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We study the dynamics of capital accumulation, income inequality, capital concentration, and voting up to 1914. Based on new panel data for Prussian regions, we re-evaluate the famous Revisionism Debate between orthodox Marxists and their critics. We show that changes in capital accumulation led to a rise in the capital share and income inequality, as predicted by orthodox Marxists. But against their predictions, this did neither lead to further capital concentration nor to more votes for the socialists. Instead, trade unions and strike activity limited income inequality and fostered political support for socialism, as argued by the Revisionists., Peer Reviewed

This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a flat tax schedule on capital income on the progressivity of the German personal income tax, with a particular focus on top income groups. The reform-induced change in net incomes is proposed as a measure for progressivity changes at the top. Changes in vertical and horizontal equity are analyzed and broken down by reform component. The analysis is based on a micro-level panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006 that is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. The panel structure is used to construct a permanent reform effect that is less prone to annual volatility in income composition. The reform is found to be regressive. It is shown that the reform included substantial loop-holes. Within the top of the distribution, the gain in net incomes is spread widely, but is not negative under plausible assumptions on reporting adjustments.

This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a flat tax schedule on capital income on the progressivity of the German personal income tax, with a particular focus on top income groups. The reform-induced change in net incomes is proposed as a measure for progressivity changes at the top. Changes in vertical and horizontal equity are analyzed and broken down by reform component. The analysis is based on a micro-level panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006 that is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. The panel structure is used to construct a permanent reform effect that is less prone to annual volatility in income composition. The reform is found to be regressive. It is shown that the reform included substantial loop-holes. Within the top of the distribution, the gain in net incomes is spread widely, but is not negative under plausible assumptions on reporting adjustments.

This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a flat tax schedule on capital income on the progressivity of the German personal income tax, with a particular focus on top income groups. The reform-induced change in net incomes is proposed as a measure for progressivity changes at the top. Changes in vertical and horizontal equity are analyzed and broken down by reform component. The analysis is based on a micro-level panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006 that is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. The panel structure is used to construct a permanent reform effect that is less prone to annual volatility in income composition. The reform is found to be regressive. It is shown that the reform included substantial loop-holes. Within the top of the distribution, the gain in net incomes is spread widely, but is not negative under plausible assumptions on reporting adjustments.

This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a flat tax schedule on capital income on the progressivity of the German personal income tax, with a particular focus on top income groups. The reform-induced change in net incomes is proposed as a measure for progressivity changes at the top. Changes in vertical and horizontal equity are analyzed and broken down by reform component. The analysis is based on a micro-level panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006 that is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. The panel structure is used to construct a permanent reform effect that is less prone to annual volatility in income composition. The reform is found to be regressive. It is shown that the reform included substantial loop-holes. Within the top of the distribution, the gain in net incomes is spread widely, but is not negative under plausible assumptions on reporting adjustments.

This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a flat tax schedule on capital income on the progressivity of the German personal income tax, with a particular focus on top income groups. The reform-induced change in net incomes is proposed as a measure for progressivity changes at the top. Changes in vertical and horizontal equity are analyzed and broken down by reform component. The analysis is based on a micro-level panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006 that is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. The panel structure is used to construct a permanent reform effect that is less prone to annual volatility in income composition. The reform is found to be regressive. It is shown that the reform included substantial loop-holes. Within the top of the distribution, the gain in net incomes is spread widely, but is not negative under plausible assumptions on reporting adjustments.

There is a widespread perception that present-day Nordic egalitarianism is the outcome of a long historical continuity, where the strong political position of peasant farmers and weak feudalism were marking characteristics of pre-industrial society. However, little empirical evidence so far exists on the distribution of income for the early modern period. In this paper, we draw on the schedule and individual assessments devised by the authorities to distribute the tax-burden associated with the Älvsborg ransom to estimate income inequality and the share of income accruing to top income earners and to different social groups in the Swedish realm (present-day Sweden and Finland) in 1613. Using this information, we are able to speak to several debates on pre-industrial distribution of income and historical inequality in the Nordic countries. We find that the income share of the richest one percent was 13 percent while the share of the top 0.01 percent stood at 2 percent. Sweden was characterized by a two- pronged social structure where a large share of income was held by the absolute top as well as by the peasants who made up the majority of the population, while the nobility, clergy, burghers and other middle-rank groups held relatively small income shares not least due to their small population numbers. This finding helps explain the relatively strong position of peasants as a fourth estate within the early modern Swedish parliament. While Sweden in the early seventeenth century was relatively equal compared to other contemporary societies, the egalitarian social structure was upended over the subsequent centuries resulting in vast economic and political inequality by the late nineteenth century. Thus, there is no apparent continuity between early modern equality and post-WW2 egalitarianism.

