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This thesis investigates fan fiction’s intellectual property issues, focusing on its legal status, copyright implications, and potential regulatory frameworks. The research explores the pathways for protecting the rights of original authors and fan fiction creators while fostering creative expression. Key topics include the definition and copyrightability of fan fiction, its potential for copyright infringement, and the application of fair use and licensing schemes. The thesis also examines the role of moral rights under the Berne Convention and the impact of antitrust law on intellectual property protection. By analysing legal precedents and case studies from different jurisdictions, this research recommends establishing a balanced approach to regulating fan fiction that protects original works and encourages creative contributions.

En el presente trabajo se afronta el estudio de la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea de 21 de diciembre de 2023, que resuelve el conocido caso de la Superliga europea de fútbol, en el que se plantea la aplicación de las normas relativas a la libre competencia y a las libertades fundamentales del Tratado a las federaciones deportivas internacionales. La iniciativa que da lugar a la Sentencia, que resuelve una cuestión prejudicial, supone además una ruptura con el denominado «modelo europeo del deporte» y sus caracteres esenciales. Se analiza la Sentencia en su contexto tanto judicial como de ecosistema, esto es, del entorno en que se ha de desarrollar la actividad y sus particularidades. De este modo, podremos aventurar los elementos a tener en cuenta para el futuro y las consecuencias de la Sentencia., We will deal with the study of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of December 21, 2023, which resolves the well-known case of the European Football SuperLeague, dealing with the application of the rules relating to antitrust and the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty to international sports federations. The initiative that gives rise to the Judgment, which resolves a preliminary ruling, also represents a break with the so-called «European model of sport» and its essential characteristics. The Judgment is analyzed in both its judicial and ecosystem context, that is, the environment in which the activity must be carried out and its particularities. In this way, we will be able to venture the elements to take into account for the future and the consequences of the Sentence.

There have been broad and vigorous debates for several years over a relatively recent phenomenon of so-called killer acquisitions, whereby incumbent large companies (mostly with market dominance) preempt future competition by acquiring potential competitors (mostly start-ups) equipped with innovative technology. The article explores the economic implications of such transactions, and how their repercussions influence the approach of the antitrust authorities to this phenomenon. First, an initial explanation of the concept and idiosyncrasies of killer acquisitions is presented. Then, their effects on innovation and competition are discussed in more depth, considering the actual scale of this phenomenon and its empirical examples. This is followed by a brief description of the difficulties in identifying and assessing killer acquisitions in terms of their economic characteristics. The article’s methodology is based on the analysis of economic and legal literature on the subject matter, and partly on the dogmatic and legal analysis of antitrust regulations and practice. Based on the research findings it is suggested that, despite the conceptual vagueness of killer acquisitions, as well as their complex economic implications, there seems to be a growing belief that this is a real and significant problem, which cannot be solved solely with conventional antitrust tools, not to mention the market’s self-regulation. It does not appear that searching for an optimal response to the challenges posed by killer acquisitions will lead to the development of a silver bullet, if only because of the jurisdiction-specific economic and legal backgrounds., Od kilku lat toczą się szerokie i ożywione debaty na temat stosunkowo nowego fenomenu tzw. zabójczych przejęć, tj. przejmowania przez duże, zasiedziałe na rynku przedsiębiorstwa (zwykle dominantów rynkowych) potencjalnych konkurentów (zwykle typu start-up) dysponujących innowacyjną technologią, w celu udaremnienia przyszłej konkurencji. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu ustalenie, jakie są ekonomiczne reperkusje tego zjawiska i w jaki sposób wpływają one na podejście do niego władz odpowiedzialnych za ochronę konkurencji. Ustalenia te poprzedzono wstępnym objaśnieniem pojęcia i specyfiki zabójczych przejęć. Następnie zbadano dogłębniej ich skutki dla konkurencji oraz innowacji, z uwzględnieniem rzeczywistej skali tego zjawiska oraz jego empirycznych przykładów. Przedstawiono także zwięźle trudności w identyfikacji oraz ocenie zabójczych przejęć, implikowane ich ekonomiczną specyfiką. Metodologia artykułu opiera się głównie na analizie literatury ekonomicznej i prawniczej dotyczącej tytułowego zagadnienia, a po części także na analizie dogmatycznoprawnej regulacji antymonopolowych oraz praktyki ich stosowania. W świetle poczynionych uwag, niezależnie od koncepcyjnej niejednoznaczności zabójczych przejęć oraz ich złożonych implikacji ekonomicznych, rośnie – jak się wydaje – przekonanie, że jest to realny i poważny problem, któremu nie można zaradzić za pomocą jedynie konwencjonalnych narzędzi antymonopolowych, nie mówiąc już o samoregulacji rynkowej. Nie wydaje się, aby poszukiwanie optymalnej odpowiedzi na wyzwania stwarzane przez zabójcze przejęcia doprowadziło do znalezienia jednego, idealnego rozwiązania dla wszystkich jurysdykcji, choćby zważywszy na ich zróżnicowane uwarunkowania ekonomiczne i prawne.

