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This paper studies the effects of absentee ownership of immobile factors on environmental policy of a jurisdiction in a federation. An increase in emissions in a jurisdiction increases factor incomes, but part of the increased factor incomes goes to absentee owners while only the residents of the jurisdiction bear the full disutility. In addition, the increase in emissions in a jurisdiction attracts capital and decreases capital in other jurisdictions, reducing the incomes that the residents of the jurisdiction earn from owning immobile factors in other jurisdictions. Absentee ownership thus reduces the marginal benefit of an increase in emissions while it leaves the marginal cost unaffected from the jurisdiction’s perspective. As a consequence, absentee ownership makes environmental policy of a jurisdiction too stringent relative to the efficient level. The paper also considers the effects of absentee ownership on environmental policy when goods trade is allowed.

Theory can be helpful to policy makers by pointing out surprising relationships unlikely to be recognized by unaided common sense; by noting significant exeptions to principles widely accepted; and by offering generalizations of its own. The paper argues that theorists may not have done enough of the first two and may have overstressed the last, giving insufficient warnings of pitfalls. Examples of each of the three are provided. The first is illustrated by a theorem which shows that any new energy source, such as gasohol, which is supplied only because of a subsidy, prospectively uses up more energy than it creates. The important exception application is illustrated by showing that subsidies which reward reduced emissions by the firm tend to increase pollution by the industry. Finally, the paper discusses inadvertent bias in the empirical evidence reasserting the superior performance of fiscal incentives for reduced environmental damage as compared to direct controls, thus casting doubt on the allegedly universal superiority of incentives.

This paper provides an overview of some of the issues involved in comparing benefit-cost analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis based on quality-adjusted life-years as alternative approaches to assessing environmental policies that affect human health. It concludes that: (i) although QALYs have the advantage of reflecting policy impacts on both health status and longevity in a single scalar measure, they are not consistent with utility theory unless individuals’ preferences satisfy some restrictive conditions; (ii) they do not capture other important aspects of the valuation of changes in mortality and morbidity; (iii) cost-effectiveness analysis based on QALYs as a measure of effectiveness omits non-health related effects of environmental policy; and (iv) it leaves unanswered the important question of what level of environmental regulation is appropriate.

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments.

Technological development is likely to play an important role in curbing growth in greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological change in climate policy analyses. This paper studies climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. The lack of an appropriate instrument reflects that R&D expenditures in a country are difficult to verify by other countries. We show that without an international agreement, the non-cooperative outcome will have too much emissions and too little R&D expenditures compared with the social optimum. While the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their domestic instruments for controlling emissions, all countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case. Next we study two types of international climate agreements with full participation. One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement a common carbon tax should be used domestically in all countries. We show that none of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the total number of quotas is set so that the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the Kyoto case, whereas with a harmonized domestic carbon tax R&D expenditures could even be too high. Finally we examine the case in which there is an incomplete agreement, i.e. some countries have not signed the agreement. We demonstrate that there is virtually no difference between this case and the case of full cooperation.

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between recycling policy options and recycling behavior to study the most effective methods of diverting post-consumer waste from landfills. We employ data from a unique, micro-data set collected from households in communities across Ontario, Canada. We estimate the relationships between several commonly recycled materials (newsprint, glass, plastics, aluminum cans, tin cans, cardboard, and toxic chemicals) and individual household characteristics, recycling program attributes, and garbage collection financing methods. We find that user fees on garbage collection have significant impacts on recycling levels for all materials except toxic chemicals, and mandatory recycling programs on particular items have significant effects on recycling for almost all materials. Limits on the amount of garbage that can be placed at the curb, and providing free units under user fee systems, however, generally have a negligible or detrimental impact on recycling.

The environmental impacts on an economy is studied over time using endogenous growth theory. Externalities from the environment on production are central in the analysis, and we examine whether an optimal path realizes more rapid economic growth. The paper focuses mainly on developing countries, where production is largely influenced by the environmental quality. The result of the analysis indicates that the economic growth rate may not depend on the internalization of the environmental externality, but rather on the internalization of the human capital externality. The level of economic activity, however, generally seems to depend on the internalization of both externalities.

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.

The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes.

The creation of the EC's internal market by the end of 1992 appears to necessitate a harmonization of environmental policies in the European Community. Against this background, the paper analyzes the options for decentralizing environmental policy in Europe and indicates some limitations of this approach. It is shown that, in the case of stationary sources, a harmonization is not required whereas, in the case of international spillovers and global environmental systems, a decentralization of policies is possible if countries can agree on international diffusion norms or national emission quantities, respectively. A harmonization seems to be unavoidable if product norms have to be applied, e.g. in the case of pollutants in consumption goods. Generally, however, price instruments should be used wherever possible, since they allow for a regional differentiation of environmental qualities without segmenting European markets.