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The Uruguayan town of Fray Bentos was long a classic enclave as the home of the British-based Liebig Extract of Meat Company. Today it is the site of a new pulp mill, which represents the largest investment in Uruguayan history. This investigation examines the geographical and sociological consequences of this investment, as part of a concerted effort to diversify land use within the interior of Uruguay. The study focuses on the diplomatic consequences and economic implications that are associated with this project. The operation of this mill near Fray Bentos was a significant source of diplomatic tensions between the governments of Argentina and Uruguay. However, the roots of these problems can be traced back several decades, as can the politics of Uruguayan forest development. I explore the origins of this conflict, while examining the broader implications of the forest industry in the shifting political and economic landscape of Uruguay.

This thesis consists of three essays studying the theory of bargaining and learning dynamics of matching platforms. The first essay studies the role of optimism in non-cooperative bargaining, while the second essay explores how introducing bargaining incentives affect trust building process in international relations context. The final essay considers learning incentives of matching platforms that utilize their matching technology to exploit or explore the quality of their constituents.The first essay asks a theoretic question: does exaggerated optimism benefit an agent in bargaining? The paper analyzes a two agent non-cooperative bargaining model to study if, and when, one has incentive to over-report his level of optimism. It modifies the complete information Rubinstein bargaining model to let players hold different beliefs about which player makes an offer. Defining optimism over one's perceived recognition probability, I find that an agent always ``envies" a more optimistic agent, and has incentive to play optimism as strategic posture to benefit. The second part of the chapter introduces an asymmetry of information to the game, letting an agent be of a ``more optimistic" type with some known probability. I find that the less optimistic type 1) pretends to be the more optimistic type---``play optimism"---if his probability of being more optimistic is high enough, 2) reveals his type before the more optimistic type would have settled, and 3) benefits more by playing optimism the higher the probability of extreme optimism is.The second essay studies social encounters that involve both trust building and bargaining. We show that while bargaining interferes with trust building in the sense that fully informative signaling becomes impossible, bargaining alongside trust-building actually improves welfare when initial trust is low. In contrast to the current literature, we show that actors improve welfare by building trust more slowly. Thus, windows of opportunity to build trust must be seized to prevent significant declines in expected welfare. We also characterize the evolution of stakes that lead to the best outcomes. Our analysis explains why trust building is so much more difficult than the current literature implies and illuminates the opportunities that produce the best outcomes between adversaries with something to lose.The third essay studies how platforms can utilize its pooling ability both to generate flow output and to discover good agents at the same time. In a simple model of two types in continuous time, the paper identifies an exploration-exploitation trade-off: by only matching good agents to each other, the platform may maximize flow output while sacrificing discovery of new good agents; on the other hand, by keeping an integrated pool, the platform maximizes learning rate while sacrificing the number of good matches. We find that the optimal matching policy is bang-bang from full integration--until the discovery ratio of good agents hits a certain threshold--to full segmentation thereafter to maximize flow payoffs. We also characterize how the threshold ratio responds to parameters of the model.

The recent dramatic surge in anti-Asian racial violence has exposed two under-examined, yet increasingly salient, dimensions of contemporary American politics. First, it demonstrates the persistence of old-fashioned racism against Asian Americans who have long been marginalized as “perpetual foreigners” in American society. Second, the concurrent rise of anti-Asian and anti-China sentiments amidst U.S.-China conflicts over the pandemic and other geopolitical disputes suggests that racial considerations may still play an important role in the formation and expression of mass foreign policy attitudes toward China – an Asian power that has historically been viewed through an explicitly racial lens. This three-paper dissertation focuses on anti-Asian racism in today’s American society and examines its far-reaching effects on the formation of foreign policy preferences among American and Chinese publics. The first paper introduces the theories of anti-Asian racism and proposes new measures of racialized views toward the minority group. Utilizing two original national surveys, I find that these new measures – the Asian American resentment (AAR) and model minority stereotype (MMS) scales – perform better than previous measures of racial attitudes in capturing the key constructs of Asian American racial tropes. The second paper expands the scope of inquiry by applying the new measures to predicting American foreign policy preferences toward China. Based on findings from two studies and multiple national surveys, I find that racialized views toward Asians significantly predict American mass support for hawkish China policies, sometimes even more so than conventional predictors of foreign policy preferences such as political ideology and party identification. The third paper turns the focus to the impact of anti-Asian racism on political discourses and foreign policy opinion in China. Through quantitative media analyses and a national survey experiment, I find that Chinese elites and masses have paid a great deal of attention to domestic racial violence in America and reacted with greater support for foreign policy aggression. By focusing on the foreign policy implications of domestic anti-Asian racism, the papers together highlight race and racism as important, yet largely overlooked, factors of international politics in general and contemporary U.S.-China relations in particular.