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit technological innovation and the economy, American technological leadership, and the free flow of information.

This article discusses how the European Commission can achieve the goal of effectively implementing the Digital Markets Act. Based on legal and economic reasoning, we highlight the important role of the gatekeeper's compliance report, and discuss how to incentivize gatekeepers to write useful reports. In addition, we develop recommendations regarding the internal organization of the Commission, the prioritization of cases, and how to effectively use the concurrent enforcement powers of the Digital Markets Act and Article 102 of the TFEU. We illustrate the principles we develop using four different EU antitrust cases. Furthermore, we discuss coordination between the Commission and National Competition Authorities and the need to already develop an independent evaluation process for the Digital Markets Act.

Competition law enforcement is informed by the knowledge of the economic phenomenon to be regulated: market power of one or more companies. Such knowledge is currently based on the fields of price theory and industrial organization. These fields of economic theory have helped, on the one hand, to structure a framework in which it is possible to analyze factors such as market structure and incentives of economic agents in order to determine whether a conduct is anticompetitive or not. On the other hand, the question arises as to whether the variables derived from these fields are enough for a complete understanding of market performance. This article shows two aspects of the literature in the field of neo-institutionalism that can be used to complement the analytical framework of competition based on price theory and modern industrial organization: 1. The influence of companies with market power in the process of adopting state regulations that may affect the intensity of competition; 2. Uncertainty regarding public policies that may affect the profits of an investment project., La aplicación de las leyes de competencia se nutre del conocimiento que se tiene sobre el fenómeno económico que se pretende regular: el poder de mercado de una o varias empresas. Dicho conocimiento se basa actualmente en los campos de la teoría de precios y la organización industrial. Estos campos de la ciencia económica han, por un lado, ayudado a estructurar un marco en el que es posible analizar factores como estructura del mercado e incentivos de los agentes económicos para poder determinar si una conducta es o no anticompetitiva. Por el otro, cabe preguntarse si las variables que se desprenden de dichos campos son suficientes para un entendimiento completo del desempeño de un mercado. El presente artículo expone dos aspectos de la literatura en el campo del neo-institucionalismo que pueden utilizarse para complementar el marco de análisis de competencia basado en la teoría de precios y la organización industrial moderna: 1. La influencia de empresas con poder de mercado en el proceso de adopción de regulaciones estatales que pueden afectar la intensidad de competencia; 2. La incertidumbre en cuanto a las políticas públicas que pueden afectar las ganancias de un proyecto de inversión.

The aim of the article is to compare Chinese and European Union antitrust law systems, including an analysis of their main differences. The analysis focuses on the example of the Qihoo 360 v. Tencent QQ case, which was judged by the Supreme People’s Court is one of the most recognized antitrust cases in China. The analysis is based on Chinese and EU acts of generally applicable law in the field of antitrust law, and the judgment of the Supreme People’s Court in the case of Qihoo 360 v. Tencent QQ. The presented analysis leads to the conclusion that both legal systems are in general similar, however their application may be differentiated by the scope of discretion granted to the competition authorities, and by the aims of the antitrust law.&nbsp, Celem artykułu jest porównanie unijnego i chińskiego prawa antymonopolowego wraz z omówieniem najważniejszych różnic obu wskazanych systemów publicznego prawa ochrony konkurencji na przykładzie wyroku Najwyższego Sądu Ludowego w sprawie antymonopolowej Qihoo 360 v. Tencent QQ. Za podstawę analizy zostały przyjęte chińskie i unijne akty prawa powszechnie obowiązującego w dziedzinie prawa antymonopolowego oraz wyrok Najwyższego Sądu Ludowego w sprawie Qihoo 360 v. Tencent QQ. Analiza regulacji prowadzi do wniosku, że oba omawiane systemy prawne w dziedzinie prawa antymonopolowego nie różnią się między sobą w sposób istotny, niemniej czynnikiem determinującym to, jak prawo antymonopolowe jest wykonywane w obu tych porządkach prawnych, jest stopień przyznanej organom ochrony konkurencji dyskrecjonalności i sposób realizacji celów prawa antymonopolowego.&nbsp

This paper proposes to contextualize the postulates of Harvard School and Chicago School as doctrinal currents that founded the protection of competition in the world. From which an analysis of the current regulations on public application of competition law in Colombia and the sanctions of the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio between the years 2009 to 2020 about price-fixing. All this in order to define the doctrinal current implemented in Colombia and its implications., El presente escrito propone hacer una contextualización de los postulados de la escuela de Harvard y la escuela de Chicago como corrientes doctrinales que fundamentaron la protección de la competencia en el mundo. A partir de los cuales se realizará un análisis de la normativa actual en materia de aplicación pública del derecho de la competencia en Colombia y de las resoluciones sancionatorias de la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio entre los años 2009 a 2020 en materia de fijación de precios. Todo ello en aras de definir la corriente doctrinaria implementada en Colombia y sus implicaciones.

