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In recent years, extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right- or left-wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well-being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, 2015). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid-style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.

In recent years, extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right- or left-wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well-being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, 2015). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid-style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.

International audience; Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Bild der abrahamitischen Religionen in den Präsidentschaftswahlprogrammen des Front National (2012 und 2017) im Vergleich zu anderen erfolgreichen rechtsextremen populistischen Parteien in EU-Ländern Nord- und Westeuropas. Die Analyse zeigt einerseits eine gemeinsame Tendenz, den Islam negativ darzustellen, andereseits auch Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Parteien in bezug auf die Darstellung des Judemtums und/oder Israel sowie der Bedeutung, die dem Christentum für die nationale oder europäische Identität zugemessen wird, die jeweils interessante Parallelen zu den nationalen diskursiven Traditionen und der Geschichte der jeweiligen Partei aufweisen.; This article analyses the image of the three abrahamic religions in the recent political programs of the French Front National (2012 und 2017) in a comparative perspective with other successful populist radical right-wing parties in EU-Countries of continental Western and Northern Europe. It will be shown that even if there is a common tendency of representing Islam negatively and avoiding overt antisemitism, there are differences with regard to Judaism and/or Israel as well as to the weight of Christianity for the national and/or European culture, which have interesting parallels with the national discourse traditions and the particular radical right-wing history of these parties.; Cet article analyse l’image des trois religions abrahamites dans les programmes politiques récents du Front National en la comparant avec celle créée par d’autres partis d’extrême droite populiste de pays de l’Union Européenne appartenant à l’Europe occidentale continentale et à la Scandinavie qui ont été couronnés d’un certain succès lors des élections récentes. Il sera montré que, même si l’on peut constater une convergence quant à l’image négative créée de l’islam ainsi que dans la tendance d’éviter un antisémitisme ouvert, il y a, toutefois, des différences en ce qui concerne le judaïsme et/ou Israël et le poids attribué au christianisme dans la culture nationale et/ou européenne. On y peut observer des parallèles intéressants avec les traditions discursives nationales ainsi que l’histoire de ces partis d’extrême droite.

In recent years, extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right- or left-wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well-being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, 2015). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid-style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.

This article argues that voters of the Italian Lega Nord have been radicalized in recent years, shifting from an intermediate ‘centrist’ position to the extreme right. Data from both national and European mass surveys (e.g. Italian National Election Studies and European Electoral Studies) provide additional support for this shift from left to right and the accompanying changes in criteria (i.e. immigration, democracy, civil rights, European integration, and politics), indicating that Lega Nord voters have evolved into a body that fits the new extreme-right concept well.

Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library. Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla. Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler. The aim of this thesis is to study the electoral success of three extreme right-wing parties on the premises of the political system. The parties in focus are the Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB), the Dutch Centrumdemocraten (CD) and the German Republikaner (REP), which are all undisputed representatives of the 'core' extreme right-wing family in present-day Western Europe. Further, the features of the political system are divided into party system features and features related to the institutional setting of a country. The former include, among other features, the fragmentation of the party system, the electoral volatility and the polarisation and cartellisation of the party system. The latter include, amongst others, the complexity of the system, federal structures, the election system and the legal constraints that can affect the performance of extreme right-wing parties in elections. The study is conducted as a case study in the sense that it aims to an in-depth analysis of the electoral success of three parties on the premises of the political systems of each of countries under which they reside. However, the study takes its starting point in the theoretical discussion concerning the potential impact of various political system features on extreme right-wing parties in general, which enables a systematic analysis of the cases, and the application of a comparative perspective to the findings. The study concludes in that the political systems of the three countries studied, indeed provide different opportunities and restraints for the three extreme right-wing parties to succeed electorally. Some political system features prove, however, to affect the electoral success of the parties differently than the theoretical discussion had led us to expect. In addition, the Belgian system appears to be advantageous for the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok with regard to most political system features studied, whereas the Dutch and the German systems prove to combine multiple disadvantageous and restraining conditions affecting the electoral success of the Centrumdemocraten and the Republikaner. Yet, the German system appears to be the most restraining system, which is due to the fact that some of the political features appear even more restraining for the German extreme right than similar features in the Netherlands. Avhandlingens avsikt är att undersöka tre högerextremistiska partiers framgång i val på det politiska systemets premisser, nämligen det belgiska Vlaams Blok (VB), det nederländska Centrumdemocraten (CD) och det tyska Republikaner (REP). Dessa tillhör alla den s.k. 'kärnfamiljen' av högerextremistiska partier i dagens Europa. Studien tar sin utgångspunkt i en analysram, vari det politiska systemet är indelat i partisystemvariabler och variabler som relaterar till det politiska systemets institutionella strukturen. De förra inkludera bl.a. partisystemets fragmentering, kartellisering, ideologiska polarisering jämte väljarrörlighet, medan de institutionella strukturerna inkluderar t.ex. det politiska systemets komplexitet, federala strukturen, valsystem och juridiska begränsningar som kan påverka högerextremistiska partiers framgång i val. Undersökningen utgörs av fallstudier av de tre partiernas framgång i val på det politiska systemets premisser. Utgångspunkten i en generell teoretisk referensram möjliggör dock en systematisk analys i de tre fallstudierna, likväl som ett jämförande perspektiv på undersökningens resultat. I avhandlingen finner jag att undersökningens olika politiska system de facto skapar olika förutsättningar för de tre högerextremistiska partierna att nå framgång i val. Dock visar avhandlingen på att somliga systemaspekter tar sig annorlunda uttryck än den teoretiska diskussionen föranledde oss att anta. Därtill visar undersökningen att det belgiska politiska systemet är gynnsamt för het Vlaams Blok med avseende på nästan alla systemaspekter som undersöktes. Däremot kombinerar de nederländska och tyska systemen flertalet karakteristika som begränsar eller förtrycker de Centrumdemocratens och die Reublikaners möjligheter till framgång i val. Det tyska systemet visar sig vara det system som begränsar ett högerextremistiskt partis framgångar mest, vilket i sig inte beror på antalet begränsande karakteristika, utan snarare på att flertalet systemaspekter har en än mera genomgripande effekt i Tyskland än motsvarande aspekter i Nederländerna. Työ on englanninkielinen.