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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing the construction and operation of new commercial power reactors proposed in the United States. This paper will discuss the NRC's Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants," licensing process for nuclear reactors, the status of the new reactor licensing reviews, and the ways in which stakeholders can participate in the review process. NRC is continuing to see increasing interest in design and possible licensing applications for advanced reactor designs. As a result, this paper will also describe the activities that the NRC is engaged in to coordinate various research and pre-application activities related to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) program and describe NRC's efforts in preparing for the review of small modular Light Water Reactors (LWRs), to include insights learned from the Part 52 review process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, empowers the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to establish by rule or order, and to enforce, standards to govern civilian uses of nuclear materials in order to protect health and safety and minimize danger to life or property. The NRC issues regulations in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). NRC Regulations govern the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities as well as the use of radioactive materials. The NRC's rulemaking process is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. NRC regulations are created and updated in an open environment, providing opportunities for the public to provide input to the regulations multiple times. The rulemaking process includes coordination between the NRC, its licensees, the public, and other interested parties. NRC develops, documents, and implements policies and procedures for developing effective, coherent, consistent, and understandable regulations. NRC staff prepare regulatory analyses, including cost analysis on the impact of proposed regulatory activities and the risk significance of its regulations. NRC also creates rulemaking schedules to ensure that rules are developed in time frames specified by Commission guidance. This paper will provide an overview of the NRC's rulemaking process. NRC staff are currently revising 10 CFR Part 74: Material Control and Accounting for Special Nuclear Material. This section details the requirements for material control and accounting (MC&A) of special nuclear material (SNM) for fuel cycle facilities and other licensees possessing SNM. The revision includes relocating some MC&A requirements from other 10 CFR chapters to consolidate MC&A requirements in Part 74. Additional changes include revision of general performance objectives, addition of definitions, revision of MC&A exemptions, and enhancement of tamper-indicating device programs. This paper will discuss the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 74 and opportunities for public involvement during the remainder of the rulemaking process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aluminum research reactor used fuel is currently being stored or is anticipated to be returned to the United States and stored at DOE-EM storage facilities at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center. This paper assesses the technologies and the options for safe transportation/receipt and interim storage of aluminum research reactor spent fuel and reviews the comprehensive strategy for its management. The U.S. Department of Energy uses the Appendix A, Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Criteria, to identify the physical, chemical, and isotopic characteristics of spent nuclear fuel to be returned to the United States under the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program. The fuel is further evaluated for acceptance through assessments of the fuel at the foreign sites that include corrosion damage and handleability. Transport involves use of commercial shipping casks with defined leakage rates that can provide containment of the fuel, some of which are breached. Options for safe storage include wet storage and dry storage. Both options must fully address potential degradation of the aluminum during the storage period. This paper focuses on the various options for safe transport and storage with respect to technology maturity and application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are central issues surrounding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The expected expansion of nuclear energy to new countries and the reactivation of nuclear activities in those that have developed nuclear energy for peaceful uses over the years, among other challenges, show the increasing importance of robust state and regional systems in international safeguards. The existence of good safeguards infrastructure in States, the added value of regional safeguards endeavours like ABACC, providing additional confidence and transparency about the peaceful nature of nuclear activities under its control, the existence of a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and the benefit of establishing a forum to exchange best practices among these systems under the auspices of the IAEA, seem important contributions to consider with special attention in the new safeguards era. Enhancing the cooperation and dialogue among interested parties, especially between the IAEA, States and Regional arrangements is relevant for modern effective and efficient safeguards. ABACC is a regional safeguards organization established by Argentina and Brazil in conformity with national and international laws as an independent entity to verify the States commitment of exclusive peaceful purpose of their nuclear activities. This makes ABACC a unique organization. The IAEA and ABACC have been working together in implementing good safeguards for almost twenty years, jointly with the existence of robust State systems in both countries in support of ABACC and IAEA's activities and to fulfil their national objectives. A lot has been accomplished, but a lot more could be done to enhance the way they operate. The concept of "state level safeguards approach" should allow to consider new opportunities to deepen the two- way street cooperation. This paper discusses the contribution of a regional safeguards system like ABACC to the non-proliferation regime and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and its role for more effective and efficient international safeguards. The paper also examines ABACC in promoting exchange of good practices and lessons learnt and whether this regional system together with Argentina and Brazil state authorities may expand this activity further in the Latin America region and internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remote monitoring of process activities is one tool under consideration by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle increasing demands for conducting verification inspections at safeguarded facilities. The ability for the IAEA to continuously monitor feed and withdrawal (F&W) station operations (e.g., load cells and other process attributes) would provide independent verificatin of 'normal' plant operations, supply data that would make safeguard more effective and efficient, and enable information-driven inspections. Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have assembled a mock uranium hexafluoride (UF6) F&W system—using water in lieu of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)—to test the feasibility of advance process monitoring systems and concepts (such as remote monitoring) for safeguards. One use of the F&W mock-up involves exploring how a safeguards inspector would interact with the data and use it to perform onsite inspections more effectively; the researchers divided the staff into two groups: operators and inspectors. This paper will discusses this method used for the inspections and the promising results of the mock facility to confirm operator declarations and detect material diversion. This paper will also presents the intuitive and user-friendly graphic interface researchers used to analyze the information. Although the data gathered previously came from a computer local to the F&W system, future work will include remote transmission and analysis of the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plutonium oxide left over from the 3013 destructive surveillance process is ultimately disposed of as waste. Therefore, this material is not re-stabilized and packaged to meet the requirements of DOE-STD-3013. Instead, it is stored on an interim basis in compliance with the interim safe storage criteria issued by DOE in January 1996. One of the safe storage criteria requires actions to be taken to minimize the formation or accumulation of flammable gases inside the storage container. Personnel responsible for the safe storage of the material have chosen to use a polymer-based, ambient air compatible hydrogen "getter" to prevent the formation of hydrogen gas inside the storage container and thus prevent the formation of a flammable gas mixture. This paper briefly describes the method in which the getter performs its functions. More importantly, this paper presents the results of the testing that has been performed to characterize the bounding effects of aging and demonstrate the use of the getter for long-term storage. In addition, the favorable results of a post-storage analysis of actual getter material are presented and compared with bounding predictions. To date, bounding test results have shown that after 18 months of continuous storage and 39 months of total storage at 70°C, the getter is able to both recombine gaseous hydrogen and oxygen into water when oxygen is available, and irreversibly getter (i.e., scavenge) hydrogen from the vapor space when oxygen is not available, both under a CO2 environment. Further bounding testing has been deemed unnecessary, and continued post-storage testing will be conducted on a periodic basis. The first post-storage testing of deployed getter material after two years of service revealed that it still performed like new material. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of its nuclear nonproliferation mission, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is working to develop a sustainable means for producing critical medical isotopes, such as molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), without using highly enriched uranium (HEU). This program is a critical part of GTRI's global effort to reduce the risk posed by vulnerable civilian nuclear and radiological materials that could be used by terrorists to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device. GTRI works to develop and implement technologies to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the civilian use of HEU, including in research reactors and isotope production facilities. This paper describes efforts to convert the existing medical isotope producers' production processes to the use of low enriched uranium. This paper also discusses GTRI's role in providing support to the U.S. private sector to accelerate the establishment of a reliable long-term domestic Mo-99 production capability without the use of HEU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the safeguarding and nonproliferation issues of nuclear fuel reprocessing. This work studies the policies of the United States and international policies toward nuclear fuel reprocessing and their impact on the state of technology. As the need for a reliable source of energy increases, it is expected that nuclear energy will receive serious attention from developing countries around the world. As a consequence of this nuclear renaissance, an increase in demand for nuclear fuel is anticipated. New strategies will need to be in place to support the growing nuclear industry and to establish a reliable fuel supply (RFS). Nuclear reprocessing appears to be an ideal solution to supply the fuel needed to establish an RFS. Furthermore, nuclear fuel reprocessing can be a viable alternative to "close" the fuel cycle and reduce the nuclear waste generated. However, in order for nuclear reprocessing to be accepted worldwide, safeguarding measures and novel detection technology are needed to assure the non-military use of the technology. Safeguarding, early detection, and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation by diversion of plutonium from the civilian fuel cycle are still key issues and serious threats to worldwide acceptance. Some of the issues related to nonproliferation and international safeguarding technological barriers are identified in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has funded a multilaboratory/ university collaboration to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in, and to detect the diversion of pins from, spent nuclear fuel assemblies. The first half of this NGSI effort is focused on quantifying the capability of a range of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques with Monte Carlo modeling and the second half involves measuring spent fuel. The focus of this paper is on the performance of the detection of delayed neutrons. A delayed neutron counting instrument using 36 fission chambers and a 14 MeV pulsed DT neutron generator was studied previously as part of the NGSI effort. The present paper will quantify the capability of a new delayed neutron instrument using an array of four ³He gas filled proportional counters to detect the delayed neutrons and a DT generator as the source of interrogating neutrons. This new design was selected in order to minimize the fission of 238U, to use a more realistic neutron generator design in the model, to reduce the cost and to facilitate the integration of a delayed neutron with a differential die-away instrument. Since this paper will focus on delayed neutron detection, the goal is to quantify the signal from 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu, which are the isotopes present in spent fuel that respond most significantly to a slow neutron interrogation. This report will quantify the capability of this new delayed neutron design to measure the combined mass of 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu for 16 of the 64 assemblies of the NGSI Spent Fuel Library in water. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2009, early career safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division (GNSTD) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developed the concept of a Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The Network was developed in response to the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched in 2007 by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in an effort to revive safeguards technology, human resources, and human capital development to sustain the safeguards system as its mission evolves over the next 25 years. Now, it is the task of NNSA and the U.S. national laboratories, working in collaboration with universities, foreign partners, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among others, to ensure that multilateral support for safeguards is strong and will remain so into the future. The purpose of the NGSPN is to build connections between the next generation of experts who will see the safeguards system into the future. Unlike most next generation human resources efforts focusing either on students or established professionals, the NGSPN is intended to involve the next generation of professionals looking to make their careers in safeguards and nonproliferation both internationally and from across the U.S. national laboratory network, NNSA staff, academia, and nuclear and safeguards technology industries. On October 28%29, 2009, the inaugural meeting of the NGSPN was held in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, hosted by GNSTD. It was attended by twenty-two participants from eight national labs, NNSA headquarters, and one industry partner. The meeting provided a unique opportunity for young safeguards professionals coming from various backgrounds and organizations to network. It also provided a forum for discussing their roles and responsibilities as well as the path forward to ensure that NGSI was addressed and built upon in the participants' respective areas. This inaugural meeting was very well received by ORNL management and the participants, thus establishing a strong foundation for the NGSPN to develop and grow. This paper describes the inaugural meeting of the NGSPN at ORNL, its organization, outcomes, and feedback received from the participants. The paper also introduces the network, its significance, goals, objectives, and future plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International professional societies, training programs, and organizations provide unique and valuable opportunities for indigenous staff of countries with plans to either expand or develop civil nuclear power programs. This paper recommends that such countries concurrently address issues associated with nuclear infrastructure development, specifically the promotion of adequate human resources, by engaging in various forms of international collaboration and networking. The paper advises that identification, training, and retention of next-generation professionals is critical for establishing a responsible civil nuclear power program; accordingly, it discusses a number of possibilities that would be highly beneficial to countries seeking to promote this type of development. In addition, this paper suggests that appropriate countries in the Gulf make use of collaboration opportunities with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its associated National Laboratory complex. Professional networking