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Background. Wearable technology is used by consumers and researchers worldwide for continuous activity monitoring in daily life. Results of high-quality laboratory-based validation studies enable us to make a guided decision on which study to rely on and which device to use. However, reviews in adults that focus on the quality of existing laboratory studies are missing. Methods. We conducted a systematic review of wearable validation studies with adults. Eligibility criteria were: (i) study under laboratory conditions with humans (age ≥ 18 years); (ii) validated device outcome must belong to one dimension of the 24-hour physical behavior construct (i.e., intensity, posture/activity type, and biological state); (iii) study protocol must include a criterion measure; (iv) study had to be published in a peer-reviewed English language journal. Studies were identified via a systematic search in five electronic databases as well as back- and forward citation searches. The risk of bias was assessed based on the QUADAS-2 tool with eight signaling questions. Results. Out of 13,285 unique search results, 545 published articles between 1994 and 2022 were included. Most studies (73.8% (N = 420)) validated an intensity measure outcome such as energy expenditure; only 14% (N = 80) and 12.2% (N = 70) of studies validated biological state or posture/activity type outcomes, respectively. Most protocols validated wearables in healthy adults between 18 and 65 years. Most wearables were only validated once. Further, we identified six wearables (i.e., ActiGraph GT3X+, ActiGraph GT9X, Apple Watch 2, Axivity AX3, Fitbit Charge 2, Fitbit, and GENEActiv) that had been used to validate outcomes from all three dimensions, but none of them were consistently ranked with moderate to high validity. Risk of bias assessment resulted in 4.4% (N = 24) of all studies being classified as “low risk”, while 16.5% (N = 90) were classified as “some concerns” and 79.1% (N = 431) as “high risk”. Conclusion. Laboratory validation studies of wearables assessing physical behaviour in adults are characterized by low methodological quality, large variability in design, and a focus on intensity. Future research should more strongly aim at all components of the 24-hour physical behaviour construct, and strive for standardized protocols embedded in a validation framework.

Background: Wearable technology is a leading fitness trend in the growing commercial industry and an established method for collecting 24-hour physical behavior data in research studies. High-quality free-living validation studies are required to enable both researchers and consumers to make guided decisions on which study to rely on and which device to use. However, reviews focusing on the quality of free-living validation studies in adults are lacking. Objective: This study aimed to raise researchers’ and consumers’ attention to the quality of published validation protocols while aiming to identify and compare specific consistencies or inconsistencies between protocols. We aimed to provide a comprehensive and historical overview of which wearable devices have been validated for which purpose and whether they show promise for use in further studies. Methods: Peer-reviewed validation studies from electronic databases, as well as backward and forward citation searches (1970 to July 2021), with the following, required indicators were included: protocol must include real-life conditions, outcome must belong to one dimension of the 24-hour physical behavior construct (intensity, posture or activity type, and biological state), the protocol must include a criterion measure, and study results must be published in English-language journals. The risk of bias was evaluated using the Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies-2 tool with 9 questions separated into 4 domains (patient selection or study design, index measure, criterion measure, and flow and time). Results: Of the 13,285 unique search results, 222 (1.67%) articles were included. Most studies (153/237, 64.6%) validated an intensity measure outcome such as energy expenditure. However, only 19.8% (47/237) validated biological state and 15.6% (37/237) validated posture or activity-type outcomes. Across all studies, 163 different wearables were identified. Of these, 58.9% (96/163) were validated only once. ActiGraph GT3X/GT3X+ (36/163, 22.1%), Fitbit Flex (20/163, 12.3%), and ActivPAL (12/163, 7.4%) were used most often in the included studies. The percentage of participants meeting the quality criteria ranged from 38.8% (92/237) to 92.4% (219/237). On the basis of our classification tree to evaluate the overall study quality, 4.6% (11/237) of studies were classified as low risk. Furthermore, 16% (38/237) of studies were classified as having some concerns, and 72.9% (173/237) of studies were classified as high risk. Conclusions: Overall, free-living validation studies of wearables are characterized by low methodological quality, large variability in design, and focus on intensity. Future research should strongly aim at biological state and posture or activity outcomes and strive for standardized protocols embedded in a validation framework. Standardized protocols for free-living validation embedded in a framework are urgently needed to inform and guide stakeholders (eg, manufacturers, scientists, and consumers) in selecting wearables for self-tracking purposes, applying wearables in health studies, and fostering innovation to achieve improved validity.

