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Copyright of Bitácora Urbano/Territorial is the property of Bitacora Urbano/Territorial and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Departamento de Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of APUNTES - Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies is the property of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Behavioral Ecology (BE) emerged as a reformulation of the principles of Sociobiology, preserving its fundamental interest in revealing the adaptive character of behavior. However, BE focuses on how the behavior of organisms is adapted to the particular characteristics of the environment in which they live, instead of trying to reveal the supposedly universal character of adaptations. Thus, a concept of adaptation from where to evaluate such relationship is required. Delimiting the very notion of adaptation constitutes a problematic task insofar as the consideration of a trait as adaptation can be defended based on the need for natural selection to have operated in the past to preserve the trait, or based on positions that exclude such temporal criterion. This paper analyzes these two ways to understand such concept and the reasons why BE choose a nonhistorical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos de Geografia: Revista Colombiana de Geografía is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Ciencias Sociales (13159518) is the property of Revista de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad del Zulia Venezuela and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Co-herencia is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper I focus on the scopes and limitations of the extended cognition's compromise with an evolutionary theory. I evaluate whether the incorporation of such theory for the explanation of cognition provides significant advantages and, if such is the case, how so. First, I consider what implies to be an extended mind and what constitute its boundaries. At this point, I refer to embedded cognition as an assumption of the aforementioned hypothesis, as well as the debate on the limits of extension. Next, I evaluate to what point this extended mind hypothesis involves a compromise with certain links between organism and environment--links dependent on an evolutionary theory--constitutive of the extended mind approach. I thus concentrate on two mains issues of the extended hypothesis: the notion of "representation" as an adaptive action, and the assumption of the term "niche" within the frame of its cognition model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ilu: Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Katharsis is the property of Institucion Universitaria de Envigado and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cuadernos de Geografia: Revista Colombiana de Geografía is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cuadernos de Geografia: Revista Colombiana de Geografía is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Should science study religion? In this paper I propose a way to understand the religious phenomena, based in its ontology, without excluding science, particularly cognitive sciences. Modularity of mind and evolutionary psychology can account for the origin of dualism and the teleology that underlies the minds that hosted religious beliefs. I will argue, from Dennett, Boyer and Dawkins naturalism, that religious phenomena is not a biological adaptation but a by-product of psychological mechanisms designed for another activities, such as the prediction of our and those of others behaviors, and the understanding of other living beings and natural phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Agora (0211-6642) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Espanola de Antropologia Americana is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper connects the biological function concept with adaptations in order to clarify the former. In this way, it is proposed that adaptations— defined in present and non-historical terms—are functional. Hence, the term function is equivalent to the concept of adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Interuniversitaria de Formación del Profesorado is the property of Asociacion Universitaria de Formacion del Profesorado (AUFOP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Adaptation is a central and widely discussed concept in modern evolutionary biology; however, it is necessary to rethink its significance given the complexity of the adaptive phenomenon, the development of biology and the emergence of new disciplinary fields in recent years. In this sense, we address the need to develop new conceptual perspectives that may provide a better understanding of this phenomenon. This paper aims to analyze the advantages of a modular approach in developing a more comprehensive notion of adaptation. A modular concept of adaptation would solve diverse kinds of problems, for example, the integration between the different levels of biological organization that are involved necessarily in every adaptive process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to posit some critical stances towards A. Rosas viewpoint, that it is possible to trace an evolutionary path linking adaptative functional characters with moral judgments emanated from our practical reason, judgments that would be unknowingly at the service of our biology. Adjustment to this theses, as well as T. Nagel's contributions to the debate, make me think that the self-referential character of our reason, that is, our capacity for self-consciousness, can liberate reason from being conceived as genetic programmed, inasmuch as it can make possible the progressive acquisition of our own biological conditionings, thus "transgressing" such "evolutionary mandates." Some cognitive capacities are explored, such as the inhibitory mechanism of impulsive conducts, which can be at the basement of our self-reflexive and moral faculties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politica y Sociedad is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Migraciones is the property of Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Instituto Universitario de Estudios sobre Migraciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)