is vital to this region, especially as members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) embark upon the establishment of peaceful nuclear programs. As a result, this paper more broadly intends to demonstrate the high return on investment for attending international conferences, participating in international training opportunities, and establishing regional chapters of international professional organizations and institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the continued evaluation of the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with various proposed nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, this paper examines two closed fuel cycles. The first fuel cycle examined is a thorium fuel cycle in which a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) is fueled with mixtures of plutonium/thorium and 233U/thorium. The used fuel is then reprocessed using the THOREX process and the actinides are recycled. The second fuel cycle examined consists of conventional light water reactors (LWR) whose fuel is reprocessed for actinides that are then fed to and recycled until consumed in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). As reprocessing of LWR fuel has already been examined, this paper will focus on the reprocessing of the scheme's fast-spectrum reactors' fuel. This study will indicate what is required to render these materials as having low utility for use in nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The methodology and key findings will be presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is actively engaged in international and domestic efforts to protect nuclear and radiological materials from theft, diversion or sabotage. This paper describes the domestic threat reduction efforts which are rapidly expanding in scope and now include: Security Assessments/Upgrades, Research Reactors, Alarm Response Training, Table Top Exercises, In-Device Delay for Cesium Chloride Irradiators, Transportation Security, and the Off-Site Source Recovery Program. This paper provides an overview of all these efforts, lessons learned, and plans for expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2004 the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The goal of GTRI's efforts is to protect nuclear and radiological materials from theft, diversion or sabotage by denying terrorists access to the means for constructing a nuclear or radiological weapon. This paper describes the Cesium Irradiator In-Device Delay (IDD) Security Enhancement program, a cooperative effort GTRI is leading in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and major irradiator manufacturers, with the support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Organization of Agreement States, and the private sector. This paper will outline the credible threat posed by irradiators containing large quantities of radioactive cesium chloride, and the pilot and national implementation programs to install security enhancements on these irradiators. The paper will also review lessons learned, plans for expansion and how the IDD program is tied into GTRI's overall domestic material protection program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it must consider how it will address the 19 elements laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. Included in these elements are specific operational needs that must be addressed. The focus of this paper is the requirements for radiological environmental monitoring and low-level radioactive waste management. To operate a nuclear power program successfully, risks associated with radioactive releases must be addressed. Any radioactive releases must be surveyed and monitored to ensure compliance with national regulations, which should be based on international conventions and treaties. Waste from these plants must be kept as low as reasonably achievable to minimize impact on the environment. Therefore, a country must establish guidelines for radioactive waste management and radiological environmental monitoring to include policy, legislation, regulations, and ongoing funding of operations. Furthermore, to achieve these long-term goals, a country must build on its current operational experience and improve its capabilities in these areas. Efficiency requires that these capabilities be integrated with the safety, security, and nonproliferation elements of a country's nuclear energy program. As such, the skills gained in the measurement of radionuclides in the environment and in waste streams are applicable to those required for adequately safeguarding nuclear material. Developing excellence in management and operation of measurement and monitoring programs translates into excellence in management and operation of an appropriately safeguarded nuclear power program. This paper describes technical collaboration projects in environmental monitoring and waste management being undertaken by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under the "U.S. Department of Energy and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Arrangement for Information Exchange and Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper documents the results of 10CFR71 regulatory testing of prototypes of the new Type AF Package (Model 9979) developed for the DOE by the Savannah River Packaging Technology group of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). A description of the testing and evaluation conducted by SRNL personnel will be presented. In January of 2004, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed the elimination of specification packaging from 49 CFR 173. In accordance with the Federal Register, issued on October 1, 2004, the NRC proposal was adopted and specification packages could no longer be fabricated. In accordance with the final rulemaking, specification packagings were mandated by law to be removed from service no later than October 1, 2008. Affected by this rulemaking are specification UN1A2 containers, per DOT 49 CFR 173.417(a)(6). To maintain continuing shipments of Department of Energy (DOE) materials currently shipped in UN1A2 specification containers, the DOE directed SRNL to commence design efforts for a new Type A Fissile material packaging design. This paper presents a summary of the testing of the new Type AF Model 9979 Package. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides details of some of the advanced safeguards related capabilities that are being incorporated to the NGAM/URDM instrument that has been jointly developed by Bot Engineering and the CSSP. As has been previously presented, the NGAM has been developed for missions related to fixed and portable safeguards, Homeland Security, transportation security as well a nuclear facility I&C. While the safeguards version of the NGAM platform was intended as a replacement for the VIFM ADAM system, additional computational capability has purposely been built into the new instrument to allow it to incorporate advanced capabilities which have been desirable but have not been possible with previous safeguard equipment. Included in the discussion are the details of the advanced capabilities which include the ability to implement a radiation hardened digitally based detector and identification system, the ability to implement COTS authentication and encryption in a non PC based system and the ability to operate the NGAM in a network of data collect instruments without the need for a collect computer. Also, for completeness, this paper presents a very brief overview of the NGAM and closes with a forward looking projection of other safeguards related capabilities that are being envisioned for future implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of the U.S.