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Are democratic norms under pressure from social divisions in society? An emerging literature in political science examines if and when citizens condone undemocratic behaviors (Broockman, Kalla, & Westwood, 2022; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Krishnarajan, 2022; McCoy, Simonovits, & Littvay, 2020; Saikkonen & Christensen, 2023). Central to this question is who engages in these undemocratic behaviors. Earlier work has largely focused on democratic norm violations by political elites. Some of these studies find that citizens are willing to accept undemocratic behaviors by their in-group political elites if they or their party gain from it politically (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Kalmoe & Mason, 2022) while other studies remain more skeptical (Broockman et al., 2022). What happens if we focus on other highly salient social divisions in society? We shift our focus to the citizens level and study if, when, and why citizens support undemocratic behaviors by different social groups. We will run our experiment in the Netherlands. Over the past years, highly salient protests have erupted in the Netherlands. Farmers and climate activists, with their respective grievances, have protested against the current Cabinet’s climate policies using identical protest actions (e.g. vandalizing state property, obstructing highways). We leverage these similarities in a conjoint experiment that randomizes protesting social groups (farmers versus climate activists), protest actions, and the use of political violence. This allows us to estimate (i) how citizens respond to similar protest actions by different social groups (climate activists versus farmers) and (ii) if and when citizens are willing to support undemocratic behaviors, including the use of violence.

Published online: 17 May 2022 How does the public form preferences about differentiated integration (DI)? The literature on mass-elite linkages offers two perspectives: top-down, political elites cue the public, or bottom-up, political elites react to public preferences. This paper develops expectations based on both perspectives, and presents novel empirical data on citizens, political parties, and governments to test them. We distinguish preferences over differentiated policy integration, like ‘Opt-Outs’, from preferences over polity differentiation, such as ‘Two-Speed Europe’. Although our evidence is observational and therefore cannot establish causal relationships between elites and the mass public, our results are most compatible with the notion of a top-down linkage. This is because DI preferences are generally of low salience, and first revealed at the European level in the context of negotiations. Subsequently, this revelation of DI preferences shapes domestic discussions about DI, especially at the level of political parties. Yet, this mostly pertains to situations when governments do not yet have clear DI preferences of their own, meaning government preferences are not yet formed and revealed in the context of the supranational negotiations. Overall, this study suggests that mass-elite linkage in the preference formation on DI might be more tenuous than either the top-down or bottom-up perspective might assume.

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_14651165221133671 for A blessing and a curse? Examining public preferences for differentiated integration by Lisanne de Blok and Catherine E. de Vries in European Union Politics

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_14651165221127633 for Mapping public support for the varieties of differentiated integration by Julian Schuessler, Max Heermann, Dirk Leuffen, Lisanne de Blok and Catherine E De Vries in European Union Politics

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_14651165221133671 for A blessing and a curse? Examining public preferences for differentiated integration by Lisanne de Blok and Catherine E. de Vries in European Union Politics

How does the public form preferences about differentiated integration (DI)? The literature on mass-elite linkages offers two perspectives: top-down, political elites cue the public, or bottom-up, political elites react to public preferences. This paper develops expectations based on both perspectives, and presents novel empirical data on citizens, political parties, and governments to test them. We distinguish preferences over differentiated policy integration, like “Opt-Outs”, from preferences over polity differentiation, such as “Two-Speed Europe”. Although our evidence is observational and therefore cannot establish causal relationships between elites and the mass public, our results are most compatible with the notion of a top-down linkage. This is because DI preferences are generally of low salience, and first revealed at the European level in the context of negotiations. Subsequently, this revelation of DI preferences shapes domestic discussions about DI, especially at the level of political parties. Yet, this mostly pertains to situations when governments do not yet have clear DI preferences of their own, meaning government preferences are not yet formed and revealed in the context of the supranational negotiations. Overall, this study suggests that mass-elite linkage in the preference formation on DI might be more tenuous than either the top-down or bottom-up perspective might assume. This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_14651165221127633 for Mapping public support for the varieties of differentiated integration by Julian Schuessler, Max Heermann, Dirk Leuffen, Lisanne de Blok and Catherine E De Vries in European Union Politics

Foundations of European Politics introduces important tools of social science and comparative analysis. The first part of the book acts as an introduction to the topic, looking at democratic politics and multilevel politics in Europe. The second part moves on to citizens and voters, considering issues related to ideology and voting decisions. Part III looks at elections and introduces electoral systems and direct democracy, representation, political parties, and party competition. The next part is about government and policy. The last part looks at the rule of law, democracy, and backsliding.

In previous reports, such as Fear Not Values: Public Opinion and the Populist Vote in Europe and Globalization and the EU: Threat or Opportunity?, we demonstrated how anxiety due to large-scale societal change is a driver of both polarization and politicization. As we showed in our report Power of the Past, these anxieties also make people more susceptible to the political messages propagated by populist and extremist political movements. Political entrepreneurs on the far left and right of the political spectrum skillfully employ nostalgic rhetoric that casts the way forward as a return to the past., eupinions

Ever since the first popular election of the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, voters are presented with two channels to legitimize decision-making within the European Union (EU). In national elections voters authorize and hold accountable their national representatives, who represent their interests in the European Council. Through EP elections voters elect and hold accountable their European representatives. These two electoral channels constitute a system of dual legitimation of EU policy-making. This study examines the extent to which voters actually use both of these channels in order to express their attitudes regarding European integration and hold European or national political elites accountable. Utilizing European Election Survey data from 2009, we show that in a majority of EU member states the process of dual legitimation is indeed functioning in practice. Importantly, the empirical findings demonstrate that when voters translate their attitudes regarding European integration in vote choice, they do so in both channels. In some countries, however, like Bulgaria or France, issue voting based on EU preferences is absent from both channels. Only in two countries, the Czech Republic and Malta, we find that voters only express their EU attitudes in one of the electoral channels present. Overall, these results indicate that with a few exceptions the voters behave in accordance to the system of dual legitimation of EU policy-making in most EU member states. Hence, this study has important implications for our understanding of how issues regarding European integration affect electoral politics, as well as for the ongoing debate regarding legitimacy and accountability in EU politics.

After three decades of European integration, during which border controls and restricted access to labour markets seemed like a relict of the past, soon to be dismantled in all EU member states, the refugee crisis and Brexit have brought the issue of European migration regimes to the centre of public debate. This thesis analyses public attitudes towards the Schengen regime and the Freedom of Movement for workers inside the European Union with respect to three distinct phenomena: i) the relevance of elite rhetoric, ii) demographic change due to immigration and iii) collective identities.