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Cet article propose une approche socio-spatiale du commerce transnational en s’intéressant à deux places situées aux deux extrémités de la route transnationale entre l’Algérie et la Chine : El Eulma et Yiwu. Ces deux places marchandes, situées dans des contextes géographiques distincts, sont reliées entre elles par des dynamiques discrètes et efficaces et sont révélatrices de la manière dont fonctionnent et évoluent des marchés transnationaux. Considérés comme un tout, El Eulma comme Yiwu permettent de saisir en quoi chaque marché devient un lieu qui fait écho à un autre dans un système relationnel global. L’étude de ces deux comptoirs montre que la compréhension de la mondialisation discrète passe par l’échelle des lieux, plus que celle des seuls États. L’article repose sur une série d’enquêtes de sociologie et de géographie urbaine menées conjointement ou séparément entre 2009 et 2016. This article proposes a socio-spatial approach to transnational trade by focusing on two trading posts situated at either end of the transnational route between Algeria and China: El Eulma and Yiwu. These two marketplaces, located in separate geographical contexts, are interconnected by discreet and efficient dynamics and are indicative of the processes in which transnational markets operate and evolve. When considered together as a whole, El Eulma and Yiwu provide insight into the way one market echoes another within a global relational system. The study of these two marketplaces demonstrates that the understanding of Inconspicuous Globalisation involves the local scale and not solely the national one. The article is based on a series of sociological and urban geographical surveys conducted jointly or separately between 2009 and 2016. Este artículo propone una aproximación socioespacial al comercio transnacional. Para ello estudia dos puntos comerciales localizados en los extremos de la ruta entre Argelia y China: El Eulma et Yiwu. Estas dos ciudades comerciales, con entornos geográficos muy diferentes, están ligadas por discretas y eficaces dinámicas geopolíticas y socioeconómicas que reflejan con funcionan y evolucionan los mercados transnacionales. En un sistema relacional global El Eulma como Yiwu solo se pueden comprender valorando sus mercados como ecos de ambas ciudades. Con el estudio de estos dos puntos comerciales se puede afirmar que la globalización refuerza más la escala de los lugares que la de los estados. Para ello, el artículo utiliza una serie de encuestas de sociología y geografía urbana realizadas de forma conjunta o separada entre 2009 y 2016.

International audience; This article proposes a socio-spatial approach to transnational trade by focusing on two trading posts situated at either end of the transnational route between Algeria and China: El Eulma and Yiwu. These two marketplaces, located in separate geographical contexts, are interconnected by discreet and efficient dynamics and are indicative of the processes in which transnational markets operate and evolve. When considered together as a whole, El Eulma and Yiwu provide insight into the way one market echoes another within a global relational system. The study of these two marketplaces demonstrates that the understanding of Inconspicuous Globalisation involves the local scale and not solely the national one. The article is based on a series of sociological and urban geographical surveys conducted jointly or separately between 2009 and 2016.; Este artículo propone una aproximación socioespacial al comercio transnacional. Para ello estudia dos puntos comerciales localizados en los extremos de la ruta entre Argelia y China: El Eulma et Yiwu. Estas dos ciudades comerciales, con entornos geográficos muy diferentes, están ligadas por discretas y eficaces dinámicas geopolíticas y socioeconómicas que reflejan con funcionan y evolucionan los mercados transnacionales. En un sistema relacional global El Eulma como Yiwu solo se pueden comprender valorando sus mercados como ecos de ambas ciudades. Con el estudio de estos dos puntos comerciales se puede afirmar que la globalización refuerza más la escala de los lugares que la de los estados. Para ello, el artículo utiliza una serie de encuestas de sociología y geografía urbana realizadas de forma conjunta o separada entre 2009 y 2016.; Cet article propose une approche socio-spatiale du commerce transnational en s’intéressant à deux places situées aux deux extrémités de la route transnationale entre l’Algérie et la Chine : El Eulma et Yiwu. Ces deux places marchandes, situées dans des contextes géographiques distincts, sont reliées entre elles par des dynamiques discrètes et efficaces et sont révélatrices de la manière dont fonctionnent et évoluent des marchés transnationaux. Considérés comme un tout, El Eulma comme Yiwu permettent de saisir en quoi chaque marché devient un lieu qui fait écho à un autre dans un système relationnel global. L’étude de ces deux comptoirs montre que la compréhension de la mondialisation discrète passe par l’échelle des lieux, plus que celle des seuls États. L’article repose sur une série d’enquêtes de sociologie et de géographie urbaine menées conjointement ou séparément entre 2009 et 2016.

The article deals with the role of the Catholic Church in the context of Portuguese colonial policy in India and describes the methods of Christianizing the local population. The problem of interaction between the Hindu and Christian religious systems is explained. When the early decades of missionary activity did not lead to desired results, it became clear that there existed profound misunderstanding by Catholic missionaries of the realities of Hindu society. As a result, Catholic Church had to seek new methods for baptizing of the Hindu population.

