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Context: Against a backdrop of dwindling oil resources and increasing unemployment rates, the government of Oman has set out to diversify its industry and establish a knowledge-based economy. In this context, forming a highly-skilled Omani workforce is considered to be of crucial importance. Yet, the national TVET system suffers from low social status, poor quality, and limited labour market connectivity. This paper offers an analysis of Oman's TVET system in the socio-economic and cultural context of a rentier state. Approach: We draw on the political economy of skills and socio-cultural approaches that understand TVET systems and the broader skills regimes in which they are embedded as part and expression of particular patterns of the social organisation of work. This helps to locate TVET systems' strengths and weaknesses in the context of their underlying social relations instead of considering them as mere dysfunctionalities at the systemic level. This paper draws on an unpublished study on TVET for industrialisation commissioned by an Omani line ministry in cooperation with an international organisation. For this study, the authors carried out a literature review, undertook two field trips to Oman in 2018 and 2019 and conducted forty semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from government, private companies, business associations, and TVET and higher education institutions. Findings: Our analysis highlights how skill formation in Oman is shaped by the socio-economic and cultural context of the Omani rentier state. First, the availability of cheap expatriate labour and Omanis' traditional preference for public sector jobs culminate in poor incentives for employing Omani nationals in the private sector. Second, reluctant employer attitudes towards national skill formation deepen quality issues in the TVET system, especially with regard to work-based training. This reinforces negative perceptions of the local workforce, which in turn contribute to biased employment patterns. Both social processes mutually reinforce each other, eventually preventing the emergence of strong national skill formation dynamics. Conclusions: While immediate structural change appears challenging, it is evident that reforms of the TVET system alone will not lead to its sustainable improvement. More research into how skill formation relates to Oman's specific socio-economic structures, how employment dynamics relate to educational credentials and how cultural traditions shape educational and work practices is needed.

Two decades after the US invasion of Iraq, the civil war of the years that followed and the ravages of the Islamic State have faded into the background. Yet the country remains shaken by internal cleavages, torn apart by corruption, and vulnerable to influence operations by external actors. Overcoming economic crisis and infrastructural shortcomings could contribute to greater political stability. Oil production has doubled over the past two decades. The historical underdevelopment of the Iraqi oil sector has been reversed, yet the federal oil law has been contested between Baghdad and Erbil. Natural gas production has grown in recent years as well, but still falls short of providing enough energy to the power grid. The country is a net importer of natural gas, relying on supplies from Iran. Oil remains paramount for the Iraqi state, its budget, exports, and its economy. Heavy industries like fertilisers and petrochemicals could enhance the value chain of Iraq's primary resources that include the second-largest phosphate reserves worldwide. Population growth in Iraq is still high. Beyond hydrocarbons, economic diversification in other areas is urgently needed. This could include alternative energies, light industries, education, services, water management, and a reorientation of agriculture. Iraq ranks 157 out of 180 in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. Its consociational muhasasa system, which allocates power along sectarian lines, is abetting such corruption and thus requires reform. Iraq can be a vital partner for European energy cooperation and not only in hydrocarbons, but competition from China is stiff. Europe is already eyeing collaboration with Middle East and North Africa countries on the production of green hydrogen. Interconnectors of electricity grids within and beyond the region as well as storage solutions are needed to increase the share of renewables involved in power generation.

The term "crisis" has become synonymous with describing the political, social, and economic state of many Arab countries including Lebanon. These continuous crises, including a global pandemic, have manifested in Lebanese news and current affairs through messages of hate disseminating via the media and journalists. Hate speech circulated via airwaves and the Internet has been shown to cause more harm than having hate shared in private conversations. The global pandemic, followed by the Beirut Port explosion in August 2020, has raised the level of hate speech in public, and Lebanese journalists have been used directly or indirectly as tools for propagating hate speech. This reflective account engages Lebanese journalists with the aim of producing a set of guidelines for tackling hate speech in news coverage and current affairs programs. Two workshops were conducted with Lebanese journalists in Lebanon in an attempt to understand the level of awareness of hate speech and its consequences among Lebanese journalists, assess how they understand hate speech, and determine the importance of guidelines and tools in helping journalists identify and tackle hate speech.

This article contributes to the analysis of local media and democratic transformation in Tunisia since the Arab Uprisings. It aims to assess the extent to which pluralism, freedom of expression, and participation—central tenets of democratisation—are evident at the local level. Tunisian local media, unlike the national media, is relatively free of governmental control. Local media is also decentralised. It is this autonomy from the government which makes the analysis of local media fundamentally important for understanding politics in Tunisia. While national media is linked to the most powerful elements in the country, the diversity of voices within the media at the local level provides an opportunity to grasp the grievances, struggles, and agency of people in Tunisia, especially the most marginalised communities. This article will detail the changes in the media landscape, especially for local media, in Tunisia and connect our analysis of local media to better understand the Tunisia that has developed between dictatorship and democracy and the extent that the fledgling Tunisian democracy can withstand its most recent test.

From discrimination against Chinese-read migrant workers, via intraregional competition for China’s favour, to collaboration on infrastructural megaprojects, vaccine development and digital surveillance techniques: Arab-Chinese relations in times of COVID-19 are complex and multi-layered. Yet, established regime-centric approaches often fail to see this complexity by almost exclusively focusing on questions of authoritarian regime collaboration. Such approaches not only ignore the diversity of involved actors and the inherently transregional nature of contemporary authoritarian power, but also bear the risk of reproducing binary notions of authoritarianism vs. liberal democracy that fundamentally ignore the latter’s coercive core. Recent work on the duality of infrastructure as both enabling global flows of goods and (re-)producing social hierarchies helps us overcome the methodological nationalism found in the majority of scholarship on authoritarian power. In this article, we provide a selective overview, through the prism of logistics and infrastructure, of Arab-Chinese authoritarian entanglements in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding authoritarian practices as territorially unbounded modes of governance, our objective is to develop a more in-depth and context-sensitive understanding of the transregionally connected mechanisms of (re-)producing authoritarian power. We argue that the pandemic constitutes a seemingly managerial opportunity for the intensified diffusion of authoritarian practices that both enable certain infrastructural politics and in turn are also rendered possible by them. This emphasis on infrastructure, understood as simultaneously fostering a global circulation of goods and capital, as well as reinforcing containment and facilitating new forms of managing and repressing public discontent, provides us with a helpful lens for the development of a truly transregional understanding of authoritarian collaboration. We discuss this argument based on selected examples of digital and physical infrastructure(s) in Arab-Chinese relations, and their embedding in global flows of capital., International Quarterly for Asian Studies, Vol. 53 No. 2 (2022): China beyond China, Part I

The unification of the two Yemeni states?the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), respectively?in 1990 has been a resounding failure. Merging the tribal-dominated northern and state-party dominated southern regimes meant increasing the number of factions competing for access to state resources to satisfy material and security needs of their respective networks of influence. In particular, efforts at growing the resource base of the unified state after 1990, by means of an expansion of oil and gas exploration and extraction, raised the revenue base of the state in an unsustainable manner. Such growth in national oil and gas rents increased rather than decreased competition over state authority to control the spoils. The major subsequent events, such as the 1994 civil war, the 2004-2010 “Saada wars” against the Houthi movement, the Yemeni version of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the failure of the National Dialogue Conference (March 2013-January 2014), and the start of the Saudi and Emirati bombing campaign and subsequent ground war in Yemen since March 2015 all triggered major clashes between different factions of the Yemeni state bureaucracy, army, and civil society. On each of these occasions, efforts to freeze out some Yemeni actors produced escalating conflict between the remaining factions instead of a winning coalition that could have reestablished a degree of stability. The article explains how local, regional, and global factors have jointly overwhelmed the Yemeni actors, and how foreign intervention has led to the further deterioration of the pre-existing national crisis.

