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The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the second part of the paper in which it is claimed that there is exactly one semantically relevant pragmatic process, namely saturation. The author analyses Re-canati's tests for free enrichment as well as Stanley's test for saturation. It is claimed that all these tests lead to unacceptable generalizations. On the other hand, it is also claimed that minimal indexicalism avoids such generalizations because it requires a more flexible theory of language. Finally, the author outlines some methodological reasons preferring minimal indexicalism to another explanation which embraces free enrichment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]