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In this paper, I offer an intellectual-historical reading of Foucault's unpublished master's thesis. In contrast with other recent scholarship on the pre-1961 period of Foucault's career, the purpose of this paper is to grapple with the philosophical content of this thesis on its own terms, distinguishing it as far as possible from his mature work. This allows forgotten concepts to re-emerge in the course of reading the text and for a novel engagement with such neglected facets of Foucault's oeuvre. Indeed, the key concept which I argue emerges from Foucault's early thesis is that of language as the être-la of thought. By closely following Foucault's Husserlian reading of Hegel, and his response to Eugen Fink's paradoxes of phenomenology, it is possible to see how Foucault briefly lands upon a novel kind of scepticism about the reality of history and minds. In the same way, I will also show why Foucault was unable to fully develop or commit to these sceptical positions during this part of his career. The article concludes by briefly suggesting contrasts between my reading of this early text and the way Foucault's oeuvre is more generally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way in which Foucault confronts Husserl helps to highlight the instance that drives Foucauldian research and its current legacy. Foucault inscribes his work through Husserl within a broader tradition, namely, that of the critical thinking that has crossed all of modernity from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment and up to phenomenology. His main legacy can be identified precisely in the way he relaunches and radicalises this tradition by intensifying its critical gaze. We will follow the steps of The Crisis of European Sciences to evoke the underlying purposes of Husserl's work, showing how his genealogical analysis of scientific knowledge, as a mix of historically determined practices, is guided by the ethical aim of self-determination. Later we will show how Foucault takes up this instance in a completely original way, and we will analyse which analogies and differences can be traced between the two authors' approaches to the problem of an individual's self-determination in his relationship with the network of knowledge-power in which he is immersed. In fact, both authors consider that there can be no emancipation and self-determination of the individual without a preliminary historical-critical retrospective on knowledge and on the ways in which its contents have been constituted. But this retrospective, which we could define generically as genealogical (genetic-phenomenological in Husserl's terms), is played out differently by the two authors and implemented by Foucault with a greater degree of radicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Der Fallbericht beschreibt die Phänodynamisch-osteopathische Behandlung eines 61-jährigen Patienten mit einem Hygrom, die ohne osteopathische Korrekturtechnik auskommt. Ziel der Behandlung war es, durch Entspannung des Nervensystems eine Sogwirkung aus dem Bereich der Gehirnventrikel zu entfalten, damit das Ödem langsam abgesaugt wird. Die Behandlung selbst bestand darin, als Patient bewusst aus der Perspektive des Behandlers und vor dem stillen Hintergrund einer im Unendlichen liegenden Idee (Husserl) und mit dem unendlichen Raum des IV. Ventrikels (Sutherland) wahrgenommen zu werden, ohne dabei eigenen Korrekturtendenzen nachzugeben. Ergebnis der mehrere Sitzungen umfassenden Behandlung: Das Hygrom bildete sich komplett zurück. Das abschließende Fazit führt Gründe auf, weshalb die Phänodynamisch-osteopathische Behandlung eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Rekonvaleszenz dieses Falls gespielt haben könnte. The case report describes the phenodynamic-osteopathic treatment of a 61-year-old patient with a hygroma without osteopathic corrective technique. The aim of the treatment was to develop a suction effect from the area of the cerebral ventricles by relaxing the nervous system so that the edema is slowly evacuated. The treatment itself consisted of being consciously perceived as a patient from the perspective of the practitioner and against the silent background of an idea lying in the infinite (Husserl) and with the infinite space of the fourth ventricle (Sutherland), without giving in to one's own corrective tendencies. The result of the treatment, which lasted several sessions, was that the hygroma completely regressed. The conclusion lists reasons why phenodynamic-osteopathic treatment may have played a significant role in the convalescence of this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article discusses the philosophical foundations of phenomenology and their relevance for research. A return to the foundations is warranted because of the popularity of phenomenology as a methodological choice in Human Resource Development (HRD). At the same time, there is concern that the groundbreaking philosophical premises of phenomenology are being lost in favor of functionalist misapplications of the method. Phenomenology offers a powerful critique of positivism and provides a way of inquiring into central qualities of human beings and of being human in this world. It focuses on core dimensions of lived experience beneath the surface of everyday life and proposes an approach to deeper understanding and insight. As a research method, phenomenology is grounded in profound and complex philosophical thought. Researchers adopting phenomenology are well advised to move beyond method-focused textbooks and engage with the movement's primary literature, especially the writing of its founders, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this investigation, neopragmatism is not something entirely different from classic pragmatism, but it only turns to new aspects that were not previously considered by pragmatism. Neopragmatism places a supplementary accent on language, meaning and experience - lived and sensed experience. The human being is a complete, tridimensional, semiotic animal, presenting the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions. At the same time the person unveils along the same co-ordinates. This conception about the human being is specific for both neopragmatism and personalism. In this respect, the common ground between phenomenology and pragmatism (I address several similarities between Husserl and Peirce) is relevant for a discussion of personalism. The person is the human being of expression and meaning (Ernst Cassirer and Lucian Blaga), who is different from the 'individual'in several important aspects, although the person is subject to rights and inherent dignity as is the individual, when conceived in political philosophy. I find a particularly interesting