In this article we explore fault as it has traveled from public enforcement to private enforcement of EU competition law and beyond the implementation of the Damages Directive. We demonstrate how differences between national tort law systems have prevented harmonization of fault in the Damages Directive. This leads us to point out the current different fault standards across Member States in private enforcement of competition law, ranging from strict liability, to a rebuttable fault presumption to a fault requirement. This variety of fault standards induces forum shopping between Member States, and has a negative effect on the European Internal Market’s level playing field. Given these adverse effects, we argue for harmonization of a fault standard in private enforcement of competition law, and find that harmonizing towards a rebuttable presumption of fault both is best in line with fair trial provisions, and best observes the effectiveness of EU competition law.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recommendation 1 The Productivity Commission is to be congratulated for producing a comprehensive discussion paper on the complex and tangled topic of the right to repair. Taking an interdisciplinary, holistic approach to the issue, the Productivity Commission shows a strong understanding that the topic of the right to repair is a multifaceted policy issue. Its draft report covers the fields of consumer law, competition policy, intellectual property, product stewardship, and environmental law. The Productivity Commission displays a great comparative awareness of developments in other jurisdictions in respect of the right to repair. The policy body is also sensitive to the international dimensions of the right to repair – particularly in light of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The Productivity Commission puts forward a compelling package of recommendations, which will be useful in achieving law reform in respect of the right to repair in Australia. Recommendation 2 There is a strong body of evidence that intellectual property restrictions do impact upon the right to repair. The evidence is more than merely anecdotal or patchy (as suggested by Draft Finding 5.1). There has been threats of litigation in respect of copyright relating to repair manuals. The High Court of Australia and the Australian Parliament have expressed concerns about the breadth of technological protection measures. There has been major litigation over the spare parts exception under designs law. There has been major litigation over patent law, and the distinction between repair and refurbishment. There has been policy discussion about repair information and trade secrets – resulting in action by Treasury and the Australian Parliament. Recommendation 3 This submission agrees with draft finding 5.1 that ‘copyright laws that prevent third-party repairers from accessing repair information (such as repair manuals and diagnosti

This paper reflects on the role of Antitrust Law in new digital markets, characterized by a limited number of gatekeepers with market power, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA). The goals of Antitrust Law are analysed in their historical evolution, to assess whether it is an adequate and sufficient instrument to solve this problem, taking into account the 2020 proposals in USA –Investigation by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust Law– and in EU –EC proposal for a Digital Markets Act–., En este trabajo se reflexiona sobre el papel del Derecho de la competencia en los nuevos mercados digitales, caracterizados por la existencia de un número limitado de guardianes de acceso con poder de mercado, como Google, Amazon, Facebook y Apple (GAFA). Para ello se analizan los objetivos del Derecho de la competencia en su evolución histórica, para valorar si es un instrumento adecuado y suficiente para resolver este problema, teniendo en cuenta las propuestas que se han hecho en 2020 en EE.UU. –Investigación del Subcomité de Derecho antitrust de la Cámara de Representantes– y en la UE –propuesta de la CE de Reglamento sobre mercados digitales-.

This paper reflects on the role of Antitrust Law in new digital markets, characterized by a limited number of gatekeepers with market power, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA). The goals of Antitrust Law are analysed in their historical evolution, to assess whether it is an adequate and sufficient instrument to solve this problem, taking into account the 2020 proposals in USA –Investigation by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust Law– and in EU –EC proposal for a Digital Markets Act–., En este trabajo se reflexiona sobre el papel del Derecho de la competencia en los nuevos mercados digitales, caracterizados por la existencia de un número limitado de guardianes de acceso con poder de mercado, como Google, Amazon, Facebook y Apple (GAFA). Para ello se analizan los objetivos del Derecho de la competencia en su evolución histórica, para valorar si es un instrumento adecuado y suficiente para resolver este problema, teniendo en cuenta las propuestas que se han hecho en 2020 en EE.UU. –Investigación del Subcomité de Derecho antitrust de la Cámara de Representantes– y en la UE –propuesta de la CE de Reglamento sobre mercados digitales-.

In our research, a critical view of mediation is offered as an extrajudicial method for the complaint of damage and damage derived from antitrust practices. It is relatively recent the possibility that those affected may complain, whereas the doctrine calls the private application of the competence, the damage and damage derived from an antitrust practice. However, even the doctrine congratulates itself for recognizing the civil action of the judgments against the antitrust practice, in the light of the problems that will make the effectiveness of the administrative resolutions in the subsequent exercise of the civil action. On the other hand, while we are at one moment in which the legislator plans to adopt a series of measures to encourage mediation as a suitable method for resolving conflicts, we reflect about the benefits and possible inconveniences of this procedural method in the context antitrust law., En este trabajo de investigación se ofrece una visión crítica de la mediación como método extrajudicial para la reclamación de los daños y perjuicios derivados de conductas contrarias a la libre competencia. Es relativamente reciente la posibilidad de que los perjudicados puedan reclamar, en lo que la doctrina denomina la aplicación privada del derecho de la competencia, los daños y perjuicios derivados de una conducta anticompetitiva mediante el ejercicio de la civil. Sin embargo, aunque la doctrina se congratula por el reconocimiento del ejercicio de la acción civil de los justiciables ante la práctica antitrust, no son pocos los problemas que conlleva la eficacia de las resoluciones administrativas en el posterior proceso civil. Por otro lado, aun cuando nos encontramos en un momento en el que el legislador se plantea adoptar una serie de medidas para impulsar la mediación como método adecuado de solución de conflictos, tanto en general como en el ámbito del derecho de la competencia, nos planteamos las ventajas y posibles inconvenientes de esta herramienta procesal en este concreto ámbito del derecho.

