje zašto su određenim piscima komedije, i uopšte onima koji se u svojim spisima služe humorom, ljubitelji mudrosti, jedna od omiljenih i lakih meta. Pored toga, ovaj ogled ima za cilj da pokaže da se stoici, interpretirajući smeh, delom nadovezuju i na Platonove uvide iz Države. Ispostavlja se kako ni Platon ni stoici nisu preterano naklonjeni smešnom, uprkos tome što se služe humorom u svojim delima. Filozofi, naime, prema Platonovom i stoičkom sudu, treba da budu dostojanstveni i iznad poroka. Osim toga, filozofi treba žive u skladu sa svojom filozofijom. Upitno je, međutim, da li filozofi mogu, i da li uspevaju sasvim (ako uopšte) da zadovolje ove kriterijume. Štaviše, doksografska tradicija, ali i drugi pisci, ubeđuju da to nije slučaj, tako što ukazuju na svojevrsni raskorak koji, makar iz njihove perspektive, postoji između teorijske pozicije koju filozofi zastupaju, i načina na koji oni žive. Taj raskorak, koji može da se razume i kao greška, podstiče, izaziva, stavlja u pitanje, a naposletku i (do)vodi do (pod)smeha., In this paper, the author examines why comedy writers, and in general those who use humor in their writings, perceive the philosophers as one of their favorite and easy targets. In addition, we aim to show that the Stoics partially follow Plato’s insights from the Republic in their interpretation of laughter. Neither Plato nor the Stoics have been overly fond of the funny or excessive laughter, even though they use humor and some of the characteristics of comedy in their works. According to Plato’s and the Stoic’ opinion, philosophers should be dignified and reluctant to vice. Moreover, the philosopher should live virtuously and follow their philosophy. However, it is questionable whether philosophers can and whether they succeed in meeting these criteria. The doxographical tradition, including the other writers, is convinced that this is not the case by pointing out a kind of discrepancy that, at least from their perspective, exists between the theoretical position that philosophers advocate and the way they live. This discrepancy can be understood as a mistake. However, this discrepancy could encourage, challenge, question, and ultimately lead to laughter.

Decadence is typically associated with a fall from, or an opposition to, ideals of civilization. Western Civilization traditionally traces its roots to the culture of Ancient Greece. While theorists of periodicity from Vico to Nietzsche and Deleuze, to Hayden White and other contemporary scholars, associate decadence with excess, artificiality and over-indulgence, they also recognize that decadence often incorporates pre-civilized, base or “Other” tendencies. Paradoxically, decadence as a degeneration of an original culture’s values can also rejuvenate that culture’s core values through mutation so that a new version of the original culture arises. In literature, degeneration has also been associated with the master trope of irony. Throughout ages when language fails to capture reality, or reality and ideals clash in other ways, irony results. Self-consciousness, for example, is inherently ironic, and could be set in contrast to “Golden Age” literature, in which master tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche dominate. Perhaps one of the first instances of a decadent character in Western literature was Plato’s Socrates, whose irony appears throughout the Dialogues as dissembling. If this is one of Socrates’ key characteristics, could it be why philosophy has been categorized as pre- and post-Socratic? Here I examine how Socratic irony relates to degenerative aspects of Greek society; better determine what we mean by the “Western” tradition that is supposed to have begun during the fifth century; and suggest that a society, a literature, or an individual must encounter an affirmative or positive irony to turn from degeneration to regeneration.

