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This paper uses German survey data on married couples to examine the association of performance pay at work and subsequent separation or divorce. Despite extensive controls, performance pay remains associated with an increased probability of separation or divorce. Yet, the results are entirely gender specific. When husbands earn performance pay, no association with marital instability is found. When wives earn performance pay, the association is large and robust. This pattern persists across a variety of modeling choices and attempts to account for endogeneity. We argue that the pattern fits theoretical expectations and discuss the implications.

We examine the hypothesis that performance pay increases work hours. If performance pay incentivizes greater hours, this could cause the demonstrated link between performance pay and poorer worker health. Using US survey data, we confirm greater work hours and an increased likelihood of long working hours for performance pay workers. This remains in worker fixed effect estimates and in worker with employer fixed effect estimates. The magnitudes remain sufficiently large to support the potential role of long hours as an intermediary between performance pay and reduced worker health. Despite managers being the most likely to both receive performance pay and work long hours, we show this association largely reflects sorting and not the behavioral response evident for other workers.

While performance pay can benefit firms and workers by increasing productivity and wages, it has also been associated with a deterioration of worker health. The transmission mechanisms for this deterioration remain in doubt. We examine the hypothesis that increased stress is one transmission mechanism. Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find performance pay consistently and importantly associates with greater stress even controlling for a long list of economic, social and personality characteristics. It also holds in instrumental variable estimations accounting for the potential endogeneity of performance pay. Moreover, we show that risk tolerance moderates the relationship between performance pay and stress. The risk tolerant receiving performance pay suffer less stress than the risk averse.

We study the link between performance pay and alcohol use in Germany, a country with mandated health insurance. Previous research from the US argues that alcohol use as a form of "self-medication" may be a natural response to the stress and uncertainty of performance pay when many workers do not have access to health insurance. We find that the likelihood of consuming each of four types of alcohol (beer, wine, spirits, and mixed drinks) is higher for those receiving performance pay even controlling for a long list of economic, social and personality characteristics and in sensible IV estimates. We also show that the total number of types of alcohol consumed is larger for those receiving performance pay. We conclude that even in the face of mandated health insurance, the link found in the US persists in Germany.

We show that couples sort on performance pay with dual receipt couples much more likely than predicted by random. In addition, we show that the return to performance pay appears largely invariant to whether one's spouse earns performance pay. The major exception is that among the college educated, the return to performance pay is larger for women when their spouse also receives performance pay. Thus, dual receipt households concentrate the returns to performance pay hinting that performance pay may influence the distribution of household income.

We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs.

We model a principal-firm offering training to its agent-worker under two alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker's preferred investment project. We assume that training reduces the worker's effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects' payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit-maximizing intensity of training. Empirical estimates from matched employer–employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed-effect estimates and, critically, in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects. (JEL D21, D22, D23, M53, M54) 56 2 1089 1115

We uniquely examine the relationship between firm-organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality. Cross section, panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that British workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality. Robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation. 155 C 159 177

We examine the hypothesis that flexible work organization involves greater skill requirements and, hence, an increased likelihood of receiving employer provided training. Using unique linked employer-employee data from Germany, we confirm that employees are more likely to receive training when their jobs are characterized by greater decision-making autonomy and task variety, two essential elements of flexibility. Critically, the training associated with workplace flexibility does not simply reflect technology. Skill-biased organizational change plays its own role. Moreover, we show that the training associated with workplace flexibility is disproportionately oriented toward employees with a greater formal education. Our results also provide modest evidence of an age bias of workplace flexibility. However, the link between workplace flexibility and training does not appear to differ by gender.

This paper tests whether the job security offered by stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) undermines positive compensating wage differentials that would otherwise be paid. Specifically, we ask whether industries with relatively more need for layoffs and labour flexibility have lower wages in countries where stricter EPL protects workers from layoffs. We find this generally to be true for a large sample of industries in the major OECD countries over 1984-2005, particularly for wages of unskilled workers. However, we also find that where workers are well organised, they can take advantage of EPL to secure higher wages.

Using the original data source of Clark, we show that over the last two decades the female satisfaction gap he documented has vanished. This reflects a strong secular decline in female job satisfaction. This decline happened both because younger women became less satisfied as they aged, and because new female workers entered with lower job satisfaction than their early 1990s peers. Decompositions make clear that the decline does not reflect changing job characteristics for women but rather their increasingly less favourable evaluation of job characteristics. These findings fit with the suggestion that women in the early 1990s had a gap between their labour market expectations and actual experience that has since closed and that the gender satisfaction gap has vanished as a consequence.