Why do some civil conflicts receive external intervention and others do not? What explains the variation in intervention type across different civil conflicts and why are some interventions more involved than others? Are some interventions more effective than others? Does intervention effectiveness vary across different types of interventions and different types of conflicts? In addressing some of these important, policy relevant questions, this dissertation project puts forth a new explanation for why there is such variation in external intervention and its effectiveness across civil conflicts: rebel group branding. In this project rebel group branding is defined as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group’s brand creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel groups motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about. This dissertation is therefore made up of three separate article projects that examine how rebel group branding affects external intervention in civil conflicts.In chapter one, this first article project argues that perceptions of a rebel group’s brand can influence whether an external intervener decides to support a rebel group in question. Drawing upon concepts from business such as brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior, this article demonstrates that different brands generate different types of intervention support. Using a multi-variate probit model to disaggregate various forms of external support and take into account the fact that different intervention types are not independent from one another, this article finds that religious rebel brands attract more committed forms of external support,whereas other rebel groups with ethnic and leftist brands attract less committed, more symbolic forms of external support. Conversely, rebel groups that do not engage in any branding behavior are the least likely to attract external support.In chapter two, this second article project then explores how the subsequent effects of external intervention on conflict outcomes can vary depending on the rebel group’s brand, showcasing the interaction effect between rebel group branding and external intervention. Using a conditional mixed process (CMP) model, this paper not only demonstrates that external military interventions are non-random, but that they have a more deleterious effect in some civil conflicts over others. In particular, rebel groups with a religious brand (as opposed to an ethnic or ideological brand or rebel groups with no brand) are not only more likely to elicit external intervention, but intervention in these conflicts is also more likely to have a negative effect on the ability of the government and rebels to come to a negotiated settlement. The article project then uses a case study of Yemen to further explore the theoretical mechanisms of interest.Finally, in chapter three, this third article project examines how rebel group branding can affect public opinion in an external state and how individual preferences for external intervention can also be manipulated by branding a rebel group in particular way. Using an original survey experiment conducted on UC Davis students, this paper finds that variation in rebel group brand awareness and brand loyalty can affect the type of interventions supported as well as the overall level of intervention support among survey respondents. In doing so, this article demonstrates that public support for external intervention is not uniform across all rebel groups and can be manipulated depending on the identity cleavage that gets emphasized.