Using tax data and combined tax-survey data, this thesis examines earnings inequality in Germany and income inequality in Australia. A particular focus is on combining tax record data and household survey data to obtain more accurate income data with the purpose of better understanding inequality in these two countries. Chapter 2, using tax data alone, creates historical series of top earnings shares. Using German wage tax statistics for 1926–2010, this chapter creates the first consistently measured long-term series of German top earnings shares. I find a U-shape pattern with top earnings shares falling from 1926 through the mid-1970s and almost continuously rising thereafter. I then compare my results to those from other studies examining top earnings shares in the US, UK, and France. Over the entire period it is reasonable to describe trends in the US, UK and Germany as U-shaped. All three decline from pre-WWII highs. The US shares begin to grow from the mid-1960s. The UK and German shares grow from the mid-1970s. In the mid-1990s, they begin to converge at a level substantially below the US. The French shares follow a different pattern that can be reasonably described as W-shaped. Over the entire period (1957–2010) that it is possible to disaggregate the data by gender, women are underrepresented among top earners. Despite an increase in their labour force participation from 1957 to 1986, their share in the top 10% and top 1% of all workers remained unchanged. Only after German reunification in 1990 did women’s presence among top earners begin to increase. Chapter 3, using a similar adjustment procedure as Burkhauser, Herault, et al. (2018) but applying it to earnings, combines data from tax records and from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) to explore measures of annual earnings inequality that are broader than the top earnings shares of the previous chapter. I show that the unadjusted survey data, unlike the adjusted data, fail to replicate those shares.

Using yearly register data on the full population of Sweden we study gender differences in top incomes, down to the top 0.01 percentile group, over the period 1971-2017. We find that, while women are still a minority of the top decile, and typically make up a smaller share the higher up in the distribution we move, their presence has steadily increased in all top groups over the past half-century. At the beginning of the period, top income women relied more on capital incomes, but the rise in the share of top women is not due to the growing importance of capital. Instead, women have increased their presence in the top by gains in the top of labour incomes, while top income men have captured most of the growth in capital incomes. Studying gender differences in observable characteristics we find small gender differences in some respects, convergence in others, but also some important remaining differences. Overall, our results suggest that many findings in the top income literature have a clear gender component and that understanding gender equality in the top of the distribution requires studying not only earnings and labour market outcomes but also incomes from other sources, as well as family circumstances.

Using yearly register data on the full population of Sweden we study gender differences in top incomes, down to the top 0.01 percentile group, over the period 1971–2017. We find that, while women are still a minority of the top decile, and typically make up a smaller share the higher up in the distribution we move, their presence has steadily increased in all top groups over the past half-century. At the beginning of the period, top income women relied more on capital incomes, but the rise in the share of top women is not due to the growing importance of capital. Instead, women have increased their presence in the top by gains in the top of labour incomes, while top income men have captured most of the growth in capital incomes. Studying gender differences in observable characteristics we find small gender differences in some respects, convergence in others, but also some important remaining differences. Overall, our results suggest that many findings in the top income literature have a clear gender component and that understanding gender equality in the top of the distribution requires studying not only earnings and labour market outcomes but also incomes from other sources, as well as family circumstances.

We explore the extent to which LIS-data can be used to shed light on the presence of women in the top of the income distribution. We show developments of the share of women in top groups (P90-100 and P99-100) of the labour income distribution for 28 countries and, when possible, compare to outcomes when including capital incomes. These turn out not to matter much for the share of women in top groups with some important exceptions. Relating our findings to the existing evidence on women in the top of the income distribution based on aggregate tax data, we find that LIS-data give a relatively accurate picture of the basic findings. However, we also note that once we divide the top1 group further, samples quickly become too small to allow further study. For countries where data allows such analysis, we find that having a partner and having children are positively associated with being in top income groups for men, but negatively associated for women. However, time interactions suggest that these differences have decreased over time. Also, top income men are more likely to have partners who are not in the top of the income distribution while this is not the case for top income women. All these results are surprisingly consistent across country groups.