This study focuses upon the financial governance mechanism set up in the Portuguese Estado da Índia, which is examined from both a structural and dynamic perspective over the period from 1517 to 1640. It seeks to provide a general outline of the peripheral extensions of this system-taking the form of a network of feitorias (trading posts) and recebedorias (tax collection offices)-as well as the successive configurations of the central institutions located in Goa. Since it is clear that this mechanism served to guarantee the material and financial flows necessary to sustain the political and commercial projects of the Portuguese monarchy in Asia, the aim of the study is to assess the constraints placed upon the relationship between the center and the periphery and to consider the challenges faced by central institutions in controlling the tax revenue of the Estado da Índia. O presente estudo toma por objecto o dispositivo de governo financeiro que se constituiu no Estado da Índia, numa perspectiva estrutural mas também dinâmica, ao longo do período compreendido entre 1517 e 1640. Procura-se caracterizar, nos seus traços gerais, as suas extensões periféricas - materializada numa rede de feitorias e recebedorias - bem como as sucessivas configurações orgânicas que conheceram as instituições centrais sedeadas em Goa. Sendo certo que era por este dispositivo que circulavam os fluxos materiais e financeiros que sustentavam os projectos políticos e comerciais da monarquia portuguesa na Ásia, trata-se aqui de avaliar os constrangimentos que impendiam sobre a articulação entre o centro e a periferia e avaliar os desafios levantados às instituições centrais para controlar as receitas fiscais do Estado da Índia.

The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamic behavior of a sequential monetary exchange economy. Transactions take place sequentially against non-equilibrium prices, there is quantity rationing, and credit or cash are the only means of exchange. Agents have optimistic or pessimistic expectations about quantity constraints that represent their beliefs about future trading opportunities. In the credit model the agents incur debts along the transition path towards equilibrium, while in the cash-in-advance model convergence takes place without the occurrence of any debts or claims. The credit mechanism is shown to act as a ‘soft’ correction mechanism on credit fluctuations, while the cash-in-advance constraint acts as a ‘hard’ negative feedback effect driving the prices back towards a neighborhood of a monetary cash-in-advance equilibrium.

We study market games with multiple posts per commodity. We provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show the following results: (i) As the number of agents increases, the price variability across posts for a commodity becomes smaller and it becomes zero when the number of agents becomes inffinite, irrespectively of the distribution of characteristics in the economy. (ii) The set of equilibrium prices and allocations of a market game is a subset of the set of equilibria of another game with more trading posts per commodity. (iii) We demonstrate via an example that the inclusion can be strict, as there are equilibria with price disparities across posts for a commodity which cannot be captured with less trading posts. (iv) One can pass from an equilibrium of a market game into an equilibrium of a game with less trading posts per commodity, by consolidating posts where the price of a commodity is uniform.

We study market games with multiple posts per commodity. We provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show the following results: (i) As the number of agents increases, the price variability across posts for a commodity becomes smaller and it becomes zero when the number of agents becomes inffinite, irrespectively of the distribution of characteristics in the economy. (ii) The set of equilibrium prices and allocations of a market game is a subset of the set of equilibria of another game with more trading posts per commodity. (iii) We demonstrate via an example that the inclusion can be strict, as there are equilibria with price disparities across posts for a commodity which cannot be captured with less trading posts. (iv) One can pass from an equilibrium of a market game into an equilibrium of a game with less trading posts per commodity, by consolidating posts where the price of a commodity is uniform.

We study market games with multiple posts per commodity. We provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show the following results: (i) As the number of agents increases, the price variability across posts for a commodity becomes smaller and it becomes zero when the number of agents becomes infinite, irrespectively of the distribution of characteristics in the economy. (ii) The set of equilibrium prices and allocations of a market game is a subset of the set of equilibria of another game with more trading posts per commodity. (iii) We demonstrate via an example that the inclusion can be strict, as there are equilibria with price disparities across posts for a commodity which cannot be captured with less trading posts. (iv) One can pass from an equilibrium of a market game into an equilibrium of a game with less trading posts per commodity, by consolidating posts where the price of a commodity is uniform.

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the outset of the model. We show that this is not true. We develop an example which features equilibria where a commodity is simultaneously exchanged in two trading posts at different prices, i.e., equilibria where the 'law of one price' fails when the one to one correspondence between commodities and trading posts is abandoned. Thus, we conclude that the set of equilibria in market games depends non-trivially on the number of trading posts. This conclusion further suggests that an explanation of the structure of trading posts is necessary.

We study market games with multiple posts per commodity. We provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show the following results: (i) As the number of agents increases, the price variability across posts for a commodity becomes smaller and it becomes zero when the number of agents becomes infinite, irrespectively of the distribution of characteristics in the economy. (ii) The set of equilibrium prices and allocations of a market game is a subset of the set of equilibria of another game with more trading posts per commodity. (iii) We demonstrate via an example that the inclusion can be strict, as there are equilibria with price disparities across posts for a commodity which cannot be captured with less trading posts. (iv) One can pass from an equilibrium of a market game into an equilibrium of a game with less trading posts per commodity, by consolidating posts where the price of a commodity is uniform.