Widad Sakakini's work reflects the transformations of Arab societies since the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly the changing gender roles. This study of her shows how she took globally circulating feminist concerns, translated them into her local contexts, and rooted them in Arab-Islamic history through her essays, short stories, and biographies. As an "Arab feminist," being both a feminist and a Muslima went together well for her. By navigating between liberal, socialist, nationalist, and Islamist peer groups, she simultaneously negotiated her own multiple forms of belonging. Taking her life as an example of a transnational biography, this study further argues that it would be unsatisfactory to reduce her complex affiliations and trajectory, spanning Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, to a mere Islamic, secular or Syrian identity. Rather, she was concerned with balancing and reconciling supposed opposites, such as East and West, reason and spirituality, men and women.

Leseprobe ----- Abstract Morocco and Tunisia, two progressive Muslim-majority countries, took vastly different approaches to women’s sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR). Sharing a French colonial past and Maliki Islamic tradition, Tunisia is an emerging democracy with a long history of top-down women’s rights advances and state-promoted SRHR. Tunisian women have benefitted from SRH education, access to contraception, emergency contraception, and state-funded first trimester abortion. Tunisia targets vulnerable populations, including unmarried, minor, rural, and poor women, with special clinics and subsidies. Finally, Tunisia holds men responsible for children they father outside of wedlock. In contrast, Morocco’s bottom-up feminist-driven approach to SRHR, including access to contraception, emergency contraception, and abortion, is circumscribed and exclusionary, targeting married couples. The criminalization of extramarital sexual relations and most abortions force single women with unwanted pregnancies to resort to unsafe abortion. Moroccan men who father children outside of marriage enjoy legal impunity from paternal responsibilities. Nevertheless, the recent rise of Islamic parties in both countries poses a potential threat to Tunisia’s proactive laws and policies governing SRHR, while adding another obstacle to adequate SRHR provision in Morocco. ----- Proaktive versus reaktive sexuelle und reproduktive Gesundheit und Rechte: Eine vergleichende Fallstudie zu Marokko und Tunesien Zusammenfassung Die beiden progressiven Lander Afrikas mit muslimischer Mehrheit, Tunesien und Marokko, zeichnen sich durch enorme Unterschiede in ihren reproduktiven Rechten und Masnahmen aus. Gepragt von sowohl einer franzosischen Kolonialherrschaft als auch von einer malikitisch ausgerichteten Tradition des Islams, ist Tunesien heute eine aufstrebende Demokratie mit einer langen Geschichte Top-Down gepragter Fortschritte bei Frauenrechten und staatlich geforderter Reproduktionspolitik. Tunesische Frauen erhalten Bildungsmasnahmen im Bereich reproduktiver Rechte, Zugang zu Verhutungsmitteln und Notfallverhutung sowie staatlich finanzierte Unterstutzung bei Abtreibung im ersten Trimester einer Schwangerschaft. Mit ihrem Angebot spezieller Kliniken und Zuschusse zielt Tunesien auf gefahrdete Gruppen wie unverheiratete, minderjahrige, landlich lebende und arme Frauen. Nicht zuletzt mussen Manner das Sorgerecht fur von ihnen auserehelich gezeugte Kinder ubernehmen. Im Gegensatz dazu zeichnet sich Marokko durch einen von feministischen Gruppen betriebenen Bottom-Up-Ansatz aus. Zugang zu Verhutungsmitteln, Notfallverhutung und Abtreibung ist begrenzt und nur fur verheiratete Frauen moglich. Ausereheliche sexuelle Beziehungen werden kriminalisiert und in den meisten Fallen mussen ungewollt schwangere Frauen auf unsachgemas vorgenommene Abtreibungen zuruckgreifen. Marokkanischen Mannern, die ausereheliche Kinder zeugen, wird hingegen Befreiung von rechtlicher Verantwortung und Straffreiheit zugestanden. Der jungste Aufstieg islamischer Parteien in beiden Landern stellt jedoch eine Bedrohung fur Tunesiens proaktive Rechte und Masnahmen dar und ein weiteres Hindernis fur die Sicherstellung adaquater reproduktiver Rechte in Marokko. ----- Bibliographie: Feather, Ginger: Proactive versus Reactive Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of Morocco and Tunisia, Femina Politica – Zeitschrift fur feministische Politikwissenschaft, 2-2020, S. 76-89. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v29i2.07

Das Buch vergleicht zwei gegensätzliche Muster sozialer Zugehörigkeit in einem muslimischen palästinensischen Lager, Al-Jalil, und dem vor 2011 letzten christlichen palästinensischen Flüchtlingslager der Welt, Dbayeh. Durch seinen innovativen Fokus auf soziale Zugehörigkeitsprozesse, die auf dem ritualisierten Rhythmus des täglichen Lebens basieren, präsentiert und analysiert der Autor komplexe Diskurse, Praktiken, Erfahrungen und Emotionen des Lebens im Exil und vermeidet vereinfachende Erklärungen, die ausschließlich auf dogmatischen Auffassungen von Religion und Nationalität basieren. Die orthodoxe Lehrmeinung neigt dazu, die Unterschiede zwischen den Lagern hauptsächlich den verschiedenen Religionen zuzuschreiben. Diese Studie zeigt jedoch, wie moralische Selbstkultivierung, Frömmigkeit und Religiosität, Nationalität, Zuflucht und Politik miteinander in Beziehung treten und einen Großteil des täglichen Lebens in den Lagern bestimmen., Living in Refuge is a unique dense socio-historical portrait of two Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon for which there is almost no recorded literature and that have changed greatly, especially after 2011 and the influx of Syrian refugees. The book compares two contrasting patterns of social belonging in one Muslim Palestinian camp, Al-Jalil, and what, before 2011, was the last Christian Palestinian refugee camp in the world, Dbayeh. Through its unique approach to social belonging processes based on the ritualized rhythm of daily life, it presents and analyses complex discourses, practices, experiences and emotions of life in exile, avoiding simplistic explanations solely based on dogmatic understandings of religion and nationhood. This study shows how moral self-cultivation, piety and religiosity, nationhood, refugeeness and politics are all embedded in each other and frame much of the camps’ daily life.

In the space of just nine months, Tunisia's President Kais Saied has centralised power and dismantled the institutions established by the young democracy since the revo­lu­tion of 2011. His new constitution establishing a "New Republic" will be put to a refer­endum on 25 July 2022. Saied's plans have divided the nation, with growing resistance from political and civil society actors demanding the return to an inclusive and demo­cratic process. At the same time, the country is moving closer to default. Tunisia's Euro­pean partners have invested heavily in democratisation and view the autocratic shift with concern. But they have failed to take meaningful action, and each new step by Saied makes it harder to reverse the path. In the interests of Tunisia’s stability, Europe should move decisively and employ the financial and diplomatic leverage it has due to Tunisia's economic crisis. (author's abstract)

When Israel signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 reactions were diverse. Experts were divided - some fearing a deepening of regional divisions, others hoping for a positive impact on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Two years later normalisation has intensified, but differs in degree and scope. Israel's normalisation process has strengthened her acceptance in the region and reaches beyond security issues. While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates lead these dynamics, eager to benefit from exchange in science and technology, in Morocco the United States' recognition of the latter's sovereignty over the Western Sahara has hardened Rabat's position on that issue. With Sudan, the process has not developed beyond contact between the Israeli government and the internationally contested military leadership. Normalisation is not a decisive factor for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. On the contrary, it was not an incentive in the past for Israel to make concessions; clashes with the Palestinians in Gaza or recently on the Temple Mount could not derail the process either. The real test, however, would be another Palestinian intifada or a return to the annexation plans of early 2020. Iran remains an important uniting factor which has led to a shared threat perception. Nevertheless, the Gulf monarchies and Israel differ in approach towards Iran. While Arab-Israeli joint military exercises mark a historical shift, talks about a military alliance in the Middle East with Israeli (and US) involvement are premature. The European Union and its member states should build on these positive dynamics and look at developments in the region not merely through the lens of the MEPP. Trilateral projects with Israel and Arab partners are a good starting point here. Also, Europe should become more involved in the broader Middle East through strategic dialogue with partners in the region as well as the US on the new order in the making.