Physical behavior (ie, physical activity, sedentary behavior, and sleep) is a crucial lifestyle factor for preventing and managing diseases across the lifespan. However, less is known about potential work-related psychological and cognitive outcomes such as productivity. The present study examined within-person associations between physical behavior and self-perceived work ability. To investigate the degree to which physical behavior parameters influence self-perceived work ability in everyday life, we conducted an Ambulatory Assessment study in 103 university students over 5 days. Physical behavior was assessed continuously via a multi-sensor system. Self-perceived work ability was assessed repeatedly up to six times per day on smartphones. We employed multilevel modeling to analyze the within-person effects of physical behavior on self-perceived work ability. Physical activity intensity (MET) (β = 0.15 ± 0.06, t = 2.59, p = 0.012) and sit-to-stand transitions (β = 0.07 ± 0.03, t = 2.44, p = 0.015) were positively associated with self-perceived work ability. Sedentary bouts (≥20 min) (β = −0.21 ± 0.08, t = −2.74, p = 0.006) and deviation from a recommended sleep duration (ie, 8 h) (β = −0.1 ± 0.04, t = −2.38, p = 0.018) were negatively associated with self-perceived work ability. Exploratory analyses supported the robustness of our findings by comparing various time frames. Total sedentary time and sleep quality were not associated with self-perceived work ability. Regular sleep durations, breaking up sedentary time through sit-to-stand transitions, and higher intensities of physical activity may be important for the regulation of self-perceived work ability in university students’ daily lives.

International relations are made up of thick layers of meaning and big streams of data. How can we capture the nuances and scales of increasingly digitalised world politics, taking advantage of the possibilities that come with ‘big data’ and ‘digital methods’ in our discipline of International Relations (IR)? What is needed, we argue, is a methodological twin-move of making big data thick and thick data big. Taking diplomacy, one of IR's core practices as our case, we illustrate how anthropological and computational approaches can be merged in IR research. We report from our experiences with the project DIPLOFACE: Diplomatic Face-Work between Confidential Negotiations and Public Display, investigating how digital communication technologies influence both the study and conduct of age-old and traditionally analogue practices of inter-state diplomacy.

This chapter investigates this puzzle of choosing non-sovereignty in a postcolonial setting. Historically, the question of freedom from imperial hegemony has been linked to how Western colonialism involved keeping the colonized in ‘the waiting room of history’ by insisting that they were not yet ready for sovereignty. It explores a number of European overseas countries and territories. More specifically, it focuses on French dependencies in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and North Atlantic Greenland constitutionally connected to Denmark. The immediate aim of anti-colonial struggles was to make the colonizers leave so that the colonized people could decide for themselves. Many anti-imperial struggles settled for nation-states each acquiring a separate, formal sovereignty-based international status. More recent versions of postcolonialism, inspired by poststructuralism and critical constructivism, have aimed at accounting for ways of realizing agency, which escape, first, imperial submission, and second, norms of an international society based on sovereignty. Instead of representing a rejection of sovereignty, the EU overseas countries and territories that remain under their metropole’s formal authority rearticulate sovereignty. As this chapter demonstrates, a universalizing European discourse on a universal norm for how to organize community and authority as a sovereign state makes a range of postcolonial choices possible, which both constructivist and some postcolonial thinking fail to fully acknowledge. A number of overseas territories take alternative routes to agency; not by resisting the norm of sovereignty - but by creatively articulating it beyond its claim to represent an 'either/or' distinction. The chapter demonstrates that territories not formally decolonized may very well perform a postcolonial agency, which tampers with the sovereignty norm.