This paper reflects on the role of Antitrust Law in new digital markets, characterized by a limited number of gatekeepers with market power, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA). The goals of Antitrust Law are analysed in their historical evolution, to assess whether it is an adequate and sufficient instrument to solve this problem, taking into account the 2020 proposals in USA –Investigation by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust Law– and in EU –EC proposal for a Digital Markets Act–., En este trabajo se reflexiona sobre el papel del Derecho de la competencia en los nuevos mercados digitales, caracterizados por la existencia de un número limitado de guardianes de acceso con poder de mercado, como Google, Amazon, Facebook y Apple (GAFA). Para ello se analizan los objetivos del Derecho de la competencia en su evolución histórica, para valorar si es un instrumento adecuado y suficiente para resolver este problema, teniendo en cuenta las propuestas que se han hecho en 2020 en EE.UU. –Investigación del Subcomité de Derecho antitrust de la Cámara de Representantes– y en la UE –propuesta de la CE de Reglamento sobre mercados digitales-.

The Political Constitution of Peru in its article 61 regulates the duty of the State to facilitate and monitor free competition, combating those practices that limit it and the abusive exercise of monopolistic or dominant positions. However, not all markets present conditions of perfect competition, as in the case of the medical oxygen production market in Peru, which is characterized by being oligopolistic, specifically a duopoly. This situation leads us to reflect on the role of State in economic matters.In this article, the authors analyze the characteristics of the oxygen market in Peru, with special emphasis on oxygen production, existing suppliers and barriers to market entry. Likewise, the relevance and necessity of the policies arranged by the State in order to face the health crisis and allow a distribution of medicinal oxygen that can satisfy the population’s demand is evaluated, La Constitución Política del Perú en su artículo 61 regula el deber del Estado de facilitar y vigilar la libre competencia, combatiendo aquellas prácticas que la limiten y el ejercicio abusivo de posiciones monopólicas o dominantes. Sin embargo, no en todos los mercados se presentan condiciones de competencia perfecta, como en el caso del mercado de producción de oxígeno medicinal en el Perú, que se caracteriza por ser oligopólico, en específico un duopolio. Esta situación lleva a reflexionar sobre el rol del Estado en materia económica. En el presente artículo, los autores analizan las características del mercado del oxígeno en Perú, con especial énfasis en la producción del oxígeno, los proveedores existentes y las barreras de entrada al mercado. Asimismo, se evalúa la pertinencia y necesidad de las políticas dispuestas por el Estado a fin de afrontar la crisis sanitaria y permitir una distribución del oxígeno medicinal que pueda satisfacer la demanda de la población

Il contributo si propone di ricostruire e svolgere alcune considerazioni sugli ultimi orientamenti della Commissione europea in tema di aiuti di Stato nel settore ambientale ed energetico, con particolare riferimento alla recente revisione delle Linee guida 2014-2020., The paper aims to outline and make some remarks on the recent approach of the European Commission to State aids in the environmental and energy sector, with particular reference to the recent revision of the Guidelines 2014-2020.

The article analyses the process of defining the relevant market, with reference to digital entrepreneurs who operate on two-sided markets. The article presents a description of two-sided markets, including their basic features, such as network effect and price structure. These aspects are then analysed in the context of three factors of the relevant market: relevant product market, relevant geographic market, and temporal relevant market. The article leads to the conclusion that a temporal relevant market should be determined each time when considering online multiside markets. The article also analyses the so-called gatekeepers, that is entrepreneurs creating markets on which they also define the market conditions. Moreover, they do not always compete on the markets which they have created. In the case of gatekeepers, the article leads to the conclusion that the legal construction of abuse of market position should be sufficient; however, further regulation of gatekeepers may be necessary in the future., Artykuł analizuje problematykę wyznaczania rynku właściwego na przykładzie przedsiębiorców cyfrowych funkcjonujących w ramach rynków dwustronnych. W artykule zostały przedstawiona charakterystyka rynku dwustronnego, w tym jego elementów charakterystycznych, takich jak efekt sieci i struktura cenowa rynku, które następne zostały przeanalizowane w kontekście trzech aspektów wyznaczania rynku właściwego. Artykuł prowadzi do wniosku, że ujęcie czasowe rynku właściwego powinno być brane pod uwagę zasadniczo każdorazowo w procesie wyznaczania rynku właściwego w odniesieniu do rynków wielostronnych funkcjonujących online. W artykule zwrócono również uwagę na pozycję rynkową przedsiębiorców cyfrowych, określanych mianem gatekeepers, tzn. takich którzy tworzą rynki i kształtują na nich warunki konkurencji, nie zawsze konkurując z podmiotami działającymi na ukształtowanych w ten sposób rynkach. W odniesieniu do tego typu przedsiębiorców artykuł stoi na stanowisku, że w odniesieniu do praktyk rynkowych konstrukcja prawna nadużywania pozycji dominującej wydaje się być wystarczająca, jednak nie można wykluczyć konieczności dalej idących regulacji.

