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The purpose of the present paper is to examine a selection of macro- and micro-linguistic features (at text and sentence/word level respectively) of the South-African Green Paper “National Climate Change Response” from 2010. Our overarching assumption is that the Green Paper needs to handle competing interests, beliefs and voices in a narrative structure favouring specific courses of action. How does the government portray the complex natural and societal phenomenon of climate change, and how does it take into account the many and often competing national and international views and interests which come into play? Our hypothesis is that the Green Paper constructs a narrative and that it relates to a number of voices other than that of the authors, through linguistic markers of polyphony, such as negation, sentence connectives, adverbs and reported speech. Thus we propose a narrative and polyphonic analysis of the Green Paper, at the level of the text as a whole (macro-level) but also with attention to linguistic constructions of polyphony or “multi-voicedness” (micro-level). We find that the narrative-polyphonic properties of the Green Paper contribute to a strategy for building consensus on climate change policy. The South African government assumes the role of main hero in its own climate change “story”, and there are subtle forms of interaction with different and typically non-identified voices, such as concessive constructions and presuppositions. These results support our overarching interpretation of the whole document as striving to impose a South African consensus on the issue of climate change.

In his article Willems (Clim Chang 120(4):931–944, 2013) proposed a methodology to analyse extremes in rainfall series. When applying it to artificially generated, non-cyclic random variables we were able to detect cyclic behavior. Therefor we had a closer look on the methodology. Here we discuss our considerations, why this method generates cycles, depending on chosen subperiods and their coherence between detected cycle lengths. To verify these relationships some examples based on random data samples are given.

The discussion reviews the prevailing pattern of energy demand and supply in the MINK states, speculates on the region's long-term energy future in the absence and presence of greenhouse warming, and, in the latter case, considers energy sector adaptation to such a prospect. Climate-sensitive energydemand is dominated by heating and cooling in various sectors of the regional economy (around 20% of regional energy consumption) and by such agricultural applications as irrigation pumping and crop drying (around 5%). A climate-sensitive energysupply issue of some importance is the region's partial dependence on hydroelectric capacity in the upper Missouri river basin. The analysis finds that, unlike the rather significant impacts likely to be experienced by other sectors of the regional economy, the hypothesized warming trend will translate into only small net increases in energy demand; and that technological possibilities and policy measures are available to mute any serious climatic effects on the energy sector.

The impacts of climate change on the agricultural, energy, forestry, and water sectors of MINK would reverberate negatively throughout the regional economy. Allowing for sectoral adjustments to the new climate, however, the decline in regional income and production would not likely exceed 1–2%. The largest economy-wide impacts would be by way of the agricultural and water sectors. The impacts by way of forestry and energy would be negligible, unless the nation adopts a program of massive reforestation to capture CO2, which would positively affect the regional economy.

The adaptability of forests in the U.S. midwest to a changing climate is assessed. The forests of Missouri are simulated with a ‘forest-gap’ model, a stochastic model of the annual growth and mortality of trees within mixed-species forest plots. The development of representative forest plots under an analog climate like that of the 1930s is compared to development under baseline climate conditions. With no management response, average forest biomass in the region declines by 11% within ten years, primarily due to moisture-stress induced mortality. Longer term declines in forest productivity on the order of 30% are simulated. A variety of possible management responses through planting or harvesting practices were evaluated. None of these adaptations appear to be practical, although the salvage harvest of stressed trees would offset the economifc losses associated with the early mortality. An investigation of anticipated trends in the broader forest products sector suggests that opportunities for further adaptation to offset the decline in primary productivity of this region's forest are quite limited. However, a shift to wood powered electrical generation in the region might justify a level of management that would allow some adaptation to the analog climate change.

A four step methodology has been developed for study of the regional impacts of climate change and the possible responses thereto. First the region's climate sensitive sectors and total economy are described (Task A, current baseline). Next a scenario of climate change is imposed on the current baseline (Task B, current baseline with climate change). A new baseline describing the climate sensitive sectors and total regional economy is projected for some time in the future (Task C, future baseline, year 2030) in the absence of climate change. Finally, the climate change scenario is reimposed on the future baseline (Task D, future baseline with climate change). Impacts of the climate change scenario on the current and future regional economies are determined by means of simulation models and other appropriate techniques. These techniques are also used to assess the impacts of an elevated CO2 concentration (450 ppm) and of various forms of adjustments and adaptations.

The climate of the 1930s was used as an analog of the climate that might occur in Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas (the MINK region) as a consequence of global warming. The analog climate was imposed on the agriculture of the region under technological and economic conditions prevailing in 1984/87 and again under a scenario of conditions that might prevail in 2030. The EPIC model of Williamset al. (1984), modified to allow consideration of the yield enhancing effects of CO2 enrichment, was used to evaluate the impacts of the analog climate on the productivity and water use of some 50 representative farm enterprises. Before farm level adjustments and adaptations to the changed climate, and absent CO2 enrichment (from 350 to 450 ppm), production of corn, sorghum and soybeans was depressed by the analog climate in about the same percent under both current and 2030 conditions. Production of dryland wheat was unaffected. Irrigated wheat production actually increased. Farm level adjustments using low-cost currently available technologies, combined with CO2 enrichment, eliminated about 80% of the negative impact of the analog climate on 1984/87 baseline crop production. The same farm level adjustments, plus new technologies developed in response to the analog climate, when combined with CO2 enrichment, converted the negative impact on 2030 crop production to a small increase. The analog climate would have little direct effect on animal production in MINK. The effect, if any, would be by way of the impact on production of feed-grains and soybeans. Since this impact would be small after on-farm adjustments and CO2 enrichment, animal production in MINK would be little affected by the analog climate.

