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International Journal of Middle East Studies. 2022, 54 (2), P.302-318

Islamic society, which is based on justice and peace, gives all rights to each community living within its legal and juridical limits. It has been observed in seerat al-Nabi (PBUH) that, non-Muslims were given full rights to building their temples and they were also free to worship according to their religious ways and thoughts. Holy Prophet (PBUH) allowed them to perform their religious customs in their towns as they wish but within the limit of Islamic terms and conditions which were imposed in different agreements (i.e. Misaq e Madinah). In the present era, as we are living in multi-cultural and multi religions, there is much confusion about whether non-Muslims should be allowed or not for these acts. There is a great discussion between classical Islamic scholars. They think not to be allowed, although if necessary they should be bond in special terms and conditions. In a certain situation, there is a second opinion that allows Muslim statesman to give non-Muslims their religious liberty and allow them to build their temples in their areas under the need of circumstances. This article deals with both views and signifies the correct one in the light of seerat al-Nabi (PBUH) and presents various charters i.e. UNO charter.

In recent decades, Islamic-inspired terrorism has worsened intergroup tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in western democratic countries, including Australia. Muslims and Islam are often linked with terrorism, and the resulting tension between Muslims and non-Muslims has fostered an “us” versus “them” mentality (Blackwood et al., 2013b). Some research suggests that the alienation Muslims feel as a result of the stigma they have faced in recent years can push some Muslims towards radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Dugan & Distler, 2016). In my dissertation, I propose that the disproportionate scrutiny that Muslims face in western democratic countries may lead some Muslims to support terrorism. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), my dissertation centres on the proposition that Muslims’ support for terrorism may manifest when some Muslims experience identity threats from non-Muslims. I propose that a feedback loop exists whereby non-Muslims’ attitudes and actions towards Muslims, as well as ingroup/ out-group tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, may lead some Muslims in Australia to experience identity threats. I propose that non-Muslims might come to hold punitive views towards Muslims because they perceive Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and that their national identity as Australians can influence this association. I also suggest that Muslims can come to perceive that their identities are threatened by (1) feeling stigmatised and (2) believing that others are punitive towards Muslims (conceptualised in my dissertation as meta-punitiveness). I further argue that the strength of a Muslim’s national and religious identity might influence how susceptible some Muslims are to these identity threats. Existing studies typically focus on how support for terrorism may arise amongst Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries. Yet, few studies consider how Muslims come to support terrorism when they constitute a minority group in, Thesis (PhD Doctorate), Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), School of Crim & Crim Justice, Arts, Education and Law, Full Text

Full Text, Thesis (PhD Doctorate), Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), School of Crim & Crim Justice, Arts, Education and Law, In recent decades, Islamic-inspired terrorism has worsened intergroup tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in western democratic countries, including Australia. Muslims and Islam are often linked with terrorism, and the resulting tension between Muslims and non-Muslims has fostered an “us” versus “them” mentality (Blackwood et al., 2013b). Some research suggests that the alienation Muslims feel as a result of the stigma they have faced in recent years can push some Muslims towards radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Dugan & Distler, 2016). In my dissertation, I propose that the disproportionate scrutiny that Muslims face in western democratic countries may lead some Muslims to support terrorism. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), my dissertation centres on the proposition that Muslims’ support for terrorism may manifest when some Muslims experience identity threats from non-Muslims. I propose that a feedback loop exists whereby non-Muslims’ attitudes and actions towards Muslims, as well as ingroup/ out-group tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, may lead some Muslims in Australia to experience identity threats. I propose that non-Muslims might come to hold punitive views towards Muslims because they perceive Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and that their national identity as Australians can influence this association. I also suggest that Muslims can come to perceive that their identities are threatened by (1) feeling stigmatised and (2) believing that others are punitive towards Muslims (conceptualised in my dissertation as meta-punitiveness). I further argue that the strength of a Muslim’s national and religious identity might influence how susceptible some Muslims are to these identity threats. Existing studies typically focus on how support for terrorism may arise amongst Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries. Yet, few studies consider how Muslims come to support terrorism when they constitute a minority group in

The people of Dhimma, covenant, truce and safety are terms that Muslim scholars call non-Muslims, residents or immigrants to The Land of Islam, and that they are in the era of Muslims, their sin and their protection. Civil peace towards others does not mean at all the contractual and intellectual thaw towards the other and the loss of identity, humiliation and rebuttal to it, but rather mutual respect and knowledge of each party's money and what it is. The policy of civil peace in the Prophetic curriculum, which provided the Islamic call and the prophetic leadership with a good reputation, and a bright face in front of public opinion, which helped to spread Islam, and the popularity of the people.

Besides its usage with the primary meanings: 1) social status; 2) subjectship, the term re‘āyā was used to denote, as many historians tend to claim, “only non-Muslim subjects” from “sometime” in the second half of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century. The paper demonstrates that this meaning of the term re‘āyā had already been in use since the first decades of the eighteenth century, and not to the exclusion of but along with other meanings. More frequent replacement of the neutral shari‘a term zimmī(ler) and the usual official term kefere with the word re‘āyā should be considered a consequence of structural social change taking place in the same century.