В статье с привлечением теории социоценозов излагаются теоретические подходы, предъявляемые к образованию ценоза промышленных предприятий в государстве, а также пропорций между крупными, средними и малыми предприятиями, что позволяет сделать научный вывод о требуемом количестве структурных элементов ценоза.

Cartel damage occurs in many different shapes. Actors that are beyond doubt heavily affected by a cartel agreement are the purchasers of the cartel—the direct same as the indirect ones. Economic insights teach us that they do not only suffer damage in the form of the overcharge they paid or of shares of this overcharge that are passed-on to lower levels in the supply chain, but also in the form of the volume effect: a price increase as induced by a cartel agreement leads to a reduction in quantities sold, the consequence of which is typically lost profit—ie the volume effect. Whereas this effect is firmly established in economics, on the legal side it is so far discussed only on a superficial level with legal practice lacking behind in its recognition altogether. This is particularly surprising in the German and Spanish legal order where the highest courts many years ago did recognize the relevance of this damage component in pass-on situations. This article thoroughly analyses the economic and legal perspectives in respect of volume effects.

Soft law issued by the European Commission plays an important role in the area of EU competition law. Focusing on the legal effect of competition soft law as applied by Germany's national competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, this contribution analyses how the authority pursues interpretational and decisional objectives through references to competition soft law. This contribution quantifies the references made to soft law and categorises these references on the basis of the involvement of other sources of law in an individual reference. It is shown that the Bundeskartellamt is comfortable making reference to competition soft law as the sole legal basis for certain parts of many decisions, ascribing to competition soft law a strong legal effect in several instances.

In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the imposition of penalties is complemented in price-fixing cases by private damage actions, which should affect both cartel deterrence and the prices set by those cartels that do form. We show that the impact of combining penalties and damages on cartel prices is not clearcut, and depends on both the nature of the penalty regime and the way that damages are calculated. We demonstrate this by focusing on two ways of calculating damages that have been advocated in practice and two different forms of the widely used revenue-based penalty regime. When the simple form of revenue-based penalties is in force, the standard method of calculating damages worsens its harmful pricing effects, whereas the proposed alternative method of calculating damages can overturn them. When a more sophisticated form of revenue-based penalties is in operation, imposing damages will improve its beneficial pricing effects under both methods of damage calculation, but the alternative method is more effective. In all cases combining penalties and damages improves deterrence.

We propose a new penalty regime for cartels in which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate increases in a systematic and transparent way with the cartel overcharge. The proposed regime formalises how revenue can be used as the base while taking into account the severity of the offence. We show that this regime has better welfare properties than the simple revenue-based regime under which the penalty rate is fixed, while having relatively low levels of implementation costs and uncertainty. We conclude that the proposed penalty regime deserves serious consideration by Competition Authorities.

Läkemedelsmarknaden är uppbyggd runt företag, så kallade originalföretag, som utvecklar nya läkemedel och patenterar dessa. Patent är viktigt eftersom det ger originalföretagen en tidsbegränsad monopolistisk marknadsställning. De har därigenom möjlighet att genom stora marknadsvinster få tillbaka investeringarna som gjorts för att ta fram nya läkemedel. Patent ger också incitament till fortsatt forskning och utveckling. Generikaföretag är konkurrenter till originalföretag då de tillverkar och säljer generiska versioner av ett originalläkemedel. Generisk konkurrens är viktigt för att priserna på läkemedel ska pressas ner. När ett generikaföretag förbereder sig för marknadsinträde, uppstår ofta patenttvister då originalföretaget stämmer generikaföretaget för patentintrång. Istället för att låta tvisten avgöras i domstol, förliks ofta parterna. Patentförlikningar är avtal för att lösa en faktisk eller potentiell tvist. Förlikningsavtal kan ibland utgöra en begränsning av generisk konkurrens och ibland också innefatta en värdeöverföring från originalföretaget till generikaföretaget. I både EU och USA anser konkurrensmyndigheterna att sådana avtal utgör förbjudna konkurrensbegränsande avtal enligt artikel 101 FEUF respektive Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1. Syftet med denna uppsats är att beskriva, analysera och jämföra under vilka förutsättningar patentförlikningar mellan originalföretag och generikaföretag kan vara konkurrensbegränsande enligt EU-rätt respektive amerikansk rätt. Slutsatsen är att förlikningsavtal innefattande en stor värdeöverföring från originalföretaget till generikaföretaget under vissa förutsättningar kan utgöra förbjudna konkurrensbegränsande avtal. Detta gäller för både EU och USA., The pharmaceutical market is based on companies, called originators, who develop new drugs and patent them. Patents are important since they allow the originators a time-limited monopolistic market position. The originators then have the opportunity to enjoy significant market profits to cover the costs for the development of a new drug. Patents are also an incentive for continued research and development. Generics are competitors to the originators as they manufacture and sell generic versions of an originator drug. Generic competition is essential to reduce the price level of drugs. When a generic company is preparing for market entry, patent disputes often arise when the originator sues the generic company for patent infringement. Instead of determining the case in court, the parties often settle. Patent settlements are agreements to settle actual or potential disputes. Settlement agreements can sometimes limit generic competition and sometimes also include a value transfer from the originator to the generic company. The competition authorities in both the EU and the US, consider such agreements as prohibited restrictions of competition under Article 101 TFEU and Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1. The purpose of this thesis is to describe, analyze and compare the conditions under which patent settlements between originators and generic companies can be anti-competitive under EU law and US law, respectively. The conclusion is that settlement agreements including a large value transfer from the originator to the generic company under certain conditions can constitute prohibited anti-competitive agreements. This is valid for both the EU and the US.

