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This essay proposes that action unaccompanied by the usual feeling of conscious agency constitutes a “mark of ultimacy.” Characteristically religious statements of “agentless action” find support in social psychological and cognitive scientific research that calls into question the intuitive belief that conscious thought causes action. An awareness of the limits of our powers of will lies at the the core of those limit experiences that provide the context for the meaningfulness of religious language.

This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet’s neuroscientific work on free will. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is argued that both lines of argument are unsuccessful.

Scientific research on neural plasticity opens up new understandings of free will. In the work of Eric Kandel and Gerald Edelman, for instance, scientific models are followed by philosophical considerations on free will. However, such views collide with the standpoints of Daniel Wegner who proposes a very deterministic interpretation of Benjamin Libet’s experiments. A synthetic presentation of these positions leads to a twofold problematic : the question of determinism and the relations between neural plasticity and language. An historical approach to determinism shows that Wegner’s interpretation is by no means required. Local non-determinism is quite compatible with contemporary scientific theories. We proceed to an analysis of language bringing together the works of Jürgen Habermas and Donald Davidson and the neurosciences. This leads to a concept of free will whereby human behaviour can be understood in relation to a logic of meanings which escapes biological explanation. It thus becomes clear that free will is compatible with contemporary neurosciences., Les recherches sur la plasticité neuronale ouvrent à de nouvelles compréhensions du libre arbitre. Des chercheurs comme Eric Kandel et Gerald Edelman prolongent leur investigation scientifique par des considérations philosophiques sur le libre arbitre. Cette position se heurte cependant aux interprétations récentes des expériences de Benjamin Libet proposées par Daniel Wegner. Une présentation synthétique des thèses de ces divers auteurs ouvre à deux thématiques : la question du déterminisme et les relations entre plasticité neuronale et langage. Un historique de la question du déterminisme montre que l’interprétation wegnérienne ne s’impose en aucune manière et qu’un indéterminisme local est parfaitement compatible avec les théories scientifiques contemporaines. Une analyse de la fonction langagière qui met en dialogue les travaux de Jürgen Habermas et Donald Davidson avec les neurosciences contemporaines ouvre à une conception du libre arbitre où le comportement humain s’articule à une logique de significations qui échappe à une explication biologique. La compatibilité du libre arbitre avec les neurosciences contemporaines se voit ainsi établie., Feltz Bernard. Plasticité neuronale et libre arbitre. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Troisième série, tome 111, n°1, 2013. pp. 27-52.