Climate change is expected to bring potentially significant changes to Washington State’s natural, institutional, cultural, and economic landscape. Addressing climate change impacts will require a sustained commitment to integrating climate information into the day-to-day governance and management of infrastructure, programs, and services that may be affected by climate change. This paper discusses fundamental concepts for planning for climate change and identifies options for adapting to the climate impacts evaluated in the Washington Climate Change Impacts Assessment. Additionally, the paper highlights potential avenues for increasing flexibility in the policies and regulations used to govern human and natural systems in Washington.

This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate about the selection of the approach for carbon accounting in wood products to be used, in the future, in the national greenhouse gas inventories under the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Two accounting approaches are used in this analysis: the stock-change approach and the atmospheric-flow approach. They are applied to the Portuguese Eucalyptus globulus forest sector. To achieve this objective, the fluxes of wood removed from the forest are tracked through its life cycle, which includes products manufacture (mainly pulp and paper), use and final disposal (landfilling, incineration and composting). This study develops a framework to the estimation of carbon sequestration in the forest of E. globulus, a fast growing species, more specifically, in the calculation of the conversion factors such as bark and foliage percentages and densities, used to convert wood volumes into total biomass. A mass balance approach based on real data from mills is also proposed, in order to assess carbon emissions from wood processing. The results show that E. globulus forest sector was a carbon sink, but the magnitude of the carbon sequestration differs substantially depending on the accounting approach used. The contribution of the forest ecosystem was smaller than the aggregated contribution of wood products in use and in landfills (including industrial waste), which reinforces the role that wood products play in national carbon budgets.

In Sweden’s Norrbotten County, a “green transition” driven by market demand and new normative structures is underway, creating a regional mega-project designed to put Sweden at the forefront of emerging green industries. These industries, such as carbon-neutral steel fabrication, battery production, and data center hosting, all require large amounts of energy, land, and minerals. This paper applies the regional environmental governance framework to Arctic data to examine which stakeholders have the capacity to impose their agenda on the Arctic environment and the points of conflict and collaboration during this period of accelerated growth. The paper tests the assumption that regional governance accommodates a plurality of interests. A case study examining Norrbotten County’s industrial mega-project centered around Luleå, Sweden, identifies a dominant coalition uniting government and industry that supports norms seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in this region. However, the existing regional governance model does a poor job of integrating the local Indigenous Sámi preferences for land use. At the core of the difference between actors advancing the green economy and the local Sámi reindeer herders are divergent conceptions of nature and sustainability. Validerad;2023;Nivå 2;2023-03-30 (joosat);Funder: United States National Science Foundation (2127364)Licens fulltext: CC BY License

This paper presents the results of a detailed review of the research literature on how nomadic pastoralists are being affected by climate change, how they are adapting, and challenges with using traditional knowledge in adaptation. It focuses on research that investigates local, and particularly traditional, knowledge of water, pasture, their variability, and livestock. This knowledge underpins nomadic livelihoods, so is a foundation for effective adaptation. Changes in the total amount of precipitation, and particularly shifts in its timing, and increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme events, are having the greatest impacts on herding livelihoods. Herders in drylands worldwide face common adaptation challenges: declining traditional water sources and pasture degradation. Herders’ adaptation strategies fall into five major categories: movement to areas with better water and pasture, improving seasonal access to water, improving seasonal access to feed, shifts in herd composition, and livelihood diversification. Movement is central to nomads’ adaptation, yet, as climate change takes hold, restrictions on movement are increasing for both socio-economic reasons and climate reasons. Many papers emphasised the importance of combining traditional knowledge and current science to guide adaptation decision-making at household, locality, and national levels. There is widespread concern about the decline in traditional knowledge. All the papers reviewed emphasised the need to support passing on traditional know-how. Herder women’s know-how, in particular, is marginalised in the research literature, so their traditional knowledge should be a focus in further research. Herders’ adaptations are mostly localised, incremental, and have a relatively short-term focus. As nomadic pastoralism moves further outside the range of historical experience, the possibility of more profound transformations looms.

Moving beyond technocratic approaches to climate action, climate justice articulates a paradigm shift in how organizations think about their response to the climate crisis. This paper makes a conceptual contribution by exploring the potential of this paradigm shift in higher education. Through a commitment to advancing transformative climate justice, colleges and universities around the world could realign and redefine their priorities in teaching, research, and community engagement to shape a more just, stable, and healthy future. As inequitable climate vulnerabilities increase, higher education has multiple emerging opportunities to resist, reverse, and repair climate injustices and related socioeconomic and health disparities. Rather than continuing to perpetuate the concentration of wealth and power by promoting climate isolationism’s narrow focus on technological innovation and by prioritizing the financial success of alumni and the institution, colleges and universities have an opportunity to leverage their unique role as powerful anchor institutions to demonstrate climate justice innovations and catalyze social change toward a more equitable, renewable-based future. This paper explores how higher education can advance societal transformation toward climate justice, by teaching climate engagement, supporting impactful justice-centered research, embracing non-extractive hiring and purchasing practices, and integrating community-engaged climate justice innovations across campus operations. Two climate justice frameworks, Green New Deal-type policies and energy democracy, provide structure for reviewing a breadth of proposed transformational climate justice initiatives in higher education.

Addressing energy provision and access in Sub-Saharan Africa is a key global challenge. This paper builds a deep understanding of how fair and just energy policies and realties are in this context. It qualitatively assesses the perceptions of stakeholders in Malawi, where electricity access remains amongst the lowest in the region. Insufficient and unreliable systems of grid energy generation and distribution limit access to electricity in both urban and rural settings. Using wood fuel remains high for meeting cooking, heating, and lighting needs. Responding to these dual challenges, of lacking electricity access and ongoing wood fuel use, must be rooted in notions of equity, fairness, and justice. This paper argues that energy justice provides key insights into how best to respond to complex and interconnected issues of energy generation and access in low-income settings. Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders in policy and Malawi on addressing these challenges, this paper also outlines recommendations for policy. Overall, a just response to these energy challenges is possible, but only if it is built on local inclusive governance with fairer and effective systems of investment.

