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The proliferation of concerns over the transparency, accountability, and democracy of international organizations has contributed to an increase in accountability mechanisms to hold global governors to account, by both state and non-state actors. Much of the scholarly focus on this subject has been on how levers of accountability can improve global governance for Member States and actors seeking to improve decision-making, and thus outputs. This article instead examines how individuals and communities, or neglected publics, are using accountability mechanisms designed to provide them with recourse for environmental and social harm. It probes the use of the grievance mechanisms for the multilateral development banks to examine what kinds of actors use them (e.g. international nongovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or project-affected people [PAP]) and to what effect. To explore these questions, we analyze 500 complaints submitted to the grievance mechanisms of the World Bank Group; the Asian, African, and Inter-American Development Banks; and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The results demonstrate that claims for recourse come from a range of primarily local actors, but that PAP in developing countries will more often achieve positive outcomes from the grievance mechanism process if they receive assistance from international and national nongovernmental organizations. These findings therefore demonstrate that transnational activists can fulfill a facilitating role as "accountability enablers" and that domestic representatives are especially effective in problem-solving processes, while international representatives are especially effective in compliance processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In a landmark decision in February 2019, the US Supreme Court delivered judgment in Jam et al v International Finance Corp (IFC), riding that this international financial institution, a member o f the World Bank Group, did not enjoy absolute immunity as argued by the World Bank. The implications o f this ruling go beyond the issue o f immunity or the existence (or lack thereof) o f a procedural bar in claims against the IFC before US courts. It arguably marks a critical moment in the manner in which financial institutions may be dealing with complaints alledging environmental and human rights abuses. The present analysis discusses the ruling and its possible implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each multilateral development bank (hereinafter "MDB") has its own procurement policy regulating procurement in projects financed by it. This article aims to investigate those key institutional arrangements, in and out of an MDB procurement policy, that tend to impact the core procurement principles and standards in the policy. The topics addressed in this article are the impact of the non-resident Board system of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (hereinafter "AIIB") on procurement, compared with the executive Board of the traditional MDBs; the role of trust funds in MDB-financed procurement; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as private entities in MDB-funded procurement; the choice of alternative procurement arrangements; and procurement-related complaints and disputes. The methods of investigating these issues include references to the law and practice of the World Bank, other MDBs, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article not only describes what these methods are regarding these issues, but also suggests what should be done to optimize MDB procurement results. There is a special focus on the procurement law of the China-led AIIB throughout the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An objective common to all BRICS countries is to reform the governance structure of the Bretton Woods financial institutions but the delaying tactics of its founding members contributed to the birth of the NDB. Since the BRICS ' entity apparently has no clear legal basis and its financial flagship is only at its infant stage, whether it could develop into a powerful international political body and compete with the IMF and other multilateral development banks is too early to predict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Quantitative dataset to track development finance in the global power sector. • Chinese Developmental Institutions largest public finance provider. • Expansion patterns differ from traditional Multilateral Development Banks. • Technology portfolio dominated by coal plants, albeit cleaner coal over time. • Coal finance driven by set of drivers and enablers on demand and supply side. Public developmental institutions are pivotal in shaping the contours of the electricity sector of the developing world and its associated greenhouse gas emissions pathways. However, we have a fragmented and incomplete picture of the evolution of their investments over time and space. This is particularly the case for the recent rise of various Chinese Developmental Institutions (CDIs) for which infrastructure investment estimates range in the trillions under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and for which data is mostly not publicly disclosed. We address this gap in two ways: first, we compile and analyze a novel dataset that draws on commercial data tracking, publicly available datasets, and more than 1,000 supporting documents to match financial transactions by the main CDIs and traditional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to power plant projects worldwide. This allows us to conduct a quantitative, comparative analysis of the role of CDIs and MDBs to understand the relative size, technology, and country focus of such investments in the period 1999–2020. Second, we complement the quantitative dataset with 39 expert interviews to shed light on the drivers behind the Chinese investments, with a particular focus on coal projects. The analysis shows that CDIs have rapidly emerged as the largest public finance provider for the electricity sector in the developing world. We also find that, in contrast with the increasingly green BRI rhetoric, the technology portfolio of CDI investments in power plants is still heavily dominated by coal plants. Over time, however, CDIs have increasingly supported more efficient coal plants and increased the share of their portfolio supporting non-hydro renewables and supported a growing number of projects jointly with MDBs. Steering China's bilateral coal finance flows through international efforts into a more sustainable direction to meet climate goals will require careful consideration of a set of drivers and enablers of the involvement of CDIs and recipient countries in coal projects, which we discuss, as well as of the role of other finance providers, including traditional MDBs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper adopts a vulnerability perspective to look into some of the key developmental issues that have been raised in discussions following the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. We contend that country vulnerability, defined as probability of shocks ×(exposure − resilience), matters for future growth and poverty reduction. However, different ways of dealing with vulnerability all have specific advantages as well as downsides. First, coping with the aftermath of shocks can be painful and is inherently backward-looking. Second, prevention by reducing exposure is typically a long-term process. Third, increasing resilience through self-insurance often carries high opportunity costs. And fourth, market insurance and hedging may be politically sensitive and is largely unavailable to countries that need it most. Hence we argue for a multi-layered ‘therapy’, combining different approaches with attention to the short and long term, mindful of country specifics and with roles to play for both developing countries themselves and international actors. A tentative exploration of how vulnerability has been dealt with before and during the crisis suggests that, in some areas, important progress has been made. Nevertheless, and particularly for low-income countries, there is still a long way to go. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Brazil, Financial markets, Foreign investment, International development, Loans, Multilateral development banks. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses recent developments concerning Brazilian trade laws, as of January 2016, and informs that Brazilian Development Bank has signed an accord with several financial institutions including Russian Vnesheconombank, India's Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank (CDB).