From spring 2019 until summer 2021, Israel was politically paralysed because no stable government could be formed. Four elections were necessary before a new gov­ernment took over on 13 June 2021. Not only was Benjamin Netanyahu replaced as prime minister after 12 years. A coalition was formed that covers almost the entire political spectrum. In the meantime, it has stabilised and its direction is becoming clearer. Nationally and internationally, the coalition has broken with the populist rhetoric of the Netanyahu government. At the same time, it is exploring different policies: Domestically, it is for the first time including an independent Arab party and has stopped the attacks on principles of liberal democracy. In its foreign policy, it is promoting rapprochement with the European Union (EU) and the Biden adminis­tration as well as more integration into the region. It is also trying to contain the conflict with the Palestinians through social and economic measures. But a political rapprochement is not in sight. A "point of no return" is looming, making a two-state solution impossible. (author's abstract)

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are mapping out agendas to kickstart a hydrogen economy. Especially Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are pursuing ambitious plans to supply Europe and Asia-Pacific with the carbon-friendly fuel. Numerous declarations of intent have been signed, and the first large-scale projects are under way. For the Gulf countries, hydrogen is not only a means of diversification. Since the hydrogen economy blends into the institutional and fiscal framework of the petroleum industry, it is primarily a chance for the GCC economies to maintain current economic and political power structures. While hydro­gen from the Gulf is an effective tool for climate change mitigation, Germany and Europe are faced with trade-offs and open questions. (author's abstract)

La representación en la contemporaneidad posee una innegable centralidad en la cultura occidental, en la cual se relaciona lo visto con la verdad. Actualmente, los productos audiovisuales son los encargados de recrear y representar visualmente espacios y culturas del mundo a los que generalmente sólo se puede acceder mediante las pantallas, con las connotaciones y filtros que ello implica. En la dicotomía entre Occidente y el mundo árabe musulmán los medios de comunicación han sustituido a otros actores como ventana de aproximación y producción de la imagen de esa parte del mundo. Las mujeres han sido parte de los elementos diferenciadores más recurridos a la hora de representar a las culturas árabes musulmanas y el choque entre los valores occidentales y de Oriente. Este capítulo propone un recorrido a través de las contribuciones teóricas y elementos contextuales que configuran e influyen en la representación de mujeres árabes musulmanas en largometrajes y series de ficción españoles de la segunda década del siglo XXI. Estos factores constituyen la base para el posterior diagnóstico del papel de los medios de españoles en la reducción de desigualdades y a favor de la equidad de género a través del discurso social del entretenimiento.

Mit ambitionierten Plänen brechen die Staaten des Golf-Kooperationsrats auf in die Wasserstoffzukunft. Insbesondere Saudi-Arabien, Oman und die Vereinigten Arabi­schen Emirate (VAE) verfolgen ehrgeizige Vorhaben, die Europa und Asien-Pazifik mit Wasser­stoff versorgen sollen. Zahlreiche Absichtserklärungen wurden abgeschlossen, erste Großprojekte auf den Weg gebracht. Für die Golfstaaten geht es nicht nur um Diver­sifizierung, sondern vor allem darum, bestehende Wirtschafts- und Machtstruktu­ren aufrechtzuerhalten. Dies wäre möglich, da sich die Wasserstoffwirtschaft in den vorhandenen institutionellen und fiskalischen Rahmen der Petroleumindustrie ein­fügt. Gleichzeitig ist sie eine wirksame Möglichkeit, den Klimaschutz international voran­zu­tragen, birgt für Deutschland und Europa jedoch Zielkonflikte und offene Fragen. (Autorenreferat)

When Qatar won the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup on December 2, 2010, at first sight it appeared to be the crowning achievement of an unparalleled development and the diplomatic success story of the 21st century. In fact, the rentier state of Qatar, which had still been suffering from major development policy deficits in the 1980s and had been acting from a position of weakness in its foreign policy, then rose to become one of the richest countries under the rule of Hamad Al-Thani (1995-2013). It was also able to achieve remarkable successes in foreign policy, too. As is discussed in Section 2, however, many of the structural problems associated with rentier statehood had by no means been overcome. The decade following the announcement was also to present unexpectedly significant challenges: the Arab Spring of 2010-11, the collapse of oil and natural gas prices in 2014, and the blockade of Qatar imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017. The wealth of the country notwithstanding, a number of structural factors placed severe pressure on the regime in Doha to further develop internal and external legitimacy so as to stabilize its rule. Because of the prominence of the World Cup, the regime in Doha faced a whole new set of challenges. Until then, Qatar’s sports diplomacy had been a clear success story that had raised the country’s international reputation, whereas Doha now faced massive criticism from Western media and nongovernmental organizations. Initially, the main accusation was that the choice of Qatar for the 2022 FIFA World Cup by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was also the result of corrupt practices. In addition, Qatar had at times been accused of supporting terrorism. However, the most sustained criticism of Qatar being awarded the 2022 FIFA World Cup came from a debate launched by Western media, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights organizations about labor conditions in the country. The criticism focused on the construction of stadiums by migrant workers. Their labor contracts are based on the kafala (Arabic for sponsor) system, which does not meet social human rights standards. Against this background, Section 3 illuminates the historical development of the Qatari kafala system, as well as its functionality for the rentier state and its limits. It shows that the prevalence of the kafala system in contemporary Qatari labor relations does not emanate from an anachronistic local tradition. Rather, Kafala was established by London as a tool for the comprehensive control of labor migration, because it was most suitable to serve the needs of the international oil companies in their endeavor of transforming Qatar into an oil country. At the same time, as kafala does not require intense administrative effort, it did not overstretch limited British capacities in Qatar. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that it is Qatari society that has a vested interest in maintaining the kafala system, because it provides Qatari citizens with significant privileges. The interest of the Qatari state, however, is mostly rooted in its need to acquire legitimacy toward its citizens. Although the abolishment of the kafala system is thus very unlikely, there are chances for further reforms to be launched, not least because the Qatari leadership is aware of the problems the system poses with regards to development policy. The fourth section, which takes a normative perspective, addresses and reviews the criticism that the kafala system is an expression of modern slavery, as it is held directly responsible for the deaths of thousands of construction workers in the 2010s. Among the major findings of this discussion is that - significant deficits of the kafala system with regards to social human rights notwithstanding - the concept of slavery does not accurately capture the nature of Qatari labor relations. Indeed, this concept tends to convey a problematic orientalist perspective that presents the Qatari political economy as a local anomaly instead of elaborating its integral embedment in the global capitalist system. The fifth section applies a political angle and argues that Western scandalization of Qatar's political economy beyond the regular politicization of social human rights violations in Qatar is inappropriate as a way of dealing with the World Cup taking place in the winter of 2022, because it reveals Western double standards, ignores the co-responsibility of the Global North, and disregards the reform efforts of the Qatari state. The final chapter proposes a number of policy recommendations. These recommendations are based on the reasonable assumption that the Qatari state has a pronounced interest in enhancing its external legitimacy. Therefore, Europe, and particularly Germany, should try to use the envisioned energy partnership to promote the consolidation of reforms in the kafala system.

The victory over the territorial rule of the so-called Islamic State provides an opportunity for the government of Iraq to restore its state institutions and reassert its authority. Can the Iraqi leadership step beyond cycles of failure in this transition to tackle the systemic issues that sustain state weakness and promote the emergence of groups like ISIS? This paper aims to enlighten the challenges faced by Iraq after ISIS for the restoration of peace between minorities and religious groups, and coexistence after the myth, so that conflicts are going on between minorities and religious groups, particularly in Mosul and other cities under the control of ISIS, the state could not reconcile the displaced people. Correspondingly, this paper intends the focus and role of local, regional, and international media in the process of peacebuilding and coexistence in Iraq after ISIS.