La educación es un problema esencial de la filosofía porque la filosofía es razón práctica, educación del alma. La educación tradicional se ha basado en el enseñar, es decir, en el profesor y en los contenidos que explica. Pero la pedagogía socrática se centra en el alumno y en el aprender. En esta praxis educativa sin embargo la función del maestro es primordial. Tiene que enseñar al alumno a aprender por sí mismo, desde dentro. Su papel es ayudar al alumno a descubrir los contenidos, en vez de dárselos directamente desde fuera. Para ello el maestro tiene que convertir la pregunta en método pedagógico. Pero entonces enseñar es más difícil que aprender. Contra el intelectualismo, el fundamento de esta pedagogía es una comprensión más práctica y vitalista del saber., Education is an essential problem of philosophy because philosophy is practical reason, education of the soul. Traditional education has been based on teaching, that is, on the teacher and the contents that explains. But Socratic pedagogy focuses on the student and learning. In this educational practice, however, the role of the teacher is primordial. He has to teach the student to learn by himself, from within. His role is to help the student to discover the contents, instead of giving them directly from outside. To do this, the teacher has to convert the question into a pedagogical method. But then teaching is more difficult than learning. Against intellect vitalist understanding of knowledge.

La educación es un problema esencial de la filosofía porque la filosofía es razón práctica, educación del alma. La educación tradicional se ha basado en el enseñar, es decir, en el profesor y en los contenidos que explica. Pero la pedagogía socrática se centra en el alumno y en el aprender. En esta praxis educativa sin embargo la función del maestro es primordial. Tiene que enseñar al alumno a aprender por sí mismo, desde dentro. Su papel es ayudar al alumno a descubrir los contenidos, en vez de dárselos directamente desde fuera. Para ello el maestro tiene que convertir la pregunta en método pedagógico. Pero entonces enseñar es más difícil que aprender. Contra el intelectualismo, el fundamento de esta pedagogía es una comprensión más práctica y vitalista del saber., Education is an essential problem of philosophy because philosophy is practical reason, education of the soul. Traditional education has been based on teaching, that is, on the teacher and the contents that explains. But Socratic pedagogy focuses on the student and learning. In this educational practice, however, the role of the teacher is primordial. He has to teach the student to learn by himself, from within. His role is to help the student to discover the contents, instead of giving them directly from outside. To do this, the teacher has to convert the question into a pedagogical method. But then teaching is more difficult than learning. Against intellect vitalist understanding of knowledge.

The paper discusses the difference between philosophy and sophistry. More precisely, it discusses the differences between Socrates and Sophists of the first generation, as well as the differences between Epictetus and Sophists of both first and second generation. While Sophists were the first professional teachers and Epictetus one of the greatest Stoic teachers of all times, Socrates, according to Plato, denied being a teacher by any means, despite many who thought otherwise. Sophists were known for their speeches that most attracted those with a wish to be successful politicians. Socrates and Epictetus were also excellent orators surrounded by Athenian and Roman politicians. However, that didn't make them Sophists. Socrates and Epictetus opted for a life in accordance with excellence (virtue) that could be achieved by philosophy rather than rhetoric. Rhetoric could only have instrumental value, not an intrinsic one.

According to Socrates, as he is described in Plato’s Phaedo, the definition of a true philosopher is a wise man who is continuously practicing dying and being dead. Already in this life, the philosopher tries to free his soul from the body in order to acquire true knowledge as the soul is progressively becoming detached from the body. Centuries after it was written, Plato’s Phaedo continued to play a role for some early Christian authors, and this article focuses on three instances where Christian women mirror Socrates and/or his definition of philosophy. We find these instances in hagiographical literature from the fourth and fifth centuries at different locations in the Roman Empire – in the Lives of Macrina, Marcella and Syncletica. These texts are all to varying degrees impacted by Platonic philosophy and by the ideal of the male philosopher Socrates. As women mastering philosophy, they widened common cultural expectations for women, revealing how Christian authors in certain contexts ascribed authority to female figures., Prema Sokratu, opisanog u Platonovom Fedonu, definicija pravog filozofa je mudar čovek koji kontinuirano vežba umiranje i smrt. Već u ovom životu filozof pokušava da oslobodi svoju dušu od tela, kako bi stekao istinsko znanje kako se duša progresivno odvaja od tela. Veko-vima nakon što je napisan, Platonov Fedon nije prestao da igra značajnu ulogu za neke ra-nohrišćanske autore, a ovaj članak se fokusira na tri slučaja u kojima hrišćanske žene opo-našalje Sokrata i / ili njegovu definiciju filozofije. Ove slučajeve nalazimo u hagiografskoj literaturi iz četvrtog i petog veka na različitim lokacijama u Rimskom carstvu - u žitijima Ma-krine, Markele i Sinkletike. Sve ove žene su, na manje ili više direktne načine i prema različi-tim strategijama u vezi sa uticajem paganske filozofije na hrišćanstvo, pod uticajem platon-ske filosofije i muškog filozofa Sokrata. Kao žene koje se usavršavaju u filozofiji, one šire zajednička kulturna očekivanja ostalim ženama i otkrivaju kako su hrišćanski autori u odre-đenim kontekstima pripisivali autoritet ženskim figurama.