The present work focuses on the determination of the “lawful and unlawful” from the perspective of Competition Law that is crucial for economic development. On this occasion, our examination will be limited to a simple approximation, since it is a broad and especially complex issue, which also forces us to focus on one of the various fields of Competition Law, that of agreements or collusive practices. It is, however, an essential issue, as economic operators must know the border that defines the legality or not of their performance in the markets when they maintain contacts with other companies, whether or not they are competitors, even sharing with them the participation in associations and institutions that represent them; and this is not, in many cases, easy or possible to always specify absolutely in terms of legal certainty, especially in markets and with business models in continuous creative evolution., Este trabalho se concentrará em determinar o que é legal e o que é ilegal sob a perspectiva do direito da concorrência, crucial para o desenvolvimento econômico. A exposição será limitada a uma aproximação, uma vez que é um tópico amplo e especialmente complexo, que se concentrará em acordos ou práticas colusórias. Esta é uma questão essencial, uma vez que os operadores econômicos devem conhecer a fronteira que delimita a legalidade ou não de suas ações nos mercados quando mantêm contatos ou relacionamentos com outras empresas, sejam elas concorrentes ou não, inclusive compartilhando com eles a participação em associações e associações. instituições que os representam. Isso não é, em muitos casos, fácil ou possível de obter em termos de segurança jurídica, especialmente em mercados e com modelos de negócios em contínua evolução criativa., El presente trabajo se centrará en la determinación de lo lícito y lo ilícito desde la perspectiva del Derecho de la competencia que es crucial para el desarrollo económico. La exposición se limitará a una aproximación, pues se trata de un tema amplio y especialmente complejo, que se centrará en los acuerdos o prácticas colusorias. Se trata de un tema esencial, pues los operadores económicos deben conocer la frontera que delimita la licitud o ilegalidad de su actuación en los mercados cuando mantiene contactos o relaciones con otras empresas, sean o no competidoras, incluso compartiendo con ellas la participación en asociaciones e instituciones que los representan. Esto no resulta, en muchas ocasiones, ni fácil ni posible de concretar en términos de seguridad jurídica, especialmente en los mercados y con modelos de negocio en continua evolución creadora.

Legal issues of counteracting the imposition of unfavorable contract terms by the dominant party raise a number of theoretical and practical problems. The authors of the article try to determine the legal nature of imposition and develop methods of comprehensive counteraction to this violation in order to ensure the balance of convenience. From the philosophical perspective and a certain worldview, the study is based on the balance of convenience regarded as the objective foundation of legal regulation. The main philosophical and scientific methods used in this article include the dialectic method, the formal-legal method, the method of legal hermeneutics, as well as the comparative-legal and empirical methods. The theoretical basis is represented by scientific works in the field of civil, administrative, entrepreneurial and procedural branches of law. The legal nature of imposition as a type of violation should be determined with due regard to the general logic of antitrust regulation. The parallel use of both public and private law necessitates the development of procedural legal means ensuring uniform law enforcement and the balance of convenience. First of all, the unity of approaches regarding legal tools of public and civil law should be concerned with the definition of features and the essence of elements compiling the imposition itself. The authors also propose approaches to the formation of an appropriate procedural model., Los problemas legales de contrarrestar la imposición de términos desfavorables del contrato por dominante forman un complejo de problemas teóricos y prácticos. Los autores de este artículo intentan determinar la naturaleza legal de la “imposición”, así como desarrollar enfoques para resolver los problemas de la resistencia integral a esta violación para garantizar un equilibrio de intereses. La base filosófica y concepcional es, en primer lugar, la idea de un equilibrio de intereses, como la base objetiva de la regulación legal. Entre los principales métodos filosóficos y científicos utilizados en el trabajo, en particular, son dialéctico, legal formal, hermenéutica legal, legal comparado, empírico. La base teórica es el trabajo en el derecho civil, administrativo, empresarial y procesal. La naturaleza legal de la imposición como la violación debe determinarse por la lógica general de la regulación antimonopolio. La posibilidad del uso paralelo de los recursos de derecho público y privado requiere el desarrollo de medios legales procesales para garantizar una práctica uniforme de aplicación de la ley, un equilibrio de intereses. En primer lugar, la unidad de los enfoques en el marco del derecho público y los recursos del derecho civil deben relacionarse con la determinación de los signos y el contenido de los elementos de la imposición. También se proponen los enfoques para la formación de un modelo procesal apropiado.