This chapter argues that to understand international hierarchies, we need to examine not only the type of hierarchy, but also processes of internalization of – and resistance to – hierarchies. We will then discover that many hierarchies are not simply imposed from above, but that subordinate actors are often complicit in the ongoing production and negotiation of hierarchies. I begin this argument with the simple observation that some international hierarchies are taken for granted. Today, it seems obvious that there is a hierarchy in the Eurozone with Germany at the top and Greece at the bottom. Scholars, politicians and media see Germany as the leader and economic power-house of Europe, while Greece is represented as ‘bankrupt’ and ‘dysfunctional’ with high levels of unemployment. What we often overlook, however, is that it was not inevitable that these particular countries would occupy these positions in the hierarchy. Why Greece and not Italy, Spain or Ireland? We cannot explain why Greece became the poster boy for the Eurozone crisis based purely on its economic troubles – because Spain and Italy share similar debt problems as Greece and are just as closely monitored and subordinated to the austerity measures imposed by the IMF, the EU and international lenders. Likewise, while the German economy has been doing relatively well, it suffers from structural problems, including a growing number of working poor. This first part of the chapter explores why hierarchy appears awkward in multilateral institutions emphasizing sovereign equality. It shows how hierarchies are produced, upheld and challenged through stigmatizing and stereotyping labels. The second part of the chapter presents a survey of how German and Greek newspapers label – and thereby also rank Germany and Greece – and react to the way in which their countries are ranked themselves in a period of three months during the height of the euro crisis. The labels include Germany as ‘Nazi oppressor and colonizer’, ‘strict teacher’ and ‘naïve victim’ and Greece as ‘colonized and oppressed – and possible neo-Nazi resistant’, ‘immature pupil’ and ‘moral sinner’. Each label positions the state very differently. Based on an in-depth analysis and contextualization of the stereotyping of self and other, the chapter suggests that rather than merely consolidating Germany’s (and Northern Europe’s) economic and political superiority and sustaining the subordination of Greece (and other Southern states); the euro crisis generates a series of more complex, self-reflective national debates and political gestures of repair and embarrassment. These dynamics reveal a deep concern in both Greece and Germany about how they are perceived on the international scene. The chapter concludes with reflections on how international status struggles are more interactive and self-reflective than usually assumed, suggesting different ways in which hierarchies may change from within.

Theresa May’s claim that ‘Brexit means Brexit' demonstrates the malleability of the concept. The referendum campaign showed that ‘Brexit’ can be articulated to a variety of post-Brexit scenarios. While it is important to analyse how Brexit gives rise to contestation in the UK, Brexit is also constructed from the outside. Brexit signifies more than the technical complexities of the UK withdrawing from the European Union. It works both as a promise of a different future and performatively to establish a particular past. Brexit works as a frame with potential to shape perceptions in three domains. The first is identity. How does ‘Brexit' shape national and European identities in distinct national environments? The second is how Brexit shapes understandings of geopolitical reality and influences conceptions of what is diplomatically possible. Third is the global economy. How does ‘Brexit' work within intersubjective frames about the nature of global economic order?

This article argues that symbolic interactionist sources of the first generation of constructivists in IR theory are worth recovering because of their ability to address what constructivists have always wanted to understand – the social construction of world politics. Symbolic interactionism is more or less implicit in key claims of canonical works of the first generation of constructivism in International Relations (IR) theory. However, constructivism lost some of its potential to address everyday experiences and performances of world politics when it turned to norm di usion and socialisation. The second generation of constructivists generated rich insights on the construction of national identities and on patterns of foreign policy, but did not fully exploit constructivism’s analytical potentials. Contrary to what most IR scholars have come to believe, symbolic interactionists saw the self as a deeply social – not a psychological or biological – phenomenon. Symbolic interactionism is interested in how inherently incomplete and fragile selves are constructed and deconstructed through processes of inclusion, exclusion and shaming. Today, third generation constructivists are returning to the sociology of Erving Go man and Harold Gar nkel and other symbolic interactionists to address problems of identity, power and deviance in international politics. This article argues that symbolic interactionist sources of the first generation of constructivists in IR theory are worth recovering because of their ability to address what constructivists have always wanted to understand – the social construction of world politics. Symbolic interactionism is more or less implicit in key claims of canonical works of the first generation of constructivism in International Relations (IR) theory. However, constructivism lost some of its potential to address everyday experiences and performances of world politics when it turned to norm diffusion and socialisation. The second generation of constructivists generated rich insights on the construction of national identities and on patterns of foreign policy, but did not fully exploit constructivism’s analytical potentials. Contrary to what most IR scholars have come to believe, symbolic interactionists saw the self as a deeply social – not a psychological or biological – phenomenon. Symbolic interactionism is interested in how inherently incomplete and fragile selves are constructed and deconstructed through processes of inclusion, exclusion and shaming. Today, third generation constructivists are returning to the sociology of Erving Go man and Harold Gar nkel and other symbolic interactionists to address problems of identity, power and deviance in international politics.