Using German establishment data, this paper examines the relationship between product market competition and the extent of employer provided training. We demonstrate that high product market competition is associated with increased training except when the competition is so severe as to threaten liquidation to a firm. We take this as evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship. We also make clear that while this relationship is very evident for the service sector it is largely missing for manufacturing where we confirm earlier results of no relationship.

We uniquely examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and product quality competition. Using an oligopolistic model of both price and quality competition, we show that an increase in the sensitivity of demand to product quality will strengthen firms’ incentives to train their workforce. Cross section, panel and instrumental variable estimations confirm that British establishments provide more intensive training when their competitive position is more sensitive to product quality. A variety of robustness checks and changes in variable definitions leave this confirmation in place.

Using British linked employer-employee data, we show that the establishment size effect for supervisors is approximately twice that for non-supervisors. This difference is routinely statistically significant, not explained by other controls and is an important determinant of the difference in earnings between supervisors and non-supervisors. Moreover, we use separate British longitudinal data to confirm both the statistically different effect and that it is not explained by worker fixed effects. Event study evidence and information on skill match suggest that the larger return to supervisors reflects, in large part, match specific returns supporting the view that talented supervisors receive a return on that talent only with larger employers.

This work contributes to the literature demonstrating an important role for psychological traits in labor market decisions. We show that West German workers with an internal locus of control sort into jobs with performance appraisals. Appraisals provide workers who believe they control their environment a tool to demonstrate their value and achieve their goals. We confirm that workers who are risk tolerant also sort into jobs with performance appraisals but explain why the influence of the locus of control and risk tolerance should not be additive. We demonstrate this by estimating a routinely large and significantly negative interaction in our sorting equations. We also show that important patterns of sorting are revealed only when taking into account the interaction of locus of control and risk tolerance.

This paper focuses on the German labor market for older workers. It does so in comparison with other countries and with a unique focus on the role of employer incentives for retaining and hiring older workers. It argues that while employment of older German workers has improved due to changes in government policy, the labor market for older workers remains characterized by far less mobility and opportunity. While we recognize the potential explanations of reduced productivity and age discrimination, we review evidence pointing to the importance of life-cycle contracts (Hutchens 1986, Lazear 1979). These contracts can be efficient but typically imply that older workers will have difficulty being re-hired into career jobs after separation. We suggest that attempts to reduce or eliminate such life-cycle contracts are likely to be counter-productive but suggest how other countries, particularly Japan, have dealt with this issue.

In the first British study, we show that the ethnic earnings gap amongst performance pay jobs is smaller than that amongst time rate jobs. This partially reflects sorting but persists with diminished magnitude in fixed effect estimates. Although varying somewhat with specification, quantile decompositions show that the smaller ethnic earnings gap is driven by bonus payments in the upper middle portion of the earnings distribution. These findings differ dramatically from those for the USA in which performance pay has been associated with larger negative racial differentials especially at the top of the earnings distribution. © Oxford University Press 2013. All rights reserved. 66 798 823 798-823

This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. "Committed" workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.

This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. Committed workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.

Past research on the federal sector job queue fails to incorporate the important role of unionization. The authors estimate a two-stage bivariate probit in which the willingness of a worker to queue for a union job enters the estimation of the federal queue. They demonstrate that the failure to implement their approach may lead to the inappropriate conclusion that there does not exist a federal queue in the U.S. labor market. The authors identify the characteristics that lead workers to seek employment in the federal sector and, as a byproduct, also provide independent confirmation of the presence of a queue for union jobs. Copyright 1995 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

The 1/n problem potentially limits the effectiveness of profit sharing in motivating workers. While the economic literature suggests that reciprocity can mitigate this problem, it remains silent on the optimal degree of reciprocity. We present a representative model demonstrating that reciprocity may increase productive effort but may also increase unproductive effort such as socializing on the job. The model implies that reciprocity increases profit up to a point but decreases profit beyond that point. Using detailed survey measures of worker reciprocity, we show that the probability of receiving profit sharing takes an inverse U-shape as reciprocity increases. This supports the general implication of the model and is shown to exist for both positive and negative reciprocity and to remain when a series of ability proxies and detailed industry indicators are included.

The paper asks why retirement can be so abrupt in countries such as France (½% of the workforce over 65), yet staged in Japan (8% over 65). We find part of the answer in tax laws that prevent people working and receiving a pension, and make little allowance for fair pension increases if retirement is deferred. While these laws have begun to change, we find another part of the answer in employment protection laws. These laws coupled with inflexible collectively agreed wages make employers choosy about hiring the old. The advent of "age discrimination" law reinforces employment protection and may well reduce older workers' hiring opportunities especially where wages are rigid.