While the rising income share of top earners has received enormous attention in recent years, the share of women at the top has not been examined as closely. This column analyses income tax data from Sweden, where taxes are filed individually regardless of marital status. It finds that while the share of women among the wealthiest groups has steadily increased over time, women remain a clear minority, especially at the very top. Unlike top-income men, top-income women are much more likely to have partners who are also in the top of the income distribution.

I analyze German top income mobility using micro-level panel data of personal income tax returns which are highly representative for top income taxpayers for the years 2001–06. Top income mobility is assessed in three dimensions: (i) persistence in top income fractiles and its stability over time, (ii) measures of individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size: the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, and (iii) mobility's impact on top income shares. Persistence in top income fractiles is comparatively high and fairly stable across the analyzed period. Top income recipients are less prone to downward mobility and see less variation in annual ranks than less rich tax units. Mobility's impact on income concentration is moderate. The top percentile's share is reduced by roughly 5 percent over six years.

This paper reviews the long run developments in the distribution of personal income and wealth. It also discusses suggested explanations for the observed patterns. We try to answer questions such as: What do we know, and how do we know, about the distribution of income and wealth over time? Are there common trends across countries or over the path of development? How do the facts relate to proposed theories about changes in inequality? We present the main inequality trends, in some cases starting as early as in the late eighteenth century, combining previous research with recent findings in the so-called top income literature and new evidence on wealth concentration. The picture that emerges shows that inequality was historically high almost everywhere at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some countries this situation was preceded by increasing concentration, but in most cases inequality seems to have been relatively constant at a high level in the nineteenth century. Over the twentieth century inequality decreased almost everywhere for the first 80 years, largely due to decreasing wealth concentration and decreasing capital incomes in the top of the distribution. Thereafter trends are more divergent across countries and also different across income and wealth distributions. Econometric evidence over the long run suggests that top shares increase in periods of above average growth while democracy and high marginal tax rates are associated with lower top shares.

This paper reviews the long run developments in the distribution of personal income and wealth. It also discusses suggested explanations for the observed patterns. We try to answer questions such as: What do we know, and how do we know, about the distribution of income and wealth over time? Are there common trends across countries or over the path of development? How do the facts relate to proposed theories about changes in inequality? We present the main inequality trends, in some cases starting as early as in the late eighteenth century, combining previous research with recent findings in the so-called top income literature and new evidence on wealth concentration. The picture that emerges shows that inequality was historically high almost everywhere at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some countries this situation was preceded by increasing concentration, but in most cases inequality seems to have been relatively constant at a high level in the nineteenth century. Over the twentieth century inequality decreased almost everywhere for the first 80 years, largely due to decreasing wealth concentration and decreasing capital incomes in the top of the distribution. Thereafter trends are more divergent across countries and also different across income and wealth distributions. Econometric evidence over the long run suggests that top shares increase in periods of above average growth while democracy and high marginal tax rates are associated with lower top shares.

From an all-time low around 1980, income inequality substantially increased, reflecting a strong rise in top incomes and income from capital, more recently also a widening gap between bottom and middle incomes. Behind this are the dual income tax system, established in the early 1990s, the introduction of earned income tax credits, and a diminished coverage of social insurance programmes, which widened the income gap between employed and non-employed during the 2000s. The benefit and tax systems became less redistributive and thereby contributed to increased income inequalities. Another important element is the deep recession in the early 1990s with skyrocketing unemployment and subsequent cutbacks in welfare provision. Income inequalities, however, increased first and foremost in the aftermath of the recession. The chapter finds no unambiguous trend in social, cultural, and political conditions corresponding to the increased inequalities. There is increased polarization for many indicators between different socio-economic groups.