This paper explores how practice theory can be recruited for the study of European integration. New generations of EU researchers are fascinated by the prospect of leaving the armchair and studying the people and artefacts that make the EU on an everyday level. This paper surveys key practice-oriented, anthropological and micro-sociological studies of the EU and European integration and shows how their findings challenge more traditional understandings of the dynamics of European integration. Moving beyond a stock-taking, the paper distinguishes between ‘organised’ and ‘everyday’ practices and explores the potential of a practice turn in EU studies for both theory (overcoming dualism, replacing substantialism with processualism and rethinking power) and methods (including unstructured interviews, fieldwork and participant observation). A practice turn will force us to rethink core assumptions about the EU and allow us to grasp otherwise unchartered performances and social activities that are crucial for European integration. This article explores how practice theory can be recruited for the study of European integration. New generations of EU researchers are fascinated by the prospect of leaving the armchair and studying the people and artefacts that make the EU on an everyday level. This article surveys key practice-oriented, anthropological and micro-sociological studies of the EU and European integration and shows how their findings challenge more traditional understandings of the dynamics of European integration. Moving beyond a stock-taking, the article distinguishes between ‘order- ing’ and ‘disordering’ practices and explores the potential of a practice turn in EU studies for both theory (overcoming dualism, replacing substantialism with processualism and rethinking power) and methods (including unstructured interviews, fieldwork and participant observation). A practice turn will force us to rethink core assumptions about the EU and allow us to grasp otherwise uncharted performances and social activities that are crucial for European integration.

In this conclusion, which reflects critically on this approach and itswider consequences, I argue that diplomats are estranged from IR theory andvice versa - because IR scholars generally subscribe to substantialism,whereas diplomats tend to think in terms of relations. In fact, a deeperunderstanding of these relations is a key theoretical take-away point ofthis book. More specifically, I argue that relationalism - as ameta-theoretical approach - not only helps us understand the diplomaticproduction of world politics, relationalism also reflects a particularontology, which differs fundamentally from the worldview that mostIR scholars subscribe to. As I suggest, most IR scholars depart from thesocial phenomenon they want to study, for example, states, diplomats,soldiers, organizations, treaties, companies, and women. Assuming a priori the existence of these phenomena (e.g. states or individuals) andascribing certain characteristics to them, they develop substantive theories.Consequently, diplomacy is reduced to the mechanics of statesbumping into each other or a system of reciprocal signaling.However, most diplomats know, in an embodied but often unarticulatedsense, that world politics is deeply relational. Their job is tomake those relations "work," and they are convinced that importantknowledge can be gained by consulting and meeting with foreignpowers, that is, "the other." As such, they subscribe to a relationalthinking (shared to some extent by diplomatic scholars). Relationalismtakes as its point of departure the idea that social phenomena makingup world politics always develop in relation to other social phenomena.Thus, for example, states are not born into' this world as fullydeveloped states that then "exist"; states are made in continuousrelations with other states and non-state actors. The development,consolidation, weakening (or even disappearance) of states can onlybe understood in terms of continuous processes that play out in relationto other social processes. These ontological and epistemologicaldifferences between much of IR scholarship and diplomatic knowledgeand practice are important for how we understand (and construct)world politics, including war, international cooperation, andresponses to human and natural catastrophes. In this conclusion, which reflects critically on the relational approach to diplomacy and its wider consequences, I argue that diplomats are estranged from IR theory and vice versa - because International Relations scholars generally subscribe to substantialism, whereas diplomats tend to think in terms of relations. In fact, a deeper understanding of these relations is a key theoretical take-away point of this book. More specifically, I argue that relationalism - as a meta-theoretical approach - not only helps us understand the diplomatic production of world politics, relationalism also reflects a particular ontology, which differs fundamentally from the worldview that most IR scholars subscribe to. As I suggest, most IR scholars depart from the social phenomenon they want to study, for example, states, diplomats, soldiers, organizations, treaties, companies, and women. Assuming a priori the existence of these phenomena (e.g. states or individuals) and ascribing certain characteristics to them, they develop substantive theories. Consequently, diplomacy is reduced to the mechanics of states bumping into each other or a system of reciprocal signaling. However, most diplomats know, in an embodied but often unarticulated sense, that world politics is deeply relational. Their job is to make those relations "work," and they are convinced that important knowledge can be gained by consulting and meeting with foreign powers, that is, "the other." As such, they subscribe to a relational thinking (shared to some extent by diplomatic scholars). Relationalism takes as its point of departure the idea that social phenomena making up world politics always develop in relation to other social phenomena. Thus, for example, states are not born into' this world as fully developed states that then "exist"; states are made in continuous relations with other states and non-state actors. The development, consolidation, weakening (or even disappearance) of states can only be understood in terms of continuous processes that play out in relation to other social processes. These ontological and epistemological differences between much of IR scholarship and diplomatic knowledge and practice are important for how we understand (and construct) world politics, including war, international cooperation, and responses to human and natural catastrophes.