This article builds on theoretical foundations from enclave urbanism, authoritarian planning and neoliberal urbanisation to explore contemporary socio-spatial transformation(s) happening in Cairo, Egypt. Relying on a nationwide road development project, inner-city neighbourhoods in Cairo are turning into urban enclaves, whereby populations are being separated by a multiplicity of transport-related infrastructure projects. As these rapid planning processes are occurring, our article aims to explain why these developments are crucial and unique in the context of the post-Arab Spring cities. We argue that the new road infrastructure is creating a spatially and socially fragmented city and transforming the urban citizenry into a controllable and navigable body. We use an inductive approach to investigate the effects of the new road infrastructure and its hegemonic outcomes on the city. On a conceptual level, we propose that the enclaving of the city is a containment method that has erupted since the mass mobilisations of the Arab Spring. In doing so, we use qualitative analysis to explain empirical evidence showing how the city is being transformed into nodes of enclaves, where communities are getting separated from one another via socio-spatial fault lines.

This working paper is based on the empirical research on translocal figurations of displacement of Syrians in Jordan. It contains methodological discussions, central findings and reflections on these findings. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the TRAFIG project, this paper explores the central research question of TRAFIG, namely ���how are protractedness, dependency, and vulnerability related to the factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, and in turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilized to enhance the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced people?��� The paper presents findings from Jordan, where Syrian refugees have sought refuge in host communities. Syrian refugees��� stay in Jordan has become increasingly protracted, with the durable solutions of return in safety and dignity, local integration and resettlement remaining out of reach for most. In this paper, we argue that Syrians are de facto integrated in Jordanian host communities due to shared language, religion and socio-cultural ties as a pragmatic strategy for dealing with uncertainty and protracted displacement. We found that family- and kin networks have proven vital in facilitating and protecting mobility out of Syria and within Jordan, even as these networks are strained due to physical and geographic distance, reliant upon aid and financial support and socio-economic stress in the local labour market. We see that Syrians experience uncertain futures in which their mobility aspirations are unrealised, economic prospects are reliant upon and highly competitive with others, and connectivity with the host community is strained and can be improved., TRAFIG Working Paper No. 6

Fleeing war, repression, and economic breakdown in their home country, Syrians have become the largest group of refugees in the Middle East. Relative to their own populations, neighboring Jordan and Lebanon have hosted the most Syrians per capita. While both are small, middle-income, and resource-poor countries, the perception of their respective governance of Syrian refugees has been diametrically different: While the 2016 Jordan Compact has been hailed as a success story of innovative refugee governance, the Lebanon Compact has never achieved similar recognition. Instead, Lebanon has been criticized for applying a largely laissez-faire, non-policy approach to the Syrian crisis. The main objective of this short intervention is to evaluate both compacts 5 years after their signing and to outline a more reflective potential EU policy approach.

Middle East Arab diasporas, primarily the Iraqi and Syrian ones, are playing an increasing role in the economy and demography of Sweden. This study aims to describe the formation of economically active diasporas in Sweden over the past three decades. There has been a paradigm shift in the immigration and business activity of people from the Middle East Arab countries in Sweden. Diaspora leadership changes depending on the situation in the countries of origin and migration phenomena driven by political and military shocks. This change affects the migration process and the role of communities in the economic life of the country. The study draws on the work of top research centres and data from leading Swedish and international statistical agencies. The rise and subsequent decline in Syrian immigration, which included labour migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, did not restore the unconditional leadership of the Iraqis among the Arab communities of Sweden. The significant business activity of Syrian immigrants, their professional skills, level of education, and broad business ties make the diaspora a likely leader in the Arab community. These four factors also contribute to easier migrant integration into Swedish society.

Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since 2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap­prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par­ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management. (author's abstract)

To what extent does societal resilience help to prevent governance breakdown? The EU’s southern neighbourhood has been troubled by multiple security risks in recent years. The security situation of many citizens is uncertain and local populations frequently feel insecure, an indication of governance breakdown. Resilience has become a new focus in preventing a breakdown of governance. Yet, the extent to which resilience can help prevent governance breakdown remains unclear. Building on original survey data from Libya and Tunisia this study contributes empirical evidence to the debate. The article shows that limited statehood and order contestation do not necessarily lead to a breakdown of governance. Although both risks affect Tunisia and Libya to different degrees none of them are strongly correlated with the security perceptions of local populations. Additionally, resilience is key in preventing governance breakdown. Social trust and the legitimacy of governance actors are two main sources of resilience helping to prevent a breakdown of governance. Moreover, resilience has divergent effects on different dimensions of security governance breakdown. While resilience has stronger effects on national security perceptions, local security considerations are partly driven by other factors such as individuals’ economic resources.

Despite the loss of its territorial "caliphate" in 2019, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) still poses a daily threat to the societies of the region and beyond. To account for the resurgence of IS, we need to look at its dynamism, in addition to the domestic and regional complexities that facilitate its persistence in Iraq and Syria. The gradual, drastic loss of territorial control in Iraq and Syria since 2015 has deprived IS of crucial assets to launch large-scale terrorist attacks and compelled it to change its tactics. Since 2019, IS has intensified its guerilla warfare and, by destabilising large parts of Syria and Iraq, managed to maintain leverage in those areas. The organisational and ideological cohesion of IS has not deteriorated significantly, even after losing its territorial base and its "caliph," Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. IS exploits the political, security, social, and economic fragmentations that continue to plague both Iraq and Syria and that contributed to its rise in the first place. Refugee camps and detention centres, especially in northeast Syria, are currently being targeted by IS for infiltration and radicalisation. If these campaigns are successful, IS may be able to regain thousands of fighters. The EU should increase its support vis-à-vis the refugee camps in Syria and Iraq by providing humanitarian aid and adopting an institutionalised policy for repatriating its citizens who have joined IS, along with their families. This should be complemented by measures of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration. If not addressed efficiently, today's legal conundrums and poor humanitarian conditions of European citizen detainees could become tomorrow's security challenges.

"Das Volk will den Sturz des Regimes!" Unvergessen bleibt der Ruf der Menschen in Ägypten nach Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung, der im Jahr 2011 durch die Straßen Kairos hallte. Auf theoretisch innovative und interdisziplinäre Weise kombiniert der Autor strukturelle, netzwerktheoretische, konstruktivistische und kommunikative Aspekte des Transitionsprozesses zur umfassenden Untersuchung der revolutionären Mobilisierung säkularer Netzwerke sowie der konfliktiven Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Regime und der Muslimbruderschaft. So zeigt er auf, dass Demokratisierung ein widersprüchlicher und schwieriger Prozess ist, an dessen Ende die Re-Autoritarisierung der Politik stehen kann.

Seit Frühjahr 2019 war Israel politisch gelähmt, weil keine stabile Regierung zustande kam. Vier Wahlen waren nötig, bis am 13. Juni 2021 eine neue Regierung die Geschäfte übernahm. Nicht nur wurde Benjamin Netanjahu nach zwölf Jahren als Premier abgelöst. Es wurde eine Koalition gebildet, die fast das ganze politische Spektrum abdeckt. Mittlerweile hat sie sich stabilisiert, und die Ausrichtung wird klarer. National und international hat die Koalition mit der populistischen Rhetorik der Netanjahu-Regierung gebrochen. Zugleich sucht sie nach anderen Politiken: Innenpolitisch integriert sie erstmals eine unabhängige arabische Partei und hat die Angriffe auf Prinzipien liberaler Demokratie gestoppt. Außenpolitisch wirbt sie für Annäherung an die EU und an die Biden-Regierung, aber auch um mehr Integration in die Region. Zudem bemüht sie sich, den Konflikt mit den Palästinensern durch soziale und wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen einzudämmen. Doch eine politische Annäherung ist nicht in Sicht. Es droht ein 'point of no return', der eine Zweistaatenlösung unmöglich macht. Am 4.1.2022 korrigierte Version

In a context of areas of limited statehood and contested order, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have been affected by similar diffuse global and more specific regional and local risks over the past two decades. Yet they differ in outcomes. Lebanon has not descended into civil war despite fears that the one raging in Syria might spill over to its territory and Iraq has coped better over the past decade than Syria has - despite having been subject to various forms of conflict since 1980. We analyse this variance by asking to what extent resilience might buffer against violent conflict and governance breakdown. Through a comparative discussion of sources of resilience - social trust, legitimacy and institutional design - we find that limited input and threatened output legitimacy are harmful to resilience, while collective memory and reconciliation, as well as flexibility of institutions are crucial factors of resilience. Nonetheless, our findings caution that resilience should not only mean the capability to adapt to crises but also needs to set the stage for comprehensive and inclusive transformations that are locally rooted.

