Search

With the emergence of a large number of waste electronic products and the enhancement of social awareness of environmental protection, the recycling of waste electronic products has become one of the pressing issues of social concern. Government environmental regulation is an important policy to promote the development of the remanufacturing industry. In this paper, we study the government levies recycling and disposal fees on original products for environmental governance and establish two game models based on the perspective of maximizing social welfare with no government regulation and a tripartite liability system. The optimal decisions on wholesale, retail prices and quantity of original and remanufactured products, as well as the recycling and disposal fee are analyzed under both models. Based on the numerical results, the impact of the main parameter (such as the responsibility sharing ratio) on the decisions and profits of the parties is discussed. The results show that (1) the wholesale and retail prices of remanufactured products are not affected by government regulation; (2) the tripartite liability system can increase the output of remanufactured products and reduce the output of original products while cutting the profits of remanufacturing supply chain members, and increasing social welfare; (3) government’s optimal recycling and disposal fee is not related to the sharing ratio. The study can provide practitioners with suggestions for ways to develop environmental regulation.

Remanufacturing is a sustainable product reutilization strategy to realize responsible consumption and production. However, it has remained a largely untapped opportunity for enhancing productivity due to some behavioral matters such as fairness concerns of remanufacturing related firms. Concerning the emerging and development of remanufacturing industry, this paper provides a game-theoretic analysis for a remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) consisting of one leading manufacturer and a following retailer, with the inclusion of fairness concern. We propose and compare several scenarios of channel members’ fairness preferences as, both members are fairness concerned, only one member is fairness concerned, and both members are fair neutral, to expound how fairness concern affects RSC strategies and resulting utilities. We also demonstrate dynamic evolution and stable state of channel members’ selections of whether being fairness concerned in the long term. Analytical results show that favorable scenarios for the RSC to achieve desired objective are relevant to its preference for improved supply chain performance or enhanced environmental benefit. Whatever the preference is, however, it is detrimental for both members to be fairness concerned in the short term. In the long term, evolutionary stable strategies of fairness concerns indicate that both members or only one member would choose to be fairness concerned. The eventual status relies on the initial state of fairness preference. The results are especially relevant as a reference for remanufacturing related strategies, thus enhancing production sustainability as well as environmental benefits.

With the shortage of global resources and the call for sustainable development, the remanufacturing supply chain and the corporate social responsibility of enterprises have attracted extensive attention from scholars. This paper studies a manufacturer-retailer corporate social responsibility (CSR) remanufacturing supply chain in which the manufacturer collects the used products grounded in the willingness to pay (WTP) differentiation. Different from previous literature, this paper first adds WTP differences to the CSR remanufacturing supply chain. Next, we analyze the manufacturer exhibiting CSR activity by Stackelberg game theory in both centralized and decentralized models with a consideration of prices, recycling, consumer surplus, and profits for the chain players in the two models with different CSR ratios. Through calculation and analyses of the models, we note that the chain members have the best status when the consumers&rsquo, WTP for new and remanufactured products is within a threshold. Subsequently, we compare the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in the decentralized and centralized systems, and we find that the retail price, wholesale price, and recycling rate decrease with a rising CSR under WTP differentiation. The centralized retail price is lower than the decentralized one. Conversely, the profit is higher when the increment of demand is higher. On top of that, in common cases, the pure and total profits of manufacturing are ascending while the retailer&rsquo, s profit is descending. We also find that the consumer surplus is increasing in two cases. Finally, to motivate the players in the supply chain to engage in CSR activity, we consider the revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of WTP differences, this paper studies CSR remanufacturing, which has certain influences on the sustainable development of the economy.

In this paper, we address the problem of choosing an appropriate channel for the marketing channel structure of remanufactured fashion products. To be specific, we consider a remanufacturer who has two options for selling the products: (1) provide the remanufactured products to a manufacturer, then the manufacturer sells both new products and the remanufactured products to customers, and (2) sell the remanufactured products directly to customers. Because of the relatively low acceptance of remanufactured products and environment consciousness of customers in developing countries like China, we model the two scenarios as decentralized remanufacturing supply chains, with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader and the government offering subsidy to the remanufacturer to incentivize remanufacturing activities. We find that the subsidy can incentivize remanufacturing activity regardless of the remanufacturer’s channel choice. A “too high” or “too low” subsidy makes the remanufacturer compete with the manufacturer, and an intermediate subsidy results in cooperation between the two members of the remanufacturing supply chain. Meanwhile, if the customers’ acceptance for remanufactured products is higher, the remanufacturer will be more likely to compete with the manufacturer. However, the remanufacturer’s optimal channel choice may be inefficient in the sense of social welfare and environmental protection.

The article explains the definition of closed-loop supply chain and remanufacturing supply chain. This thesis describes the remanufacturing logistics process which based on closed-loop supply chain management. Through analysis of the current remanufacturing supply chain management problem, we proposes some measures of the implementation of remanufacturing supply chain management. It has an important significance on remanufacturing reverse logistics management based on closed-loop supply chain management processes.