This chapter teases out the different theorisations – or conceptual frameworks – of the EEAS in order to show how they – whether implicitly or not – make a difference to our understanding of the EEAS. The chapter first provides an overview of existing approaches to the EU’s diplomatic service, examining specifically two main approaches to the EEAS: the rationalist approach (including intergovernmentalism, rational choice institutionalism and rationalist organisation theory) and the constructivist approach (including sociological institutionalism and sociological organisation theory). The chapter then demonstrates how these approaches paint contrasting portraits of the EEAS: as a rational political player seeking autonomy from its principals (the member states) or as a social body or organisational arena with norm-abiding civil servants trying to make sense of the new diplomatic world. These theoretically informed portraits of the EEAS build on different assumptions about the nature of European integration, diplomacy and social science. The chapter points to possible blank spots on the map and the potential contribution of approaches currently not widely adopted in the study of the EEAS, including legal-constitutional frameworks, diplomatic theory, network theory, practice theory, anthropology and democratic theory.

This article seeks to understand how Copenhagen functioned as the political core ofthe Danish empire from absolutism in 1660 to the loss of Norway in 1814, thereby contributingto the debate on how empires hang together. My focus is the imperial middlemenor intermediaries who became astonishingly loyal to the core. This loyalty wasensured not through circulation of officials across the different parts of the empire, butthrough asymmetrical contracting, various strategies of control, binding and pivotingof local elites. The professionalization of civil servants involved much continuity withthe old landowning and noble elite and ensured that corruption, deceit or local autonomymovements could be sanctioned quickly. There was nothing inevitable in the fallof the Danish empire and its transformation into a rump nation-state. Instead, imperialrule was a dominant imaginary within which almost all protest against absolutistpower took place right up until the Napoleonic wars.

Even though the Lisbon Treaty has made the rotating Council Presidencies less politically relevant, the country holding the presidency during six months still has an important role to fill. For Denmark, holding the presidency during the first half of 2012, the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone has posed particular challenges. Like Sweden, Denmark remains outside the Euro Group and has therefore been excluded from some of the most important decision-making. In this publication, the authors examine the context of the Danish Presidency and conclude with an evaluation of what has indeed been achieved during the first months. The publication is part of the SIEPS research programme The EU Presidencies and was presented at the seminar The Danish Presidency.

EU forbereder i øjeblikket en reform af forholdet til medlemslandenes 21 oversøiske lande og territorier. Grønlands ønsker til reformen skiller sig markant ud ved delvist at italesætte en fremtidig relation til EU som et ligeværdigt forhold. I modsætning hertil forbliver de øvrige oversøiske lande og territorier inden for en postkolonial diskurs om ensidig bistand. En væsentlig ressource i konstruktionen af de “westfalske” elementer i det grønlandske svar er en forestilling om uudnyttede ressourcer og muligheder i det arktiske.

Det danske formandskab i 2012 bliver helt anderledes end formandskabet i 2002. Det skyldes ikke kun, at topmøderne nu holdes i Bruxelles og, at euroen er midt i sin værste krise. Det skyldes også, at der ikke er én stor sag – udvidelsen – der dominerer dagsordenen. Samtidig er EU blevet større, og Lissabon-traktaten har medført markante ændringer i formandskabsrollen. Formandskabet er fortsat en enestående mulighed for Danmark til at indtage en central rolle på den europæiske scene. Denne artikel analyserer den ændrede formandskabsrolle og den danske regeringens muligheder for at præge den europæiske dagsorden. Selvom Herman Van Rompuy og Catherine Ashton har overtaget formandskabsrollen for henholdsvis stats- og regeringscheferne og udenrigsministrene, er formandskabsopgaven ikke blevet mindre – tværtimod.