In recent years, arbitration has been an alternative route to judicial proceedings, especially in commercial disputes. This, as a result of its lottery, for its flexibility, speed, confidentiality, among other aspects. Nonetheless, part of the doctrine considers that this route is not suitable for private disputes relating to matters of antitrust law. In this article, the authors assess the scope of arbitrability, in private matters, on antitrust law in Peru. Thus, they examine whether the courts may interpret compliance with antitrust laws and subsequently issue a ruling on civil liability resulting from this analysis. In this regard, they analyze the most important concepts on the arbitrability of antitrust law, identify the most relevant issues related to the arbitration of antitrust law and, finally, review some Peruvian cases to identify the barriers that make it impossible to arbitral practice on antitrust law in Peruvian law., En los últimos años, el arbitraje ha sido considerado como una vía alternativa a los procesos judiciales, sobre todo en conflictos comerciales; esto, por su flexibilidad, rapidez, confidencialidad, entre otros aspectos. Pese a ello, una parte de la doctrina considera que esta vía no es adecuada para someter controversias privadas relacionadas a materias de libre competencia. En el presente artículo, los autores evalúan el alcance de la arbitrabilidad, en materia privada, sobre la Libre Competencia en el Perú. Así, examinan si los tribunales, efectivamente, pueden interpretar o no el cumplimiento de las leyes de libre competencia para, posteriormente, emitir un pronunciamiento sobre la responsabilidad civil resultado de este análisis. En esa línea, analizan los conceptos más importantes sobre la arbitrabilidad de la Libre Competencia, identifican las cuestiones más relevantes relacionadas al arbitraje de la Libre Competencia y, por último, revisan algunos casos peruanos para identificar cuáles son las barreras que imposibilitan su práctica arbitral en el ordenamiento peruano.

Soft law issued by the European Commission plays an important role in the area of EU competition law. Focusing on the legal effect of competition soft law as applied by Germany's national competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, this contribution analyses how the authority pursues interpretational and decisional objectives through references to competition soft law. This contribution quantifies the references made to soft law and categorises these references on the basis of the involvement of other sources of law in an individual reference. It is shown that the Bundeskartellamt is comfortable making reference to competition soft law as the sole legal basis for certain parts of many decisions, ascribing to competition soft law a strong legal effect in several instances.

In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the imposition of penalties is complemented in price-fixing cases by private damage actions, which should affect both cartel deterrence and the prices set by those cartels that do form. We show that the impact of combining penalties and damages on cartel prices is not clearcut, and depends on both the nature of the penalty regime and the way that damages are calculated. We demonstrate this by focusing on two ways of calculating damages that have been advocated in practice and two different forms of the widely used revenue-based penalty regime. When the simple form of revenue-based penalties is in force, the standard method of calculating damages worsens its harmful pricing effects, whereas the proposed alternative method of calculating damages can overturn them. When a more sophisticated form of revenue-based penalties is in operation, imposing damages will improve its beneficial pricing effects under both methods of damage calculation, but the alternative method is more effective. In all cases combining penalties and damages improves deterrence.

We propose a new penalty regime for cartels in which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate increases in a systematic and transparent way with the cartel overcharge. The proposed regime formalises how revenue can be used as the base while taking into account the severity of the offence. We show that this regime has better welfare properties than the simple revenue-based regime under which the penalty rate is fixed, while having relatively low levels of implementation costs and uncertainty. We conclude that the proposed penalty regime deserves serious consideration by Competition Authorities.

