Radenović, Ljiljana, Perović, Slobodan, Stojković, Biljana, Zorić, Aleksandra, Simić, Dušan M., Radenović, Ljiljana, Perović, Slobodan, Stojković, Biljana, Zorić, Aleksandra, and Simić, Dušan M.
Glavni cilj ovog rada jeste formulisanje modela svesti koji bi uspeo da prevaziđe prigovore i probleme sa kojim su se suočavali svi dosadašnji neurobiološki modeli. Najveći izazov je odgovor na pitanje kako je moguće da neki materijalni sistem, poput mozga, proizvede subjektivno iskustvo. Kao što ću pokazati, odgovor se nalazi u načinu na koji je mozak organizovan i njegovoj sposobnosti da proizvede posebnu vrstu kauzalnih interakcija (neprekidnu kauzalnu samoreferencu). Model svesti koji predlažem se oslanja na dinamičke modele prema kojima je svest globalno sistemsko svojstvo. Prema hipotezi neprekidne kauzalne samoreference koju ću zastupati, organizacija ima nesvodivu ulogu u stvaranju novih svojstava. Svest se ne može u potpunosti objasniti svođenjem na osnovne materijalne konstituente, već je ona suštinski relaciono svojstvo tih konstituenata. Objašnjenje svesti ne možemo naći u pojedinačnim gradivnim jedinicama mozga, neuronima, već u načinu na koji su oni organizovani. Istraživanja (Bressler and Kelso, 2016) (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014) (Kelso, 2012) pokazuju da postoje svojstva koja se nalaze na nivou celog sistema, koja proizilaze iz relacija među konstituentima a koja se ne mogu pronaći na nivou bazičnih konstituenata. Svest je dinamički proces, neprekidno menjajuća struktura kauzalnih relacija među konstituentima sistema. U skladu sa tim pokušaću da pokažem da se svest kao svojstvo pojavljuje u slučajevima kada materija i relacije između njenih elemenata imaju posebnu kauzalnu konfiguraciju. Kao glavnu teorijsku i empirijsku podršku toj hipotezi koristiću modele i eksperimentalnu evidenciju različitih autora koji zastupaju dinamičke teorije svesti poput Tononija, Edelmana, Spornsa i drugih. Navedeni autori implicitno podržavaju ontologiju u kojoj relacije spadaju u osnovna primitivna svojstva stvarnosti. (Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser and Hilgetag, 2004) (Edelman and Tononi, 2000) (Olaf Sporns, 2010) (Tononi and Koch, 2015). U prvom poglavlju ću pokazati kakav je, The main goal of this paper is to formulate a model of consciousness that would overcome the objections and problems faced by all neurobiological models to date. The biggest challenge is answering the question of how it is possible for a material system, such as the brain, to produce subjective experience. As I will show, the answer lies in the way the brain is organized and its ability to produce a special kind of causal interactions (continuous causal self-reference). The model of consciousness I propose relies on the dynamic models according to which consciousness is a global property of the system. According to the hypothesis of continuous causal self-reference that I will present, organization plays an irreducible role in creating new properties. Consciousness cannot be fully explained by reduction to basic material constituents, but it is rather essentially a relational property of those constituents. We cannot find an explanation of consciousness in the individual building blocks of the brain, neurons. It is in the way they are organized. Research (Bressler and Kelso, 2016) (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014) (Kelso, 2012) shows that there are properties that can be found on the level of the system as a whole, that arise from relationships among constituents, but that cannot be found at the level of basic constituents. Consciousness is a dynamic process, a constantly changing structure of causal relations between the constituents of a system. Accordingly, I will try to show that consciousness as a property occurs in cases where matter and the relations between its elements have a special causal configuration. As the main theoretical and empirical support for this hypothesis, I will use models and experimental record of various authors representing dynamic theories of consciousness such as Tononi, Edelman, Sporns and others. Listed authors implicitly support the ontology in which relations belong to the basic primitive properties of reality. (Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser and