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Local perceptions in the definition of cultural landscapes have been on the radar of the scientific community for a long time, but very few studies have focused on integrating this information into heritage and planning practices. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, with a practical example, how to do so through a Public Participation GIS (PPGIS) application. In this study, a landscape approach and participatory mapping framework were tailored to a case study area in the south of Italy, where an online map-based survey was shared with the public. The survey results illustrate how the application effectively brought to the fore local heritage perceptions as relevant sources for future potential spatial planning strategies.

Niccolò Machiavelli het oor 'n tydperk van vyf eeue 'n onverdiend negatiewe staatkundige reputasie as 'n siniese, immorele, magsugtige, wreedaardige en opportunistiese politieke Renaissance-intellektueel gekry. Hy het naamlik gedurende en ná sy betrokkenheid as senior beampte en adviseur in die regering van die Florentynse Republiek 'n besonder sterk premie geplaas op 'n regeerbenadering van "die doel heilig die middele", wat dikwels as oneties beskou word. Sy standpunte is vir baie lank geïsoleerd beoordeel van die komplekse omstandighede waarin hy geleef en gewerk het. Al hoe meer resente kommentaar op en beoordelings van sy werk erken egter dat hy hierdie slegte reputasie verwerf het omdat hy onder die baie moeilike omstandighede van sy tyd en ter wille van sy eie oorlewing en ambisie sy lojaliteit moes bewys aan die wrede outoritêre heersers onder wie hy geleef en gewerk het. Hy het inderwaarheid konsekwent probeer om fundamentele demokratiese regeer-kundebeginsels en -doelwitte, soos stabiliteit, responsiwiteit, openbare deelname, burgerlike tevredenheid en volhoubaarheid, na te streef en te bevorder, maar moes dit op meestal implisiete wyse doen, nie eksplisiet nie. In die lig van resente navorsingsbevindings en gevolgtrekkings beoordeel hierdie artikel sy rol as Renaissance-denker, diplomaat, strateeg en beplanner in 'n meer positiewe lig. Hy was 'n rigtinggewende grondlegger van die demokratiese magspolitieke denkskool in die politieke wetenskap. This article reassesses Niccolò Machiavelli's contribution to political governance theory and practice. At the height of the Renaissance, Machiavelli was one of the most influential intellectuals. He was also a consummate and influential senior strategist, diplomat, negotiator and public official in the "democratic" Florentine Republic from 1494 to 1512. He gained extensive governance experience before the republican government was toppled in a coup by a member of its former absolutist Medici rulers, and he was arrested as a traitor, tortured and exiled from Florence. He remained in exile until his death in 1527. Machiavelli lived and worked in turbulent times. The period was characterised by violent and brutal competition for power, status and resources among mostly still feudal city states, manipulated by an increasingly influential politically interventionist and corrupt Roman Catholic Church dominated for centuries by the powerful Medici family. Machiavelli had a cynical view of human interactions. He regarded life as a series of overlapping games that people play for different purposes in different contexts. Politics consist of a series of power games played between competing rulers, between a ruler and his subjects, and between different individuals and groups in society to promote their respective self-interests. Machiavelli completed his first book (Il Principe ["the prince"]) in 1513 for the primary purpose ofwinning favour from the new Medici dictator and probably also for his own survival. In it he advised Lorenzo de Medici that political history had proven that power politics requires a ruler to fluctuate between good and evil actions in order to maintain and consolidate his hold on power in the long term. He therefore recommended that Medici should not flinch from using deflection, disinformation, lies and other "unethical" means to achieve stable, sustainable good governance goals that satisfy the interests of both the ruler and his subjects. He even condoned merciless action (when necessary) against rebels who undermine and destabilise the ruler's control over society, because the masses only obey their rulers out of fear or contentedness and not necessarily out of loyalty. However, in his later publications he explained at great length how a responsive republican government, supported by a strong military capacity, can be the most stable and successful form of government, because it creates an equilibrium between citizen contentment and fear in society. Machiavelli gave ambiguous and mixed signals about the interventionist political role of the Catholic Church. He was sometimes very critical of this institution, which he regarded as a corrupt and self-serving manipulator of Renaissance politics, and yet, in other instances he put forward more sympathetic views about the potentially constructive and supportive role of religion in promoting good governance. From a modern democratic perspective, such seemingly contradictory statements afforded him the very negative reputation of being unethical, but, at the same time, have led to continuing speculation about the real motives for his enigmatic views. Over the last five centuries Machiavelli has therefore become highly controversial because of his allegedly "immoral" advice to the Medici dictators, who ended his career in Florence. The latest assessments of his work and of the rationality, cogency, coherence and logic of his arguments, however, increasingly indicate that for his time he was in essence a committed "democrat". He seems to have deliberately followed a very subtle and sometimes ambiguous writing style to survive personally in an antagonistic political climate and to regain his former job as a senior political official and counsellor in the Florentine government. For this purpose, he had to commit himself to accepting the cruel, authoritarian nature of the power politics of the prevailing Renaissance political and governance practices in order to try to effect an improvement in the democratic responsiveness, stability and sustainabillty of those systems. He therefore followed a deliberate strategy to try, on the one hand, to appease authoritarian rulers 'power ambitions but, on the other, to explain how their reign could be stabilised and be maintained more sustainably through more responsive good governance practices. His advice therefore reflects the subtle ironies and apparent contradictions of the political game that he decided to play and to advance. What Machiavelli really wanted to achieve with his writings - and what his relevance to and influence on contemporary democratic politics are - has in fact been significantly underrated and needs to be reassessed in view of new research findings and conclusions.

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, appointed two former military generals, Ryamizard Ryacudu (2014–2019) and Prabowo Subianto (2019–present), for the first- and secondterm defence minister positions consecutively. The appointment of military officers – either retired or active – as defence ministers has been perceived as a recipe for potential democratic setbacks. Current studies on the quasi-civilian defence minister mainly focused on explaining the logic behind such appointments. On the other hand, our study attempts to test the argument about whether the decision to select former military figures to lead the Ministry of Defence undermines civilian control. This article examines: (1) the institutional arrangement of the defence establishment; (2) the composition of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence’s leadership structure; and (3) the leadership activities and key initiatives. The findings are that military officers have indeed dominated the ministry’s organisational structure. Nevertheless, such domination did not automatically translate into the deterioration of civilian supremacy as the institutional arrangement limits those quasi-civilian defence ministers’ manoeuvres. Submitted/Accepted version

L’objectif démocratique visant à favoriser l’accès aux arts et à la culture pour tous les élèves est l’un des leitmotivs les plus stables des politiques d’éducation artistique des cinquante dernières années en France. Rarement un objectif éducatif, par ailleurs fortement chevillé à des valeurs politiques, n’a bénéficié d’une telle longévité et suscité autant d’unanimité dans l’histoire du système éducatif français. L’article formule et met à l’épreuve l’hypothèse selon laquelle, sous l’impression de continuité produite par la mise à l’avant-plan d’enjeux démocratiques, les objectifs de l’éducation artistique et culturelle subissent un ensemble de réorientations discrètes, décelables par l’analyse qualitative de l’évolution des champs lexicaux et sémantiques mobilisés dans les discours produits sur l’éducation artistique et culturelle, et par leur mise en regard avec les contextes tout à la fois sociaux et éducatifs (particulièrement sur le plan des politiques éducatives) constituant l’arrière-plan de leur production. La recherche repose sur le recensement, l’analyse et la mise en regard de deux corpus de textes (archives constituées de textes de lois et des discours officiels qui les accompagnent) renvoyant : 1/ à la mise en œuvre des politiques d’éducation artistique et culturelle en France depuis 1968 d’une part ; 2/ à l’évolution concomitante des politiques éducatives au sein du même espace d’autre part.

The thesis focuses on three main questions: the quality of democracy, democratic backsliding, political culture, and the relationship among them. The theoretical basis of the thesis starts with the quality of democracy model of Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. The theoretical purpose of the research is to reconceptualise the quality of democracy and embed it into political culture to find answers to democratic stagnation and backsliding experienced in European states today. To achieve this objective, the thesis offers a four-level model of political culture that provides a foundation for explaining the links among different aspects of political culture and factors of democratic quality. Additionally, the thesis proposes a two-fold hierarchical interpretation of the factors of the quality of democracy to define the deficiency needs of democratic functioning. The main hypotheses cover the connections among the three factors mentioned above. The first hypothesis focuses on the continuity and fragmentation of political culture as explanatory factors that play a crucial role in the thesis. The second hypothesis examines the ‘citizen dimension’ of democratic quality and its impact on democratic stability through factors such as the citizens’ interest in the political dynamics of their own country, their perceptions of their democracy, and their confidence in democratic institutions. The third hypothesis investigates the potential reasons and levels of democratic stagnation and backsliding in democracies, arguing that political culture and the weakening of the rule of law are the main influencing factors, as the latter serves as the basis and guarantee for the other factors of the quality of democracy. The empirical research is based on a comparative analysis of the quality of democracy in three European countries with fundamentally different democratic systems and traditions of democratic evolution: Luxembourg, the UK, and Hungary. The methodology used is based on the most-different cases with similar results model.

Hierdie artikel beoordeel die toepassing van "Machiavelliaanse" benaderings dat die doel die middele heilig, wat tussen 1980 en 1992 as redelik suksesvolle demokratiese politieke transformasie- en oorredingstrategieë deur die Nasionale Party (NP) regering in Suid-Afrika gevolg is. Dit het onder meer doelbewuste manipulasie van inligting en ondernemings wat nie gestand gedoen was nie, ingesluit. Die doel daarvan was om wit kiesers op verskillende wyses te probeer oorreed om op 'n vreedsame, demokratiese wyse afstand te doen van hul monopolie op politieke mag en gesag tot in daardie stadium. Die suksesvolle, vreedsame konstitusionele oorgang van apartheid na volle demokrasie in Suid-Afrika tussen 1990 en 1996 kan deels toegeskryf word aan hierdie "onetiese Machiavelliaanse" politieke oorredingsprosesse van die NP. Dit het egter ook uiters negatiewe beoordelings uitgelok by konserwatiewe wit kiesers wat die leier van die NP op daardie tydstip, FW de Klerk, van disinformasie, misleiding, bedrog en selfs verraad teenoor die wit gemeenskap in die land beskuldig het. Hierdie negatiewe beoordelings bestaan steeds in baie van daardie kringe. Dit het egter groot meerderhede wit kiesers in die 1989-verkiesing en die 1992-referendum oorreed om aan die Nasionale Party vae beginselmandate te gee om die finale tegniese besonderhede van 'n nuwe demokratiese politieke magsdelingsbedeling met swart bevrydingsbewegings te beding. Machiavelli se Renaissance-denke word vyf eeue ná sy advies oor hoe om meer stabiele, responsiewe en volhoubare regerings te bedryf, as aanvaarde politieke optrede toegepas. Hierdie en ander vermeende "immorele" beïnvloedingstegnieke en optrede deur staatsagente en staatsagentskappe word naamlik in hedendaagse demokrasieë paradoksaal steeds de facto as "normale" praktyke aanvaar. This contribution summarises and assesses the applicability of and application to modern global democratic practices of Niccold Machiavelli's views about the theory and practice of political governance strategies during the Renaissance. Machiavelli focussed on how to promote transitions from feudal authoritarian and tyrannical governmental systems in his era to more stable, responsive and sustainable democratic governance systems. He developed a cogent and coherent governance approach during his career, from 1494 to 1512, as a senior strategic advisor, diplomat and official in the government of the "democratic" Republic of Florence. This approach was aimed at satisfying the main concerns and interests of the rulers as well as their subjects. His proposals combined strategies to satisfy the needs and desires of the population through responsive public services and facilities, supported by strong military back-up interventions to quell resistance to and uprisings against governments. His recommended strategies included morally and ethically doubtful propaganda, disinformation, deflection and even outright lies and, as a last resort, murdering perceived opponents where necessary. These "cynical" strategies afforded Machiavelli a very negative historical and modern reputation as an immoral, unethical power-hungry opportunist. Contemporary research into the driving forces behind different types of governance systems, however, is increasingly confirming the worldwide modern applicability and validity of these suspect practices of governments, including democratic governments. Machiavellian governance strategies remain "normal" democratic government practices today, although they are routinely disavowed. They include so-called "dirty hands" and "white lies" practices, which are not any different from behaviour alleged to be Machiavellian. Machiavelli's influence on contemporary political practice can be illustrated by various examples in virtually all modern democracies. It is also illustrated by a number of National Party (NP) persuasion strategies in South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, inter alia through the work and advisory involvement of international intellectual thought leaders on transitions such as Samuel Huntington and Philippe Schmitter. NP leaders and government units under PW Botha and FW de Klerk used various Machiavellian double-speak persuasion strategies, deflection and deliberate disinformation campaigns aimed at white voter constituencies in particular in order to mobilise support for their respective transformation agendas. They also reneged on a number of political undertakings. These strategies contributed to bring about the end of apartheid and to manage a relatively peaceful transition to a more democratic post-apartheid political dispensation. Machiavelli's relevance to and influence on contemporary democratic politics have in fact been significantly underrated. Many of his views for which he has been ostracised in the past have proved to be "normal" democratic governance assumptions and practices to this day, despite the fact that their ethical nature may be questioned.

From 1950 onwards, the study of creativity has not stopped. Today, AI has revitalised debates on the subject. That is especially controversial in the artworld, as the 21st century already features AI-generated artworks. Without discussing issues about AI agency, this article argues for AI’s creativity. For this, we first present a new functionalist understanding of Margaret Boden’s definition of creativity. This is followed by an analysis of empirical evidence on anthropocentric barriers in the perception of AI’s creative capabilities, which is later criticised for considering insights from media theory. Finally, benefits derived from including AI as an artistic creative producer and supportive tool are discussed. It is then argued that AI can contribute to democratising the artworld. Therefore its creative role must be recognised.

From 1950 onwards, the study of creativity has not stopped. Today, AI has revitalised debates on the subject. That is especially controversial in the artworld, as the 21st century already features AI-generated artworks. Without discussing issues about AI agency, this article argues for AI’s creativity. For this, we first present a new functionalist understanding of Margaret Boden’s definition of creativity. This is followed by an analysis of empirical evidence on anthropocentric barriers in the perception of AI’s creative capabilities, which is later criticised for considering insights from media theory. Finally, benefits derived from including AI as an artistic creative producer and supportive tool are discussed. It is then argued that AI can contribute to democratising the artworld. Therefore its creative role must be recognised.

This article comprehensively analyses the potential for politicians’ speeches to influence the public, taking into account the main linguistic and pragmatic factors: political, social, and cultural context, the communication occasion, the personality of the politician, and the structural features of the text that determine the psycholinguistic effectiveness of the speech. The purpose of the research is to study the functional and pragmatic opportunities of well-known US presidents’ public speeches as a political tool and as part of a political strategy. It is a socio- and psycholinguistic study; its goal is not only to demonstrate the features of different types of communication strategies and tactics but also to explain how this variety arises, how society contributes to it and what complicates the emergence of productive social communications. Political speeches use both purely lingual and extra-lingual means that determine the conceptual content and ways of verbalising meanings, explicable through specific strategies and tactics. The communication situation includes a chronotope and a format for political public speech The personality of the politician, his or her image and status, social and political experience, and degree of eloquence - all play an important role in the preparation and implementation of the speech.

Large scale urban development projects, marketed as ‘new cities’ are emerging across the African continent. However, there is a limited empirical insight into how their partnerships, involving foreign investors and the local African landowners are brokered, and the extent to which local communities are engaged in such projects. Using the Appolonia City project in Ghana and drawing analytical insights from the DEDA urban governance framework, this paper scrutinises the partnership between Rendeavour, the foreign investor, and the Appolonia community, the owners of the land used for the project to interrogate the extent to which the community has been involved, and the benefits that have accrued. We find that the traditional rulers saw the project as an opportunity to secure community lands against ongoing unauthorised encroachments, and to assist the local economy. We argue that the 99-year lease granted to Rendeavour in return for a 10% equity stake does not reflect a partnership where concessions and benefits are equally distributed. The paper concludes by reflecting on the implications of the unequal partnership arrangements and the ensuing entangled urban governance process that set in motion project outcomes that do not necessarily reflect the needs of urban citizens.

O nascimento da questão de Timor é um caso paradigmático das dificuldades do legado colonial e da complexidade do duplo processo de normalização interna e internacional que Portugal teve de gerir na sua infância democrática. Neste quadro, este artigo desenvolve uma análise sobre os contextos, ideias e estratégias da política externa portuguesa face a Timor entre 1976 e 1985. Com base no cruzamento de fontes primárias e secundárias, o artigo identifica as ideias, estratégias e contextos fundamentais da questão timorense no quadro da formulação da política externa portuguesa, sublinhando os seus principais pontos de viragem. Mais do que a apresentação dos factos, o artigo desenvolve uma leitura compreensiva que pretende explicar as razões para que a questão timorense não fosse considerada uma das prioridades da política externa portuguesa neste período. Este artigo faz parte do dossier temático A Autodeterminação de Timor-Leste, organizado por Rui Graça Feijó. The birth of the Timor question is a paradigmatic case of the difficulties of the colonial legacy and the complexity of the double process of internal and international normalisation that Portugal had to manage in its democratic infancy. In this context, this article develops an analysis of the contexts, ideas and strategies of Portuguese foreign policy towards Timor between 1976 and 1985. Based on a cross-referencing of primary and secondary sources, the article identifies the fundamental ideas, strategies and contexts of the Timorese question within the formulation of Portuguese foreign policy, highlighting its main turning points. More than the presentation of facts, the article develops a comprehensive reading that intends to explain the reasons why the Timorese issue was not considered one of the priorities of Portuguese foreign policy in this period. This article is part of the special theme section on The Self-Determination of East Timor, guest-edited by Rui Graça Feijó. La naissance de la question du Timor est un cas paradigmatique des difficultés de l’héritage colonial et de la complexité du double processus de normalisation interne et internationale que le Portugal a dû gérer dans son enfance démocratique. Dans ce contexte, cet article développe une analyse des contextes, des idées et des stratégies de la politique étrangère portugaise envers Timor entre 1976 et 1985. Sur la base d’une analyse croisée de sources primaires et secondaires, l’article identifie les idées fondamentales, les stratégies et les contextes de la question de Timor dans la formulation de la politique étrangère portugaise, en soulignant ses principaux tournants. Plus que la présentation des faits, l’article développe une lecture globale qui entend expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles la question timoraise n’a pas été considérée comme l’une des priorités de la politique étrangère portugaise à cette époque. Cet article fait partie du dossier sur L’Autodétermination du Timor oriental, dirigé par Rui Graça Feijó.

& RÉSUMÈ & ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : Brazil’s foreign and trade relations with Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) date back to the Portuguese slave trade. Of the 9.5 million people captured in Africa and brought to the New World between the 16th and 19th centuries, nearly 4 million landed in Rio de Janeiro, i.e. ten times more than all those sent to the United States. Still today, about 51 % of the population see themselves as black or mixed. Racial inequality remains deeply engrained in many respects, notably concerning persistent inequality. Nonetheless, oppression and marginalization of black Brazilians have been largely ignored in modern Brazilian-African relations. Instead, a pronounced nationalism suffused Brazil’s political life. It guided Brazil’s foreign and trade relations and defined how Brazilians interpreted the opportunities of African independence movements. Only Brazil’s President Lula da Silva acknowledged the common historical roots during his first time as president from 2003 to 2011. In fact, his election was driven by the overwhelming support of Afro-Brazilians. Trade relations in the first half of the 20th century were largely limited to South Africa, which accounted for 90 % of Brazil’s African trade. Brasilia’s foreign and trade policy since the 1960s focussed on Nigeria, an important oil supplier, and the five Portuguese-speaking former Portuguese African colonies (PALOP) and the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP), founded in 1996. Up to date, Brazilian’s trade relations in West Africa, apart from Nigeria (34 % of Brazil’s African trade) remained fairly modest. Nevertheless, Ghana and Senegal played a decisive role in shaping Brazil-African relations in the early stages of African independence since the 1960s. Because Brazil has meanwhile considerable energy and commodity resources of its own, its approach concerning African trade is less commodity driven than the Chinese or European, but orientated at resource diversification, sustainable development and cooperation to develop these resources, e.g. bioethanol plants in Ghana and other African countries. Therefore, African governments see a greater sense of mutual partnership and reciprocity in their relationship with Brazil. However, corrupt political African elites themselves urged the Brazilian government and companies often into informal political and business norms, with controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction, infrastructure and land-grabbing. Apart from that, Brazil tried to create a niche for Brazilian management services, knowledge and technology transfer, suited supposedly exceptionally well for tropical markets. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ : Résumé : [Le Brésil, soutient-il le développement en Afrique de l'Ouest ? L'exemple du Nigeria, du Ghana et du Sénégal] – Les relations étrangères et commerciales du Brésil avec l'Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) remontent à la traite négrière portugaise. Sur les 9,5 millions de personnes capturées en Afrique entre le XVIe et le XIXe siècle et amenées dans le Nouveau Monde, près de 4 millions se sont retrouvées à Rio de Janeiro, soit dix fois plus que tout les esclaves envoyés aux États-Unis. Aujourd'hui encore, environ 51 % de la population brésilienne se considère comme noire ou métisse. L'inégalité raciale reste ancrée à bien des égards, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'inégalité persistante. Néanmoins, l'oppression et la marginalisation des Brésiliens noirs ont été largement ignorées dans les relations modernes entre le Brésil et l'Afrique. Au lieu de cela, un nationalisme fort a imprégné la vie politique brésilienne. Il a également déterminé ses relations extérieures et commerciales et défini comment les Brésiliens ont saisi les opportunités présentées par les mouvements d'indépendance africains. Seul le président brésilien Lula da Silva, au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel de 2003 à 2011, a reconnu leurs racines historiques communes. En fait, il doit son élection au soutien écrasant des Afro-Brésiliens. Les relations commerciales de la première moitié du XXe siècle se limitaient en grande partie à l'Afrique du Sud, qui représentait 90 % du commerce africain du Brésil. La politique étrangère et commerciale de Brasilia dans les années 1960 et 1970 s'est concentrée sur le Nigeria, un important fournisseur de pétrole, ainsi que sur les cinq anciennes colonies africaines portugaises (PALOP) et la Communauté lusophone (CPLP), créée en 1996. Le commerce avec l'Afrique de l'Ouest est resté assez modeste, à l'exception du Nigeria (34 % du commerce africain du Brésil). Néanmoins, le Ghana et le Sénégal ont joué un rôle crucial dans l'élaboration des relations entre le Brésil et l'Afrique dans les premiers stades de l'indépendance africaine. Étant donné que le Brésil dispose désormais de ressources considérables en énergie et en matières premières, son approche du commerce africain est moins axée sur les matières premières que celle des investisseurs chinois ou européens, mais orientée vers la diversification des ressources, le développement durable et la coopération pour développer ces ressources, par ex. usines de bioéthanol au Ghana. Par conséquent, les gouvernements africains considèrent leurs relations avec le Brésil comme davantage basées sur un partenariat mutuel. Cependant, les élites politiques africaines corrompues elles-mêmes ont souvent fait pression sur le gouvernement brésilien et les entreprises d’appliquer des pratiques politiques et commerciales informelles, avec des investissements controversés et corrompus, p.ex. concernant l'extraction des ressources, les infrastructures et l'accaparement des terres. En dehors de cela, le Brésil s'efforçait de se tailler un créneau pour les services de gestion brésiliens, le transfert de connaissances et de technologie qui était, disait-on, spécialement adapté aux marchés tropicaux. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : [Unterstützt Brasilien die Entwicklung in Westafrika? Das Beispiel Nigerias, Ghanas und Senegals] – Die Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen Brasiliens zu Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) gehen bis auf den portugiesischen Sklavenhandel zurück. Von den 9,5 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert in Afrika gefangen genommen und in die Neue Welt gebracht wurden, landeten fast 4 Millionen in Rio de Janeiro, d.h. zehnmal mehr als alle Sklaven, die in die Vereinigten Staaten geschickt wurden. Noch heute sehen sich etwa 51 % der Bevölkerung Brasiliens als schwarz oder gemischt. Rassenungleichheit ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nach wie vor tief verwurzelt, insbesondere in Bezug auf die anhaltende Ungleichheit. Dennoch wurden Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung schwarzer Brasilianer in den modernen brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Stattdessen durchdrang ein ausgeprägter Nationalismus das politische Leben Brasiliens. Es bestimmte auch seine Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen und definierte, wie die Brasilianer die Chancen afrikanischer Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen nutzten. Erst Brasiliens Präsident Lula da Silva bekannte sich während seiner ersten Amtszeit als Präsident von 2003 bis 2011 zu den gemeinsamen historischen Wurzeln. Tatsächlich verdankte er seine Wahl der überwältigenden Unterstützung der Afrobrasilianer. Die Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beschränkten sich weitgehend auf Südafrika, auf das 90 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens entfielen. Brasilias Außen- und Handelspolitik konzentrierte sich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren auf Nigeria, einen wichtigen Öllieferanten, sowie die fünf ehemaligen portugiesischen afrikanischen Kolonien (PALOP) und das 1996 gegründete Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP). Der Handel mit Westafrika blieb, mit Ausnahme von Nigeria (34 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens), recht bescheiden. Dennoch spielten Ghana und Senegal in den frühen Stadien der afrikanischen Unabhängigkeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Gestaltung der brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Da Brasilien mittlerweile über beträchtliche eigene Energie- und Rohstoffressourcen verfügt, ist sein Ansatz im afrikanischen Handel weniger rohstoffgetrieben als der chinesischer oder europäischer Investoren, sondern orientiert sich an Ressourcendiversifizierung, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Kooperation zur Erschließung dieser Ressourcen, z.B. Bioethanolanlagen in Ghana. Daher sehen afrikanische Regierungen ihre Beziehungen zu Brasilien eher auf gegenseitiger Partnerschaft gegründet. Korrupte politische afrikanische Eliten selbst drängten jedoch die brasilianische Regierung und Unternehmen oft zu informellen politischen und geschäftlichen Praktiken, mit umstrittenen und korrupten Investitionen in Rohstoffgewinnung, Infrastruktur und Landraub. Abgesehen davon versuchte Brasilien, eine Nische für brasilianische Managementdienstleistungen, Wissens- und Technologietransfer zu schaffen, der angeblich hervorragend für tropische Märkte geeignet war.

As producers and gatekeepers of knowledge, and as providers of education and training, our universities play a key role in the reproduction of unsustainability. This article finds that they are, as currently organised, therefore complicit in frustrating and delaying action to address the planetary crisis. However, as highly resourced and influential institutions, they have an inherently transformative potential, should their resources and activities be redirected towards progressive social and ecological ends, which challenge rather than support the unsustainable status quo. This means that, as workers within these institutions, academics and researchers are faced with a choice: to be agents of this reproduction or to be advocates and activists for change. We argue for the latter. In doing so, we seek to build on the analysis and demands of emergent movements such as Fossil Free Research, Faculty for a Future and Scientist Rebellion in making the case for universities to show leadership on listening to the very science they produce on the planetary emergency, and act accordingly. Employing a green political economy critical analysis, the article suggests that, if they are to contribute to societal transformation, universities themselves must undergo transformations that explicitly and systematically reorient academic practices around social and ecological protection and priorities. Building on these findings, it lays out a series of normative and practical arguments for a broad programme of democratisation around three pillars of academic practise: (1) Research, (2) Education and (3) Outreach and engagement. However, any such processes will of course be difficult, especially given the wider neoliberal political and political economy context within which universities operate, as well as a conservative institutional culture which disincentivises dissent from “business as usual”. In the discussion that follows, we therefore anticipate and argue that advancing such transformative and innovative changes will initially involve individuals or small groups of academics willing to go beyond “academia as usual”.

It is a challenge for educational institutions in Peru to respond effectively to the pedagogical, ethical-training, humanistic and interdisciplinary requirements and challenges that an inclusive quality education demands, especially in a post-pandemic context. The objective was to find out the impact of inclusive cultures on the improvement of democratic school coexistence in the reality of Peruvian Regular Basic Education. Regarding the methodology, a theoretical-reflective review was carried out in the scientific databases of Scopus, Scielo and Redalyc, using the method of analysis-synthesis. The results showed that the practice of inclusive cultures has a significant impact on the strengthening and consolidation of democratic school coexistence. It is concluded that the school community must be more than willing to contribute to the consolidation of an accessible, accessible, adaptable and acceptable educational ecosystem of diversity, with greater attention to students with special educational needs.

The idea that Portugal, Greece and Spain shared a model of transition from dictatorship to democracy has been proposed, criticised and revived several times in the past four decades. After a survey of the criteria found in the literature, this article develops a comparative exploration of the three transitions guided by the definition of democracy as an effective system of government built upon the rule of the people, operationalised in three key dimensions. The first one is the reconfiguration of the people by means of the redefinition of the boundaries and contents of the nation. The second is the means deployed to express and channel the political preferences of the population, including elections, referenda and demonstrations. The final dimension is the transformation of the policing apparatus that contributes to make government effective. There were important differences in the direction of change and the centrality of the elements of these three dimensions, especially regarding the choices concering the redefinition of the national community, the use of referenda and the urgency of police reform. However, the three countries successfully became multi-party democracies, suggesting that even if not every path opened ahead for each country would have resulted in democracy, democracy was the possible outcome of many different sets of collective and individual choices. L’idée que le Portugal, la Grèce et l’Espagne partagent un modèle de transition de la dictature à la démocratie a été proposée, critiquée et relancée plusieurs fois au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Après une étude des critères trouvés dans la littérature, cet article développe une exploration comparative des trois Transitions, guidée par la définition de la démocratie comme un système de gouvernement efficace fondé sur le pouvoir du peuple, opérationnalisé en trois dimensions clés. La première est la reconfiguration du peuple par le biais de la redéfinition des frontières et du contenu de la nation. La deuxième est le moyen déployé pour exprimer et canaliser les préférences politiques de la population, notamment les élections, les référendums et les manifestations. La dernière dimension est la transformation de l’appareil policier qui contribue à rendre le gouvernement efficace. Il existe d’importantes différences dans la direction du changement et la centralité des éléments de ces trois dimensions, notamment en ce qui concerne les choix relatifs à la redéfinition de la communauté nationale, l’utilisation des référendums et l’urgence de la réforme de la police. Cependant, les trois pays ont réussi à devenir des démocraties multipartites, ce qui suggère que même si toutes les voies ouvertes pour chaque pays n’auraient pas abouti à la démocratie, celle-ci était le résultat possible de nombreux ensembles différents de choix collectifs et individuels. La idea de que Portugal, Grecia y España compartieron un modelo de transición de la dictadura a la democracia se ha propuesto, criticado y revivido varias veces en las últimas cuatro décadas. Tras un repaso de los criterios encontrados en la literatura, este artículo desarrolla una exploración comparativa de las tres transiciones guiada por la definición de democracia como un sistema efectivo de gobierno construido sobre el gobierno del pueblo, operacionalizado en tres dimensiones clave. La primera es la reconfiguración del pueblo mediante la redefinición de los límites y contenidos de la nación. La segunda son los medios desplegados para expresar y canalizar las preferencias políticas de la población, incluidas las elecciones, los referendos y las manifestaciones. La última dimensión es la transformación del aparato policial que contribuye a hacer efectivo el gobierno. Hubo importantes diferencias en la dirección del cambio y la centralidad de los elementos de estas tres dimensiones, especialmente en lo que respecta a las opciones relativas a la redefinición de la comunidad nacional, el uso de referendos y la urgencia de la reforma policial. Sin embargo, los tres países se convirtieron con éxito en democracias multipartidistas, lo que sugiere que, aunque no todos los caminos abiertos para cada país hubieran desembocado en la democracia, ésta fue el resultado posible de muchos conjuntos diferentes de elecciones colectivas e individuales.

& RÉSUMÉ & ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : In the 19th and 20th centuries, Turkey considered only North Africa a substantial part of the Ottoman Empire and neglected sub-Saharan Africa unless vital interests were at stake. However, the apathy of successive Turkish governments changed with the 1998 "Africa Action Plan". Since then, the Turkish state has intensified its diplomatic, political, economic and cultural interactions with sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish-African relations received a further boost when Ankara declared 2005 the "Year of Africa". Although the predominantly Muslim region of North Africa is the focus of Turkish foreign policy due to their shared history, the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa has also increased due to the growing demand for military and medical supplies. Since 2005, Ankara promoted state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, although it does not follow Western democratization policies. Turkey's growing economic, political and security involvement in Africa aims to open new markets for its manufactured goods, particularly its defence and security industries. Presenting itself as a relevant regional power without colonial ballast, Turkey sets itself apart from traditional Western players on the continent. Turkey's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa differed markedly from that of other emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While Ankara shared the disregard for Western sanctions due to BRICS members' democratic deficits, it went beyond traditional state-to-state relations and increasingly relied on cooperation with non-state actors. African partners value Turkish products and expertise. In addition, Ankara has taken a coordinated approach to working with African states and leaders, avoiding entanglements with international organizations or other alliances, as in Somalia and Kenya, but more recently in much of East, South and West Africa. This has been demonstrated using the example of the three West African countries Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ : [La Turquie soutient-elle le développement Le développement durable en Afrique subsaharienne ?] - Aux XIXe et XXe siècles, la Turquie ne considérait que l'Afrique du Nord comme une partie substantielle de l'Empire ottoman et négligeait l'Afrique subsaharienne à moins que des intérêts vitaux ne soient en jeu. Cependant, l'apathie des gouvernements turcs successifs a changé avec le « Plan d'action pour l'Afrique » de 1998. Depuis lors, l'État turc a intensifié ses interactions diplomatiques, politiques, économiques et culturelles avec l'Afrique subsaharienne. Les relations turco-africaines ont reçu un nouvel élan lorsqu'Ankara a déclaré 2005 « l'Année de l'Afrique ». Bien que la région à prédominance musulmane de l'Afrique du Nord soit au centre de la politique étrangère turque en raison de leur histoire commune, l'importance de la région subsaharienne a également augmenté en raison de la demande croissante de fournitures militaires et médicales. Depuis 2005, Ankara promeut la construction de l'État en Afrique subsaharienne, bien qu'elle ne suive pas les politiques de démocratisation occidentales. L'implication économique, politique et sécuritaire croissante de la Turquie en Afrique vise à ouvrir de nouveaux marchés pour ses produits manufacturés, en particulier ses industries de sécurité et de défense. En se présentant comme une puissance régionale pertinente sans lest colonial, la Turquie se démarque des acteurs occidentaux traditionnels sur le continent. L'engagement de la Turquie en Afrique subsaharienne différait nettement de celui d'autres puissances émergentes telles que le Brésil, la Russie, l'Inde, la Chine et l'Afrique du Sud. Alors qu'Ankara partageait le mépris des sanctions occidentales en raison des déficits démocratiques des membres du BRICS, elle est allée au-delà des relations traditionnelles d'État à État et s'est de plus en plus appuyée sur la coopération avec des acteurs non-étatiques. Les partenaires africains apprécient les produits et l'expertise turcs. En outre, Ankara a adopté une approche coordonnée pour travailler avec les États et les dirigeants africains, évitant les enchevêtrements avec des organisations internationales ou d'autres alliances, comme en Somalie et au Kenya, mais plus récemment dans une grande partie de l'Afrique de l'Est, du Sud et de l'Ouest. Ceci est illustré à l'aide de l'exemple des trois pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest, le Nigeria, le Ghana et la Côte d'Ivoire. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG : [Unterstützt die Türkei die nachhaltige Entwicklung in Afrika südlich der Sahara?] – Im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert betrachtete die Türkei nur Nordafrika als einen wesentlichen Teil des Osmanischen Reiches und vernachlässigte Afrika südlich der Sahara, es sei denn, es standen lebenswichtige Interessen auf dem Spiel. Die Apathie aufeinanderfolgender türkischer Regierungen änderte sich jedoch mit dem „Afrika-Aktionsplan“ von 1998. Seitdem hat der türkische Staat seine diplomatischen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Interaktionen mit Subsahara-Afrika intensiviert. Einen weiteren Schub erhielten die türkisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen, als Ankara 2005 zum „Jahr Afrikas“ erklärte. Obwohl die überwiegend muslimische Region Nordafrikas aufgrund der gemeinsamen Geschichte im Fokus der türkischen Außenpolitik steht, hat die Bedeutung der Subsahara-Region auch aufgrund der wachsenden Nachfrage nach militärischen und medizinischen Gütern zugenommen. Seit 2005 betreibt Ankara Förderung in Form von Staatsaufbau in Subsahara-Afrika, obwohl es nicht der westlichen Demokratisierungspolitik folgt. Das wachsende wirtschaftliche, politische und sicherheitspolitische Engagement der Türkei in Afrika zielt darauf ab, neue Märkte für seine Industriegüter zu erschließen, insbesondere für seine Verteidigungs- und Rüstungsindustrie. Indem es sich als relevante Regionalmacht ohne kolonialen Ballast präsentiert, grenzt sich die Türkei von traditionellen westlichen Akteuren auf dem Kontinent ab. Das Engagement der Türkei in Subsahara-Afrika unterschied sich deutlich von dem anderer aufstrebender Mächte wie Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika. Während Ankara die Missachtung westlicher Sanktionen aufgrund demokratischer Defizite der BRICS-Mitglieder teilte, ging es über herkömmliche Staat-zu-Staat-Beziehungen hinaus und setzte zunehmend auf die Zusammenarbeit mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren. Afrikanische Partner schätzen türkische Produkte und Expertise. Darüber hinaus hat Ankara einen koordinierten Ansatz zur Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Staaten und Führern gewählt und Verstrickungen mit internationalen Organisationen oder anderen Allianzen vermieden, wie in Somalia und Kenia, aber in jüngerer Zeit auch in weiten Teilen Ost-, Süd- und Westafrikas. Dies wird am Beispiel der drei westafrikanischen Staaten Nigeria, Ghana und Elfenbeinküste gezeigt.

About 45 years after the 1979 revolution which overthrew the last Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Islamic Republic of Iran became a regional power, thanks to four decades of social, economic, diplomatic, and military advancements. But not all of these successes are clear-cut. Many of Iran’s achievements created new challenges or even led to political and diplomatic failures. Some episodes isolated Iran and made dialogue with the West difficult: the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, the military and financial support to Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon (Hezbollah), the adversarial relationship with Saudi Arabia, the anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic posture, and the controversial nuclear program, have alienated the sympathy of Western powers. The Islamic Republic has survived, despite sustained acute enmity from the US and Israel, a decade-long war against Iraq (1980-1988), and four decades of various forms of economic sanctions but, so far, was not able to come up with a governing model that reconciles the vision of a religious state with democracy. One of the last contemporary theocracies, along with Saudi Arabia and the Vatican, Iran should strive to introduce reforms, which are strongly demanded by the people: ease censorship, progress with human rights and respect for gender equality, restrict state intervention in the economy and pass electoral reforms. The harsh crack-down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on anti-government protests which have broken out since 2017 demanding reforms or the end to the Islamic Republic have raised public outrage. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, and the civil unrest against the government associated with the death of Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the Guidance Patrol, Iran's image has further deteriorated. After 20 years, Iran is still perceived as President George W. Bush characterized it, jointly with North Korea and Iraq, in his State of the Union address of January 29, 2002: ‘an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world’. Economic sanctions, such as the embargo against crude oil, have injured the Iranian economy which suffers from double-digit unemployment and high inflation. Iran country would enormously benefit from their removal and the openness to the global market, in compliance with Art. 12 of the Constitution which sets the regime's goals: ‘A fair economy based on Islamic criteria to create welfare and eliminate poverty and deprivation in the areas of nutrition, housing, employment, health and insurance’. Is the Tehran leadership able to get the country out of this long-term situation and bring it into a new era of prosperity? This work aims to analyze the current situation in Iran and the opportunities for the country to find the right place within the international society., presented at the I. International Congress of Iranian Studies (Iranian Congress), June 15-18, 2023 https://iraniancongress.org/index.php/kongre/article/view/8. Abstract published in the Abstract Book https://iraniancongress.org/index.php/kongre/libraryFiles/downloadPublic/6

Este artigo procura investigar as representações narrativas da Revolução portuguesa de 25 de abril de 1974 construídas pelos partidos Chega e Ergue-te, partindo da aplicação do conceito de acontecimento de Alain Badiou e estabelecendo uma articulação entre as suas intervenções interpretativas sobre o acontecimento do 25 de Abril e o objetivo político de substituir a democracia resultante da Revolução portuguesa por o que ambos os partidos apelidam de IV República. Cet article étudie les représentations narratives de la révolution portugaise du 25 avril 1974 construites par les partis Chega et Ergue-te, en prenant comme point de départ l’application du concept d’événement d’Alain Badiou et en établissant une articulation entre leurs interventions interprétatives sur l’événement du 25 avril et l’objectif politique de remplacer la démocratie qui résulte de la révolution portugaise par ce que les deux partis appellent la « IV República ». This paper seeks to research the narrative representations of the Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1974 constructed by the parties Chega and Ergue-te, taking as its starting point the application of Alain Badiou’s concept of event and establishing an articulation between their interpretative interventions about the event of the 25 April and the political objective of replacing the democracy that results from the Portuguese Revolution by what both parties call the “IV República”.

The political development of Romania started after the death of Nicole Ceausescu in 1989. The article describes and analyses institutional and behavioural dynamics of the political processes that have occurred in Romania since 1989. This article focuses on the constitutional framework of governing institutions. This paper tries to explore the understanding of theoretical approaches to political and institutional development in the country. It examines the evolution of legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies. These are the three pillars of democracy. The article discusses how political parties participating in elections, form a government and will look at the stability of the institutions. This article examines institutional foundations of the coalition government in the 1990–2020 post-communist democracy period in Romania. The article starts with the institutional framework premise that electoral systems and constitutional provisions on the division of powers, structure, and the relationship between parliament and the president determines the point at which political power can be dispersed or concentrated in the political system. Przemiany polityczne w Rumunii zapoczątkowane w 1989 roku, po śmierci Nicole Ceausescu. Artykuł opisuje i analizuje dynamikę zmian instytucjonalnych i zachowań w procesach politycznych zachodzących w Rumunii po 1989 r. Artykuł koncentruje się na ramach konstytucyjnych najważniejszych instytucji. Autor analizuje rozumienie podejść teoretycznych do zmian politycznych i instytucjonalnych w kraju, a także ewolucję organów ustawodawczych, wykonawczych i sądownictwa – trzech filarów demokracji. Artykuł prezentuje jak partie polityczne uczestniczące w wyborach tworzą rząd i omawia stabilność instytucji. Artykuł analizuje podstawy instytucjonalne koalicji rządowej w latach 1990–2020 w okresie post-komunistycznej demokracji w Rumunii. Artykuł zaczyna się od przedstawienia założenia ram instytucjonalnych, iż systemy wyborcze oraz zapisy konstytucji dotyczące podziału władzy, struktury i relacji pomiędzy parlamentem a prezydentem determinują punkt rozproszenia lub koncentracji władzy w systemie politycznym.

Peer reviewed: True, This study examines the drivers of the steady decline in South Africa’s private sector labour share between 1971 and 2019. The focus on South Africa is instructive as its distributional contestation is bounded in a matrix of racial conflict. Crucial reforms on trade, finance and welfare were undertaken since 1994, but the study finds little evidence that the extension of the franchise promoted egalitarianism, since white economic elites invested in de facto political power. This study employs an Unrestricted Error Correction Model to estimate the drivers of the private sector labour share, and the findings suggest that globalisation, financialisation and public spending have decreased the labour share, while the effects of education have been positive but insufficient to halt the decline.

This thesis is about the participatory production of cultural heritage and its regulation by institutional information structures in digital settings. The thesis combines perspectives from the scholarly fields of information studies, cultural heritage studies and cultural memory studies. The prerequisites for formation of more inclusive cultural heritage collections through digital participation is investigated by studies of how institutional information structures dictates conditions for heritagisation of information both as thing and as process. By profiling institutional creation of cultural heritage collections as a special mode of heritage production, the thesis advance the understanding of the conditions for digital participation as a method for heritage creation and negotiation in institutional information environments. The institutional heritage production is theorised based on the concepts of infrastructuring, heritagisation, rhetoric agency of knowledge organisation systems, and an understanding of cultural heritage as building on dynamic passages between memory and forgetting. The thesis comprises four articles. The first investigates cases of exclusion of participatory created image-metadata in information systems. The second is about participatory infrastructuring in an archival transcription project. The third article studies how participants position contemporary photographs as heritage in relation to an institutional collection. The fourth article questions the problematisation of participatory influence with the aim to challenge the idea of participation being perceived of as a threat to preservation in memory institutions. The thesis found that the possibilities to create inclusive heritage collections with digital participation are limited, partly because of limitations in information structures within which the participation takes place. To facilitate diversification, institutions need to implement flexible information structures that provide support for user-generated information. This might require institutions to re-evaluate their approach to preservation and open up for flexible strategies which recognise constructive forgetting and negotiation of heritage as part of their responsibility and day-to-day work with heritage collections. One of the biggest challenges for institutions is therefore how to tune in to such a dynamic approach to heritage and how to prepare for participatorily generated suggestions and additions, while at the same time, keeping up with caring for integrity and preservation of heritage and heritage metadata.

The purpose of this two hour workshop was to introduce the participants to the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). In the first part, the participants were introduced to the concept, history, growing popularity, hybrid nature, and questions to which the fsQCA can provide answers. In the second part, by using the examples from the book “Comparing Post-Socialist Media Systems: The Case of Southeast Europe” by Peruško et al. (2021), the participants were shown eight steps of conducting the fsQCA analysis. Although mostly theoretical in nature, the workshop also included two simple exercises in which the participants participated.

There is something in common between the countries located in the Western Hemisphere—and is not just the geographic position. Latin America boasts an impressive string of coups, compared to the stable democracy of its American neighbor. Recent events in Brazil after Lula was sworn in for a third term as president against incumbent Bolsonaro, reminded us of the assault on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, that disrupted a joint session of the Congress in the process of affirming the presidential election results which kicked Donald Trump out of the White House. The election protests in Brazil began shortly after the conclusion of the general election’s second round on October 30, 2022, in which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president, and picked on January 8, 2023, when thousands of far-right supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed all three branches of Brazil’s government in the capital calling for military intervention. There are similarities and differences between the Brazil attack compared to January 6 attack in the United States. Both Bolsonaro and Trump have contested their electoral defeats, amplifying unsupported conspiracy theories of voter fraud. Also, the Venezuelan presidential crisis which lasted from 2019 to 2023 was paved by fraudulent elections., Published also in Spanish 'América Latina: los escollos del sistema presidencial estadounidense reflejado en las Repúblicas Bananeras' Trans. by Verónica Guillén Melo), in Boletín de la Academia de Yuste, 28 (June), 1-31. The author gratefully acknowledges the Ministry of University and Research (MUR) for supporting his work through the Young Researchers-Seal of Excellence (SOE) grant funded by Next Generation EU (NGEU) under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP).

This thesis investigates practices that constitute participation in museums, building on information studies’ tradition of exploring work of professionals in memory institutions. In an effort to democratise, memory institutions have been increasingly interested in working with external stakeholders and audiences through various collaborative, participatory and engagement projects. Scholarship on this type of work in museums largely focuses on if and how specific participatory goals are best achieved in projects. Instead, the aim of this study is to understand how participation is organisationally situated, maintained and done in museums. The thesis is based on a multi-sited ethnographic investigation set in two Northern European museums: Fisksätra Museum in Sweden and Museum Europäischer Kulturen in Germany. By describing and analysing practices of practitioners in preparation of, throughout and in-between different participatory projects in these two museums, the thesis advances our understanding of the work of doing participation. Museum practitioners work with and around internal and external systems through repeated and continuing practices that create and maintain both social and financial resources for participation. Participatory projects are planned in negotiation with socio-material structures of the museum organisation, as well as individual interpretations of participatory goals. During projects, practitioners engage participants in practices of making and sharing, by framing the project through explaining, organising meetings and project management, and reflecting on this work. The findings suggest practices of participation in museums can be understood as maintenance work. This work is contextually bound by the museum organisation and requires structural support. Practitioners and participants also engage in emotion work, including emotion and affective labour, which can benefit interaction with cultural heritage but also problematises the frequent affective quality of work shared with external audiences. Based on the findings, participation is proposed to constitute of practices which configure material, people and systems in and between three contexts: the organisation, moment(s) of interaction, and the museum’s institutional and local context. By understanding participation as a practice-based infrastructure, this study proposes future research and practice to consider participatory goals as pragmatically realised and negotiated, in further contexts than projects alone. POEM European Training Network on participatory memory practices

International audience; Citizen audit is about investigating, as citizens, local public finances and holding elected officials and decision-makers to account. By studying the trajectories of activists engaging in this practice in France, Spain, and Belgium, this article contends that dissatisfaction with existing representative institutions does not necessarily lead to political apathy or to the delegitimisation of representative democracy. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the literature on critical political judgments. It highlights the critical dispositions of the activists, embedded in social trajectories, and how it gives rise to a yet unconsidered political imaginary: the will to democratise representative democracy through popular control over political representatives. Subsequently, such critical judgments are put into perspective with a repertoire of practices operationalising the control of citizens over powerholders and elected officials. It helps to overcome the idealistic bias of the literature on democratic imaginaries, while helping to shed light on modes of action and citizen participation that are little taken into account in scholarship on collective action.; L'audit citoyen consiste à enquêter, comme citoyen•nes, sur les finances publiques locales et à demander des comptes aux élu•es et aux décideur•euses. En étudiant les trajectoires des personnes qui s'engagent dans cette pratique militante, en France, en Espagne et en Belgique, cet article montre que l'insatisfaction à l'égard des institutions représentatives existantes n'aboutit nécessairement ni à l'apathie politique, ni à la délégitimation de l'ordre représentatif. À partir de l'analyse de ces militant•es, il contribue d'abord à la littérature sur les jugements critiques de la représentation politique. En revenant sur les dispositions critiques des militant•es, ancré•es dans des trajectoires sociales, il met en valeur un imaginaire démocratique insuffisamment étudié, à savoir la volonté de démocratiser la démocratie représentative, par l'intermédiaire d'un contrôle populaire sur les représentant•es politiques. Par la suite, ces jugements critiques sont mis en perspective avec un répertoire de pratiques opérationnalisant le contrôle des citoyen•nes sur les gouvernant•es. Cela permet de dépasser l'écueil idéel de la littérature sur les imaginaires démocratiques, en même temps que cela contribue à éclairer des modes d'action et de participation citoyenne peu pris en compte dans les travaux sur l'action collective.

The article is of an overview and theoretical nature, and its subject is the active processes in the language of modern Russian mass media, caused by the democratization of society, especially in connection with the restructuring of the state and political system that took place in the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Based on scientific publications, as well as on empirical material (modern journalistic text), the authors systematize socio-cultural processes (within the framework of the general trend towards democratization) that have influenced and continue to influence the language of the media: the social construction of reality and the engagement of the media, the polarization of social groups and formations, the displacement of the transmission model of media functioning by the interaction model, the phenomenon of echo chambers. In connection with the influence of the socio-political factor, the authors note the most important dynamic processes in the language of the media, such as depatetization of the language clichs of the era of totalitarianism, neosemantization, the growth of vocabulary related to the sphere of consumerism, the activation of means serving the sphere of dialogical relations, overcoming an overly complex nature the language system, etc. It has been shown that the transition to a model of interaction between the media (with political, religious, public organizations, corporations - on the one hand, and the consumer community - on the other hand) caused the social engagement of media discourses, which in its the queue has caused the growth of labeling, evaluative and expressive text elements. Another important trend is associated with the phenomenon of echo chambers - its reflexes in the language of the media are the specialization of vocabulary and a decrease in the degree of grammaticalization of messages. The aspects of democratization of the language of the media presented in the article in the future can serve as parameters in accordance with which media monitoring can be carried out, including elements of a linguo-critical nature.

This article contributes to the analysis of local media and democratic transformation in Tunisia since the Arab Uprisings. It aims to assess the extent to which pluralism, freedom of expression, and participation—central tenets of democratisation—are evident at the local level. Tunisian local media, unlike the national media, is relatively free of governmental control. Local media is also decentralised. It is this autonomy from the government which makes the analysis of local media fundamentally important for understanding politics in Tunisia. While national media is linked to the most powerful elements in the country, the diversity of voices within the media at the local level provides an opportunity to grasp the grievances, struggles, and agency of people in Tunisia, especially the most marginalised communities. This article will detail the changes in the media landscape, especially for local media, in Tunisia and connect our analysis of local media to better understand the Tunisia that has developed between dictatorship and democracy and the extent that the fledgling Tunisian democracy can withstand its most recent test.

Privilégiant une perspective historique de la longue durée géographiquement située et une approche critique de l’économie politique de la communication, l’auteur s’intéresse au développement de l’espace médiatique et en particulier à l’historicité de la radiophonie à s’attardant aux conflictualités sociales qui leur ont donné leur matérialité ainsi qu’aux acteurs sociaux qui les ont investis idéologiquement pour faire valoir leurs valeurs, leurs intérêts voire leur conception de la communication et, au-delà, de la société. Privileging a geographically situated long-term historical perspective and a critical approach to the political economy of communication, the author is interested in the development of the media space and, in particular, in the historicity of radio, focusing on the social conflicts that gave them their materiality, as well as on the social actors who invested them ideologically to assert their values, their interests and even their conception of communication and, beyond that, of society. Privilegiando una perspectiva histórica de largo plazo situada geográficamente y un enfoque crítico de la economía política de la comunicación, el autor se interesa por el desarrollo del espacio mediático y, en particular, por la historicidad de la radio, centrándose en los conflictos sociales que les dieron su materialidad, así como en los actores sociales que las invistieron ideológicamente para afirmar sus valores, sus intereses e incluso su concepción de la comunicación y, más allá, de la sociedad.

Since 2018, two seemingly contrasting realities surfaced in the Ethiopian political landscape. On one hand, the big-bang political reforms in the country were acclaimed both within and outside of the country. On the other hand, the country has been rocked by violent ethno-political conflicts, arguably as never seen before in terms of its intensity and frequency. Based on extensive insights gathered from existing literature and an interpretative approach, this article examines how the theoretical debate of democratization, security, and violent conflict have unfolded in the post-2018 Ethiopian political landscape. Settling the national and regional questions; bargain between the autocratic elites and the opposition; and co-optation between the old and the new elites are scrutinized to draw a direction for the way forward.

Starting from the observation of digital inequalities, their close link with social inequalities, and the contemporary need to support citizens in the appropriation of the uses of digital tools, this thesis aims to understand and analyze the institution of digital mediation. Its main objective, digital inclusion, leads us to consider it as a pedagogic and inclusive relation whose goal is the democratization of the digital culture. In such a way that if the mission of digital mediation is to regulate digital inequalities, and that these are strongly correlated with social inequalities, then digital mediation would be capable of social inclusion, not only socializing to digital tools, but just socialize.From this entry of social inclusion under the guise of digital inclusion, we propose to examine how digital mediation had developed, for what issues and with what effects. The thesis will first focus on a sociohistory of the digital mediation, in order to understand its structuring into social spaces. The second part of the thesis will focus on the professional group, its members, their dispositions to practice this activity, while proposing a typology of digital mediation professionals. In the third part, the practices, the and the pedagogical conventions that structure their activities will be detailed. In the fourth part, we will examine the publics and non-publics of digital mediation while considering their receptive experiences in teaching-learning situations. Finally, it will be necessary to come back on the main results and discuss the modalities of digital and social inclusion, enabled by digital mediation.; Partant du constat des inégalités numériques, de leur étroite relation avec les inégalités sociales, et de la nécessité contemporaine d’accompagner les citoyens dans l’appropriation des usages des outils numériques, cette thèse a pour ambition de comprendre et d’analyser l’institution que représente la médiation numérique. Son objectif principal, l’inclusion numérique, nous conduit à la considérer comme une relation pédagogique inclusive visant la démocratisation de l’accès aux outils numériques et de leurs usages ainsi que la construction d’une culture numérique. De telle manière que si la médiation numérique a pour mission de réguler les inégalités numériques, et que celles-ci sont fortement corrélées aux inégalités sociales, alors la médiation numérique serait capable d’inclusion sociale, au-delà de socialiser aux outils numériques, elle a pour vocation générale de socialiser. A partir de cette entrée de l’inclusion sociale sous couvert d’inclusion numérique, nous proposons d’examiner la manière dont la médiation numérique s’est développée, pour quels enjeux et avec quels effets. La thèse s’articule dans un premier temps autour d’une socio-histoire de la médiation numérique, pour comprendre sa structuration en espaces sociaux. L’attention sera portée dans un deuxième temps sur le groupe des professionnels de la médiation numérique, leurs dispositions à exercer cette activité, nous conduisant à produire une typologie des professionnels de la médiation numérique. Dans un troisième temps seront détaillées les pratiques, les dispositifs et les conventions pédagogiques qui structurent les activités de ces professionnels. Dans un quatrième temps il s’agira d’étudier les publics et non-publics de la médiation numérique, en considérant leurs expériences réceptives en situation d’enseignement-apprentissage. Il conviendra finalement de revenir sur les principaux résultats et d’analyser les modalités de l’inclusion, numérique et sociale, engendrée par la médiation numérique.

Ezidiler, Mezopotamya’nın kadim etno-dini topluluklarından biridir. Birkaç on yıl öncesine kadar, Türkiye’nin güneydoğusu da onların esas yerleşim alanları arasındaydı. Farklı bir inanca mensup olmaktan dolayı maruz kaldıkları sosyo-ekonomik zorluklar nedeniyle neredeyse tamamı Avrupa’ya göç etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Büyük çoğunluğu Almanya’ya giden Ezidiler ve orada doğan nesilleri, bambaşka bir politik ve toplumsal iklimde kurdukları yeni yaşantılarla bazı kazanımlar ve kayıplar yaşamışlardır. Bu arada Avrupa Birliği’ne uyum reformları vasıtasıyla Türkiye’de 2000’li yılların başlarında ciddi demokratikleşme adımları atılınca, Ezidiler de eski yurtlarıyla bağlarını yeniden ve çeşitli kanallardan güçlendirmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu çalışmada, çoğunluğu Ezidilerle yapılan röportajlara dayanarak, onların eski yurtlarıyla bağlarını daha fazla güçlendirmelerinin koşulları ve muhtemel etkileri analiz edilmiştir., Ezidis are one of the ancient ethno-religious communities of Mesopotamia. Until a few decades ago, southeastern Türkiye was among their main settlements. Almost all of the Ezidis had to migrate to Europe because of the socio-economic difficulties they faced due to belonging to a different religious belief. Most of the Ezidis migrated to Germany. While some were better-off some were worse-off with the new lives they established in a completely different political and social climate. Meanwhile, when serious democratisation steps were taken in Türkiye in the early 2000s through the reforms for harmonisation with the European Union, the Ezidis also tried to strengthen their ties with their former homeland through various channels. In this study, based on interviews largely with Ezidis, the conditions and possible effects of the Ezidis' further strengthening of their ties with their former homeland are analysed.

Voluntary associations played a role in processes of politicisation that are visible in Europe in the nineteenth century. This is not in itself a new insight, but we lack a good understanding of how and why this was the case. In my contribution I will reflect on various ways in which associational life broadened popular participation as well as broadened people’s understandings of politics between 1820-1860. Middle-class reformers of all sorts and stripes played an important role in reinventing voluntary associations as tools for political pressure. Using examples from such organizations as the Irish Catholic Association and British antislavery societies in the 1820s, and from a Dutch temperance society in the 1840s and 1850s, it will become clear that mass organization in politics could be very attractive, and was sometimes successful.

Comment comprendre la politisation des violences sexistes et leur perpétuation dans un environnement institutionnel en apparence favorable à leur sanction ? Ce livre retrace la construction en enjeu public des violences contre les femmes au Nicaragua, et la façon dont ce phénomène traverse historiquement trois régimes politiques (de la fin de la dictature des Somoza à l’essai d’instauration démocratique) et une guerre civile en période de guerre froide. Cet enjeu a été consubstantiel au façonnement du féminisme nicaraguayen de la deuxième vague, en collusion et en collision avec les dirigeants révolutionnaires sandinistes. Puis, il s’est inscrit dans une nouvelle acception des droits humains. L’investissement de ce langage juridique a engendré une production contradictoire du droit, où ont fini par se côtoyer la pénalisation des violences intrafamiliales et sexuelles, et l’interdiction totale de l’avortement. Enfin, ces processus ont paradoxalement contribué au reflux d’une expression latente sur les crimes sexistes perpétrés sur les fronts guerriers. Cet ouvrage permet de relire l’histoire nicaraguayenne contemporaine à l’aune du genre. Il apporte un regard neuf sur l’imbrication des pactes patriarcaux et de pouvoir dans l’entretien des violences sexistes. Il fournit des éléments de compréhension plus généraux sur la façon dont les politiques contre ces violences sont menées dans une sorte de dissociation instrumentale entre l’objet fédérateur qu’elles représentent, et l’étouffement de controverses plus souterraines qu’elles engendrent à propos de l’impunité masculine.

From the early 2000s onwards the EU has embarked on becoming a major state-building actor in the Balkans so that the countries in the region could establish functioning democratic institutions and eventually become member states themselves. One such country is Macedonia, which has so far experienced various stages of state-building involving intervention from the EU in its domestic affairs. This research article assesses the impact of EU state-building policies on its democratisation process from the republic’s independence in 1991 to the present day, after its constitutional name was changed to North Macedonia. In order to do so, it examines the three different phases of EU state-building in Macedonia (1991-2001, 2001-2015, 2015-today) using realism as a theoretical approach to analyse events, trends and how the EU and the Macedonian political leadership interact with each other. The findings reveal that the EU’s line towards the young state was mainly shaped by security and geopolitical interests rather than normative or idealistic concepts of European integration. Macedonia’s behaviour can be described as an example of bandwagoning, i.e. aligning with the stronger powers as a means of acquiring benefits. However, the findings of this article suggest that Macedonia has not gained any substantial advantages from its alignment with the EU. This has resulted in a democratic backsliding that turned the country into a hybrid regime that currently does not have a realistic accession prospect due to disputes imposed by its neighbours and differences among EU member states about the future of enlargement.

The study investigates the validity of the positive nexus between taxation and Democracy in developing economy setting with an emphasis on Nigeria. This study is motivated by the counterintuitive trend of the Nigerian tax to GDP ratio, which in current terms is not substantially different from the results of the Middle East economies where there is zero-tolerance for democratisation. This is a country-specific, longitudinal, time-series research strategy with data set from 1980 to 2017. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable necessitates the use of logistic regression. The result of the analysis shows a mildly positive relationship between tax ratio to GDP and index of democratisation. The alternate variable of indirect tax is negatively related to democratisation, so do the control variables of population growth rate and openness. The control variable of corruption is positive and significant. We recommend a sweeping reform of the Nigeria Tax system, including reengineering the mindset of the Nigerian tax administrators.

From 1950 onwards, the study of creativity has not stopped. Today, AI has revitalised debates on the subject. That is especially controversial in the artworld, as the 21st century already features AI-generated artworks. Without discussing issues about AI agency, this article argues for AI’s creativity. For this, we first present a new functionalist understanding of Margaret Boden’s definition of creativity. This is followed by an analysis of empirical evidence on anthropocentric barriers in the perception of AI’s creative capabilities, which is later criticised for considering insights from media theory. Finally, benefits derived from including AI as an artistic creative producer and supportive tool are discussed. It is then argued that AI can contribute to democratising the artworld. Therefore its creative role must be recognised.

This article reviews the first twelve months of the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup d’état and its many dynamics and manifestations. Myanmar’s ‘Spring Revolution’ generated a shared sense of national unity—overcoming gender, ethnic, religious and class boundaries, but raising questions about the long-term sustainability of nonviolent civil resistance in a state where the military has for decades wielded political and economic power. Since the coup, Myanmar has been in turmoil, paralysed by instability which escalated after the military’s deadly crackdown on pro-democracy activists. The article charts the growth of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), its multiple methods of strategic resistance and non-cooperation, and the radicalisation of the resistance agenda. It analyses the formation of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the creation of the interim National Unity Government (NUG), the founding of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the inauguration of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). It examines the implications for Myanmar when the crisis reached a more complex phase after the military’s open use of force and terror on the broader civilian population prompted the NUG to declare war on the junta, and to urge ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and newly formed anti-junta civilian militias (PDF) to attack the State Administration Council (SAC) as a terrorist organisation. The NUG now opposes the military junta by strategic and peaceful non-cooperation, armed resistance, and international diplomacy. This paper considers whether the predominantly nonviolent civil resistance movement’s struggle for federal democracy and inclusive governance is laying the foundations for eventual transition to a fully democratic future or whether the cycles of violence will continue as the military continues to control power by using intimidation and fear. It notes that the coup has destroyed the economy and expanded Myanmar’s human rights and humanitarian crises but has also provided the opportunity for Myanmar’s people to explore diverse visions of a free, federal, democratic and accountable Myanmar. It finally examines the possibilities for future peaceful nation building, reconciliation, and the healing of the trauma of civil war.

The article presents the issue of issue of implementing training methods in future education managers’ professional training for developing their democratic culture that is a requirement of current conditions of Ukraine’s integration into European educational environment. The purpose of the article is to theoretically substantiate the use of different types of educational instructions during the professional training of the specialists in the sphere of managing education institutions. For achieving the purpose of the research, the theoretical methods are involved: analysis and generalisation of scientific and pedagogical sources for clarifying the key research definitions «training», «training methods», and «educational training», revealing the specific features of different types of training in future education managers’ professional training, theoretically substantiating the ways of implementing training methods in future education managers’ professional training. The specific characteristics of future education managers’ professional training are revealed. The necessity of developing future education managers’ democratic culture as a component of their professional competence is proved. It is emphasised that the educational trainings are considered to be an effective method of developing democratic culture, as it involves future specialists in the interaction, based on the principles of mutual respect, trust, and tolerance. It is concluded that the implementation of educational trainings (social and psychological trainings, trainings of business communication, rhetorical trainings) contributes to the deeper awareness of democratic values of modern society and getting experience of professional interaction, based on the democratic foundations that positively influences the developing future education managers’ democratic culture., У статті представлено проблему запровадження тренінгових методів у професійну підготовку майбутніх менеджерів освіти з метою формування їхньої демократичної культури, що є вимогою сучасних умов інтеграції України до європейського освітнього простору. Метою статті є теоретичне обґрунтування особливостей використання різних видів навчальних тренінгів у професійній підготовці майбутніх фахівців у сфері управління закладами освіти. Для досягнення поставленої мети залучено теоретичні методи дослідження: аналіз, синтез, узагальнення та систематизація. Узагальнено особливості професійної підготовки майбутніх менеджерів освіти. Доведено необхідність формування демократичної культури майбутніх фахівців як складника їхньої професійної компетентності. Проаналізовано особливості запровадження різних типів навчальних тренінгів, а саме: соціально-психологічні тренінги, тренінги ділового спілкування, риторичні тренінги.

The article is premised on the hypothesis that the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) and the attendant auxiliary forces are not an ideal force for domestic deployment in contending with public health pandemics such as COVID-19 The UPDF has been the main architectural tool that has been deployed by the National Resistance Movement party, a former guerilla movement, to perpetuate militarisation in the country for the past 30 years The conduct, power, authority and prominent position accorded to the UPDF in the management of COVID-19 and the enforcement of the prevention measures laid bare this reality Thus, unlike in other jurisdictions where the militaries were deployed because of their superior capability to adapt and provide extra and immediate professional services to support the civilian authorities, in Uganda this deployment was different It was informed by the long-held and widely-documented belief by the President of Uganda, Museveni, that the UPDF, which developed from his personal guerrilla army of the National Resistance Army (NRA), only holds a legitimate vision for the country and is far more reliable The COVID-19 pandemic, therefore, was an opportunity to continue the deliberate build-up and normalisation of the infiltration of the military in what have hitherto been spheres of operation for the civil and public servants Thus, a critical question arises as to whether the primary motivation factor for the UPDF deployment was political, to accentuate the presidency of Museveni in power through militarisation The question is also whether any positive harvests from the deployment of the military in the fight against COVID-19 were unintended consequences and, if they did materialise, how they were used to further glorify the centrality of the military in dealing with societal crises, further entrenching militarism The article concludes with some recommendations emphasising the need for accountability – more so, parliamentary oversight in the deployment of the military in such situations to counter a breach of rights and freedoms Additionally, this would check the current trend of the executive having the exclusive power to deploy the military, making it susceptible to hijacking and eventual politicisation and militarisation © 2020, Pretoria University Law Press All rights reserved

By comparing and analysing four cross-national measures of democracy, this article provides novel information regarding the statistical properties, convergence, and interchangeability of some of the most frequently used measures of democracy. The author points out limitations related to the statistical properties of these measures and finds that even if measures of democracy are highly convergent, their interchangeability is weak. This means that the choice of the measure of democracy has considerable consequences for the conclusions of a given study. Especially so in studies covering the last few decades, because the author finds that in general the interchangeability of democracy measures has decreased since the 1980s. In choosing one measure over another, scholars should be aware of the limitations identified in this article. To overcome problems related to weak interchangeability, if a single measure cannot be credibly chosen on theoretical grounds, the author recommends users of the measures to validate their findings with multiple measures of democracy.

As more and more political systems acquire signs of hybridity, and as the cycle of accountability and decision making for society becomes narrower, processes of de-democratisation emerge in democracies. Also, the result of the connection between processes of democratisation and de-democratisation becomes even more unclear. The analytical construction of post-democracy has appeared in the scientific discourse. In this article, the connection between democratisation and de-democratisation in a post-democratic environment is analysed through the concept of C. Tilly’s methodologically presumed analysis of democracy. For the purpose of theoretical statement operationalisation, an analysis of the Ukrainian practice is used. Methods: scientific literature and publication analysis, statistical analysis, case study. Research results: The theorisation of the connection between processes of democratisation and dedemocratisation which was highlighted and updated in C. Tilly’s democracy research is an effective analytical tool for the development of democracy. The famous analytical triad formulated by C. Tilly (an increase or decrease in integration between interpersonal networks of trust and public politics; an increase or decrease in the insulation from public politics of the main categorical inequalities; an increase or decrease in the autonomy of major power centres) allows us to reveal the many nuances of democracy. Despite this, Tilly stresses the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation as negating each other, and multiple political hybrids unfold under post-democratic conditions. We respond to Tilly’s call for those who want the worldwide establishment of democracy not to waste their time preaching about the benefits of democracy, creating constitutions and NGOs, or even expressing sympathy for undemocratic countries; but instead, to make a significant effort at integrating politics into networks of trust, insulating the main categorical inequalities from public politics, and fighting against autonomous power centres. In a world full of processes of democratisation and de-democratisation, the number of undemocratic political regimes and undemocratic tendencies does not decrease, even in old democracies. Different cases of trust network insulation from politics or the relationship between politics and categorical inequalities, power centres autonomous from the state, still exist. The inclusion of trust networks in public hearings and other public processes is a welcome and necessary ingredient for sustaining democracy, or at least for the beginning of its consolidation. Despite this, the process still does not guarantee democratisation, because fundamental democratic principles, such as government control, equivalence of representation and participation, are not guaranteed by formally democratic institutions themselves. This is partly because democracies cannot significantly reduce social and economic inequality. The inability to limit the growth of social inequality has evolved into mass protest movements. They do not necessarily propose violent conflict, but rather raise doubts about the potential of democracy to solve current problems in people’s daily lives. Moreover, it means that the configuration of processes of democratisation and dedemoratisation remains a complex issue. The latter significantly complements autonomous power centres, which occurs both in a globalised, post-democratic world and in free and partly free countries. They have the potential to continue to get stronger and limit state power and authority even more. A partial analysis of recent processes in Ukraine using C. Tilly’s concept of the connection between democratisation and de-democratisation showed that democratisation and de-democratisation in this country take place in parallel, they coexist, and do not contradict each other in principle. More detailed research and comparative studies are needed in order to find out whether it is a random situation, or a universal current situation. The study conducted of processes of democratisation and de-democratisation shows that it is meaningful to continue research not only into the radical opposition of these processes, but also their parallel opposition, when they do not contradict each other, but rather hybridise; and also to test the assumption of simultaneous, one-directional processes of democratisation and de-democratisation.

Hierdie artikel bied 'n bestekopname en kritiese, sinsoekende bevraging van die geesteswetenskappe as 'n kollektief aan universiteite en binne die samelewing van die een-en-twintigste eeu. Nadat universiteite vir baie lank op die rand van die samelewing was, het die universiteit as instelling na die middelpunt beweeg sedert die middel van die twintigste eeu, en meer so sedert die aanbreek van die wêreldwye hoëronderwysrevolusie vanaf ongeveer 1990. Deel van die massifikasie wat die hoofkenmerk van hierdie revolusie is, is die toename in geesteswetenskappe-inskrywings. In die lig van die eise wat die huidige eeu se ontvouende samelewing aan hoër onderwys stel, is hierdie tendens te verwelkom. Die grootste leemte is dat daar geen dienooreenkomstige navorsingsaktiwiteit is om hierdie studentekorps of hul dosente te begelei tot die beste onderwys en onderwysstelselpraktyk nie. In die slotgedeelte van hierdie artikel word enkele aanbevelings vir die agenda van so 'n navorsingsprojek gemaak. This article offers a stocktaking and critical, meaning-searching interrogation of the humanities as collective at universities and in the twenty-first-century society. As a working definition of "humanities", the lexical definition of "any of the fields of scholarship taking the mental life and resultant cultural products of humans as its object ofstudy " is accepted. To the humanities belong not only history and linguistics but also the group of fields sometimes named the social sciences, such as sociology, anthropology and political science. "An autonomous institution devoted to the advancement of various branches of higher learning" is taken as a working definition of a university. During its long history, this institution has acquired an unexchangeable, irreplaceable number of interrelated roles in society, namely teaching and research, community service of a particular kind, innovation, cultural preservation, transmittance and development, and societal critique. A set of powerful societal forces characterising the twenty-first-century society is gathering momentum today, including the ecological crisis, demographic dynamics (population explosion in the Global South, changing age profiles, migration patterns and an increasingly mobile population) and growing affluence as well as inequalities. Also part of these forces are a nascent knowledge economy, the fourth industrial revolution, the neo-liberal economic revolution, changing roles in the family and the workplace and the rise of tertiary social groupings, technological developments (the information, communications and transportation revolution in particular), the rise of multicultural societies, democratisation and individualisation, the rise of global political structures, the persistent but changed presence of religion in society and the rise of the creed of human rights as the new global moral code. These trends underscore even more the role and value of the university in society, including that of the humanities in universities. After having been on the periphery of society for centuries, the university as institution has, since the mid-twentieth century and especially since the global higher education revolution has commenced around 1990, moved to the frontstage of society. In view of the imperatives that the nascent, unfolding twenty-first century directs to higher education, this is a wholesome development, as is the swelling rise of enrolments in the humanities as part of the massification that is the hallmark of the global higher education revolution. In countries such as the United States of America, Turkey and Egypt, at any given point, the number of students of humanities at universities runs into the millions, while in the case of India, the figure tops the 12 million mark. The case for the humanities and enrolling in the humanities can be strongly argued from many points of view, not only in terms of the need of a schooled citizenry (or elite vanguard of the citizenry schooled in the humanities) but also from stark empirical evidence of individual and social rates of return (although the numbers of publications with these calculations are not at all sufficient). The biggest lacuna is the absence of research on the teaching and research of humanities at universities on the research agenda of the meteoric rise of higher education as field of scholarship in recent decades. Without denigrating or negating the importance of academic freedom and academic autonomy of faculty, such research is needed in order to construct a pedagogy of humanities and to guide faculty in advancing humanities at universities. In conclusion, some suggestions as to the research agenda for such a research project on the pedagogy of humanities at universities are made. These include teaching methods, learning methods, curricula, the need for a normative superstructure in the humanities, tracer studies (surveying both students and employers), individual as well as social rates of return analyses, student surveys and surveying students' sources of inspiration and motivation for enrolling in the humanities.

Security sector reform has remained largely disconnected from the broader debate on societal transition in the literature thus far. We conceptualise how external support to security sector reform could potentially facilitate socio-political order opening in a limited access order. Based on two dimensions, we examine the case of NATO and the EU’s support to Ukraine’s security sector reform between 2014 and 2019. NATO’s support to the military and the EU’s support to the police and state security service (SBU) appear unlikely to cause opening of the social order, while NATO’s support to the military-industrial complex is more likely to cause opening. The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is freely available in East European Politics, 20 March 2021, Taylor & Francis,https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.1878151&nbsp

É controversa a luta pela redução da desigualdade social por meio do acesso, dito democrático, ao ensino superior, sobretudo, privado. As instituições de ensino superior privadas de caráter quase mercantil pertencentes, hoje, aos grandes conglomerados educacionais, transformaram a formação universitária em um grande negócio lucrativo, cujo sistema de exploração inclui professores e alunos ao exigir de ambos uma cumplicidade perversa. Em entrevistas realizadas com professores universitários do contexto privado, eles revelam dramas e impasses submetidos ao ethos corporativo aplicado ao ensino, que exige do mestre a negação de sua experiência e de sua autoridade enunciativa. Assim, em nome da sobrevivência do mercado educacional, o professor aliena a sua subjetividade e torna-se instrumento a serviço da rentabilidade da privatização. A pesquisa aponta para a necessidade de revisão das políticas públicas de acesso à universidade e das formas de contratos de trabalho precários para os docentes. La lutte pour la réduction de l'inégalité sociale grâce à l'accès, dit démocratique, à l'enseignement supérieur, en particulier privé, est objet de controverse. Les institutions d'enseignement supérieur privées au caractère largement mercantile, appartenant, aujourd'hui, aux grands conglomérats éducationnels, ont transformé la formation universitaire en une grande entreprise lucrative, dont le système d'exploitation implique les professeurs et les étudiants, en exigeant d'eux une complicité perverse. Au cours d'entretiens réalisés avec des professeurs universitaires du privé, ceux-ci révèlent des drames et des impasses, soumis qu'ils sont à l'ethos corporatif appliqué à l'enseignement, qui exige du maître le déni de son expérience et de son autorité énonciative. Ainsi, au nom de la survie du marché éducationnel, le professeur aliène sa subjectivité et devient un instrument au service de la rentabilité de la privatisation. L'étude souligne la nécessité de révision des politiques publiques d'accès à l'université et des types de contrats de travail précaires des enseignants. Es controvertida a lucha por la reducción de la desigualdad social, a través del acceso democrático a la educación superior, sobre todo privada. Las instituciones de educación superior privadas de carácter tienen solamente quasi mercantil, pertenecientes hoy a los grandes conglomerados educacionales, transformaron la formación universitaria en un gran negocio lucrativo, cuyos sistema de explotación incluye profesores y estudiantes, exigiendo entre ambos una complicidad perversa. A partir de entrevistas realizadas con profesores universitarios, en este contexto, revelan sus dramas e impasses sometidos al ethos corporativo aplicado a la enseñanza, en la que se le exige al docente la negación de su experiencia y de su autoridad enunciativa. Así, en nombre de la sobrevivencia del mercado educativo, el profesor se aliena, pues se torna también instrumento al servicio de la rentabilidad del sector privado. La investigación apunta sobre la necesidad de revisión de las políticas públicas de acceso a la universidad y a las formas de contratos de trabajo precarios para los docentes. The struggle to reduce social inequality through the so-called democratic access to higher education, above all private, is controversial. Private higher education institutions of mercantile character, belonging today to the large educational conglomerates, have transformed university education into a large profitable business, whose operating system includes teachers and students, demanding between them a perverse complicity. From interviews with university professors in this context, they reveal their dramas and impasses underwent to the corporate ethos applied to teaching, in which the professor is required to deny his experience and his enunciative authority. Thus, in the name of the survival of the educational market, the teacher alienates his subjectivity, as well as becoming an instrument at the service of the profitability of privatization. The research points to the need to review public policies for access to university and the forms of precarious employment contracts for teachers.

This paper creates a framework for the comparison of two similar and yet different democratisation cases – Slovenia and Montenegro. The two countries have obvious similarities: their geography and small population, as well as their common socialist Yugoslav heritage and common aspirations to join international organisations, most importantly the European Union. However, while Slovenia went through the democratisation process rather smoothly, Montenegro took the longer road, struggling for more than a decade to regain its independence and complete its transition. We take into account different internal and external factors in these two cases such as the year of independence and of joining NATO, the political and electoral system, ethnic homogeneity, the viability of civil society, EU integration status, economic development and the presence of war in each territory in order to identify and describe those factors that contributed to the success of democratisation in different areas: the party system, the interest groups system, the defence system, Europeanisation and social policy. We find that the democratisation process in these countries produced different results in terms of quality. Various objective measures of the quality of democracy score Slovenia higher compared to Montenegro, while public opinion data shows, in general, greater satisfaction with the political system and greater trust in political institutions in Montenegro than in Slovenia.

The democratisation of national defence policies and systems plays a vital role in making any country more democratic. The democratic transition of this sector in Slovenia and Montenegro has experienced a challenging reform process and it is now time for reflection. This paper aims to identify the main characteristics and issues of the democratisation process in the field of national defence in both countries and, by comparing them, to look for key similarities and differences. The paper argues and confirms that the Slovenian and Montenegrin national defence and security systems were initially faced with serious post-socialist democratic deficits, but gradual democratisation then brought drastic improvements to the quality of their democracy. The process of joining NATO and the change from a military threat perception to a non-military threat perception created space for many reforms. Greatest steps forward in democratisation in both countries entailed nominating civilian defence ministers, having a reasonable number of civilian defence experts involved in the military business, establishing working parliamentary monitoring committees, reducing defence budgets and reallocating funding to other sectors. Progress was also observed in reducing the total number of soldiers, establishing a fully professional armed force, assuring that women in the armed forces were properly represented and increasing the deployment of soldiers to foreign stabilisation operations in a sign of becoming security providers.

Despite the joint history of Montenegro and Slovenia as republics of the former Yugoslavia, the development of the interest groups system has been different in these countries. While in Slovenia, these groups started to develop from the 19th century, in Montenegro the interest groups system was almost non-existent in the pre-socialist period with only a few participative elements, such as the use of tribal assemblies. Socialism did not support associational life, since most of the organizations that were founded at the time were under some form of government control. As a consequence, the interest groups system in Slovenia shrank during socialist rule, while in Montenegro it remained at the same level. During the 1980s and after the collapse of the socialist regime the interest group system in Montenegro finally starts to develop, being heavily influenced by international donor and assistance programmes, while in Slovenia the system had a new opportunity to flourish. In this article we are in particularly interested in how the interest group system contributes to the quality of democracy. Although Montenegrin interest groups have been a tool of influence and democratisation primarily on behalf of the international community, their internal democracy is less sophisticated than is the case in Slovenia. The results show that the origin of the interest groups system and the distinct histories of the specific political cultures seem to be embedded in the functioning of contemporary interest groups. This in turn, determines the strength or weakness of these groups in facing the challenges of de-democratisation.

L’article fait état des transformations et enjeux actuels de l’action communautaire autonome au Québec. Il s’inspire d’un rapport de recherche réalisé sur les rapports d’activités des organismes communautaires et de groupes de discussions exécutés avec ses dirigeants. À partir des enjeux identifiés, l’article soulève les nouveaux défis de l’action communautaire autonome dans un contexte de rationalisation et comment les organismes en santé et services sociaux réussissent à s’inscrire dans un projet de participation et démocratisation social. The article outlines the changes and current issues of independent community action in Quebec. It is based on a research report on the activity reports of community organizations and focus groups carried out with its leaders. Based on the issues identified, the article raises new challenges for independent community action in the context of streamlining and how organizations in health and social services are able to be part of a project of social participation and democratization.