In the closing scene of The Last of Us (2016), we see the torso of a young black man who stands naked before a clearing in the forest. As he gazes out at a cascade of water tumbling down to a rocky pool below, the young man's image gradually fades away, absorbed into the landscape. Nothing about this scene, from the blackness of the protagonist to the coniferous forest, has any clear reference point in Tunisian national cinema. Indeed, director Ala Eddine Slim has expressed distaste for being classified as a regional filmmaker, preferring that his work be seen as international, transcending borders. And yet, to the familiar eye, this film belongs unmistakably to Tunisia's postrevolutionary political transition, a time fraught with unpredictable shifts in national identity and the contours of the state. Slim is part of a new generation of Tunisian filmmakers who have won critical acclaim on the international festival circuit since the 2011 revolution. More than a burst of creative energy released by the demise of autocratic rule, their experimental aesthetic emerges, in part, from struggles within Tunisian filmmaking establishment that have shaped the conditions of production under political transition. In this essay, I track the intergenerational conflicts that have prompted to the recent extroversion of young Tunisian filmmakers, who have set their sights beyond the nation for funding and recognition.

Leseprobe ----- Zusammenfassung Im Zuge tiefgreifender Umbruche ist der Vordere Orient fundamental politisch in Un-Ordnung geraten. Auch die patriarchale Geschlechterordnung geriet unter Druck und ist teilweise erodiert. Frauenrechte werden in der Krise zum machtpolitisch umkampften Terrain, auf dem autoritare Regime, regionale, substaatliche und transnationale Krafte um Legitimitat und Kontrolle wetteifern. Frauenbewegungen sehen sich mit vielfaltigen Strategien ‚maskulinistischer Restauration‘ konfrontiert. Am Beispiel des Irak analysiert der Beitrag in historisch-struktureller Perspektive, wie Geschlechterpolitik im autoritar zentralisierenden Staat des alten Regimes wie auch im fragmentierten konfessionalistisch verengten politischen System im ‚neuen Irak‘ herrschaftspolitisch instrumentalisiert wird und Frauenrechte jeweils strategisch erweitert oder eingeschrankt werden. Die innen- wie die geschlechterpolitischen Dynamiken im neuen Irak sind eng mit regionalen und internationalen Machtkampfen verwoben. Schlusselworter: Irak, Geschlechterpolitik, Maskulinistische Restauration, Personenstandsrecht, Konfessionalismus ----- Political (dis-)order and gender order in a transforming Middle East. The case of Iraq Summary Profound transformations in the Middle East have created a fundamentally dis-orderly regional order. Even the patriarchal gender order has come under pressure and has been eroded in parts. Women’s rights have become a highly contested terrain, with authoritarian regimes, regional, sub state and transnational forces competing for power, legitimacy and control. Women’s movements are faced with multiple ’masculinist restoration’ strategies. Taking Iraq as a case study, the article analyses, from a historical and structural perspective, how gender politics has been used by the centralizing authoritarian state of the ancien regime and is also being used by the fragmented sectarian political system of the ‘new Iraq’. Both regimes are instrumentalizing women’s rights in their quest for power, using different strategies and consequences. In the ‘new Iraq’ both domestic and gender politics have become closely interwoven with regional and international power struggles. Keywords: Iraq, gender politics, masculinist restoration, civil status law, sectarianism ----- Bibliographie: Kreile, Renate: Transformationsprozesse, politische Un-Ordnung und die Ordnung der Geschlechter im Vorderen Orient. Das Beispiel Irak, GENDER – Zeitschrift fur Geschlecht, Kultur und Gesellschaft, 1-2021, S. 109-123. https://doi.org/10.3224/gender.v13i1.08

2020/21 unterzeichnete Israel Abkommen mit vier arabischen Staaten, die international als Durchbruch gefeiert wurden. Von der Öffentlichkeit weitgehend unbemerkt vollzieht sich unterdessen seit 2018 eine Wiederannäherung arabischer Staaten an Syrien. Schließlich beendeten mit dem Treffen des Golfkooperationsrates (GKR) im saudischen Al-Ula im Januar 2021 Ägypten, Bahrain, Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) ihren Boykott Katars. Veränderte Lagebeurteilungen und das Konvergieren von Interessen haben die (Wieder-)Annäherungen ermöglicht. Damit bewegt sich die Region aber nicht auf Frieden und Stabilität zu; langanhaltende Konflikte werden nicht beigelegt, Bedrohungsperzeptionen dritter Akteure verstärkt. Deutschland und seine Partner in der EU sollten sich nicht von lokalen und regio­nalen Konfliktparteien vereinnahmen lassen, sondern Ansätze regionaler Konflikt­bearbeitung unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

Utilizing a qualitative research methodology, the paper introduces the background to the conflict in Darfur, including its origins, main causes, and related consequences and impacts. The causal factors of the conflict include colonialist and post-independence policies of economic and political marginalization, environmental degradation, demographic pressures and ecological hardships, ethnic and tribal conflicts fuelled by the then Al Bashir's governmental inaction or partial support, and wider regional conflicts and intervention. Later the paper addresses Darfur Peace process from a general perspective. Then, the third part of the study sheds lights on the vital needs and tremendous challenges of Darfur's post-conflict reconstruction, respectively. The paper concludes that addressing these all-encompassing and overlapping needs and challenges represents the indispensable conditions for post-conflict reconstruction in Darfur, without which the recovery, sustainable development, and prosperity of greater Darfur region are likely to be negligible or insignificant.

Measured in terms of licenses issued, Arab states will again be among the main recipi­ents of German military equipment exports in 2020. This continues a trend that has been evident since the early 2000s and especially since 2010, all despite Germany’s recently extended ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. From 2018 to 2020, the value of export licences for the five most important Arab buyer countries has decreased compared to the previous period. However, their share of total export licences is still over 25 percent. In view of regional developments, this is problematic. The foreign policies of the biggest customers have changed in recent years as they become less predictable and more willing to use military means to assert their interests. Military equipment exports could thus contribute to further escalation of the numerous inter­state conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, thereby posing great risks to Ger­many and the EU. Against the backdrop of Germany and the EU’s own export gui­de­lines, it is therefore advised to halt exports of military products to these countries. (author's abstract)

A majority of scholars consider Egypt’s urban development a product of the neo-liberal political economy facilitated by the country’s central government. In this article, we want to shift our attention towards the public and its demand for housing. We describe the urban everyday experiences of a population within a country in which a visual culture established via public media creates an urban imagination that does not reflect the lived social, spatial, and economic reality of the majority of the population. Exploration of the general public’s attitudes towards media narratives that focus their advertisement campaigns on high class residential projects launched this investigation. The argument that follows is based on empirical studies within the Greater Cairo Region (GCR). In this setting, a puzzling trend from our collected data guides our central research question: Why aren’t ads for luxury housing—a market segment clearly beyond the reach of most Egyptians—condemned by those who cannot afford it? To tackle this phenomenon, we shed light on how the pre—and post-marital demand for housing among young couples and their families influence the market, and particularly, the market for upscale and luxury housing in Cairo. The research consists of four phases, including (1) field interviews with Uber and Careem drivers, (2) an online survey targeting inhabitants across varying urban and social segments of the GCR, (3) the first author’s personal story, which posits that marriage culture acts as a key driver for real estate narratives, and (4) a visual analysis of a real estate advertisement. To conclude, the article discusses how far a hegemonic visual culture that caters to socio-economic links between class, marriage, and real estate engages the support of a large part of the population, which in turn, co-produces a spatially unjust urban development scheme that works against their own interests.