This paper reviews the long run developments in the distribution of personal income and wealth. It also discusses suggested explanations for the observed patterns. We try to answer questions such as: What do we know, and how do we know, about the distribution of income and wealth over time? Are there common trends across countries or over the path of development? How do the facts relate to proposed theories about changes in inequality? We present the main inequality trends, in some cases starting as early as in the late eighteenth century, combining previous research with recent findings in the so-called top income literature and new evidence on wealth concentration. The picture that emerges shows that inequality was historically high almost everywhere at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some countries this situation was preceded by increasing concentration, but in most cases inequality seems to have been relatively constant at a high level in the nineteenth century. Over the twentieth century inequality decreased almost everywhere for the first 80 years, largely due to decreasing wealth concentration and decreasing capital incomes in the top of the distribution. Thereafter trends are more divergent across countries and also different across income and wealth distributions. Econometric evidence over the long run suggests that top shares increase in periods of above average growth while democracy and high marginal tax rates are associated with lower top shares.

This paper reviews the long run developments in the distribution of personal income and wealth. It also discusses suggested explanations for the observed patterns. We try to answer questions such as: What do we know, and how do we know, about the distribution of income and wealth over time? Are there common trends across countries or over the path of development? How do the facts relate to proposed theories about changes in inequality? We present the main inequality trends, in some cases starting as early as in the late eighteenth century, combining previous research with recent findings in the so-called top income literature and new evidence on wealth concentration. The picture that emerges shows that inequality was historically high almost everywhere at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some countries this situation was preceded by increasing concentration, but in most cases inequality seems to have been relatively constant at a high level in the nineteenth century. Over the twentieth century inequality decreased almost everywhere for the first 80 years, largely due to decreasing wealth concentration and decreasing capital incomes in the top of the distribution. Thereafter trends are more divergent across countries and also different across income and wealth distributions. Econometric evidence over the long run suggests that top shares increase in periods of above average growth while democracy and high marginal tax rates are associated with lower top shares.

This paper reviews the long run developments in the distribution of personal income and wealth. It also discusses suggested explanations for the observed patterns. We try to answer questions such as: What do we know, and how do we know, about the distribution of income and wealth over time? Are there common trends across countries or over the path of development? How do the facts relate to proposed theories about changes in inequality? We present the main inequality trends, in some cases starting as early as in the late eighteenth century, combining previous research with recent findings in the so-called top income literature and new evidence on wealth concentration. The picture that emerges shows that inequality was historically high almost everywhere at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some countries this situation was preceded by increasing concentration, but in most cases inequality seems to have been relatively constant at a high level in the nineteenth century. Over the twentieth century inequality decreased almost everywhere for the first 80 years, largely due to decreasing wealth concentration and decreasing capital incomes in the top of the distribution. Thereafter trends are more divergent across countries and also different across income and wealth distributions. Econometric evidence over the long run suggests that top shares increase in periods of above average growth while democracy and high marginal tax rates are associated with lower top shares.

This paper presents new evidence on intergenerational mobility at the top of the income and earnings distributions. Using a large dataset of matched father-son pairs in Sweden, we find that intergenerational transmission is very strong at the top, more so for income than for earnings. At the extreme top (top 0.1%) income transmission is remarkable with an intergenerational elasticity of approximately 0.9. We also study potential transmission mechanisms and find that IQ non-cognitive skills and education of the sons are all unlikely channels in explaining the strong transmission. Within the top percentile, increases in the income of the fathers, if they are related at all, are negatively associated with these variables. Wealth, on the other hand, has a significantly positive association. Our results suggest that Sweden, known for having relatively high intergenerational mobility in general, is a society in which transmission remains strong at the very top of the distribution and wealth is the most likely channel.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets.

This paper presents new evidence on intergenerational mobility at the top of the income and earnings distributions. Using a large dataset of matched father-son pairs in Sweden, we find that intergenerational transmission is very strong at the top, more so for income than for earnings. At the extreme top (top 0.1%) income transmission is remarkable with an intergenerational elasticity of approximately 0.9. We also study potential transmission mechanisms and find that IQ, non-cognitive skills and education of the sons are all unlikely channels in explaining the strong transmission. Within the top percentile, increases in the income of the fathers, if they are related at all, are negatively associated with these variables. Wealth, on the other hand, has a significantly positive association. Our results suggest that Sweden, known for having relatively high intergenerational mobility in general, is a society in which transmission remains strong at the very top of the distribution and wealth is the most likely channel.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We showthat in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequalityand, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to averageincomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excludingcapital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than atransitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however,makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capitalgains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes interms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primarydriver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulatedfinancial markets., Also published in Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2011:7.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets., Also published in Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University; 2011:4.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We showthat in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequalityand, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to averageincomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excludingcapital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than atransitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however,makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capitalgains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes interms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primarydriver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulatedfinancial markets., Also published in Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2011:7.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets., Also published in Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University; 2011:4.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets., Also published in Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University; 2011:4.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We showthat in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequalityand, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to averageincomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excludingcapital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than atransitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however,makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capitalgains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes interms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primarydriver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulatedfinancial markets., Also published in Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2011:7.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We showthat in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequalityand, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to averageincomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excludingcapital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than atransitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however,makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capitalgains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes interms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primarydriver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulatedfinancial markets., Also published in Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2011:7.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets., Also published in Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University; 2011:4.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We show that in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequality and, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to average incomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excluding capital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than a transitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however, makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capital gains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes in terms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primary driver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulated financial markets., Also published in Working paper / Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University; 2011:4.