The presence of some “Socrates” in the Ramon Llull’s "Declaratio" suggests a possible Lulian synthesis of the medieval reception of this personality from ancient philosophy, which is reflected in his behavior during this dialogue. Socrates was known among medieval masters as the founder of philosophy and ethics. He was described both in philosophical and historical works and in a considerable tradition of sentences and anecdotes from different traditions such as Arabic and vernacular. Besides, there are images of Socrates devoted to the medieval art of text transcription or dialectical exercises. Those examples will be displayed in the Lullian work, and they show Llull’s concern on ancient philosophy and its ideal of philosopher “Christianized” by the Middle Ages., La aparición de un tal “Sócrates” en la "Declaratio" de Ramon Llull sugiere una posible síntesis luliana de la recepción medieval de este personaje de la filosofía antigua, reflejada en el comportamiento de este personaje durante el diálogo que muestra esta obra. Sócrates conocido por los medievales como el fundador de la filosofía y la ética fue descrito tanto en obras filosóficas e históricas, como en una larga tradición de sentencias, hechos y anécdotas que provienen de distintas tradiciones como la árabe y vernácula. Además, existen imágenes de un Sócrates dedicado al arte medieval de la trascripción de textos o en un ejercicio dialéctico. Estos ejemplos se verán reflejados en la obra luliana y mostrarán el interés de Llull por la filosofía antigua y un ideal de filósofo “cristianizado” por los medievales.

This thesis poses the question ‘What is the critique of democracy in Plato’s Republic?’ It is not the first to do so. But contrary to standard readings, this thesis does not assume neither epistemological nor elitist explanations. Rather, it sees the Kallipolis, ‘the beautiful city in words’ as predicated on a particular anthropology. This theory of human nature, which claims that it is human to be greedy for wealth, sex, and power is contributed by Glaucon, Socrates’ main interlocutor in the dialogue. Noting this, the argument of this thesis makes the following interpretational claims about the Republic: First, I claim that the Kallipolis should be read as an answer to the following question: What would a just city look like given the anthropology of Glaucon? The second claim informing this thesis is the following: Reading the Republic itself as challenging this anthropology, the function of the anthropology it provides is not so much a positive theory of human nature as it is revealing of what Glaucon, in most regards a paradigmatic Athenian citizen, thinks is human nature. His ideas and character are thus central to my reading of the Republic. What has this got to do with democracy? Glaucon’s beliefs, ideas, and his character can not be understood without reference to the society which has produced him, that is, the democratic polis of Ancient Athens. This premise is inserted by the city-soul analogy, a central tenet of the argument of the Republic. As this thesis argues, the tripartite soul provides an explanatory model which accounts for why and how the human soul is moldable and plastic. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the issue of akrasia, by that it based on this interpretation becomes possible to say that cases of akrasia, – breakdowns of rationality – differ in its causes like the souls of humans differ in their internal constitutions: Humans, the Republic postulates, simply attribute different weight to different reasons, depending on what part of