The paper asks why retirement can be so abrupt in countries such as France (1/2% of the workforce over 65), yet staged in Japan (8% over 65). We find part of the answer in tax laws that prevent people working and receiving a pension, and make little allowance for fair pension increases if retirement is deferred. While these laws have begun to change, we find another part of the answer in employment protection laws. These laws coupled with inflexible collectively agreed wages make employers choosy about hiring the old. The advent of age discrimination law reinforces employment protection and may well reduce older workers' hiring opportunities especially where wages are rigid.

The determinants of worker job satisfaction are estimated using a representative survey of three major cities in China. Legally segregated migrants, floaters, earn significantly less than otherwise equivalent non-migrants but routinely report greater job satisfaction, a finding not previously reported. We confirm a positive role for membership in the communist party but find that it exists only for non-migrants suggesting a club good aspect to membership. In contrast to earlier studies, many controls mirror those found in western democracies including the paradox of the contented female worker.

Recent confirmation of sheepskin effects in the returns to education for prime age white males has been taken as evidence of screening or signaling in the labor market. The authors report evidence of sheepskin effects among women and minority males, and demonstrate that they are somewhat smaller for lower diploma years, but larger for higher diploma years, than those of white males. These are among the first broad-based results confirming the frequent contention derived from signaling models that minorities have smaller returns to low productivity signals, but larger returns to high productivity signals. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

We present a sorting model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs and contrast it with the classic agency model of performance pay. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our sorting model. First, prior to controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for the higher earnings associated with performance pay, the job satisfaction of those in performance pay jobs is the same as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support the sorting model, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.

This paper uses establishment data to estimate the determinants of using agency workers. It contends that those employers with less ability to direct effort of core workers are more likely to use agency workers to meet uncertain labor demand. Family friendly practices are viewed as either increasing or decreasing such ability, depending upon their influence upon absence rates. The empirical results imply that special leave practices reduce firms' ability to direct worker effort, thereby increasing the likelihood of using agency workers. On the other hand, practices linked with flexible working conditions (workplace nurseries, flexitime and job sharing) have the opposite effect. The findings thus distinguish between family friendly practices that make core workers better off without expanding contingent agency jobs, and those that do not.

This paper posits that the provision of family friendly practices is, on balance, costly to firms and valuable to workers. As a consequence, we anticipate the emergence of a hedonic equilibrium in which workers provided with such practices face an implicit reduction in their earnings. Using WERS98 linked employer-employee data, we show that the ability to confirm this compensating wage differential depends critically on an appropriate treatment model designed to purge typical estimates of the income effect. We find that family friendly jobs may be associated with as much as a 20 percent reduction in earnings. Our estimates can be used to inform impact assessments of new UK legislation extending family friendly practices.

High performance workplaces elicit greater involvement and productivity from employees but past theory and evidence remain divided on whether or not such workplaces are compatible with family friendly work practices. We present new evidence on the association using perceptions of a representative sample of workers and an innovative testing framework. The evidence reveals that high performance workplaces are no more likely to make commitments to provide family friendly workplaces than are other workplaces. It shows, however, that high performance workplaces are more likely to keep the family friendly commitments they make, thereby maintaining a psychological contract based on mutual obligation. As providing family friendly practices requires both making and keeping commitments, the evidence confirms that high performance workplaces are more likely to provide such practices.

Research on spatial price discrimination demonstrates that strategic (off center) location choices by downstream firms can increase downstream profit and reduce both the profit of an upstream monopoly and social welfare. This paper examines exclusive territories as a vertical control mechanism and shows that such territories can force downstream firms to return to the center of the market. Yet, exclusive territories cannot completely eliminate the influence of strategic downstream location - the profit maximizing exclusive territories are either too small or too large to be socially efficient.

In this paper we exploit the longitudinal element of the 1990 and 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Surveys for Britain to investigate the effect of unionism on establishment closings. Contrary to both recent U.S. research and British work using information from the earlier workplace surveys, we find a robust positive association between two measures of unionism – union recognition for collective bargaining purposes and union coverage – and plant closings. This association survives the incorporation of very detailed industry controls but is driven by plants that are parts of multi-establishment enterprises. There appears to be little or no statistically significant association for single plant enterprises. In explaining our findings, we address their consistency with the widely perceived reduction in the "disadvantages of [British] unionism" in recent years.

This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximizing leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatization are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.