aspect in relating neopragmatism and personalism: The person is always a surprising, paradoxical and active participant in an ontological circle of actualisation and becoming which renders any philosophical discussion of 'new'asked personality, post personalism, deeply related to human expressivity, actualisation and becoming, is defined by the idea of authenticity behind the mask, unveiled in expressivity, in artworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Agora (0211-6642) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I examine the philosophical assumptions subtending the newly emerging concept of the smallest possible chunk of discrete space — Planck length, employing the method of historical analysis, hermeneutics, and phenomenological investigation.With the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding Planck length revealed, I attempt a discussion of the philosophical implications of the discrete space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy is the property of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Mass Communication Research is the property of Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Xinwenxue Yanjiusuo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is a response to a polemical study by A. Novák, who, based on the recently published volumes of Heidegger's posthumous work (GA, Vol. 82, 94), presents Heidegger as a critic of phenomenology and of himself. At the same time, Heidegger denied the existence of phenomenology as a doctrine and also distanced himself from the book Being and Time in order to turn to the "history of being". Author of the response argues that Heidegger's reading of Husserl is selective, that in philosophy, and thus in phenomenology, method is inseparable from the system and that phenomenology is present also in Heidegger after the turn. Heidegger not only did not stop with his phenomenological inquiry, but his entire "post-turn" philosophy seems to be the realization of Husserl's project of noematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy is the property of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts "institution" and "transcendence", there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts "institution" and "transcendence", there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper follows the personalist current in Stuart Hampshire's philosophy. Hampshire defends the person conceived as an indisociable whole. Accordingly, he opposes Cartesian dualism, while maintaining that monadism does not entail determinism. Adopting an intentionalist position, he argues that there is a continuum between embodiment, situatedness within the world, environment, and intentional action. Scientific thinking, being based on external observations, is incapable of perceiving this whole picture, whereas person-centred philosophical enquiry both expresses and demonstrates freedom of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy is the property of Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In his introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”, Derrida makes several claims for the superiority of Husserl’s philosophy over Kant’s. The main claim of superiority is Husserl’s grounding of transcendental historicity and transcendental intersubjectivity in concrete experience. For Kant, Derrida points out, the truth of geometry is already constituted, and thus must be extrinsic to all history. But for Husserl, every ‘objectivity’ has a history, including geometrical objectivities, and these objectivities did not pre-exist the originary intuitive act. I will explore these claims, as they reach into the heart of issues concerning time and temporality. First, I will consider Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl, and argue that there is an unclarity or a contradiction in Husserl’s treatment of the temporality of ideal objects, which arises from his avoidance of the issue of whether ideal objects pre-exist their first intuiting. Derrida interprets Husserl as if Husserl had indeed dealt with this issue, thus avoiding the same issue in turn. I will examine the arguments in support of Derrida’s interpretation, but will provide reasons for rejecting each argument. Then I consider various ways of resolving the ambiguity, and will conclude by looking at the implications of Derrida’s avoidance of this issue for the project of deconstruction in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The present article deals with the tension between so-called objective values that somehow originate from valuable objects, and the subjective values, which have their source in a loving subject who gives certain objects their particular value through his or her loving act that is directed toward the said objects. The latter values are important for introducing individuality into the discipline of ethics, which is an objective science. These issues emerged in Husserl's later writings on ethics where he considers it possible, in some way, to regard the individuality of the agent as a source of normativity without, as a result, 'dissolving' ethics into a catalogue of individual experiences. The article endeavours to present the main elements of Husserl's view on the possibility of taking an agent's individuality into account in explaining his moral ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The students’ internal need for proof is at the crux of their learning mathematics. In this essay, we present a multi-faceted reading of the historical genesis of proof in ancient Greece, including socio-cultural, economic and epistemological aspects. We argue that by re-visiting this reading through Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology a didactical framework that fosters the students’ fully-fledged need for proof may be built. Importantly, we posit that, in contrast with existing approaches, this framework allows for the students’ developing internal need for organising the corpus of mathematical knowledge within a deductively derived structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our article seeks to demonstrate that Husserl's approach to intersubjectivity in his First Investigation of 1901/1913 was rigorous rather than rash. To do so, it applies a combination of intentionality and whole-part logic that has been overlooked in Husserl study. It therefore starts from Husserl's Prolegomena of 1901 to follow his normative phenomenology until it excludes knowledge of another's consciousness, then unpacks how he does so by his "proofs" in his 1913 Third Investigation (also considering his 1901 version), to apply those results to his First Investigation. The outcomes might demonstrate an unexpected rigour in Husserl's early address to intersubjectivity, and even support a novel logic