The study of the phenomenon of religion is a field that has many challenges regarding what its object of study is and how to observe and interpret the different religious phenomenon in a way that reflects both its origin and how its practiced. The study is carried out through a philosophical approach. In this essay Lua Nazerian intends to address the four different theoretical perspectives: Critical Religion Theory, Cognitive Sciences of Religion, Positive Psychology and Platonic Idealism. The two former ones are well established theoretical frameworks in the study of religion, while the two latter ones are lend from the field of psychology and philosophy to test whether they could be used as analytical tools in the study of religion. Moreover the perspectives different view on the human nature in particular are further examined through the lens of the subcategories: Materialism, Conceptualism and Realism. Furthermore, by adding the two subcategories of 1) a virtuous life 2) transcendence, the essay examines whether the perspectives touches on these topics which seems to be central concepts in the majority of religious doctrine. Finally, some possible conclusions of the perspectives inherent premises impacting the understanding of religion are carefully examined and presented. Suggested further studies to be done cross-disciplines, such as religious studies, positive psychology and philosophy. Also by a combination of descriptive and prescriptive approach within religious studies.

This thesis poses the question ‘What is the critique of democracy in Plato’s Republic?’ It is not the first to do so. But contrary to standard readings, this thesis does not assume neither epistemological nor elitist explanations. Rather, it sees the Kallipolis, ‘the beautiful city in words’ as predicated on a particular anthropology. This theory of human nature, which claims that it is human to be greedy for wealth, sex, and power is contributed by Glaucon, Socrates’ main interlocutor in the dialogue. Noting this, the argument of this thesis makes the following interpretational claims about the Republic: First, I claim that the Kallipolis should be read as an answer to the following question: What would a just city look like given the anthropology of Glaucon? The second claim informing this thesis is the following: Reading the Republic itself as challenging this anthropology, the function of the anthropology it provides is not so much a positive theory of human nature as it is revealing of what Glaucon, in most regards a paradigmatic Athenian citizen, thinks is human nature. His ideas and character are thus central to my reading of the Republic. What has this got to do with democracy? Glaucon’s beliefs, ideas, and his character can not be understood without reference to the society which has produced him, that is, the democratic polis of Ancient Athens. This premise is inserted by the city-soul analogy, a central tenet of the argument of the Republic. As this thesis argues, the tripartite soul provides an explanatory model which accounts for why and how the human soul is moldable and plastic. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the issue of akrasia, by that it based on this interpretation becomes possible to say that cases of akrasia, – breakdowns of rationality – differ in its causes like the souls of humans differ in their internal constitutions: Humans, the Republic postulates, simply attribute different weight to different reasons, depending on what part of

La educación es un problema esencial de la filosofía porque la filosofía es razón práctica, educación del alma. La educación tradicional se ha basado en el enseñar, es decir, en el profesor y en los contenidos que explica. Pero la pedagogía socrática se centra en el alumno y en el aprender. En esta praxis educativa sin embargo la función del maestro es primordial. Tiene que enseñar al alumno a aprender por sí mismo, desde dentro. Su papel es ayudar al alumno a descubrir los contenidos, en vez de dárselos directamente desde fuera. Para ello el maestro tiene que convertir la pregunta en método pedagógico. Pero entonces enseñar es más difícil que aprender. Contra el intelectualismo, el fundamento de esta pedagogía es una comprensión más práctica y vitalista del saber., Education is an essential problem of philosophy because philosophy is practical reason, education of the soul. Traditional education has been based on teaching, that is, on the teacher and the contents that explains. But Socratic pedagogy focuses on the student and learning. In this educational practice, however, the role of the teacher is primordial. He has to teach the student to learn by himself, from within. His role is to help the student to discover the contents, instead of giving them directly from outside. To do this, the teacher has to convert the question into a pedagogical method. But then teaching is more difficult than learning. Against intellect vitalist understanding of knowledge.

