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In this paper a distinction is made between the concept of social power and the more basic concept of power. Because the more basic concept is not a social or sociological notion, it is analysed with the tools of action theory. In light of this analysis the concept of social power can be seen in a new and revealing light. Additionally, a special version of social power comes into view. I dub this phaenomenon ‘meta-power’.

This paper discusses the claim found in several existentialist philosophers according to which agents are identical with their actions. First, I clarify the claim by pointing to some possible misunderstandings. Secondly, some consequences of this claim are spelled out which are important not only for existentialism but for contemporary theory of action. This discussion brings to light a severe inconsistency in the existentialist project. I argue that the claim can nevertheless serve as a starting point for an independent theory of action.

After a short survey of some discussions in modern action theory and in the theory of explanation an alternative account of reasons for action is presented and explained. According to this alternative, not mental states of the agent but non-mental facts constitute reasons for action. Some ramifications of this view are discussed with special regard to the question of how to overcome the established dichotomy of subjective and objective rationality.