Besides its usage with the primary meanings: 1) social status; 2) subjectship, the term re‘āyā was used to denote, as many historians tend to claim, “only non-Muslim subjects” from “sometime” in the second half of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century. The paper demonstrates that this meaning of the term re‘āyā had already been in use since the first decades of the eighteenth century, and not to the exclusion of but along with other meanings. More frequent replacement of the neutral shari‘a term zimmī(ler) and the usual official term kefere with the word re‘āyā should be considered a consequence of structural social change taking place in the same century.

The purpose with this essay is to investigate if there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. My methodology is to investigate the question of religions liberty in Sudan on the basis of three social levels: state level, religious actors and individual- level. I will use Cole Durham’s comparative Model for analyzing religions liberty and apply it on Sudan. The theory consists of the four thresholds of minimal pluralism, economic stability, political legitimacy and respect for other beliefs. My research questions are based on answering what has been done on the three social levels in Sudan after 2005. The conclusion of the study is that there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the peace agreement. I also claim that the conditions are better now compared to the contiguous period before the CPA. Finally, I remark that there exists religious discrimination in the whole Sudanese society that has to be dealt with on the three different levels.

The purpose with this essay is to investigate if there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. My methodology is to investigate the question of religions liberty in Sudan on the basis of three social levels: state level, religious actors and individual- level. I will use Cole Durham’s comparative Model for analyzing religions liberty and apply it on Sudan. The theory consists of the four thresholds of minimal pluralism, economic stability, political legitimacy and respect for other beliefs. My research questions are based on answering what has been done on the three social levels in Sudan after 2005. The conclusion of the study is that there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the peace agreement. I also claim that the conditions are better now compared to the contiguous period before the CPA. Finally, I remark that there exists religious discrimination in the whole Sudanese society that has to be dealt with on the three different levels.

The purpose with this essay is to investigate if there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. My methodology is to investigate the question of religions liberty in Sudan on the basis of three social levels: state level, religious actors and individual- level. I will use Cole Durham’s comparative Model for analyzing religions liberty and apply it on Sudan. The theory consists of the four thresholds of minimal pluralism, economic stability, political legitimacy and respect for other beliefs. My research questions are based on answering what has been done on the three social levels in Sudan after 2005. The conclusion of the study is that there are conditions for freedom of religion in Sudan after the peace agreement. I also claim that the conditions are better now compared to the contiguous period before the CPA. Finally, I remark that there exists religious discrimination in the whole Sudanese society that has to be dealt with on the three different levels.

he release of the anti-Islam movie “Fitna” by the Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders, early 2008, aroused anxious fears of angry responses by Muslims communities. As happened in the Danish cartoon crisis, people expected the movie to trigger violent demonstrations, boycotts, the burning of flags and other aggressive responses by Muslim communities, both in the Netherlands and around the world. Months prior to the actual release of the movie, the Dutch prime minister already spoke of a crisis, predicting violent confrontations between Muslims and non- Muslims, and devastating consequences for Muslim integration in Dutch society. Contrary to the wide anticipation that Muslims would respond violently to the movie, there were few incidents. In the Netherlands, there were no noticeable incidents at all. Eloquent young Muslims stepped forward as representatives for their communities and of Islam, explicitly distancing themselves from radical or violent action by Muslims in answer to the film. Likewise, orthodox Muslims made strong pleas to react in a non-violent and dignified way to “Fitna”. Outside the Netherlands, there were only a few incidents, like the attack on a Dutch consulate in Indonesia by a group of students and the expected burning of the Dutch flag in countries like Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Dutch fear of violence involving Muslims typifies the implicit association that people easily seem to make between Muslims and violence. Almost irrespective of the actual level of violent incidents, Muslims seem to project an image of responding violently to every political incident. How did this image come into being? In the Netherlands, what types of incidents and developments have occurred that led to potentially violent tensions and conflicts in which Muslims were involved?

he release of the anti-Islam movie “Fitna” by the Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders, early 2008, aroused anxious fears of angry responses by Muslims communities. As happened in the Danish cartoon crisis, people expected the movie to trigger violent demonstrations, boycotts, the burning of flags and other aggressive responses by Muslim communities, both in the Netherlands and around the world. Months prior to the actual release of the movie, the Dutch prime minister already spoke of a crisis, predicting violent confrontations between Muslims and non- Muslims, and devastating consequences for Muslim integration in Dutch society. Contrary to the wide anticipation that Muslims would respond violently to the movie, there were few incidents. In the Netherlands, there were no noticeable incidents at all. Eloquent young Muslims stepped forward as representatives for their communities and of Islam, explicitly distancing themselves from radical or violent action by Muslims in answer to the film. Likewise, orthodox Muslims made strong pleas to react in a non-violent and dignified way to “Fitna”. Outside the Netherlands, there were only a few incidents, like the attack on a Dutch consulate in Indonesia by a group of students and the expected burning of the Dutch flag in countries like Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Dutch fear of violence involving Muslims typifies the implicit association that people easily seem to make between Muslims and violence. Almost irrespective of the actual level of violent incidents, Muslims seem to project an image of responding violently to every political incident. How did this image come into being? In the Netherlands, what types of incidents and developments have occurred that led to potentially violent tensions and conflicts in which Muslims were involved?