Search

There is a common assumption that the promotion of democracy and economic development are the most effective means of quelling widespread political unrest within a country. Many believe that free and fair elections, health care, education, and employment will help secure the hearts and minds of citizens. By contrast, the violation of human rights and international law is presumed to be counterproductive, engendering political protest and violent rebellion.When Bad States Win challenges the belief that democratic institutions and economic growth are effectual tools in countering insurgencies. Jeffrey Treistman uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the conditions in which governments have violated human rights and attacked civilians to effectively suppress political dissent. His research suggests that moderate levels of violence against civilians tend to backfire and only provoke widespread resentments that lead to the overthrow of a central government; however, when pursued to extremes, brutal repression and indiscriminate violence against civilians can effectively defeat a rebellion. As a result, bad states may sometimes win.As the number of democratic states in the world continues to decline, violence and authoritarian rule are on the rise. A thought-provoking and timely analysis, When Bad States Win offers important insight into how democratic states can respond to human rights violations in regions in crisis.

This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare.Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements.This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency: Find, Fix, Fight focuses on how to understand the relationship between the use of force and the outcomes of such use. Specifically, there is debate as to how to evaluate counterinsurgency conflicts, and what prescriptions flow from that evaluation. The Neo-Classicist school emphasises prescriptions which are either directly from, or inspired by, Cold War counterinsurgency efforts undertaken by anti-communist states. The Revisionist school focuses on how best to evaluate the political dimensions of such conflicts. This book finds that a third approach, Reflective-Action, is best as it combines Neo-Classicism's strength of issuing practical prescriptions with Revisionism's strength for conceptually evaluating counterinsurgency conflicts. This conceptual debate is exposited in three cases. They are the British counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, American counterinsurgency in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Coalition counterinsurgency in Iraq during the 2000s.

This will be a case study of the little known Fetterman Massacre of 1866. It will look the situation at the time, possible causes, key players, the massacre itself and the aftermath. Similarities to the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be noted where applicable throughout this paper. A case will be proposed that the Army was ill prepared for the Indian Wars of the latter 19th Century, just as they were initially ill prepared for an extended Afghanistan Insurgency Campaign. Connections are drawn showing that there were lessons learned in 1866 that are still appropriate today. Familiarity with them, along with other more recent examples, will better prepare the Army to fight counterinsurgencies in the future.

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires, constraints and limitations on indirect fires, the counterinsurgency effort's force organization, and the conversion cost of non-standard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain a pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and it's influence on these imperative fundamentals.

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today.Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

'Soft'Counterinsurgency reviews the promises and achievements of Human Terrain Teams, the small groups of social scientists that were eventually embedded in every combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States'limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author's experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile's views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama's ‘surge'in Afghanistan can't work.... And, if Afghanistan doesn't turn around soon, the Democrats... who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare... may find themselves wondering whether it's time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic

This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies.In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers.

The authors assess the utility and limitations of'minimalist stabilization'--small-scale interventions designed to stabilize a partner government engaged in violent conflict--and propose policy recommendations concerning when minimalist stabilization missions may be appropriate and the strategies most likely to make such interventions successful, as well as the implications for U.S. Army force structure debates and partnership strategies.

Public debate over surrogate forces and proxy warfare has been largely dormant since the end of the Cold War. The conventional wisdom has been that with the end of the U.S.- Soviet rivalry, state sources of support for proxy guerrilla, insurgent, and terrorist organizations dried up, forcing them to look to criminal activity to survive and precipitating the growth of dangerously independent and well-resourced militants, mercenaries, and warlords. But in the few years since 2001, a wide range of issues raised to prominence by wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere suggest that armed proxies, and the forces that drive and shape their use, are part of a larger dynamic. From the legacies of the wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, to the growth of privatized security and military companies, and to increased reliance on intermediaries of all kinds, these surrogate forces bear further study.Making Sense of Proxy Wars is the first book to seriously challenge Cold War assumptions about terrorism and proxy warfare, offering an alternative view of armed surrogates—whether they are private armies, indigenous militias, or unwilling victims—as complex, selfinterested actors on the international stage.

This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right—or wrong—to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.