-Russian Tamper Indicating Device (TID) Working Group's accelerated efforts to facilitate the modernization of TID programs at State Corporation Rosatom nuclear facilities, the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) was one of several sites selected at which to conduct a trial operation of an upgraded TID program. This paper discusses the joint Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and ECP trial operation activities in the area of material control and accounting system enhancement at ECP to ensure safeguards with respect to highly enriched uranium (HEU) handling. The 6-month trial operation involved modernized TID design development, manufacture, and implementation at the HEU-low enriched uranium (LEU) process. The TID is customized to ECP technical conditions of operation, including its application in the computer-based material control and accounting system. TID bar coding allows automation of all operations performed with TIDs, starting from its manufacture up to disposal. This paper describes the various stages and results of the TID trial operation and recommendations for application and design modification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative activities between Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) have played a significant role in the research and development of safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation technologies. JAEA is the independent administrative agency conducting comprehensive nuclear research and development in Japan, established in October 2005 after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). The achievements of the cooperative activities have been applied to the enrichment plant, reprocessing facility, MOX fabrication facility, and advanced reactors in JAEA. It was the first experience for IAEA to implement safeguards to those types of facilities in a non nuclear weapon state. These cooperative activities have contributed substantially to develop reliable and cost-effective IAEA safeguards systems. In addition, the safeguards technologies developed through these activities play an important role when the integrated safeguards is implemented to those facilities and sites. This paper provides an overview of the cooperative activities carried out for over 20 years between DOE and JAEA (JNC/JAERI). This paper also presents a comprehensive analysis of the 99 programs as they satisfied the requirements of safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation over time. Finally we suggest potential future cooperative activities between DOE and JAEA for the further enhancement of efficient and effective safeguards, transparency, and nuclear security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes a recent Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) workshop on Human Resource Development (HRD), which focused on assisting participants from emerging nuclear states develop the essential elements of a National Human Resource strategy for nuclear power. The need to develop a cadre of skilled professionals capable of implementing a nuclear power program has been singled out as a key milestone by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its 2007 Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power document. A number of countries considering nuclear energy have reiterated that HRD is a major need and priority but many have expressed concerns over assuring the long-term availability of crucial human resources, initiating the workforce planning process, and determining the key elements of developing a national strategy. This paper will describe the methodology for developing human resources presented during the NNSA workshop and present lessons learned and recommendations for future workshops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) was responsible for siting, construction and operation of a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of the nation's spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) at the planned Yucca Mountain site. OCRWM was also responsible for safely and securely transporting SNF and HLW from numerous sites to the repository. This paper provides an overview of a number of security considerations applicable to the preliminary planning process for such transportation. This paper will briefly discuss general security requirements for current DOE shipments and also reviews some of the considerations pertaining to selected transportation risk factors, as discussed by both DOE and other parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2008, the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Central Region Chapter (CRC) in conjunction with the Materials Control and Accountability Division (MC&A) and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) co-hosted the International Workshop on Gamma Spectrometry Analysis Codes for U and Pu Isotopics at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This workshop was conducted in response to needs expressed by the international safeguards community to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the codes; to ensure these codes are sustained; and to ensure updates or revisions are performed in a controlled manner. The workshop evolved from an effort conducted under a bilateral agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Under this agreement, DOE and ABACC collaborate to implement safeguards methods and techniques to support ABACC inspections at nuclear fuel cycle facilities in South America. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM are invited to participate as observers on the collaborative activities specific to these codes. All parties agreed that an international working group should be formed to provide a forum to exchange information, discuss technical developments, and validate and test the various codes. This workshop was the first recommendation conducted under the newly formed working group. The workshop was attended by approximately 100 participants, 30% of whom represented foreign countries. The participants included code developers, code suppliers, safeguards specialists, domestic and international inspectors, process operators, regulators, and program sponsors from various government agencies. The workshop provided a unique opportunity for code developers, commercial distributors, and end users to interact in a hands-on laboratory environment to develop solutions for programmatic and technical issues associated with the various codes. The workshop also provided an international forum for discussing development of an internationally accepted standard test method. This paper discusses the organization of the workshop, its goals and objectives and feedback received from the participants. The paper also describes the significance of the working group's contribution to improving codes commonly used during inspections to verify that nuclear facilities are compliant with treaty obligations that ensure nuclear fuel cycle facilities are used for peaceful purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector's efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo's paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2000, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Russian Federation signed an Agreement Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation. This agreement requires the two countries to each dispose of 34 metric tons (for a total of 68 metric tons) of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in an environmentally safe and timely manner. Before implementing this agreement in the United States, the U.S. Department of Energy (the Department) prepared two detailed environmental impact statements (EISs) evaluating the potential environmental impacts of how and where to dispose of the U.S. surplus plutonium, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. NEPA requires Federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. This paper focuses primarily on the environmental documents (including six supplement analyses) that have been prepared in support of implementing the U.S. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (the Program). The two EISs allowed the Department to select the technical disposition methods (converting the majority of the plutonium to mixed oxide fuel [MOX] fuel and immobilizing the remainder) and location of facilities needed to implement the Program (the Savannah River Site, South Carolina), and provided the basis for later supplemental NEPA evaluations for changes in Program direction. Each EIS took approximately 3 years to complete and evaluated a large number of alternatives. The NEPA process required the Department to issue draft documents for public review and hold public hearings before issuing the final documents and records of decision. The two EISs are the: (1) Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS, issued December 1996; and (2) Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS, issued November 1999. This paper also provides the current status of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Nuclear Energy System Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology has been used in several proliferation resistance nuclear reactor system design case studies to evaluate the differences in proliferation resistance of these systems. These studies, performed by a team of multi-national laboratory proliferation resistance experts, used an expert elicitation pathway assessment tool developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This paper will discuss a variety of approaches, including graphical approaches, for the display and analysis of preliminary proliferation resistance results and describe the technical difficulties associated with the analysis of the collected data. The paper concludes with recommendations for qualitative methods to display the results from the expert elicitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification was eliminated from the regulations on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 Shipping Container as its replacement. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised 9 times, adding contents to the authorization basis. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, because of the need to support foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency and a Competent Authority Certificate from the U. S. DOT. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to become fully operational on this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the third and final presentation on Sandia National Laboratories' SNM De-inventory project. On May 7, 2004, the Secretary for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) announced the National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Nuclear Materials Consolidation Initiative. This initiative was established to reinforce national security by consolidating Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from across the nuclear weapons complex. As an early adopter of this initiative, Sandia National Laboratories was directed to remove all Security Category I and II SNM from the Albuquerque, New Mexico location by the end of fiscal year 2007. Sandia identified seven discrete groups of SNM requiring removal in order to meet the objectives and establish Sandia National Laboratories as a "non-enduring" SNM site for the complex. Planning and preparations began early and continued throughout the project to solve the numerous logistical, operational and political challenges of transferring large quantities of nuclear materials from one site to another. Proper and sustainable transfers of SNM between sites present formidable challenges even under ideal circumstances. Development of transfer/ receipt agreements, safety analyses, packaging certifications, transportation and security solutions under the pressures of an aggressive schedule amplifies these challenges significantly. While many of the core processes to package, ship and dispose of materials are well-established within the DOE Complex, the unique and varied characteristics of Sandia's nuclear materials did not fit neatly within the confines of the typical transfer routines. SNM disposition requirements include material analysis, site receiving agreements, shipping container certifications, packaging hardware development/procurement, MC&A, safeguards and security requirements, safety authorization basis approvals, and nuclear criticality and radiological safety. Also, basic project management elements including task identification, scheduling, budget, staffing, stakeholder buy-in, and communication must be managed judiciously to ensure project success. This paper summarizes the Sandia National Laboratories SNM De-inventory Project and presents some lessons learned and best practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assessment of the status of physical protection systems (PPS) is important for improving physical protection of nuclear sites (NS). Rosatom strives to continually improve the regulatory and methodological documents governing organization and operation of the system of Agency monitoring of physical protection at nuclear sites. In 2008, Rosatom developed and enacted in cooperation with experts from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) a regulation addressing a "Methodology and Criteria for Assessing the Status of a PPS on the Basis of Agency Inspections and Site Self-Assessments" (hereinafter "Methodology"). This regulation is aimed at enhancing the objectivity of agency inspections as well as facilitating comparative analysis of PPS status (comparing pre and post upgrade status) during the implementation of physical protection upgrades both at a specific site and at different similar types of NS. The Methodology presents general approaches to the assessment of PPS status including: - criteria and indicators for PPS assessment - procedure for evaluating different aspects of physical protection, taking into consideration the significance of the criteria • how critical is one criteria vs. another criteria of the same level? • how important is it for the security of nuclear materials? The regulation includes specific methods of the application of the criteria for the evaluation of different aspects of physical protection (PP), as well as for the comprehensive assessment of the PPS status in the form of text, tables, diagrams and examples. The Methodology is intended to facilitate agency inspections and site self-assessments of PPS at a NS as well as evaluation of their results. This regulation was approved by Rosatom Headquarters in October 2008 and is currently used in the process of agency PP inspections. The Methodology was discussed by Rosatom PP specialists, who take part in agency inspections and site self-assessments, at a workshop in Moscow, June 2009, and was presented at the 4th MPC&A Conference in Obninsk, October 2009. This paper presents the methodology and its practical application during Rosatom agency inspections and site self-assessments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission sets forth regulations for licensees in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). To assist licensees and the public in understanding how to comply with the regulations, the NRC issues guidance documents known as regulatory guides. Regulatory guides contain acceptable methods for licensees to comply with NRC regulations. These guides only provide suggestions and do not contain any new or additional requirements beyond what is contained in 10 CFR. Regulatory guides provide guidance to licensees, applicants, and stakeholders on (1) implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, (2) techniques used by the NRC staff for evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, (3) data needed by the NRC staff for review of applications for permits or licenses, and (4) the preferred standard format and content for information submitted for NRC's approval of a specific program, license, permit, or certificate. During development, regulatory guides undergo extensive reviews by NRC staff, stakeholders, the public, and as appropriate, advisory committees to the NRC. NRC staff are currently revising all regulatory guides relating to material control and accounting (MC&A) of special nuclear material (SNM). This process will make the guides current to reflect both current technology and the current threat environment. The MC&A regulatory guides will also be consolidated into 11 guides covering all aspects of MC&A to provide licensees and the public with concise, understandable, and accurate information on complying with MC&A regulations. This paper will provide an overview of the current revision process and information on opportunities for public involvement throughout the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of the NRC organization and its activities. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was created by The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and began operations on January 19, 1975. NRC is an independent regulatory agency, led by a five member, politically-appointed commission. The agency's mission is to "protect people and the environment." The NRC mission covers three main areas; reactors, materials, and waste. The NRC is responsible for overseeing the construction and operation of civilian nuclear reactors in the United States and regulating the safe use of radioactive materials for civilian purposes. This includes medical, industrial, and academic settings and facilities that produce nuclear fuel, as well as the waste. The NRC is responsible for all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle including mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, operating power reactors, storage of spent fuel, long-term disposal of waste, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. NRC works with the U.S. Department of Energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other government and international organizations to promote the safe use of nuclear materials throughout the world. The NRC engages in extensive public outreach activities and encourages public involvement in its regulatory activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2009, the Department of Energy Office of Dismantlement and Transparency sponsored a Workshop at LLNL by entitled, " Advanced Radiation Detection Materials for Safeguards NDA". The goals of the workshop were to bring together experts on materials research, radiation detection and safeguards; to better understand the needs for new radiation detector materials for Next Generation Safeguards; and to identify the research required to introduce these new materials into commercial-off- the-shelf detectors. The Workshop was focused on materials that have not yet been implemented for gamma or neutron detectors to address challenges in safeguards. For gamma detectors, we discussed possible routes to a portable in-field gamma detector that might be