Tropical cyclones (TCs) are amongst the costliest natural hazards for southwest Pacific (SWP) Island nations. Extreme winds coupled with heavy rainfall and related coastal hazards, such as large waves and high seas, can have devastating consequences for life and property. Effects of anthropogenic climate change are likely to make TCs even more destructive in the SWP (as that observed particularly over Fiji) and elsewhere around the globe, yet TCs may occur less often. However, the underpinning science of quantifying future TC projections amid multiple uncertainties can be complex. The challenge for scientists is how to turn such technical knowledge framed around uncertainties into tangible products to inform decision-making in the disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) sector. Drawing on experiences from past TC events as analogies to what may happen in a warming climate can be useful. The role of science-based climate services tailored to the needs of the DRM and DRR sector is critical in this context. In the first part of this paper, we examine cases of historically severe TCs in the SWP and quantify their socio-economic impacts. The second part of this paper discusses a decision-support framework developed in collaboration with a number of agencies in the SWP, featuring science-based climate services that inform different stages of planning in national-level risk management strategies.

Previous studies have projected a significant role for bioenergy in decarbonizing the global economy and helping realize international climate goals such as limiting global average warming to 2 ˚C or 1.5 ˚C. However, with substantial variability in bioenergy results and significant concerns about potential environmental and social implications, greater transparency and dedicated assessment of the underlying modeling and results and more detailed understanding of the potential role of bioenergy are needed. Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) initiated a 33rd study (EMF-33) to explore the viability of large-scale bioenergy as part of a comprehensive climate management strategy. This special issue presents the papers of the EMF-33 study—a multi-year inter-model comparison project designed to understand and assess global, long-run biomass supply and bioenergy deployment potentials and related uncertainties. Using a novel scenario design with independent biomass supply and bioenergy demand protocols, EMF-33 separately elucidates and explores the modeling of biomass feedstock supplies and bioenergy technologies and their deployment—revealing, comparing, and assessing the modeling that is suggesting that bioenergy could be a key climate containment strategy. This introduction provides an overview of the EMF-33 study design and the overview, thematic, and individual modeling team papers and types of insights that make up this special issue. By providing enhanced transparency and new detailed insights, we hope to inform policy dialogue about the potential role of bioenergy and facilitate new research.

Cities in the USA and around the world have begun to take an active role in responding to climate change. A central requirement for effective urban climate strategies is the capacity to understand and measure how the climate is changing, the physical, environmental, and social impacts of the changes, and whether adaptation and resiliency policies and programs put in place in response are working. The objective of this paper is to review and assess how urban climate change and resiliency efforts can be measured and to define what might serve as meaningful indicator and monitoring protocols. The New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) is used as a case study along with a reviews of the emerging literature of urban climate change indicators to analyze the requirements and processes needed for a successful urban climate resiliency indicator and monitoring (I and M) system. In the paper, the basic requirements of a proposed Urban Climate Resilience Indicators and Monitoring System are presented. A specific illustration of an I and M system for tracking the urban heat island highlights challenges as well as potential solutions embedded within such systems. Discussions how these protocols can be translated to other locales and settings, as well as the relationship to the US National Climate Assessment indicator process, are presented.

This paper explores stakeholder perspectives on the drought discourse in the UK, where climate change is predicted to increase drought risk. This study took a co-productive, mixed-methods approach to investigate drought risk communication issues through repeated engagements with local advisory groups in seven catchments across Britain and a national stakeholder competency group. These data were enriched by in-depth interviews with 17 statutory and non-statutory stakeholders working in a variety of capacities from water supply to habitat management. Codes were divided into contextual factors (cultural or drought specific factors) and individual factors (individual attributes relating to the person receiving the communication or factors within the control of communicators). The paper considers the implications of these contextual and personal factors for approaches to, and the framing of, drought risk communication (DRC). We conclude by proposing a framework for thinking about DRC in maritime climates where drought risk may not be readily perceived by some publics. This framework explores the role of heuristics in risk perception, and proposes a way of conceptualising publics that may more readily engage with DRC. In proposing the framework, we seek to stimulate new ways of thinking about DRC.

This paper assesses the options that developing countries have in ensuring food security in an environment where key climate parameters are changing rapidly. Based on a case study of Lesotho, the paper utilizes the Global Climate Model ensemble to determine future precipitation and temperature projections using data from Climate Explorer. The results indicate that in Lesotho, maximum temperature is likely to continue to increase. Coupled with a significant increase in precipitation under both Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 (p = 0.0008) and RCP 8.5 (p = 0.0001) scenarios and a significant increase of evaporation under the two scenarios for RCP 4.5 (p = 0.0008) and RCP 8.5 (p = 0.0103), the country’s preparedness for hazards arising from climate change is rendered uncertain. Despite this reality, we suggest that uncertainty could be reduced by reinforcing existing innovative measures that could improve the productive capacity of subsistence farmers, so that they meet their own food requirements, while preventing further environmental deterioration. While some measures will be based on the intensification of government-led social support mechanisms, others will depend on the support rendered to “tried and tested” traditional practices such as machobane and fato-fato, which have a long tradition in the country. However, on their own, these measures are insufficient to cope with rapidly changing climatic conditions, unless they are coupled with national research development initiatives, improved early warning systems, and enhancement of environmental monitoring capabilities, the implementation of which requires careful land use planning.

In this paper, a systematic literature review was conducted to synthesize understanding on farmers’ perception on climate change. Farmers’ perception of climate change is conceptualized as comprising of three dimensions—first, as farmers’ “awareness”; second, “conceptual understanding”; and third, the “experience” of climate change. The review included 162 papers published during the period January 2000 to July 2019. The highest number of studies was conducted in Africa, followed by Asia. A large majority of farmers report being aware of climate change. However, only a few studies elicit the difference between climate variability and climate change from farmers. A negligible number of studies attempt to identify the role of agricultural activities in greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Furthermore, authors compare farmers’ perception with meteorological evidence, which is more aligned in terms of change in “temperature” rather than “precipitation.” The insights from the review provide guidance on conceptualization and operationalization of the variable “farmers’ perception of climate change” for future studies.