The post-9/11 world has witnessed a rebirth of irregular and asymmetrical warfare, which, in turn, has led to an increase in conflicts between conventional armies and non-state armed groups. In their haste to respond to the threat from insurgencies, nations often fail to plan effectively not only for combat operations but also for withdrawal, which is inevitable, win or lose. In order to answer the question of how to withdraw from engagement with an insurgency, Gleis examines how insurgencies are conducted and what, if anything, is unique about an Islamist insurgency. He then proposes ways to combat these groups successfully and to disentangle one's military forces from the war once strategic objectives have been met—or once it is clear that they cannot be.Because this type of warfare is dynamic and ever-changing, this book is not meant to suggest a set of cookie-cutter solutions for how to withdraw from insurgencies. Rather, the author analyzes six counterinsurgency operations that have taken place in the past, with the intention of gleaning from them as many lessons as possible to better prepare for future withdrawals.The literature on how wars end has failed to explore irregular warfare.This much needed reexamination serves as an indispensable starting point.

A core finding of previous RAND research on 30 years of insurgencies worldwide was that a conflict's overall score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad counterinsurgency factors and practices perfectly predicted the ultimate outcome. Using the scorecard approach and an expert elicitation (Delphi) exercise, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011.

Insurgency is the most prevalent form of armed conflict and the subject of countless studies, yet the U.S. military has only recently begun to review doctrine and training in this area. An examination of approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns reveals, for example, that good COIN practices tend to'run in packs'and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.

A collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, covering the period 1978 to 2008, along with a bank of 76 factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, supplements an analysis of historical and contemporary insurgencies, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations.

Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency (COIN) first presented in prior RAND research, this volume presents an approach to the civil component of counterinsurgency that builds on detailed background, context analysis, and threat analysis to identify and develop critical civil COIN activities and illustrates them with three case studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run.

This edited volume focuses on India's experiences waging counterinsurgency campaigns since its independence in 1947. Filling a clear gap in the literature, the book traces and assess the origins, evolution and current state of India's counterinsurgency strategies and capabilities, focusing on key counterinsurgency campaigns waged by India within and outside its territory. It also analyzes the development of Indian doctrine on counterinsurgency, and locates this within the overall ebb and flow of India's defense and security policies. The central argument is that counterinsurgency has been an integral part of India's overall security policy and can thereby impart much to political and military leaders in other states. Since its emergence from British colonialism, India's defence policies have not merely sought to protect and preserve India's inherited colonial borders from threats by rival states, but have also sought to prevent and suppress secessionist movements. In countering insurgencies, the Indian state has fashioned strategies that seek to repress militarily any secessionist movement, while simultaneously forging a range of civilian administrative and institutional arrangements that attempt to address the grievances of disaffected populations. The book highlights key strategic and tactical innovations that the Indian Army and security forces made to deal with a range of insurgent movements. Simultaneously, it also examines how the civilian-military nexus enabled India's policy makers to utilize existing, and formulate novel, institutional means to address extant political grievances. India has been most successful where it has managed to use calibrated force, obtained the trust of much of the aggrieved population and made persuasive commitments to political and institutional reform. Examination of these elements of India's counterinsurgency performance can be compared to counterinsurgency doctrine developed by other countries, including the United States, and thus yield comparative policy prescriptions and recommendations that can be applied to other counterinsurgency contexts. This book will be of great interest to students of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, Indian politics, Asian Security Studies and Strategic Studies in general.

Effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. Too often, the result is a postponement of efforts to improve government and serve the population until contested territory has been cleared of insurgents. This can lead to excessive reliance on force to defeat insurgents - delaying or even preventing success. A RAND team with combined security and development expertise set out to learn how civilian counterinsurgency (civil COIN) (essential human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic development, and indigenous capacity-building) could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good. The authors propose the following to improve the security of civil COIN under fire: a concept for setting priorities among civil COIN measures; a way to allocate security forces optimally among various civil COIN activities, as well as between them and other COIN security missions (e.g., direct operations against insurgents); new, integrated concepts of operation (ICONOPS) that military and civilian leaders could employ during COIN campaigns to manage risk and produce best results for COIN as a whole; and general requirements for capabilities and corresponding investments to secure civil COIN, derived from ICONOPS.