that considers alterity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Zusammenfassung Die objektivierende Naturwissenschaft arbeitet in der Regel nach einer Methode, die der französische Philosoph René Descartes in seiner „Prima Philosophia” skizzierte. Auf der Suche nach einer unteilbaren geistigen Dimension, die jeglicher Wissenschaft zugrunde liegen sollte, führte seine Methode immer deutlicher in einen Dualismus. Diese Trennung ist mittlerweile immer stärker auch im Bewusstsein und in der Einstellung des Menschen zur Gesundheit zu finden. Der Philosoph Edmund Husserl wies in seiner cartesianischen Meditation auf den gravierenden Fehler hin, die unteilbare Transzendenz als logische Grundlage der Wissenschaft zu übergehen. In der Biodynamik gilt diese Transzendenz als Erscheinungsform der Stille als Grundlage der Behandlung. Subjektive Patientenberichte zeugen von den Erfahrungen der Einheit und von subjektiv orientierten Behandlungserfolgen. René Descartes is the founder of modern science. Although he was looking for an indivisible fundament of science, it was his philosophy, which led into a strong dualism hardly to overcome. This division is already part of human mind and influences his attitude to health. The philosopher Edmund Husserl indicated the problem to eliminate indivisible transcendency as logical fundament for science. Biodynamics tries to base its work on silence, which is transcendency. Patients speak about their subjective experiences with this form of treatment, which brings them into a living unity with health and relief from their symptoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper I analyze some important contemporary criticisms of McDowell's conceptualism by Kant and Husserl scholars. Many Kant scholars have recently taken a stance against McDowell's reading of Kant in Mind and World, arguing that Kant's account involves non-conceptual content. At the same time, phenomenologists such as Dreyfus [2013] have drawn on first person descriptions of skillful coping to support non-conceptual content, while Hopp [2010, 2011] bases himself on Husserl's early theory of fulfillment in Logical Investigations to reject conceptualism. I will show for each of these Kantian and phenomenological theories that although they point to something significant, they fail to trouble McDowell's conceptualism. I then turn to Barber's [2008] and Mooney's [2010] conceptualist readings of the later Husserl. Against them, I will argue that Husserl's late phenomenology does make room for a kind of non-conceptual content inconceivable from Kant's or McDowell's viewpoint, but also that this need not contradict McDowell's conceptualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The present treatise tackles the phenomenon of boredom by first providing reasons for evading the dualistic approach to the phenomenon addressed. Based on the Cartesian criticism of the oversimplified dualist approach of neuroscience, the paper delves into the phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of boredom, as could be only indirectly surmised from Husserl's (basically Cartesian) transcendental phenomenology of time consciousness. The next chapter deals with Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as implicated in his compelling and as of yet unsurpassed analysis of the phenomenon of boredom. Through approaching the phenomenon of boredom via Husserl and Heidegger, the basic discontinuity between Husserl's transcendental and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology comes clearly to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Kantian philosophy attempts to rise above the traditional controversy between idealism and realism by distinguishing phenomenon from "thing-in-itself", and identifies its unique philosophical position with "transcendental idealism". However, Kant himself refuted the traditional realism and idealism, and called them "dogmatism". After making a transcendental turn, Husserl explicitly identified his transcendental phenomenology with Kant's "transcendental idealism", but at the same time he also dismissed the Kantian philosophy as "dogmatism". From Husserl's perspective, phenomenological idealism has nothing to do with the key issues between traditional idealism and realism, and it is simply not affected by their mutual controversy. In this regard, the fundamental differences between Husserl's phenomenology and the Kantian philosophy on the issues concerning world, transcendental ego and a priori existence highlight the marvelous philosophical position of phenomenological idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of "perspective of time" of consciousness discovered by Husserl and the theory of "center of relations" put forward by him demonstrate the undoubted being of "I". The method of categorical intuition and the thinking way from the phenomenology of time let Husserl not only "grasp" "I" and therefore distinguish "I" from the stream of consciousness, intentional objects, objectified "I", body and acts of consciousness, but also shed phenomenological insights onto the problem of the development of "I" and its division into three phases as "primary I", "I" and "we". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Athena: Filosofijos studijos is the property of Lithuanian Culture Research Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In mathematics education, there is a continuing debate about the nature of mathematics, which some claim to be an objective science, whereas others note its socially and individually constructed nature. From a strict cultural-historical perspective, the objective and subjective sides of mathematics are but manifestations of a higher-order phenomenon that may be summarized by the aphorism that mind is in society to the extent that society is in the mind. In this study, we show, drawing on exemplifying materials from a second-grade unit on three-dimensional geometry, how mathematics manifests itself both as objective science all the while being subjectively produced. A particular three-turn interactional sequence comes to play a central role. We conclude by re-assigning a positive role to a much-maligned sequentially ordered conversational routine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to provide a close reading analysis of Derrida"s critique of Husserl's approach to philosophy of sings and language. Its focus is on Derrida's Speech and Phenomena and Form and Meaning, trying to disclose the main line of his argument against HusserFs attempt to separate the indicative and expressive functions of language sings, as well as to think language as a nonproductive medium of expressing the pre-linguistic sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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