In 2013, the Arctic Athabaskan Council representing the Arctic Athabaskan peoples filed a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Council sought relief for violations of their rights resulting from rapid Arctic warming and melting caused by emissions of black carbon by Canada. The aim of the paper is to show legal complaints and arguments of a particular indigenous people, Arctic Athabaskans—arguments intended to enforce Canada’s obligation to reduce or eliminate black carbon emissions, which negatively affect numerous rights of indigenous Athabaskans. Additionally, the article will point to the new legal developments and potential success of those arguments and litigation itself. The article analyses issues at the intersection of human rights, indigenous peoples and climate change. The concluding remarks attempt to answer the research questions and offer some reflections on the potential to protect indigenous peoples’ rights offered by this type of advocacy strategy and, more specifically, the petition in particular. The research method adopted is that of legal-institutional analysis as well as content analysis of relevant literature (analysis of the discourse). This paper moves forward existing climate litigation literature which focuses on human rights. As Osofsky and Peel (2018) highlight, human rights-based climate litigation is a new development in the field, and this paper expands it further.

The cranberry, a commodity of social, cultural, and economic importance to New England, is under threat due to climatic change in this region of the United States. Yet, previous research reveals that cranberry growers have mixed attitudes about the anthropogenic roots of climate change, with many being skeptical. Building on the researchers’ analysis of the personal and ecological conditions that affect climate change attitudes among cranberry growers, this paper examines the effect that key actors in the growers’ social networks have on those attitudes. Through statistical analysis of survey data and content analysis of two important cranberry newsletters, the paper finds that cranberry growers’ perceived importance of two key cranberry growing institutions, the “sociopolitically focused” Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Association and the “technically focused” University of Massachusetts Cranberry Station, as well as connections to other cranberry growers, is associated in nuanced ways with growers’ climate change attitudes. Drawing on the sociological theory of “social capital,” the paper examines how these social ties to key actors/institutions may result in greater threat perception or worry about climate change. It then considers how “green ties,” if harnessed and supported by these important actors in the cranberry grower network, might significantly mitigate climate change in the future. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1007/s10584-020-02808-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

The tangible progress to address climatic change remains painfully slow. As a result, practices to deliberately manipulate the Earth’s carbon and energy cycles to counteract climate change have gained traction and they are increasingly incorporated into mainstream debate. This paper examines one of the less documented examples of climate geoengineering, namely the creation of ‘super low carbon cows’. Driven by the public’s desire for a low carbon pint of milk or beef burger, I show how a combination of bioengineering, technological fixes and management practices have resulted in, and are informing, everyday changes to the way in which animals are bred, cared for and eaten—and in turn, how it affects the food that we consume. Thus, the role of the cow within the Anthropocene now extends from meat machine and sentient being to climate change saviour. I seek to show that super low carbon cows represent part of a wider climate ‘responsibilisation’ in which business interests and corporate storytelling are governing and enacting everyday mundane practices of climate engineering as part of the corporate carbon economy. Yet, as with other climate ‘fixes’, this paper shows that the super low carbon cow provides, at best, an imperfect correction. Critical gaps in the evidence of the efficiency of the solutions being advanced remain whilst manipulating an animal to be more climate friendly evokes unease when considering the wider sustainability and ethical impacts. Perhaps most critically, reliance on climate engineering to provide cheap and easy ways to control our climate fails to question, far less address, the ever-increasing demand, production and wastage of food. It also potentially undermines the already weak political will for other essential and more radical responses to climate change. In doing so, I contrast the extensive efforts to change the everyday behaviours of a cow with the limited attempts to meaningfully challenge the everyday practices, consumption lifestyles and dietary choices of the general public.

Greenhouse gas removal (GGR) techniques appear to offer hopes of balancing limited global carbon budgets by removing substantial amounts of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere later this century. This hope rests on an assumption that GGR will largely supplement emissions reduction. The paper reviews the expectations of GGR implied by integrated assessment modelling, categorizes ways in which delivery or promises of GGR might instead deter or delay emissions reduction, and offers a preliminary estimate of the possible extent of three such forms of ‘mitigation deterrence’. Type 1 is described as ‘substitution and failure’: an estimated 50–229 Gt-C (or 70% of expected GGR) may substitute for emissions otherwise reduced, yet may not be delivered (as a result of political, economic or technical shortcomings, or subsequent leakage or diversion of captured carbon into short-term utilization). Type 2, described as ‘rebounds’, encompasses rebounds, multipliers, and side-effects, such as those arising from land-use change, or use of captured CO2 in enhanced oil recovery. A partial estimate suggests that this could add 25–134 Gt-C to unabated emissions. Type 3, described as ‘imagined offsets’, is estimated to affect 17–27% of the emissions reductions required, reducing abatement by a further 182–297 Gt-C. The combined effect of these unanticipated net additions of CO2 to the atmosphere is equivalent to an additional temperature rise of up to 1.4 °C. The paper concludes that such a risk merits further deeper analysis and serious consideration of measures which might limit the occurrence and extent of mitigation deterrence.

Developing country case studies have thus far been under-represented in conceptual models attempting to theorize energy transitions. This paper explores the role of climate finance in the process of Madagascar’s planned transition to renewable energy sources as envisioned in the country’s New Energy Policy in order to demonstrate the different experience in developing countries when compared to hegemonic transition narratives. Drawing upon qualitative interviews with energy finance providers and focus groups in recently electrified rural communities, this paper reveals that Madagascar’s transition is dependent on the financial resources mobilized by the government’s technical and financial partners. Climate finance emerges as a critical lever to implement environmental legislation. The interview findings were correlated with census data to evaluate how current financing strategies are directly connected to energy justice issues, namely the equality in access to affordable and clean energy. Through an analysis of projected energy finance flows and key financiers’ financing strategies, this paper exposes a shift from grant-based climate finance to financial instruments with clear return profiles, such as concessional loans and private capital, and finds that the choice of financial instrument impacts the provision of complementary social services in rural electrification schemes. Grants are linked to higher investments into complementary social services, while private financiers focus on innovation and scale. Purely private financed electrification projects were found to negatively impact social cohesion by increasing the inequality in access to energy. This study concludes that if only commercially viable energy projects were to be financed going forward, up to 19 million Madagascans might be excluded from future electrification efforts. Consequently, this paper urges researchers to consider social justice implications when evaluating climate finance strategies.