We measure the prevalence of discrimination between Jordanian host and Syrian refugee children attending school in Jordan. Using a simple sharing experiment, we find only little discrimination. Among the Jordanian children, however, we see that those who descended from Palestinian refugees do not discriminate at all, suggesting that a family history of refugee status can generate solidarity with new refugees. We also find that parents' narratives about the refugee crisis are correlated with the degree of discrimination, suggesting that discriminatory preferences are being transmitted through parental attitudes.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power after the military ousted President Morsi in July 2013 following widespread protests and strikes. With the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring uprising approaching, it has become clear that civil-military relations, infrastructure development, and population growth remain three interrelated challenges for Egypt that have persisted throughout the last decade. The military is historically tied to politics and remains a highly popular institution in Egyptian society. Simultaneously, socio-economic grievances and its importance as an employer continue to push the military into Egypt's domestic politics. Infrastructure development is on a split course: On one hand, because of its resources and manpower, the military can invest in mega-projects in hopes of long-term economic benefits. On the other hand, urbanisation has remained stagnant due to the crackdown on booming illegal, albeit urgently needed, housing. There is acknowledgement among policymakers that population growth is stifling infrastructure and development, yet there is little incentive for change. Measures targeting women fail to gain traction because of societal pressure to bear children, and because access to education, employment, and political participation remain unsafe given rampant sexual violence in public spaces. Through supporting socio-economic advancement in Egypt, Germany and the EU can facilitate the military's withdrawal from politics over the long term. Active support for infrastructure development implemented by civilian actors will over time reduce the need for the military's economic engagement. Improving women's safety will enable their access to work and political participation, which in turn can lower birthrates more effectively than the provision of birth control alone.

Während der syrische Bürgerkrieg zugunsten des Regimes von Präsident Bashar al‑Assad entschieden scheint, haben der Prozess und die Debatte über die Normalisierung der Beziehungen arabischer Länder mit Syrien und dessen mögliche Wieder­eingliederung in die Arabische Liga (AL) bereits begonnen. Eine Rück­kehr zur diplo­ma­tischen Nor­ma­lität würde die Legitimität des syrischen Regimes stärken. Dies würde dem Bestreben Deutschlands und der Europäischen Union (EU) entgegen­wirken, die gemeinsam mit den USA das syrische Regime mittels Sanktionen und Isolation zur Verhandlung einer politischen Lösung des Konfliktes bewegen wollen. Neben der Diskussion über die frag­liche Rückkehr Syriens in die AL besprechen die hier vorgestellten Beiträge die Beweggründe arabischer Länder, ihre Beziehungen mit Damaskus zu normalisieren, sowie den Einfluss externer Akteure und der Corona-Pandemie auf diesen Prozess. (Autorenreferat)

© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This paper examines how ceasefires can influence elements of statehood. It adds to scholarship that views statehood as being in a continuous process of change by conceptualising international ceasefires as the negotiation of an embryonic type of wartime order that has ramifications for how power and authority are dispersed among competing actors in civil war. Through the example of the Syrian de-escalation zones, the paper suggests that the ceasefire not only affected the use of violence but recalibrated relations between international and local actors for control over diplomacy, security, territory, and citizenship.

A powerful pro-Palestinian transnational advocacy network has emerged in Malaysia since the Gaza war of 2008-09. Taking the cooperation between the Palestinian Cultural Organization Malaysia, the Islamist Hamas, and the United Malays National Organisation as an example, I analyze the network and argue that the three actors are engaging there to promote the Palestinian struggle for an independent state but at the same time, each actor is using the network to pursue its own interests.

EU-GCC relations started thirty years ago, but proceeded very slowly. After the first agreement between the two institutions in 1998, the EU transformed, the GCC slowly changed, the international system dramatically converted and rules between two parties were amended by the ENP of the EU. Although both sides need each other, obstinate policies caused cessation of relations several times. According to some scholars, the GCC is becoming a periphery region for them, however the GCC still needs the EU as a first market in total trade. Bilateralism, cultural differences, the GCC's loose integration and lack of EU leverage in the Gulf could be lined up as some reasons for the non-progressive relations. Recent developments such as Trump’s election, Brexit, the Qatar crisis, 5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal and Russia's growing interest to the Gulf are affecting EU-GCC relations negatively. In this study, historical and recent developments and their effects on the EU-GCC relations were examined; and lastly some alternative solutions are discussed.

Gemessen an den erteilten Exportgenehmigungen werden auch 2020 arabische Staa­ten wieder zu den Hauptempfängern deutscher Rüstungslieferungen gehören. Damit setzt sich trotz des kürzlich verlängerten Exportstopps für Saudi-Arabien ein Trend fort, der sich seit den frühen 2000er Jahren, vor allem aber seit 2010 beobachten lässt. Angesichts der regionalen Entwicklungen ist dies problematisch. Denn in den vergan­genen Jahren hat sich die Außenpolitik der wichtigsten Abnehmerstaaten gewandelt. Sie sind weniger berechenbar und eher bereit, militärische Mittel zur Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen zu nutzen. Rüstungsexporte könnten somit dazu beitragen, die zahl­reichen zwischenstaatlichen Konflikte in Nahost und Nordafrika weiter eskalieren zu lassen, mit hohen Risiken für Deutschland und die EU. Auch vor dem Hintergrund der eigenen Exportrichtlinien ist daher für diese Länder ein Ausfuhrstopp anzuraten. (Autorenreferat)

So-called "climate migration", i. e. human mobility following prolonged drought periods, floods, or other climate-related environmental changes, has been singled out as an important factor connecting climate change effects and (violent) conflict. However, the existing studies on this relationship do not offer a clear picture. Nevertheless, Syria has evolved into a "show case study" for this assumed linear causality: A "century drought" and ensuing internal migration are seen as an untold prequel of the Syrian uprising. This alarmist, determinist, and simplifying image is questioned and reviewed in order to answer the following questions: Was the Syrian drought related to or caused by climate change? Which role, if any, did it play for internal migration in pre-revolutionary Syria? What do we know about "drought migrants" and their role in the Syrian uprising? The article summarizes available research and adds to it by way of interviews with Syrian refugees.