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age argues that two intimately connected grassroots trends—the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the web—are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt new forms of counterinsurgency to new forms of social war.After the U.S. military—transformed into a lean, lethal, computerized force—faltered in Iraq after 2003, a robust insurgency arose. Counterinsurgency became a social form of war—indeed, the U.S. Army calls it'armed social work'—in which the local population was the center of gravity and public opinion at home the critical vulnerability.War 2.0 traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted irregular conflict to novel media platforms. It examines the public affairs policies of the U.S. land forces, the British Army, and the Israel Defense Forces. Then, it compares the media-related counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies with the methods devised by their irregular adversaries, showing how such organizations as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the web, not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize a following and put violent ideas into action.

After America's Iraq adventure devolved into a debacle, a chorus of commentators and analysts noted that the U.S. military had no plan to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. Given the failure of conventional tactics, America in the last two years has redoubled its efforts to develop a new strategy to fight the Iraqi insurgency, and has gone so far to place our leading counterinsurgency expert, General David Petraeus, in charge of the Iraq theater. In sum, there seems to be a growing consensus that for better or worse, counterinsurgency will be a core tactic in future American military campaigns. Iraq, of course, presents special problems to the U.S. because of the intensity of religious belief and sectarianism. How do we fight against an insurgency that so often strategically positions itself on'hallowed ground'--mosques and shrines? Yet Iraq is not unique. As the contributors to Treading on Hallowed Ground show, counterinsurgency efforts on religiously contentious terrain is a widespread phenomenon in recent times, ranging from North Africa to Central and Southeast Asia. Here, C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly have assembled an impressive group of experts to explore the most important counterinsurgency efforts in sacred spaces in our era: churches in Israel, mosques and shrines in Iraq, the Sikh Golden Temple in India, mosques and temples in Kashmir, the Krue Se Mosque in Thailand, and the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia. Taken together, the essays comprise the first comprehensive account of this increasingly pivotal component of contemporary war.

New insights for understanding and combating Al Qaeda and other contemporary security threats Wars were once fought mainly between nations—a presumption put to rest on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda showed that nonstate actors could threaten a traditional nation-state and pursue strategic objectives without conventional weaponry, thereby altering the nature of war and often rendering military firepower meaningless. National security expert Max G. Manwaring examines the emergence of nonstate actors in a geopolitical world. Manwaring invites policy makers to look past familiar insurgencies such as those in Vietnam and Iraq and consider global security problems from multiple perspectives. He concludes that the use of calculated political and psychological power may be the most effective response in many situations. The power to make war no longer rests solely in the hands of traditional governments. Manwaring analyzes the context, conduct, and outcome of today's irregular wars and applies proven methods of effective response to seven case studies: Colombia, Al Qaeda, Portugal, Uruguay, Venezuela, Italy, and Central American gangs and criminal organizations. Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime translates the cogent lessons of recent events into workable strategies for tomorrow's leaders. This book is required reading for students of national security policy and foreign-policy analysis.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price Contains a discussion of armed groups which are considered to include classic insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, police agencies, criminal organizations, war-lords, privatized military organizations, mercenaries, pirates, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, orchestrated rioters and mobs, and tribal factions. - To study armed groups use of history, political science, anthropology, sociology, theology, and economics are traditional areas of research. The book also delves into matters of ethics, technology, intelligence, education, the law, diplomacy, military science, and even mythology. - The book is divided into five sections: History and armed groups, Present context and environment, Religion and inspiration, thinking differently about armed groups, the shape of things to come. Related products: Other products produced by the United States (U.S./US) Naval War College can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/621 Defense and National Security collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/defense-national-security Counterterrorism resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/counterterrorism

As the War in Iraq continues to rage, many in the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and outside government are left to wonder if it was possible to foresee the difficulty the United States is currently having with Sunni nationalists and Islamic extremists. Recent American military experience offers significant insight into this question. With the fog of the Cold War finally lifting and clarity returning to the nature of conflict, the dominance of asymmetry in the military experience of the United States is all too evident.Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994), and Afghanistan (2001-2004) offer recent and relevant insight into successes and failures of American attempts to fight adversaries utilizing asymmetric conflict to combat the United States when it intervened in these three states. The results illustrate the difficulty of engaging adversaries unwilling to wage a conventional war and the need for improved strategic and tactical doctrine.It is easy, Lowther writes, for Americans to forget the lessons of past conflicts as the politics of the present dominate…. His purpose here is to highlight some of history's recent lessons so that we may move forward with an awareness of what experience offers.

'Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.'