This paper assesses the potential role of the implementation of the best available technologies to reduce the economic consequences of outdoor air pollution in the coming decades. The paper focuses on market impacts related with additional health expenditures, changes in labour productivity and crop yield losses and also presents results on non-market costs, i.e. welfare losses from avoided premature deaths. The results show that technological improvements can potentially reduce concentrations of air pollutants to levels compatible with the WHO guidelines in most countries. However, technology measures can only reduce part of the economic costs relative with the market impacts. While those are efficient in reducing the direct costs of air pollution, there are still large indirect costs associated with current and remaining pollution levels. Policies that aim directly at avoiding economic impacts need to be implemented to further reduce air pollution damages, especially in the regions where technologies are not sufficient to reduce concentrations or where economic consequences persist despite reduced concentration levels.

Climate change impacts and their consequences are determined not only by the intensity and frequency of different climatic hazards but also by the vulnerability of the system, society or community exposed. While general agreement exists about the importance of assessing vulnerability to understand climate risks, there is still a tendency to neglect global and regional vulnerability patterns because they are hard to quantify, despite their value in informing adaptation, disaster risk and development policies. Several approaches to quantifying global vulnerability exist. These differ in terms of the indicators they use and how they classify countries or regions into vulnerability classes. The paper presents the structure of selected approaches and explores two indices in depth. The aim of this paper is to assess the level of agreement between selected international indicator-based assessments of vulnerability, at the level of climate regions. Results suggest that the two major global vulnerability assessments analysed largely agree on the location of the most and least vulnerable regions when these assessments are aggregated to a regional scale using the IPCC’s climate regions. The paper then discusses the robustness of the information derived and its usefulness for adaptation, disaster risk and development policies. Measuring progress towards reducing vulnerability to climate change and hazards is key for various agencies and actors in order to be able to develop informed policies and strategies for managing climate risks and to promote enabling conditions for achieving the SDGs and building resilience., Projekt DEAL

This is an extended editors' commentary on the topical collection "Historical and recent change in extreme climate over East Asia", which collects a total of 15 papers related to the change and variability of extreme climate events in East Asia over the last few hundreds years. The extreme climate events are broadly classified into three categories: temperature and extreme warmth/coldness, precipitation and floods/droughts and western North Pacific typhoons. This commentary briefly summarizes the main findings presented in each paper in this topical collection, and outlines the implications of these findings for monitoring, detecting and modeling of regional climate change and for studying climate change impacts and adaptability. It also assesses the uncertainties of these studies, as well as the remaining knowledge gaps that should be filled in the future. One solid conclusion we can draw from these studies is that there was a marked decadal to multi-decadal variability of extreme climate events in East Asia in recent history, and the extreme events as observed during the last decades of the instrumental era were still within the range of natural variability except for some of those related to temperature. More severe and enduring droughts occurred in the early 20 th century or the earlier periods of history, frequently leading to great famines in northern China. Uncertainties remain in reconstructing historical extreme climate events and analyzing the early instrumental records. Further research could focus on the improvement of methodology in proxy based reconstruction of multi-decadal variations of surface air temperature and precipitation/drought, the recovery, digitization, calibration and verification of the early instrumental records, and the mechanisms of the observed multi-decadal variability of extreme climate in the region.

A high risk of overestimating emission reductions would be detrimental to the credibility of forest mitigation. But high-quality information on uncertainties in measuring emissions from forests is hard to obtain because of frequent shortcomings in uncertainty analyses. This paper aims to gauge what precision is achievable by examining data from several contexts (including data from 18 countries that have proposed jurisdictional mitigation programmes to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Carbon Fund). Countries reported random uncertainties in measuring forest carbon density (mostly 5–15% of the mean at the 90% confidence level), forest areas and their changes (mostly 0–20% for forest loss and forest degradation and 10–40% for forest gain), and greenhouse gas emissions (mostly 10–30%). It follows that uncertainties may be substantial in estimating emission reductions from forests and land-use change, and that these uncertainties entail significant risks of overestimation. I propose discount factors (between 9 and 44%) to conservatively adjust emission reduction estimates and reduce the overestimation risk. The paper concludes by pointing out that uncertainties are much lower for aggregate emission reductions of several programmes than they are for individual programmes. Discounting individual programmes’ emission reductions could therefore lead to understating the mitigation contribution that forests deliver.

This paper proposes an assessment of long-term climate strategies for oil- and gas-producing countries—in particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states—as regards the Paris Agreement goal of limiting the increase of surface air temperature to 2°C by the end of the twenty-first century. The study evaluates the possible role of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies under an international emissions trading market as a way to mitigate welfare losses. To model the strategic context, one assumes that a global cumulative emissions budget will have been allocated among different coalitions of countries—the GCC being one of them—and the existence of an international emissions trading market. A meta-game model is proposed in which deployment of CDR technologies as well as supply of emission rights are strategic variables and the payoffs are obtained from simulations of a general equilibrium model. The results of the simulations indicate that oil and gas producing countries and especially the GCC countries face a significant welfare loss risk, due to “unburnable oil” if a worldwide climate regime as recommended by the Paris Agreement is put in place. The development of CDR technologies, in particular direct air capture (DAC) alleviates somewhat this risk and offers these countries a new opportunity for exploiting their gas reserves and the carbon storage capacity offered by depleted oil and gas reservoirs. This paper was made possible by NPRP grant number 10-0212-170447 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The first author acknowledges support provided by FONDECYT 1190325 and by ANILLO ACT192094, Chile. The fourth author also received support provided by the IFP School Chair on Carbon Management (CARMA). The last author also received support provided by the H2020 European Commission Project “PARIS REINFORCE” under grant agreement no. 820846.