The rich and diverse Islamic religious heritage sites of the Arab world constitute a tremendous asset for economic and human development in the region. Archaeological, natural, and historic Islamic sites as well as archaeological monuments, historic objects and traditions are recognized and given the status of heritage. These Islamic sites play a significant role in building Arab-Islamic national identities and are considered to be an important economic resource. These Islamic sites are divided into three main categories: • The three holiest sites in Islam, namely the Al-Masjid-Al-Haram (Great Mosque) in Makkah, Saudi Arabia; the Prophet's Mosque in Al-Madina Al-Monawara, Saudi Arabia; and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Mosque of Jerusalem) in Palestine. • Religious sites related to art and architecture from the historical Islamic modern or medium ages. • Sites associated with Quranic stories; the biographies of the Prophets (Abraham , Joseph, Moses, Jesus, etc.); the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and followers; and Islamic battles, conquests, and other events that happened in the early period of Islam. The first and second types are already part of tourist programs in every Arab country. Although the third type has significant religious value, it is however still neglected. No development projects are directed towards these kinds of Islamic sites and they are not included in any tourism programs because of the fact that they lack exploration, care, and attention. Thus, they are not included in current development processes of historical and heritage sites. Nevertheless, current and potential cultural Islamic religious sites of this type are considered to be a creative sector in the Arab world and promise to be a major source of economic development in the future. The purpose of this research study is to analyze the state of Islamic religious heritage sites of this third type that prevail in the Arab World from several main perspectives. These perspectives include: (1) discussing the concept of heritage in light of current international usage—including tangible and intangible heritage—as well as studying the concept and classification of Islamic religious heritage sites in the Arab world and the main problems and obstacles they face; (2) studying tourism as an economic dimension for developing Islamic religious heritage sites in the Arab world by presenting facts and figures about the position of tourism in Arab economies and specifically the role of religious tourism as a special segment of tourism in the Arab world; and (3) studying the economic evaluation methods that can be applied to these sites for maximizing the economic benefit of the upgrading process in a framework that acknowledges both the monetary aspects and those intangible values that are deemed essential for the preservation of heritage resources. Using specific case studies, the current thesis has chosen four examples in the field of developing religious heritage sites from the four largest religious groups by population—the shrine of St. Padre Pio in Italy (Christianity), the Ramayana Trail in Sri Lanka (Hindusim), Phra That Doi Suthep Temple in Thailand (Buddhism), and the tomb and shrine of Abu Ubaida ibn al-Jarrah in Jordan (Islam)—in order to identify the most important problems facing the sites, determine how the sites were developed, measure the economic returns as well as other social, urban, tourist benefits generated through the development process at each site, and, finally, determine the principles and basis of the development process that will help deduce a strategy appropriate to religious sites in the Arab world. The analyses of the four examples were compared. Indicators for the success of the development projects at the religious heritage sites were discussed, including a discussion of the reasons for the success and deficiencies of each religious tourism project. Additionally, SWOT analyses were presented in order to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of each project. These four examples provide the basis for making concrete suggestions on how best to develop Islamic religious heritage sites in the future. Based on the analyses of the examples, a strategy for upgrading Islamic heritage sites in the Arab world in many aspects (economic, social, urban, administrative, religious, scientific, media-related, tourism-related) was developed; the strategy also included considerations of the mechanisms, actions, or policies that will help to achieve the strategy’s objective, in additional to the expected outcomes for each policy. The principles of the proposed strategy were then applied to a case study of an Islamic religious heritage site of great religious value in Egypt that could later be used as a model for other similar sites throughout the Arab world. The chosen case study is located in El-Sheikh Ibada village in El-Minya province in Upper Egypt: the “El-Sheikh Ibada Mosque,” birthplace of Maria, a wife of the Prophet Muhammad. Apart from its historical significance, the site has a charming rural environment, the beauty of the Nile, the wide desert, and the presence of remnants of some pharaonic monuments. This study proposed a development project with different objectives and components for this site to become a model for similar Islamic sites, and then applied the concept of Total Economic Value (TEV), in addition to a SWOT analysis, to the El-Sheikh Ibada site. Current approaches to religious tourism in Egypt and other Arab countries need to be reevaluated in terms of (1) the national planning policy of archaeological areas (especially Islamic sites) that are addressed in this study; and (2) the relationships within and between the relevant authorities in order to mobilize Islamic religious heritage of the Arab world and to provide a basis for a common culture of peace, cooperation, and mutual understanding, in addition to a special economic resource., Die vielen, sehr unterschiedlichen islamischen Kulturstätten der arabischen Welt tragen ein enormes Potentialin sich, sowohl für die ökonomische Entwicklung als auch für die der Bevölkerung der Region. Islamische Kulturstätten lassen sich in drei Hauptkategorien einteilen: 1. Die drei heiligen Stätten des Islams: Die Al-Haram-Moschee in Makkah (Saudi-Arabien) als Pilgerstätte, die Moschee des Propheten Muhammad in Medina (Saudi-Arabien) sowie die Al-Aqsa-Moschee in Jerusalem (Palästina). 2. Religiöse Stätten der Moderne und des Mittelalters mit künstlerischer und architektonischer Bedeutung. 3. Gebiete, die einen Bezug zu Geschichten aus dem Quran, den Reiserouten der Propheten (Abraham, Joseph, Moses, Jesus, usw.), dem Propheten Muhammad und seinen Gefährten und Anhängern, Schlachten und islamischen Eroberungen und Ereignissen in der frühen Periode des Islam haben. Die Orte der ersten und zweiten Kategorie werden in jedem arabischen Land bereits frequentiert und es gibt ausführliche Informationen und Angebote für Touristen. Stätten, die der dritten Kategorie entsprechen, werden trotz der Möglichkeit einer großen Attraktivität, vor allem für Gläubige, bisher vernachlässigt. Sie sind weithin unbekannt, weshalb sie auch in keinem Touristenkatalog erwähnt werden. Sie werden bei Entwicklungsprogrammen islamischer Stätten der arabischen Welt nicht berücksichtigt, dementsprechend werden dort auch keine Erhaltungs- oder Instandsetzungsmaßnahmen durchgeführt. Gegenwärtig verspricht die Weiterentwicklung dieser Gebiete eine wichtige Quelle der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in der arabischen Welt zu sein. Diese Studie gibt einen analytischen Überblick über diese dritte Kategorie und untersucht die ökonomischen Dimensionen dieser Orte. Die Bedeutung der religiös-islamischen Kulturstätten wird dabei aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln betrachtet. Zu Beginn ist es erforderlich, näher zu definieren, was unter dem Begriff „Kulturerbe“ zu verstehen ist und was als solches wahrgenommen wird, vor allem unter dem Gesichtspunkt der gegenwärtigen internationalen Nutzung sowie dem materiellen und immateriellen Wert. An zweiter Stelle wird der gegenwärtige Zustand dieser Kulturstätten erörtert, Hauptprobleme und -hindernisse identifiziert und die Potentiale und künftigen Perspektiven analysiert. Konkrete Entwicklungen bekannter Kulturstätten dienen als Positiv- oder Negativbeispiel und ermöglichen eine weitere Differenzierung begünstigender Faktoren und der Maßnahmen, die möglichst vermieden werden sollten, um das Projekt nicht zu gefährden oder gar zu dessen Abbruch zu führen. Eine dritte Perspektive greift die ökonomische Dimension für die Entwicklung islamischen Kulturerbes in arabischen Ländern auf. Dabei werden Fakten aufgezeigt und Beispiele gesucht, wie sich der Tourismus im Allgemeinen und der religiöse Tourismus im Besonderen auf die wirtschaftliche Lage arabischer Länder auswirkt. An vierter und letzter Stelle wird der Versuch unternommen, die potentiellen Standorte mit Hilfe verschiedener ökonomischer Methoden zu bewerten, um einen möglichst großen wirtschaftlichen Gewinn aus der Entwicklungsarbeit zu ziehen. Beispiele aus vier Weltreligionen werden ausgewählt, um die unterschiedliche Herangehensweise an die Entwicklung eines Ortes zu einer religiösen Kulturstätte modellhaft aufzuzeigen: San Padre Pio in Italien (Christentum), der Ramayana Trail in Sri Lanka (Hinduismus), der PhraThat Doi Suthep Temple in Thailand (Buddhismus), und der Grab und Schrein von Abu Ubaida ibn al-Jarrah in Jordanien (Islam). Anhand dieser Projekt Beispiele werden die größten potentiellen Probleme sowie Kriterien eines positiven Einflusses bei der Weiterentwicklung von Kulturstätten identifiziert und näher untersucht. Ergänzend zu der Wertsteigerung auf wirtschaftlicher Ebene werden Verbesserungen in sozialer, urbaner und touristischer Hinsicht gemessen. Aus den Ergebnissen werden Prinzipien und Regeln abgeleitet, die als Grundlage für eine angemessene Strategie bei der Entwicklung des kulturellen Erbes in arabischen Ländern dienen können. Zusätzliche zur allgemein üblichen SWOT Analyse werden die vier Modelle vergleichend untersucht. Dabei werden Indikatoren und Kriterien gefunden, die entweder einen Erfolg bzw. ein Versagen anzeigen. Im Weiteren wird versucht, Gründe für eine positive Entwicklung zu finden. Um konkrete Vorschläge für wenig oder gar nicht bekannte religiösen Stätten der arabischen Welt machen zu können, werden die in verschiedenen Bereichen (Wirtschaft, Soziales, Stadt, Administration, Religion, Wissenschaft, Medien/Berichterstattung, Tourismus) erwünschten Ziele, die dafür notwendigen Maßnahmen und das zu erwartende Ergebnis einander tabellarisch gegenüber gestellt. Zur Erprobung der zuvor vorgeschlagenen Strategie wird eine Fallstudie durchgeführt. Eine islamisch religiöse Kulturstätte von großer Bedeutung in der Provinz El-Minya in Oberägypten Ägypten wird gewählt. Der ausgesuchte Ort liegt. Im Dorf El-Sheikh Ibada steht die gleichnamige Moschee, die die Geburtsstätte von Maria, einer Frau des Propheten Muhammad ist. Eine idyllische Landschaft, der schöne Nil, die weite Wüste und Ruinen pharaonischer Monumente umgeben diesen Ort. Wie bei den Modellprojekten der vier Weltregionen werden auch hier bestimmte Ziele, die auf verschiedenen Ebenen erreicht werden sollen, definiert und eine SWOT Analyse durchgeführt. Die ökonomische Komponente der Entwicklung wird mit dem bei Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern etablierten Konzept des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wertes (TEV) beurteilt.

