Search

This PhD investigates the development of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with a particular focus on the distinction between terrorism and insurgency. The findings have been published in five peer-reviewed articles, and are joined by an introductory framework and a concluding chapter. The scene-setter contextualizes the problem of terrorism in Mali, describes the fragmented landscape of jihadist groups, analyzes how Tuareg separatism led to AQIM's control of northern Mali, and illustrates how shortcomings in national and local governance fueled insecurity. The second conceptual article analyzed whether AQIM should be regarded as terrorism, insurgency or organized crime, and concluded that - at the time of writing (2016) - most indicators pointed to the group following a strategy of terrorism. A treatise on methodology investigated the discrepancy between the international community's perception of Mali pre-2012 as a stable 'posterboy for democracy', while it was Mali that suffered a near-complete collapse in 2012. It concluded that a quantitative risk approach, rather than a qualitative threat approach, contributed to this misperception. The fourth article applied the first trinity from Clausewitz’s opus On War to Operation Serval, the French military operation to oust AQIM from northern Mali in 2013. Clear political goals, contingency planning, an audacious military operation combined with luck all helped France secure an initial victory against AQIM. The final article focused on potential pathways for AQIM to end, and concluded that in 2021 AQIM followed a strategy of insurgency, while much of the international response remained rooted in the paradigm of counterterrorism.

Emmanuel Macron hat während seiner ersten Amtszeit (2017-2022) versucht, sich von altbekannten, weithin kritisierten Mustern französischer Afrikapolitik abzusetzen. Er diversifizierte die Beziehungen zu Afrika in regionaler und inhaltlicher Hinsicht, inte­grierte nicht-staatliche Akteure und pflegte einen vergleichsweise offenen Um­gang mit Frankreichs problematischer Vergangenheit auf dem Kontinent. Das Narra­tiv des Wandels, das Paris vor allem über Kanäle der Public Diplomacy verbreitet hat, wurde jedoch von Pfadabhängigkeiten überlagert, sichtbar vor allem an der Fort­setzung des gescheiterten militärischen Engagements im Sahel und an einem politisch inkohärenten Auftreten gegenüber autoritären Regierungen. Ein Resultat war der un­freiwillige militärische Abzug aus Mali im August 2022, der eine historische Zäsur in den fran­zösisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen darstellt.

Each country has its own Strategic Culture in maintaining its national defenseand security. In French case, its Strategic Culture emphasizes national grandeuror glory. Departing from de Gaulle’s vision in the past, France is a country thatremains actively involved in maintaining global peace and plays role as an intermediary,mediator, and critic within the dynamics of international relations.France also has the principle of “Anti-Terroriste” which sees that terrorism as amajor threat to its national defense and security. It should be noted that Francehas a long history of war on terror, as it had faced in the 1970, 1985, and 1990s.In today’s world, acts of terrorism is even more sophisticated, complex, and globalized.Through Operation Serval in 2013, it could be interpreted as France’sconsistency in combating terrorism in Mali, West Africa. By using the concept ofStrategic Culture and four analysis variables, which is identity, values, norms,and perceptive lens, this paper intends to analyze the basic foundation and directionof France’s Strategic Culture and the accompanying interests.

The Sahel is one of the most unstable and underdeveloped region of the world. In Niger and Mali situation worsened after the year 2011 because of of the political vacuum, emerged after the overthrow of Gaddafi. Among basic problems of Mali and Niger, causing instability, can be named poverty, security troubles (uncontrolled extensive borders, terrorism), ethnic conflicts and misgovernance. This paper is concentrated on the US and French activities in solving those problems. The aim of the paper is thus defining of the basic problems causing instability of Niger and Mali, and analyse military and development aid aimed at solving those problems by the USA and France in years 2005-2014.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze selected military operations of NATO states in Somalia, Afghanistan and Mali against violent non-state actors, who led anti-government insurgence in these states. On the basis of analysis of individual interventions will be rendered their comparison and by its result, I will try to capture the development of military strategies, which were used by the states within counter-insurgence operations. Because the start of interventions in Somalia and Mali is divided by more than 20 years, it is possible to capture prospective development. Furthermore, due to analyzing individual military interventions, I will be able to identify reasons for their success or eventual failure.

Les opérations Serval au Mali et Sangaris en République centrafricaine ont été des réussites sur le plan tactique. Leurs résultats politiques sont en revanche moins probants.

La France déclenche l’opération Serval au Mali le 11 janvier 2013, alors que cet État du Sahel est plongé dans un conflit armé interne sans précédent et que les deux-tiers de son territoire sont occupés par des groupes armés inscrits sur des listes d’organisations terroristes. Le gouvernement français justifie l’intervention en invoquant simultanément la « guerre contre le terrorisme », le consentement des autorités maliennes, l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et la légitime défense. Cette étude examine chacune de ces justifications afin de déterminer la légalité de l’intervention française au regard du droit international et de mettre en lumière les règles applicables à la lutte armée contre le terrorisme international, notamment en situation de conflit armé interne., France triggers operation Serval in Mali on January 11, 2013, while the Sahelian State is plunged into an unprecedented internal armed conflict and armed groups listed as terrorist organizations occupy the two-thirds of its territory. The French Government simultaneously invoked the “war on terror”, the consent of the Malian authorities, the authorization of the United Nations Security Council and self-defence to defend its use of armed force. This study examines each of these justifications in order to determine the legality of the French intervention under international law as well as the legal rules applicable to armed measures against international terrorism, with particular reference to situations of internal armed conflict., Mémoire récipiendaire de la mention "Excellent", avec les félicitations du jury.