Läkemedelsmarknaden är uppbyggd runt företag, så kallade originalföretag, som utvecklar nya läkemedel och patenterar dessa. Patent är viktigt eftersom det ger originalföretagen en tidsbegränsad monopolistisk marknadsställning. De har därigenom möjlighet att genom stora marknadsvinster få tillbaka investeringarna som gjorts för att ta fram nya läkemedel. Patent ger också incitament till fortsatt forskning och utveckling. Generikaföretag är konkurrenter till originalföretag då de tillverkar och säljer generiska versioner av ett originalläkemedel. Generisk konkurrens är viktigt för att priserna på läkemedel ska pressas ner. När ett generikaföretag förbereder sig för marknadsinträde, uppstår ofta patenttvister då originalföretaget stämmer generikaföretaget för patentintrång. Istället för att låta tvisten avgöras i domstol, förliks ofta parterna. Patentförlikningar är avtal för att lösa en faktisk eller potentiell tvist. Förlikningsavtal kan ibland utgöra en begränsning av generisk konkurrens och ibland också innefatta en värdeöverföring från originalföretaget till generikaföretaget. I både EU och USA anser konkurrensmyndigheterna att sådana avtal utgör förbjudna konkurrensbegränsande avtal enligt artikel 101 FEUF respektive Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1. Syftet med denna uppsats är att beskriva, analysera och jämföra under vilka förutsättningar patentförlikningar mellan originalföretag och generikaföretag kan vara konkurrensbegränsande enligt EU-rätt respektive amerikansk rätt. Slutsatsen är att förlikningsavtal innefattande en stor värdeöverföring från originalföretaget till generikaföretaget under vissa förutsättningar kan utgöra förbjudna konkurrensbegränsande avtal. Detta gäller för både EU och USA., The pharmaceutical market is based on companies, called originators, who develop new drugs and patent them. Patents are important since they allow the originators a time-limited monopolistic market position. The originators then have the opportunity to enjoy significant market profits to cover the costs for the development of a new drug. Patents are also an incentive for continued research and development. Generics are competitors to the originators as they manufacture and sell generic versions of an originator drug. Generic competition is essential to reduce the price level of drugs. When a generic company is preparing for market entry, patent disputes often arise when the originator sues the generic company for patent infringement. Instead of determining the case in court, the parties often settle. Patent settlements are agreements to settle actual or potential disputes. Settlement agreements can sometimes limit generic competition and sometimes also include a value transfer from the originator to the generic company. The competition authorities in both the EU and the US, consider such agreements as prohibited restrictions of competition under Article 101 TFEU and Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1. The purpose of this thesis is to describe, analyze and compare the conditions under which patent settlements between originators and generic companies can be anti-competitive under EU law and US law, respectively. The conclusion is that settlement agreements including a large value transfer from the originator to the generic company under certain conditions can constitute prohibited anti-competitive agreements. This is valid for both the EU and the US.

In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress sought to prevent big businesses from maintaining and augmenting their power through collusion, mergers, and exclusionary and predatory practices and also aimed to preserve the ability of workers to act in concert. At times, the antitrust laws have benefited ordinary Americans. Antitrust achievements include the restructuring of the oil industry in 1911, the creation of competitive market structures in the mid-twentieth century, and the termination of AT&T’s telecommunications monopoly in 1984. Yet, the history of antitrust in the United States is not one of uninterrupted successes. Over two forty-year periods, the executive branch and federal courts, in enforcing and interpreting the antitrust laws, have failed to advance Congress’s vision and indeed inverted congressional intent. During the original and current Gilded Ages, the antitrust laws were and are used to protect the power of large-scale business and also to limit the autonomy of workers to organize and demand higher wages and better working conditions. Through this anti-labor application, the federal government has employed antitrust to aid big business, rather than restrain its power. Despite this history of accommodating capital and policing labor, the antitrust laws can still be reinterpreted and redeemed. Congressional, executive, and judicial action can remake these laws to control the power of large corporations and also protect the freedom of all workers to organize for higher wages and better working conditions. A renewal of antitrust, in accordance with the expressed purposes of Congress, would help remedy the inequities of the New Gilded Age and create a more just society.

Purpose- The purpose of this study is to analyze whether an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. Design/Methodology- The study employed secondary data and quantitative research method was also utilized to achieve the objectives of the study. Multiple regression analysis techniques were used to analyze the data. Findings- The results support the hypothesis that an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. It appears that industry-level revenue from exports is highly correlated with the size of that industry and its lobbying activity. Practical Implications- These results have practical relevance which helps to predict the intensity of antitrust activity in future years. Its practical implication is that there are disparities in antitrust enforcement that are influenced by factors other than concentration. By creating a benchmark that takes into account components such as this, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) can identify those companies who are likely to be engaging in anticompetitive behavior.

Purpose- The purpose of this study is to analyze whether an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. Design/Methodology- The study employed secondary data and quantitative research method was also utilized to achieve the objectives of the study. Multiple regression analysis techniques were used to analyze the data. Findings- The results support the hypothesis that an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. It appears that industry-level revenue from exports is highly correlated with the size of that industry and its lobbying activity. Practical Implications- These results have practical relevance which helps to predict the intensity of antitrust activity in future years. Its practical implication is that there are disparities in antitrust enforcement that are influenced by factors other than concentration. By creating a benchmark that takes into account components such as this, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) can identify those companies who are likely to be engaging in anticompetitive behavior.

Purpose- The purpose of this study is to analyze whether an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. Design/Methodology- The study employed secondary data and quantitative research method was also utilized to achieve the objectives of the study. Multiple regression analysis techniques were used to analyze the data. Findings- The results support the hypothesis that an increase in the concentration of industry causes an increase in the level of Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ)’s antitrust enforcement within that industry. It appears that industry-level revenue from exports is highly correlated with the size of that industry and its lobbying activity. Practical Implications- These results have practical relevance which helps to predict the intensity of antitrust activity in future years. Its practical implication is that there are disparities in antitrust enforcement that are influenced by factors other than concentration. By creating a benchmark that takes into account components such as this, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) can identify those companies who are likely to be engaging in anticompetitive behavior.