How are we to understand the perplexing and sometimes even counter-intuitive position of Denmark in relation to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)? In this article, we attempt to go behind the many myths and misunderstandings involved and analyse the consequences of the Danish opt-out from EU cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. Symbolically, the opt-out plays a major role for large parts of the Danish population as a sort of sovereignty guarantee in the face of European integration. While shifting Danish governments may point out the detrimental effects of opt-outs on Denmark's position in the EU, they still have to guarantee to the Danish public that they respect the protocols. In Denmark, the opt-outs are seen to constitute a bulwark against European integration; underpinning an image of the state with full political and legal authority over people, territory and money. This gives them an almost sacred character. In addition to their dramatic origins, the extremely controversial nature of the opt-outs is displayed in how they are debated. The opt-outs from the basic treaties of the EU are highly politicised. Most recently, politicians have exaggerated or downplayed the importance of opt-outs. Eurosceptic politicians and media claim that protocols protect national sovereignty and may serve as an example to other member states, whereas British and Danish pro-European ministers argue that they lose political influence when they ‘are sent outside'.

This book rethinks the key concepts of International Relations by drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu.The last few years have seen a genuine wave of publications promoting sociology in international relations. Scholars have suggested that Bourdieu’s vocabulary can be applied to study security, diplomacy, migration and global environmental politics. Yet we still lack a systematic and accessible analysis of what Bourdieu-inspired IR might look like. This book provides the answer. It offers an introduction to Bourdieu’s thinking to a wider IR audience, challenges key assumptions, which currently structure IR scholarship – and provides an original, theoretical restatement of some of the core concepts in the field. The book brings together a select group of leading IR scholars who draw on both theoretical and empirical insights from Bourdieu. Each chapter covers one central concept in IR: Methodology, Knowledge, Power, Strategy, Security, Culture, Gender, Norms, Sovereignty and Integration. The chapters demonstrate how these concepts can be reinterpreted and used in new ways when exposed to Bourdieusian logic.Challenging key pillars of IR scholarship, Bourdieu in International Relations will be of interest to critical theorists, and scholars of IR theory. The last few years have seen a genuine wave of publications promoting sociology in international relations. Scholars have suggested that Bourdieu’s vocabulary can be applied to study security, diplomacy, migration and global environmental politics. Yet we still lack a systematic and accessible analysis of what Bourdieu-inspired IR might look like. This book provides the answer. It offers an introduction to Bourdieu’s thinking to a wider IR audience, challenges key assumptions, which currently structure IR scholarship – and provides an original, theoretical restatement of some of the core concepts in the field. The book brings together a select group of leading IR scholars who draw on both theoretical and empirical insights from Bourdieu. Each chapter covers one central concept in IR: Methodology, Knowledge, Power, Strategy, Security, Culture, Gender, Norms, Sovereignty and Integration. The chapters demonstrate how these concepts can be reinterpreted and used in new ways when exposed to Bourdieusian logic.Challenging key pillars of IR scholarship, Bourdieu in International Relations will be of interest to critical theorists, and scholars of IR theory.

This book rethinks the key concepts of International Relations by drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu.The last few years have seen a genuine wave of publications promoting sociology in international relations. Scholars have suggested that Bourdieu’s vocabulary can be applied to study security, diplomacy, migration and global environmental politics. Yet we still lack a systematic and accessible analysis of what Bourdieu-inspired IR might look like. This book provides the answer. It offers an introduction to Bourdieu’s thinking to a wider IR audience, challenges key assumptions, which currently structure IR scholarship – and provides an original, theoretical restatement of some of the core concepts in the field. The book brings together a select group of leading IR scholars who draw on both theoretical and empirical insights from Bourdieu. Each chapter covers one central concept in IR: Methodology, Knowledge, Power, Strategy, Security, Culture, Gender, Norms, Sovereignty and Integration. The chapters demonstrate how these concepts can be reinterpreted and used in new ways when exposed to Bourdieusian logic.Challenging key pillars of IR scholarship, Bourdieu in International Relations will be of interest to critical theorists, and scholars of IR theory. Why yet another dead French thinker'.' We already have Althusser. Foucault andDerrida. Docs International Relations (I R) really need Pierre Bourdieu! The shortanswer is yes. The slightly longer answer is that Bourdieu's sociology provides uswith an opportunity to rethink international politics in ways not offered by theseother thinkers. Bourdieu helps us rediscover the everyday practices. symbolicstructures and arenas of conflict that bring many other actors into perspective.rather than just focusing on nation slates that produce (what we call) international politics. All engagement with his work redirects our discipline from being in influenced by overly abstract and simplified reifications of world politics. which is currently the case in both positivist and post-positivist IR schools. Bourdieu allows us to explore how people create international relations in their daily activities. In short. Bourdieu helps us to take the discursive, visual and embodied practices in international politics more seriously.