On 27 November 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had concluded a treaty on military assistance and cooperation with the government of Fayez al-Sarraj in Libya. The agreement permits the deployment of Turkish troops into the civil-war-torn country. The announcement was met with almost unanimous criticism in Western Europe. The indignation grew even greater when it became known that Turkey was controlling and financing the smuggling of Islamic Syrian fighters into Libya. Reports of a dominant influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Libyan gov­ern­ment seemed to complete the picture of a strongly Islamist-motivated Turkish policy. However, Turkey's engagement in Libya is not driven by ideology, but rather by stra­tegic considerations and economic interests. Ankara is thus reacting to its isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, where the dispute over the distribution of gas resources is intensifying. At the same time, Turkey is drawing lessons from the war in Syria. An­kara has lost this war, but through its engagement in Syria, it has been able to estab­lish a conflictual - but viable - working relationship with Russia. The bottom line is that Turkey’s commitment to Libya is a shift in the focus of its foreign policy from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, a shift that will present entirely new challenges to Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (author's abstract)

Am 27. November 2019 erklärte der türkische Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, die Türkei habe einen Vertrag über militärischen Beistand und Zusammenarbeit mit der Regierung von Fayez al-Sarraj in Libyen geschlossen, der die Entsendung türkischer Truppen in das Bürgerkriegsland ermögliche. Diese Mitteilung stieß in West­europa auf nahezu einhellige Kritik. Die Entrüstung wuchs noch, als bekannt wurde, dass die Türkei von ihr kontrollierte und finanzierte islamistische syrische Kämpfer nach Libyen schleust. Meldungen über einen dominanten Einfluss der Muslimbruderschaft auf die libysche Regierung schienen das Bild einer stark islamistisch motivierten türkischen Politik zu vervollständigen. Doch das Engagement der Türkei in Libyen ist nicht von Ideologie, sondern von strategischen Überlegungen und von ökonomischen Interessen getrieben. Ankara reagiert damit auf seine Isolation im östlichen Mittelmeer, wo sich der Streit um die Aufteilung der Gasressourcen zuspitzt. Gleichzeitig zieht die Türkei Lehren aus dem Krieg in Syrien, der für sie verloren ist, ihr jedoch eine zwar konflikthafte, aber trag­fähige Arbeitsbeziehung mit Russland eingebracht hat. Unter dem Strich manifestiert sich im Libyen-Engagement eine Verlagerung des Schwerpunkts türkischer Außen­politik vom Nahen Osten in das Mittelmeer, ein Schwenk, der Europa und die Nato vor ganz neue Herausforderungen stellen wird. (Autorenreferat)

The Beirut Port blast (BPB) has revealed the fundamental failure of the Lebanese political system, but deep democratic reforms will take time and are fraught with risks. Given the US withdrawal and the extreme tensions in the region, the EU has a critical role to play in addressing the short-term humanitarian crisis, responding to the economic and financial situation, and providing a forum for civil society empowerment. If it fails to do so, the price is further geopolitical destabilization.

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been pursuing an increasingly active foreign and security policy and have emerged as a leading regional power. The UAE sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious threat to regime sta­bility at home, and is fighting the organisation and its affiliated groups throughout the Arab world. The UAE's preferred partners in regional policy are authoritarian rulers who take a critical view of political Islam and combat the Muslim Brother­hood. The new Emirati regional policy is also directed against Iranian expansion in the Middle East. Yet the anti-Iranian dimension of Emirati foreign policy is considerably less pronounced than its anti-Islamist dimension. The UAE wants to gain control of sea routes from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Since the Yemen conflict began in 2015, it has established a small maritime empire there. The rise of the UAE to a regional power has made the country a more im­portant and simultaneously a more problematic policy partner for Germany and Europe. (author's abstract)

One aspect of Iran’s involvement in Syria that has come under the spotlight recently is Iran's growing presence and activities in Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria. Not only has Iran established its military presence in the region by deploying troops and constructing military bases, it has also been active in social, cultural, and economic spheres. Many observers believe that Iran's goal is to establish a "land corridor" to connect the country to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Others argue that Iran is attempt­ing to expand its ideological influence in Deir ez-Zor by promoting Shi'ism. However, the Islamic Republic is pursuing a multifaceted strategy in the area. Tehran wants to establish an economic corridor to the Mediterranean to play a role in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Iran is also trying to create a zone of influence in Syria's east while strengthening its deterrence against Israel and the United States. Prevent­ing the revival of the so-called Islamic State (IS) remains another priority. (author's abstract)

The Syrian civil war seems to have been decided in favour of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the process and the debate about the normalisation of relations between Arab states and Syria, as well as the country’s possible readmis­sion into the Arab League (AL), have already begun. A return to normality would help strengthen the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. This, however, would run counter to efforts by Germany, the European Union (EU) and the USA, who seek to force the Syrian regime by means of sanctions and isolation to negotiate a political solution to the con­flict. In addition to Syria's contentious return to the AL, the articles examined here discuss the motives of those Arab countries wishing to normalise relations with Damascus, and the influence that external actors and the Covid pandemic exert on this process. (author's abstract)

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi kam im Juni 2013 an die Macht, nachdem das Militär Präsident Morsi im Kontext anhaltender Massenproteste des Amtes enthoben hatte. Zehn Jahre nach dem Beginn des Arabischen Frühlings wird deutlich, dass die zivil-militärischen Beziehungen, die Entwicklung der Infrastruktur sowie das Bevölkerungswachstum drei weiterhin ungelöste und miteinander in Verbindung stehende Herausforderungen für Ägypten darstellen. Das ägyptische Militär ist historisch eng mit dem politischen System verzahnt und genießt nach wie vor eine große Beliebtheit in der Bevölkerung. Aufgrund sozio-ökonomischer Missstände und seiner Bedeutung als Arbeitgeber ist das Militär kontinuierlich in die Politik involviert. Die Problemlagen bei der Infrastrukturentwicklung sind vielschichtig. Einerseits engagiert sich das Militär mit seinen finanziellen und menschlichen Ressourcen in Großprojekten, die langfristig ökonomische Vorteile versprechen. Andererseits wird die urbane Entwicklung massiv blockiert, weil die Regierung den Bau von dringend benötigtem Wohnraum, der bisher vorwiegend illegal stattfindet, behindert. Zwar erkennen politische Entscheidungsträger an, dass das Bevölkerungswachstum infrastrukturelle und entwicklungspolitische Impulse konterkariert, allerdings gibt es kaum Anreize, dies zu ändern. Maßnahmen zur Bevölkerungskontrolle, die sich an Frauen richten, laufen ins Leere, da diese einem immensen gesellschaftlichen Druck ausgesetzt sind, Kinder zu gebären. Der Zugang zu Bildung, Arbeit und politischer Teilhabe wird Frauen zudem durch weitverbreitete sexualisierte Gewalt im öffentlichen Raum genommen. Deutschland und die EU können den Rückzug des ägyptischen Militärs aus der Politik durch langfristig orientierte sozioökonomische Entwicklungsmaßnahmen unterstützen. Eine Förderung von zivilen Akteuren, die Infrastrukturprojekte implementieren, kann zukünftig die Notwendigkeit eines ökonomischen Engagements des Militärs verringern. Eine Verbesserung der Sicherheitslage für Frauen würde deren berufliche und politische Teilhabe verbessern, was wiederum die Geburtenrate effektiver absenkt als das Verteilen von Verhütungsmitteln.