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We present a uniform characterisation of three-valued logics by means of a bisequent calculus (BSC). It is a generalised form of a sequent calculus (SC) where rules operate on the ordered pairs of ordinary sequents. BSC may be treated as the weakest kind of system in the rich family of generalised SC operating on items being some collections of ordinary sequents, like hypersequent and nested sequent calculi. It seems that for many non-classical logics, including some many-valued, paraconsistent and modal logics, the reasonably modest generalisation of standard SC offered by BSC is sufficient. In this paper, we examine a variety of three-valued logics and show how they can be formalised in the framework of BSC. We present a constructive syntactic proof that these systems are cut-free, satisfy the subformula property, and allow one to prove the interpolation theorem in many cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a generalization of logical expressivism. It is shown that, in the wide sense defined here, the expressivist approach is neutral with respect to different theories of inference and offers a natural framework for understanding logical forms and their function. An expressivist strategy for explaining the development of logical forms is then applied to the analysis of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Gentzen’s sequent calculus and Belnap’s display logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, leading to the definition of a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present a calculus of paraconsistent logic. We propose an axiomatisation and a semantics for the calculus, and prove sev- eral important meta-theorems. The calculus, denoted as CB¹, is an exten- sion of systems PI, Cmin and B¹, and a proper subsystem of Sette's calculus P1. We also investigate the generalization of CB1 to the hierarchy of related calculi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at how the idea of pointless topology itself evolved during its pre-localic phase by analyzing the definitions of the concept of topological space of Menger and Nöbeling. Menger put forward a topology of lumps in order to generalize the definition of the real line. As to Nöbeling, he developed an abstract theory of posets so that a topological space becomes a particular case of topological poset. The analysis emphasizes two points. First, Menger's geometrical perspective was superseded by an algebraic one, a lattice-theoretical one to be precise. Second, Menger's bottom-up approach was replaced by a top-down one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a productive and suggestive approach in philosophical logic based on the idea of generalized truth values. This idea, which stems essentially from the pioneering works by J.M. Dunn, N. Belnap, and which has recently been developed further by Y. Shramko and H. Wansing, is closely connected to the power-setting formation on the base of some initial truth values. Having a set of generalized truth values, one can introduce fundamental logical notions, more specifically, the ones of logical operations and logical entailment. This can be done in two different ways. According to the first one, advanced by M. Dunn, N. Belnap, Y. Shramko and H. Wansing, one defines on the given set of generalized truth values a specific ordering relation (or even several such relations) called the logical order(s), and then interprets logical connectives as well as the entailment relation(s) via this ordering(s). In particular, the negation connective is determined then by the inversion of the logical order. But there is also another method grounded on the notion of a quasi-field of sets, considered by Bialynicki-Birula and Rasiowa. The key point of this approach consists in defining an operation of quasi-complement via the very specific function g and then interpreting entailment just through the relation of set-inclusion between generalized truth values. In this paper, we will give a constructive proof of the claim that, for any finite set V with cardinality greater or equal 2, there exists a representation of a quasi-field of sets ⟨P(V ), ∪, ∩, -⟩ isomorphic to de Morgan lattice. In particular, it means that we offer a special procedure, which allows to make our negation de Morgan and our logic relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]