employed in a Complementary Access Inspection as well as detectors that could be used to measure enrichment. Many neutron detectors were proposed as substitutes for helium-3 detectors. These new neutron detectors might be used for multiplicity counters, or to measure neutron energy or spent fuel. We discussed detector material prospects for harsh environments such as acid or salt baths, high temperatures, cold and humid environments, or high radiation fields. In this paper we will recount many of the topics of this workshop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) within the Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration, as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is investigating concepts and approaches for strengthening the application in international safeguards at gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This paper will describe current DOE-sponsored efforts at the national laboratories to evaluate (1) continuous, unattended monitoring of feed and withdrawal activities and plant accountability scales, (2) authentication of data from operator systems, (3) on-site tracking of uranium hexafluoride cylinders, and (4) nondestructive assay of process piping. The capability to efficiently analyze and evaluate the large quantities of data generated by the systems and the ability of inspectorates to use the information to drive inspection schedules and activities are also being investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear energy is an important part of the U.S. and global environmental and energy future. It has many benefits, but it does generate used nuclear fuel which contains high level nuclear waste that must be managed and disposed of in a safe, secure, proliferation resistant, and environmentally protective manner within an ethical and morally responsible timeframe. This country has been generating used nuclear fuel for over 50 years, and it is currently being generated at a rate of 2,000 tons per year with approximately 64,000 tons of fuel being temporarily stored at 121 operating and shutdown nuclear facilities in 39 states. Plans are underway to further increase used nuclear fuel generation with US nuclear energy expansion. However the Obama Administration has proposed to abandon development of the US Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) established deep geologic repository at Yucca Mountain because they believe the NWPA approach for the last 25 years has "not proven effective" and is unworkable," even though it officially states there are no safety flaws in the site. In lieu of continuing the Yucca Mountain repository, the Administration has established a Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) to recommend better options. This paper examines the history of the NWPA development and implementation over the past 30 years to gather lessons learned experiences that are useful for charting the future course of action for US used nuclear fuel management, including an examination of the critical technical/economic/social-political balances of siting used nuclear fuel management facilities, e.g. interim storage, repositories, or advanced used fuel processing facilities. In addition it will explore the recommendation options available to the BRC. The work by the BRC to develop recommendations, coupled with current DOE high level waste and used nuclear fuel program actions, are critical foundations for our societal ability to sustain our nuclear future here in the US and globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Surplus U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Disposition Program has eliminated 118 metric tons of surplus U.S. weapons-usable HEU by down-blending it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in power and research reactors in the United States and abroad. Two major projects underway to down-blend HEU for commercial power reactors are the Reliable Fuel Supply (RFS) Project and the Mixed Oxide (MOX) LEU Inventory Project. In 2007, NNSA awarded a prime contract to the team of WesDyne International and its subcontractor, Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS), to down-blend 17.4 metric tons of surplus HEU into reactor-grade LEU for use in the RFS Project. The intent of the RFS is to support U.S. Government efforts to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel supplies for qualifying entities that face a disruption in supply that cannot be corrected through normal commercial means. This project is well underway with all HEU materials delivered and down-blending over 50% complete. In 2009, NNSA competitively bid and awarded a similar contract for down-blending services of 12.1 metric tons of surplus HEU. WesDyne and NFS were also selected for this contract which is intended to provide an LEU inventory for use by utilities participating in the NNSA MOX Fuel Program in the event of a fuel supply disruption. HEU deliveries on this contract are underway with over four MTU shipped and down-blending to begin in 2011. The down-blended product is being transported to the Westinghouse facility in Columbia, South Carolina, for exchange into UF6. It is then stored until required for use under the provisions established in the respective contracts. This paper will discuss the background, materials and their preparation for shipment, down-blending approach, and progress to date on these projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being able to verify the operator's declaration in regards to technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is relevant to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in piping and ducts not declared. The possibility of combining different measurement techniques into one tool should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in a technical collaboration project involving two U.S. Department of Energy foreign partners to investigate combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems. ORNL conducted simultaneous measurements with a coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and the 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. This paper describes these measurements and their results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for internal corrosion of hermetically sealed stainless steel containers of plutonium oxide is assumed to increase dramatically when an aqueous electrolyte phase of high chloride ion concentration forms in contact with an internal container surface. This potential for liquid formation will not be uniformly distributed over the inner surface, but rather will be influenced by contact with solid phase contained material, by total moisture content, by temperature, and by the hydration and solution thermochemical properties of the various phases in the heterogeneous material. With knowledge of the amount of contained moisture, the contained quantities of certain material phases with highest affinity for moisture, and the thermal profile of the container and contents, it is possible in principle to determine whether a liquid phase can form and if so, where in the container it will occur. This paper discusses the likely moisture distribution and liquid phase formation in existing packages based on temperature measurements, thermal models, thermodynamics of known phases, and measured water partial pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criteria for stabilizing plutonium-bearing materials, detailed in DOE-STD-3013-2004, require verification that moisture content is less than 0.5 wt. percent at the time of packaging. This value limits the potential for H2 gas generation from moisture decomposition to levels that are within the design pressure of the 3013 storage container. Ongoing container surveillance and shelf-life studies have confirmed that plutonium oxide containing salt impurities and moisture can generate H2 gas inside sealed containers. The observed levels of H2 inside containers stored for five years have not approached the limiting case of complete conversion of measured moisture to H2 gas. To understand these observations, the reliability of the reported moisture content is one factor that must be considered. The moisture measuring protocols were inherently biased toward reporting higher than actual moisture content. This was recognized at the time the protocols were selected but was seen as desirable for assuring that reported values were conservative in assuring that packaging criteria were met. Other error sources such as those due to differences in the handling of the moisture analysis sample after removal from the parent batch can also be presumed to bias towards over-estimating the actual moisture content because the greater surface exposure and the relatively smaller ratio of sample mass to moisture in the glovebox atmosphere. Ongoing surveillance of containers in storage at Savannah River Site includes opening multiple