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Harm-centric accounts of judgments of moral wrongdoing argue that moral judgments are fundamentally based on appraisals of harm. However, past research has failed to operationally discriminate harm appraisals from appraisals related to injustice. Four studies carefully discriminated harm qua pain/suffering from injustice, alongside appraisals related to impurity, authority, and disloyalty. Appraisals of injustice outperformed appraisals of harm as independent predictors of the judged wrongness of recalled offenses (Study 1). Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 extended these findings using a diverse range of wrongful acts and two different cultural samples—the United States and Greece. In addition to the strong relevance of injustice appraisals, these latter studies uncovered substantial contributions of impurity and authority appraisals. The results inform debates on moral pluralism and the foundations of moral cognition.

ABSTRACTRecent research has suggested that humans have a robust tendency to default to teleological (i.e., purpose-based) explanations of natural phenomena. However, because samples have previously been heavily drawn from Western cultures, it is unclear whether this is a universal cognitive bias or whether prior findings are a product of Western philosophical and theological traditions. We evaluated these possibilities by administering a speeded judgment task to adults in China – a country that underwent nearly 40 years of institutionally enforced atheism in the Maoist era and which has markedly different cultural beliefs than those found in Western societies. Results indicated that Chinese adults, like Western adults, have a propensity to favor scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations under processing constraints. However, results also yielded suggestive evidence that Chinese culture may attenuate baseline tendencies to be teleological. Overall, this study provides the strongest evidence to date of the cross-cultural robustness of a teleological explanatory bias.