Home insurance for extreme weather events is a significant security mechanism not only for individual households but for global finance. As extreme weather events become more frequent and intense, home insurance has been identified by governments as a critical tool for climate adaptation and disaster resilience. However, the growing research literature on the interactions between household insurance and extreme climatic events has not previously been systematically reviewed. In this paper, we analyse 175 original peer-reviewed empirical research papers on this subject, published between 2009 and 2018. We identify areas of research focus, themes, spatial and temporal patterns, and knowledge gaps, and examine policy implications of these findings. We find that an overall focus on flood insurance leaves unanswered questions about the different insurantial challenges posed by storms and wildfire. We suggest existing technocratic and calculative insurance narratives obscure the political and moral assumptions embedded within them, and that these assumptions warrant further investigation in the context of socially legitimate insurance against the impact of extreme weather events.

Investments in climate-change adaptation will have to be made while the extent of climate change is uncertain. However, some important sources of uncertainty will fall over time as more climate data become available. This paper investigates the effect on optimal investment decision-making of learning that reduces uncertainty. It develops a simple real options method to value options that are found in many climate-change adaptation contexts. This method modifies a binomial tree model frequently applied to climate-change adaptation problems, incorporating gradual learning using a Bayesian updating process driven by new observations of extreme events. It is used to investigate the timing, scale, or upgradable design of an adaptation project. Recognition that we might have more or different information in the future makes flexibility valuable. The amount of value added by flexibility and the ways in which flexibility should be exploited depend on how fast we learn about climate change. When learning will occur quickly, the value of the option to delay investment is high. When learning will occur slowly, the value of the option to build a small low-risk project instead of a large high-risk one is high. For intermediate cases, the option to build a small project that can be expanded in the future is high. The approach in this paper can support efficient decision-making on adaptation projects by anticipating that we gradually learn about climate change by the recurrence of extreme events.

There is now no doubt that current global production-consumption-disposal systems are threatening the fundamental conditions of existence on this planet. In response, the pressing need for total system transformation has gained civic and political traction, feeding into long-standing debates and interventions that are aimed at recalibrating prevailing economic and social practices. One such debate and intervention is that of the circular economy (CE). Here, advocates argue that current linear resource and energy use systems must be reconfigured into loops of re-use, repair, refurbishment, and recycling, displacing primary production and lessening greenhouse gas emissions in the process. This agenda has potentially profound implications for aspects of daily social practices. Yet, to date, little attention has been paid (politically and in research) to how the CE does and will interact with everyday habits, norms, and meanings. In response, this paper explores some of the conceptual assumptions underlying the CE ‘consumer’. It argues that mainstream CE debates are underscored by an impoverished view of our relationships with complex material cultures, which in turn is creating barriers to transformation. Drawing on empirical research into responses to the CE in the UK and the Netherlands, this paper contrasts the challenges of inciting consumers to take up new, resource-efficient business models in contexts of hyper-consumerism, with a more hopeful ‘small story’ of overt, small-scale circular spaces, that nevertheless embed the CE and its underlying impetuses more clearly into the everyday.

Climate information and agro-advisory services are crucial in helping smallholder farmers and pastoralists in East Africa manage climate-related risks and adapt to climate change. However, significant gaps exist in provision of climate information that effectively addresses the needs of farmers and pastoralists. Most farmers and pastoralists, therefore, rely on indigenous knowledge (IK), where local indicators and experiences are used to observe and forecast weather conditions. While IK-based forecasting is inbuilt and established in many communities in East Africa, coordinated research and systematic documentation of IK for weather forecasting, including accuracy and reliability of IK is largely lacking. This paper documents and synthesizes existing IK for weather forecasting in East Africa using case studies from Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. The results show that farmers and pastoralists use a combination of meteorological, biological, and astrological indicators to forecast local weather conditions. IK weather forecasting is, therefore, crucial in supporting efforts to improve access to climate information in East Africa, especially in resource-poor and vulnerable communities. The paper draws valuable lessons on how farmers and pastoralists in East Africa use IK weather forecasts for making crop and livestock production decisions and demonstrates that the trust and willingness to apply scientific forecasts by farmers and pastoralists is likely to increase when integrated with IK. Therefore, a systematic documentation of IK, and a framework for integrating IK and scientific weather forecasting from national meteorological agencies can improve accuracy, uptake, and use of weather forecasts.

This paper describes five sets of regions intended for use in summarizing extreme weather over Earth’s land areas from a climate perspective. The sets differ in terms of their target size: ∼10 Mm2, ∼5 Mm2, ∼2 Mm2, ∼0.5 Mm2, and ∼0.1 Mm2 (where 1 Mm2= 1 million km2). The regions are based on political/economic divisions, and hence are intended to be primarily aligned with geographical domains of decision-making and disaster response rather than other factors such as climatological homogeneity. This paper describes the method for defining these sets of regions; provides the final definitions of the regions; and performs some comparisons across the five sets and other available regional definitions with global land coverage, according to climatological and non-climatological properties.

The assessment of the impacts of climate change at different levels of global warming helps inform national and international policy discussion around mitigation targets. This paper provides consistent estimates of global and regional impacts and risks at increases in global mean temperature up to 5 °C above pre-industrial levels, for over 30 indicators representing temperature extremes and heatwaves, hydrological change, floods and droughts and proxies for impacts on crop yields. At the global scale, all the impacts that could plausibly be either adverse or beneficial are adverse, and impacts and risks increase with temperature change. For example, the global average chance of a major heatwave increases from 5% in 1981–2010 to 28% at 1.5 °C and 92% at 4 °C, of an agricultural drought increases from 9 to 24% at 1.5 °C and 61% at 4 °C, and of the 50-year return period river flood increases from 2 to 2.4% at 1.5 °C and 5.4% at 4 °C. The chance of a damaging hot spell for maize increases from 5 to 50% at 4 °C, whilst the chance for rice rises from 27 to 46%. There is considerable uncertainty around these central estimates, and impacts and risks vary between regions. Some impacts—for example heatwaves—increase rapidly as temperature increases, whilst others show more linear responses. The paper presents estimates of the risk of impacts exceeding specific targets and demonstrates that these estimates are sensitive to the thresholds used.

