1. Why incompatibilism about mental causation is incompatible with non-reductive physicalism
- Author
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Umut Baysan and Jonas Rask Christensen
- Subjects
physicalism ,causal closure ,Health Policy ,Philosophy ,05 social sciences ,proportionality ,Proportionality (law) ,06 humanities and the arts ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,Causal closure ,Physicalism ,disjunctive properties ,050105 experimental psychology ,Incompatibilism ,Epistemology ,interventionism ,Epiphenomenalism ,Mental causation ,060302 philosophy ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,Causation - Abstract
The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that incompatibilism undermines either the non-reductionist or the physicalist aspirations of non-reductive physicalism.
- Published
- 2018
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