containers per year and measuring the moisture on the contained material. In this paper we compare these surveillance data with the reported moisture on the materials in the same containers at the time of packaging. This comparison is used to better understand the errors and biases in both the pre-packaging and the surveillance data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear facility personnel expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against both natural and man-made threats. Historically, most attention has been placed on physical security. Recently however, the threat of cyber-related attacks has become a recognized and growing worldwide concern. Much attention has focused on the vulnerability of the electric grid and chemical industries to cyber attacks, in part, because of their use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Lessons learned from work in these sectors indicate that the cyber threat may extend to other critical infrastructures including sites where nuclear and radiological materials are now stored. In this context, this white paper presents a hypothetical scenario by which a determined adversary launches a cyber attack that compromises the physical protection system and results in a reduced security posture at such a site. The compromised security posture might then be malevolently exploited in a variety of ways. The authors conclude that the cyber threat should be carefully considered for all nuclear infrastructures, and that new facilities should be designed for cyber-resilience from the ground up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and x-ray microanalysis (XRMA) are a combination of analytical methods used for particle analysis. What is the smallest particle one can find, detect and measure? In order to get believable results and to make confident conclusions about particle characteristics and its presence in the sample one should know how accurately every measurement technique can measure a single particle contained uranium or plutonium. This paper estimates theoretically achievable detection limits of SEM (partly of XRMA) and provides numerical results where possible. The numerical results of detection limits were obtained for uranium-containing microparticles in routine laboratory conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The apparent renaissance in nuclear power has resulted in a new focus on nonproliferation measures. There is a lot of activity in development of new measurement technologies and methodologies for nonproliferation assessment. A need that is evolving in the United States is for facilities and test loops for demonstration of new technologies. In the late 1970s, the Fuel Recycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was engaged in advanced reprocessing technology development. As part of the program, the Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as a test bed for advanced technology. The IET was a full-scale demonstration facility, operable on depleted uranium, with a throughput capacity for 0.5 MtU/d. At the front end, the facility had a feed surge vessel, input accountability tank, and feed vessel for the single cycle of solvent extraction. The basic solvent extraction system was configured to use centrifugal contactors for extraction and scrub and a full-size pulsed column for strip. A surge tank received the solvent extraction product solution and fed a continuous operating thermo-syphon-type product evaporator. Product receiving and accountability vessels were available. Feed material could be prepared using a continuous rotary dissolver or by recycling the product with adjustment as new feed. Continuous operations 24/7 could be realized with full chemical recovery and solvent recycle systems in operation. The facility was fully instrumented for process control and operation, and a full solution monitoring application had been implemented for safeguards demonstrations, including actual diversion tests for sensitivity evaluation. A significant effort for online instrument development was a part of the program at the time. The fuel recycle program at Oak Ridge ended in the early 1990s, and the IET facility was mothballed. However, the equipment and systems remain and could be returned to service to support nonproliferation demonstrations. This paper discusses the status of the facility and operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coded-aperture gamma-ray imaging is a mature technology that is capable of providing accurate and quantitative images of nuclear materials. Although it is potentially of high value to the safe-guards and arms-control communities, it has yet to be fully embraced by those communities. This can be attributed to the limited choice, high cost, and low efficiency of commercial instruments, and the general unsuitability for field work of instruments made by research organizations. In this paper we present the results of a project that mates the coded-aperture-imaging approach with the latest in commercially available, position-sensitive, high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors. The instrument replaces a laboratory prototype that was suitable only for demonstrations. The original instrument, and the cart on which it is mounted to provide mobility and pointing capabilities, has a foot-print of ∼ 2/3 m by 2 m, weighs ∼100 Kg, and requires cryogen refills every few days. In contrast, the new instrument is tripod-mounted, weighs ∼30 Kg, operates with a laptop computer, and is me-chanically cooled. The instrument is being used in a program that is exploring the use of combined radiation and laser-scanner imaging. The former provides information on the presence, location, and type of nuclear materials; while the latter provides design verification information. To align the gamma-ray images with the laser-scanner data, the HPGe imager is fitted and aligned to a visible-light stereo imaging unit. This unit generates a locus of three-dimensional (3D) points that can be matched to the precise laser-scanner data. With this approach, the two instruments can be used completely independently at a facility, and yet, the data can be accurately overlaid based on the very structures that are being measured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents initial results from development of the induced-fission imaging technique, which can be used for the purpose of measuring or verifying the distribution of fissionable material in an unopened container. The technique is based on stimulating fissions in nuclear material with 14 MeV neutrons from an associated-particle deuterium-tritium (D-T) generator and counting the subsequent induced fast fission neutrons with an array of fast organic scintillation detectors. For each source neutron incident on the container, the neutron creation time and initial trajectory are known from detection of the associated alpha particle of the d + t → α + n reaction. Many induced fissions will lie along (or near) the interrogating neutron path, allowing an image of the spatial distribution of prompt induced fissions, and thereby fissionable material, to be constructed. A variety of induced-fission imaging measurements have been performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with a portable, low-dose D-T generator, including single-view radiographic measurements and three-dimensional tomographic measurements. Results from these measurements will be presented along with the neutron transmission images that have been performed simultaneously. This new capability may have applications to a number of areas in which there may be a need to confirm the presence or configuration of nuclear materials, such as nuclear material control and accountability, quality assurance, treaty confirmation, or homeland security applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Renaissance is best defined as new or renewed interest in nuclear energy as a sustainable, carbon emission free component of a nation's energy portfolio. Aside from the benefits of a 'green' alternative, the expanded use of nuclear energy has prompted the international non-proliferation community to evaluate how its expanded use can be effectively and efficiently safeguarded. One concept under the name 'Safeguards By Design' aims at the efficient use of limited safeguards resources, facilitate authorities, designer and operators to create a "Safeguard standard" and optimize financials. The International Atomic Energy Agency would work with installation designers to facilitate the implementation of safeguards throughout the design and construction phases. The international non-proliferation community has picked up the discussion and the nuclear industry is ready to contribute by evaluating if a broader, synergetic engineering approach of a holistic design concept can be developed that would consider provisions for safety and security of new nuclear facilities. Especially, a broader approach that would involve additional stakeholders and regulatory authorities can only be realized if it is supported by the designers and engineers on the industry side. The following paper will outline the background of Safeguards By Design and how the comprehensive concept of Safety, Security, and Safeguards By Design (3SBD) was developed. It will then address the expected synergies lying in a multi-user approach to instrumentation and highlight the potential advantages for day-to-day operation of installations. An overview on the expected challenges, ranging from sensitivity concerns on the operator side to fostering a safeguards culture on the designer side will follow. Finally, we will sketch an opinion on the best way for the industry to interact with the various stakeholders to initiate a 3SBD project to pave the way for effective and efficient safeguards implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mission of the United State (U.S.) Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize or, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: • Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), developing new LEU fuels, and deploying associated manufacturing capabilities needed for new LEU fuels in the U.S., • Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide, and • Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview of the GTRI Convert Program's status, the development of new high-density uranium-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) fuel, and future plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a brief update on the National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative program's to return U.S.-origin foreign research reactor fuel and Gap nuclear materials. It will discuss recent program accomplishments, initiatives, and future activities. The goal of the two programs is to recover U.S.-origin and Gap nuclear materials that could be used by terrorists to make an improvised nuclear device. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation among countries to improve the security of radioactive and nuclear assets is clearly the key to success in establishing a safer, more secure world. Over the past few years the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiatives (GTRI) program has actively engaged with many countries to identify, account for, and support enhancements to security and accounting measures for these materials. The Republic of Albania has demonstrated its willingness and desire to work closely with the United States to achieve and implement the GTRI goals for security of their assets. The GTRI program has assisted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in development on a variety of subject areas related to security of sources and nuclear materials. Albania, a Member State of the IAEA, received training and information support from the agency. The leadership of the Albanian nuclear program has changed, but the commitment of Albania to work closely with GTRI continues. The GTRI/Albania global partnership has made significant accomplishments in security and safe storage of Albania's nuclear assets. This paper describes the history of the Albanian nuclear program and the achievements of the cooperative program with GTRI that have resulted in a more secure Albania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the Obama Administration's cancellation of the Yucca Mountain Project, it is likely that spent fuel will need to be stored at reactor sites for many decades to come, where it will remain vulnerable to sabotage attacks. The Christmas Day 2009 attempted bombing of a U.S. jetliner over Detroit is a stark reminder that U.S. infrastructure remains an attractive target of international terrorism. Nuclear plant licensees and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) should be taking steps now to ensure that Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) will have robust protection against attack over the long-term. The NRC is currently undertaking a rulemaking to revise the physical protection requirements for ISFSIs, motivated in part on the results of vulnerability assessments that, according to a December 16, 2009 notice in the Federal Register, challenged "previous NRC conclusions on the ability of a malevolent act to breach shielding and/or confinement barriers and thus release radiation or radioactive material." However, the NRC's proposed approach for the rulemaking suffers from a number of flaws. Under the proposal, the NRC would not require any ISFSI licensee to protect the facility from the design basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage, and would not require ISFSIs to be targets in force-on-force exercises. Moreover, the proposal does not require that the licensee's security force be able to interdict and neutralize an adversary, provided that the projected dose at the controlled area boundary from a sabotage attack does not exceed 5 rem. Thus the need to apply a denial of access strategy at a particular ISFSI would depend on the results of calculations. However, such calculations are of dubious reliability because they have not been validated with experimental data (and the Department of Energy cancelled a program that would have provided such data). This paper will discuss the problems with the NRC's proposed approach and suggest a better path forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the personal experiences of a nuclear engineering graduate student, this paper seeks to share the benefits of, challenges of and lessons learned from working within and trying to understand nuclear public policy. These experiences come from a United States federal government internship, a nongovernmental organization workshop, and various liberal arts university courses. These lessons have been condensed into three categories to prepare a young nuclear safeguards professional to better understand public policy: (1) establish a nuclear policy foundation (2) discuss the development of critical reading skills (3) prepare for technical policy interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and the Russian Federation have been cooperating on the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) of weapons-grade special nuclear materials for over 15 years with an emphasis on physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC&A) upgrades of those materials at State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) and non-Rosatom sites. In addition to these upgrade activities the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation (NA-25), has been funding infrastructure work to enhance and strengthen nuclear infrastructure activities at the national, regional and site levels in Russia. This project work, focusing on inspections, training, education, MC&A measurements, protective force strategies, transportation security, MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM), sustainability, and civilian and military regulatory development, is primarily supported by NA-25's Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability (ONIS). Working jointly with their Russian counterparts, each respective project has achieved significant accomplishments toward the common objective of a secure Russian nuclear complex. This paper describes the integrated, systematic approaches used by ONIS and its project teams to bridge gaps and enhance Russian Federation efforts toward an effective and sustainable governmental infrastructure regulating and supporting the Russian nuclear complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and the Russian Federation have long worked together to combat growing trends in nuclear proliferation due to a common understanding of the dangers and experience in securing such materials from the hands of proliferators and eventually terrorists. Since 1996, Texas A&M University (TAMU) has led a number of academic safeguards and nonproliferation collaborations with Russian universities such as the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Obninsk Institute for Atomic Energy (IATE). These collaborations have ranged between research projects by students and staff and educational endeavors at respective institutions for increasing the number of technical safeguards experts in Russia and the U.S. The main crux of this academic collaboration focuses on students and respective faculties at the universities. This paper will discuss a plethora of various activities recently conducted between the educational institutions in both countries and a selection of future activities currently planned for the next year: student exchanges at respective universities, sharing of educational lessons and examinations, joint tours of nuclear facilities, and open dialogues between students in the fields of nuclear material safeguards and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]