This paper comments on the applicability of the global indicators of climate change adaptation policy drivers contained in Berrang-Ford et al. (2014) (Climatic Change, 124(1–2), 441–450. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1078-3 ) for small island developing states (SIDS). SIDS are a globally recognised ‘special’ case in terms of environment and sustainable development issues as they are disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. While acknowledging that the choice of final indicators in the Berrang-Ford et al. (2014) assessment was primarily the function of the results of bivariate analyses with their Adaptation Initiatives Index and that there is no certainty of statistically significant relationships with any measure of adaptation initiatives, this paper proposes the inclusion of a number of predictor variables for a future SIDS-specific quantitative analysis. By doing this, this commentary helps to contribute a more nuanced understanding of potential national adaptation policy drivers in SIDS.

In this final paper, the guest editors identify and discuss ten guidelines emerging from the papers in this Special Issue on Decision-Support Tools for Climate Change Adaptation. The guidelines are arranged under three headings: foundational, design and construction, and supporting sustainability in the long term. Under foundational, we address the need for co-operation with end users of decision-support resources, the contribution these resources can make to the formation of thriving communities of practice, and the match between the different types of decision support and user needs. Under design and construction, we point to the risk that policy settings will change over the multiple years required to build and publish complex decision-support resources, reducing the relevance of the final product. We discuss the need for innovative approaches to ensure visibility, credibility and hence uptake. Developers should be mindful of the requirements, resources and capabilities of potential users at all points in the design and build. We also suggest that decision-support resources may be transferable between sectors and locations, but the motivation should be around achieving excellence, and not just cost savings. Under supporting sustainability in the long term, we stress the need for evaluation and comparative studies of performance, leading to carefully documented updating and improvement of decision-support resources. Finally, in the conclusions, we look to the future. Can decision-support resources evolve successfully to meet the information and guidance requirements of the increasingly sophisticated adaptation practitioner community?

There has been a global trend away from delivering ‘climate information’ towards producing ‘climate services’ for decision-makers. The rationale for this shift is said to be the demand for timely and actionable climate knowledge, whilst the means of its delivery involves a shift from public good to more privatised forms of climate science. This paper identifies important implications of this shift to climate services by examining the role of consultants, drawing on an in-depth study of adaptation consultants in Australia. The role of consultants is instructive, not just because these private sector experts are engaged in climate services, but also because publicly funded climate science agencies are increasingly encouraged to behave as consulting firms do. Four imperatives of knowledge businesses—to be client-focussed, solutions-oriented, resource-efficient and self-replicating—are described. The paper argues that an emphasis on climate services shifts the incentives for climate science away from the public interest towards the ongoing pursuit of profit. There is a subsequent diversion of effort away from publicly accessible and transparent climate information to private knowledge for discrete clients. Climate services also emphasise knowledge for climate solutions as opposed to the politically charged identification of climate risks. The paper concludes with a warning that the trend towards climate services undermines the knowledge required for societies to adequately respond to the scale, speed and severity of climate change. At the heart of this issue is a climate services paradox: how to achieve customisation without exclusion.

Formal structures for evaluating climate change risk are important components of adaptation decision-making. In this paper, we present an accessible, cost-effective and user-tested climate change risk assessment framework which allows organisations to systematically apply a risk management process aligned with international standards to identify and manage their climate change risks. It is delivered through ‘CoastAdapt’, a resource supporting climate change adaptation in Australia. This three-tier framework offers four benefits to the adaptation process. First, it allows organisations to identify climate change risks and integrate them with their mainstream risk management process. Second, it makes optimal use of an organisation’s limited adaptation resources by taking a tiered approach, so allowing an organisation to start from a low knowledge base using minimal resources and, only if required, then move to more complex and resource-intensive risk assessment processes. Third, it introduces a time-dependent vulnerability rating which recognises the particular characteristics of climate change risks—that they are long term and associated with a considerable degree of uncertainty. Finally, it takes into account business inter-dependencies that can exacerbate impacts but be overlooked in a sector-based impacts evaluation. In this paper, we highlight the appropriate context in which to use each risk assessment tier, explore key technical differences among the three tiers, describe performance testing and present one case study of application. We discuss the benefits of this tiered risk assessment approach in the context of broader adaptation planning.

Resilience has experienced exponential growth in scholarship and practice over the past several decades. We conduct a meta-analysis of recent review papers on resilience from all relevant fields to distill key themes emanating from both research and practice. These themes reflect prevalent debates, trends and insights from the thousands of underlying papers. The seven themes are: 1) the distinction between resilience as a system trait, process, or outcome; 2) the importance of resilience as a strategy for dealing with uncertainty; 3) a shift from understanding resilience to active resilience building; 4) the incorporation of transformation into resilience; 5) the increasingly normative interpretation of resilience; 6) the growing emphasis on measuring and evaluating resilience; and 7) the mounting critiques of the resilience agenda demanding attention. We discuss each in detail and find that they help explain both why resilience has attracted widespread attention, but also why it is an increasingly contested concept. We offer several steps to engage in productive dialogue across differences in resilience interpretations and conclude that this interand transdisciplinary dialogue is the difficult and necessary work that must be done, if resilience scholarship and practice is to advance in productive ways in the future.