Realized capital gains are typically disregarded in the study of income inequality. We showthat in the case of Sweden this severely underestimates the actual increase in inequalityand, in particular, top income shares during recent decades. Using micro panel data to averageincomes over longer periods and re-rank individuals according to income excludingcapital gains, we show that capital gains indeed are a reoccurring addition to rather than atransitory component in top incomes. Doing the same for lower income groups, however,makes virtually no difference. We also try to find the roots of the recent surge in capitalgains-driven inequality in Sweden since the 1980s. While there are no evident changes interms of who earns these gains (high wage earners vs. top capital income earners), the primarydriver instead seems to be the drastic asset price increases on the post-1980 deregulatedfinancial markets., Also published in Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975; 2011:7.

This paper studies determinants of income inequality using a newly assembled panel of 16 countries over the entire twentieth century. We focus on three groups of income earners: the rich (P99-100), the upper middle class (P90-99), and the rest of the population (P0-90). The results show that periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile income share at the expense of the rest of the top decile. Financial development is also pro-rich and the outbreak of banking crises is associated with reduced income shares of the rich. Trade openness has no clear distributional impact (if anything openness reduces top shares). Government spending, however, is negative for the upper middle class and positive for the nine lowest deciles but does not seem to affect the rich. Finally, tax progressivity reduces top income shares and when accounting for real dynamic effects the impact can be important over time., authorCount :3

Does a rising tide lift all boats? This question – that is, to what extent does improvements of the general economy benefit all – is central to the study of economics and history. From fundamental issues about whether market forces have an innate tendency to increase or decrease differences in economic outcomes, to much debated questions about the effects of government policies, distributional concerns are always present. In this dissertation, a novel dataset of international long-term income wealth inequality data is presented and used to shed new light on long-standing issues in economic history. What were the distributional impacts of the industrial revolution? Who gains and who loses the most from the outbreak of a financial crisis? Has progressive taxation been a successful way to redistribute resources from the rich to the rest of the population? Several important findings come out of the analyses presented. A general result is that whereas nineteenth century industrialization had a mixed impact on inequality across the Western world the twentieth century experience, including a rapid growth of government, educational reforms and the introduction of progressive taxation, uniformly equalized societies.

Using taxation and household survey data, this paper estimates top income shares for Indonesia during 1920-2004. Our results suggest that top income shares grew during the 1920s and 1930s, but fell in the post-war era. In more recent decades, we observe a sharp rise in top income shares during the late-1990s, coincident with the economic downturn, and some evidence that top income shares fell in the early-2000s. For pre-war Indonesia, we decompose top income shares by income source, and find that for groups below the top 0.5 percent, a majority of income was derived from wages. Throughout the twentieth century, top income shares in Indonesia have been higher than in India, broadly comparable to Japan, and somewhat lower than levels prevailing in the United States.

We investigate whether changes in economic inequality affect mortality in rich countries. To answer this question we use a new source of data on income inequality: tax data on the share of pretax income going to the richest 10 percent of the population in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US between 1903 and 2003. Although this measure is not a good proxy for inequality within the bottom half of the income distribution, it is a good proxy for changes in the top half of the distribution and for the Gini coefficient. In the absence of country and year fixed effects, the income share of the top decile is negatively related to life expectancy and positively related to infant mortality. However, in our preferred fixed-effects specification these relationships are weak, statistically insignificant, and likely to change their sign. Nor do our data suggest that changes in the income share of the richest 10 percent affect homicide or suicide rates.