Search

This report offers a comprehensive look at how both race and geography influenced voter support for 2020 ballot measures in California dealing with affirmative action, rent control, employee protections for gig workers, and other issues.

We analyze official state primary election returns from a subset of states with large populations of Asian American and Latino voters to evaluate their candidate preferences and participation rates going into the 2020 general election.

Asian Americans and Latinos are currently one of the fastest growing racial minority groups in the United States. However, much of this growth is due to immigration: over half of both communities are new immigrants. Thus, Asian American and Latino political incorporation is directly related to the challenges associated with immigration and in ensuring the transition from citizen adult to voter. This paper explores the effect of immigration on the Asian American and Latino political behavior. Applying DeSipio’s (1996) model of new electorates, we disaggregate immigrants from both communities into three non-voting categories: non-naturalized immigrant adults, citizen adults not registered to vote, and registered voter adults who did not vote in the 2000 or 2004 election. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data we identify and compare the factors that differentiate these three non-voting categories from those who voted between both communities. We find that Asian American and Latino political incorporation cannot be predicted solely on the basis of individual socioeconomic factors. In addition, we must take into account influences related to immigration and political institutions such as labor unions.

We look at the structure of job placements in Ph.D. granting departments in political science: (1) in terms of conformity to the assumptions of what the social network theorist Scott Feld has called a vertical organization of ties (Feld, Bisciglia and Ynalvez, 2003); (2) in terms of patterns of direct and indirect (majority) influence of (sets of) departments on other departments, and (3) in terms of the regional geography of placements. We show how the structure of placements involves a small core set of departments which are able either directly and at first or second remove to “majority dominate” the discipline. We also consider the links between placements and department prestige. In particular, we demonstrate how the structure of placements forces downward mobility for most Ph.D.s.