Indicators have been proposed as critical elements for sustained climate assessment. Indicators provide a foundation for assessing change on an ongoing basis and presenting that information in a manner that is relevant to a broad range of decisions. As part of a sustained US National Climate Assessment, a pilot indicator system was implemented, informed by recommendations and (Kenney et al. 2014; Janetos and Kenney 2015; Kenney et al. Clim Chang 135(1):85–96, 2016). This paper extends this work to recommend a framework and topical categories for a system of climate indicators for the nation. We provide an overview of the indicator system as a whole: its goals, the design criteria for the indicators and the system as a whole, the selection of sectors, the use of conceptual models to transparently identify relevant indicators, examples of the actual indicators proposed, our vision for how the overall network can be used, and how it could evolve over time. Individual papers as part of this special issue provide system or sector-specific details as to how to operationalize the conceptual framework; these recommendations do not imply any decisions that are made ultimately by US federal agencies.

Achieving climate targets requires more stringent mitigation policies, including the participation of all economic sectors. However, in a fragmented global climate regime, unilateral mitigation policies affecting sectors’ production costs increase carbon leakage risk. Carbon leakage implies reducing the competitiveness of domestic sectors without achieving the full mitigation objectives. Under such circumstances, generating information about sectors’ vulnerability is essential to increase their acceptance of more stringent climate policies and design anti-leakage mechanisms. Our paper calculates and compares potential carbon leakage risk across sectors and OECD countries under varying climate policy scenarios covering GHG emissions along global supply chains. To measure this risk, we use the emission-intensity and trade-exposure metric and emission data including CO2 and non-CO2 gasses. Our results show that agri-food and transport sectors, usually lagging behind in countries’ national climate mitigation policies, could have an even higher carbon leakage risk than energy-intensive industries. Furthermore, we find that this risk can be higher in many downstream sectors compared to directly regulated sectors and is highly heterogenous across OECD countries.

Developing a better scientific understanding of anthropogenic climate change and climate variability, especially the prediction/projection of climate futures with useful temporal and geographical resolution and quantified uncertainties, and using that knowledge to inform adaptation planning and action will become crucially important in the coming years. Generating such policy-relevant knowledge may be particularly important for developing countries such as India. It is with this backdrop that, in this paper, we analyze future heat waves in India by using observations and a large number of model simulations of historical, + 1.5 °C, and + 2.0 °C warmer worlds. In both the future scenarios, there is an increased probability of heat waves during June and July when the Indian monsoon is in full swing and humidity is high, which makes the heat events even more of a health risk. While the highest temperatures in heat waves may not increase much in future climates, the duration and areal extent of the heat waves will most likely increase, leading to the emergence of new heat wave-prone zones in India. The results indicate that the joint frequencies of the longest duration and large area events could be nearly threefold greater in the + 1.5 °C and fivefold greater in the + 2.0 °C future scenarios compared to historical simulations. Thus, overall, the study indicates a substantial increase in the risk of heat events that typically elicit warnings from forecasters. The likely widespread and persistent nature of heat wave events in the future, as revealed by this study, will require planning and adaptation measures beyond the short-term disaster planning frameworks currently in place. Exploring what these measures might look like is beyond the scope of this study, but it underlines the importance of developing climate knowledge with high temporal and geographical resolution capable of informing adaptation policy and planning.

This paper examines the influence of democratic institutions on environmental policy stringency and the degree to which it is affected by membership in the Arctic Council. We hypothesize that, relative to countries with no Arctic presence, countries present in the Arctic given their territorial, trade, and touristic interests are more pro-environmentally inclined as they experience the effects of global warming first-hand, and the quality of democratic institutions may reinforce this effect. Our empirical analysis based on global macroeconomic data suggests that countries with democratic institutional environments are associated with more response to Arctic status and more stringent environmental policies. Moreover, the presence of democratic governments in the Arctic increases the stringency of both market- and non-market-based environmental regulations. The suggestive estimated monetary value associated with the impact of democratic institutions in the Arctic is about 101,000 international dollars per capita. These findings underscore that the development of democratic institutions may lead to strong welfare improvements and can be used in the design of international environmental agreements for Arctic area protection.

Rapid adaptation is necessary to maintain, let alone expand, access to reliable, safe drinking water in the face of climate change. Existing research focuses largely on the role, priorities, and incentives of local managers to pursue adaptation strategies while mostly neglecting the role of the broader public, despite the strong public support required to fund and implement many climate adaptation plans. In this paper, we interrogate the relationship between personal experiences of household water supply impacts from extreme weather events and hazard exposure with individual concern about future supply reliability among a statewide representative sample of California households. We find that more than one-third of Californians report experiencing impacts of climate change on their household water supplies and show that these reported impacts differently influence residents’ concern about future water supply reliability, depending on the type of event experienced. In contrast, residents’ concern about future water supplies is not significantly associated with hazard exposure. These findings emphasize the importance of local managers’ attending to not only how climate change is projected to affect their water resources, but how, and whether, residents perceive these risks. The critical role of personal experience in increasing concern highlights that post-extreme events with water supply impacts may offer a critical window to advance solutions. Managers should not assume, however, that all extreme events will promote concern in the same way or to the same degree.

Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch), Regional environmental governance has emerged as a viable alternative to supranational environmental solutions, using regional and local knowledge and actors to tailor more efective policies. This does not deny a role for supranational institutions, however, which can enable their members to efectively shift towards such a decentralized and polycen tric approach. In specifc regions such as the Arctic, with many national and local actors interested in environmental improvement, such impetus from meta-organizations (i.e., organizations comprised of organizations) could result in benefcial environmental out comes. This paper examines an underutilized institution, the Eurasian Union (EaEU), and the role it currently plays in facilitating regional environmental governance. Focusing on its largest member, Russia—and the only member with an Arctic linkage—I explore the tension between supranational facilitation and interference in an area not directly afect ing all members. Despite explicit Russian interest in this realm, the EaEU may be able to infuence Russian environmental policy for the better via multilateral means and internal mechanisms. By challenging the Russian monopoly on Arctic policy in the EaEU, these additional voices may.