La educación es un problema esencial de la filosofía porque la filosofía es razón práctica, educación del alma. La educación tradicional se ha basado en el enseñar, es decir, en el profesor y en los contenidos que explica. Pero la pedagogía socrática se centra en el alumno y en el aprender. En esta praxis educativa sin embargo la función del maestro es primordial. Tiene que enseñar al alumno a aprender por sí mismo, desde dentro. Su papel es ayudar al alumno a descubrir los contenidos, en vez de dárselos directamente desde fuera. Para ello el maestro tiene que convertir la pregunta en método pedagógico. Pero entonces enseñar es más difícil que aprender. Contra el intelectualismo, el fundamento de esta pedagogía es una comprensión más práctica y vitalista del saber., Education is an essential problem of philosophy because philosophy is practical reason, education of the soul. Traditional education has been based on teaching, that is, on the teacher and the contents that explains. But Socratic pedagogy focuses on the student and learning. In this educational practice, however, the role of the teacher is primordial. He has to teach the student to learn by himself, from within. His role is to help the student to discover the contents, instead of giving them directly from outside. To do this, the teacher has to convert the question into a pedagogical method. But then teaching is more difficult than learning. Against intellect vitalist understanding of knowledge.

In this article I argue that an especial kind of ignorance, of «Socratic» overtones, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. Socrates noted the relevance of a certain type of ignorance in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the epistemic division of labor in society. Firstly, I explain how I understand the so-called «Socratic Ignorance» (SI) as different from what I will call «stubborn ignorance» (SI). Then, I discuss some intellectual vices (such as epistemic arrogance) and the role that intellectual virtues (epistemic humility and autonomy) can have regarding stubborn ignorance as a corrective that has both epistemic and moral implications. This kind of approach can be very helpful for exploiting some assumptions of contemporary social epistemology, according to which the acquisition of knowledge is made from others and with others., En este artículo argumento que un tipo particular de ignorancia, de connotaciones «socráticas», es central para la adquisición de conocimiento dada la estructura epistémica de la sociedad. Sócrates advirtió la relevancia de un cierto tipo de ignorancia en la adquisición de conocimiento y fue consciente de la división del trabajo epistémico en la sociedad. Primero explico la manera en que entiendo la llamada «ignorancia socrática» (IS) como diferente de lo que llamo «ignorancia obstinada» (IO). Luego, discuto algunos vicios intelectuales (como la arrogancia epistémica) y la función que las virtudes intelectuales (la humildad epistémica y la autonomía) pueden tener respecto de la ignorancia obstinada como un correctivo que tiene alcances no sólo epistémicos, sino también morales. Este tipo de enfoque puede ser muy útil para explotar algunos supuestos de la epistemología social contemporánea, según los cuales la adquisición de conocimiento se hace a partir de los demás y con los demás.

The phenomenon of the Socratic dialogue describes how many members of the circle attribute their own ideas to Socrates. This procedure provokes profiles distant from Plato or Xenophon’s variants. In this case, we are interested in the Hedonist Socrates built by Aristippus of Cyrene and his followers. We examine the Cyrenaic obstacles to justify Socrates’ strategy during the trial that was understood at the moment as a choice for death, which results incompatible with hedonistic principles. With this purpose, we will analyse the information from Papyrus Köln 205 that presents a Hedonist Socrates trying to explain his behaviour, and then we will study the elements in the Cyrenaic thought that make it compatible with Aristippus’ ideas. Thus, we will be able to elucidate relevant points of the link between pleasure, happiness and death in the Cyrenaic philosophy., El fenómeno del diálogo socrático describe la adopción por parte de varios integrantes del grupo de la figura de Sócrates, a quien atribuyen sus propias ideas, dando lugar a perfiles alejados de las variantes más conocidas, como las de Platón o Jenofonte. Nos interesa aquí la del Sócrates hedonista que cultivaban Aristipo de Cirene y sus seguidores. En este trabajo examinamos el problema de esta línea para justificar la estrategia adoptada durante el juicio, que el entorno evalúa como una preferencia de la muerte, dado que contraría principios hedonistas. Para ello, analizaremos el material proveniente del Papiro de Colonia 205 que retrata precisamente a un Sócrates hedonista en ocasión de explicar su conducta, y luego estudiaremos qué elementos del pensamiento cirenaico lo hacen compatible con las ideas de Aristipo, lo cual nos permitirá elucidar puntos relevantes de la relación entre placer, felicidad y muerte en la filosofía cirenaica.