Why do some civil conflicts receive external intervention and others do not? What explains the variation in intervention type across different civil conflicts and why are some interventions more involved than others? Are some interventions more effective than others? Does intervention effectiveness vary across different types of interventions and different types of conflicts? In addressing some of these important, policy relevant questions, this dissertation project puts forth a new explanation for why there is such variation in external intervention and its effectiveness across civil conflicts: rebel group branding. In this project rebel group branding is defined as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group’s brand creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel groups motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about. This dissertation is therefore made up of three separate article projects that examine how rebel group branding affects external intervention in civil conflicts.In chapter one, this first article project argues that perceptions of a rebel group’s brand can influence whether an external intervener decides to support a rebel group in question. Drawing upon concepts from business such as brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior, this article demonstrates that different brands generate different types of intervention support. Using a multi-variate probit model to disaggregate various forms of external support and take into account the fact that different intervention types are not independent from one another, this article finds that religious rebel brands attract more committed forms of external support,whereas other rebel groups with ethnic and leftist brands attract less committed, more symbolic forms of external support. Conversely, rebel groups that do not engage in any branding behavior are the least likely to attract external support.In chapter two, this second article project then explores how the subsequent effects of external intervention on conflict outcomes can vary depending on the rebel group’s brand, showcasing the interaction effect between rebel group branding and external intervention. Using a conditional mixed process (CMP) model, this paper not only demonstrates that external military interventions are non-random, but that they have a more deleterious effect in some civil conflicts over others. In particular, rebel groups with a religious brand (as opposed to an ethnic or ideological brand or rebel groups with no brand) are not only more likely to elicit external intervention, but intervention in these conflicts is also more likely to have a negative effect on the ability of the government and rebels to come to a negotiated settlement. The article project then uses a case study of Yemen to further explore the theoretical mechanisms of interest.Finally, in chapter three, this third article project examines how rebel group branding can affect public opinion in an external state and how individual preferences for external intervention can also be manipulated by branding a rebel group in particular way. Using an original survey experiment conducted on UC Davis students, this paper finds that variation in rebel group brand awareness and brand loyalty can affect the type of interventions supported as well as the overall level of intervention support among survey respondents. In doing so, this article demonstrates that public support for external intervention is not uniform across all rebel groups and can be manipulated depending on the identity cleavage that gets emphasized.

This paper analyses the deployment of counter-narratives on social media as part of counter violent extremism (CVE) strategies aimed at degrading Islamic State’s ability to recruit foreign fighters and inspire attacks abroad. It argues that the bulk of counter-narrative content emerges out of a small network of NGOs, think-tanks and organizations based in London which is conceptualized as a lattice. The quantity of counter-narrative content emerging from this lattice and elsewhere, whilst significant, is vastly mismatched by the scale of Islamic State content produced at their operational apex, and is frequently overestimated by policy papers and CVE reports from social media companies. Successful counter-narrative campaigns – identified by their adherence to academic communications theory and prevalence within CVE policy spheres – demonstrate the need for religious narratives in which normative Islam plays an active yet embedded role in modern societies outside of the so-called caliphate.

This dissertation examines the role that cities can play in human security with particularemphasis on urban water systems. Global environmental change and shiftinggeopolitical alliances are increasing the vulnerability of individuals and communities. Inthe absence of enforced human rights protections at international and national levels,cities have agency to ensure that urban spaces are contributing to human security,ensuring that basic needs of individuals are prioritized including water, food, andshelter, as well as medical and legal attention. However, urban water systems, as theliteral lifeblood of cities, are the focus of this research.Urban water systems across the globe are transitioning, undergoing fundamentalchange. This study first examines transition in two particular cities, in order tounderstand the conditions, barriers and opportunities of change. A human securityanalysis follows, drawing on these findings as well as that of a third city. Made up ofthree discrete papers, the first two articles are case studies in which the evolution of the urban water system as well as its current and future transitions are constructed throughparticipant observation and interviews with primary actors within each city, includingAthens, Greece and Los Angeles, U.S. In the third paper, these findings as well asresearch in Istanbul, Turkey are garnered to inform a human security analysis of urbanwater systems, especially those in the semi-arid Mediterranean climate region.While each city has a unique profile with distinct social, economic, political andenvironmental characteristics, some drivers of change are unsurprisingly sharedincluding global environmental change and aging infrastructure. Findings howeverreveal another shared vulnerability with deep human security implications: risingnumbers of urban inhabitants that are without permanent housing. And while the driversof homelessness vary across and within the cities studied, there are shared connectionsto global trends of income inequality, climate change and political instability. Analysisreveals a lack of public water in the cities of interest, a particular concern in dryMediterranean and arid climates. Recommendations are made for re-introducing publicwater into the modern city as an assertion of human security.

Classical international law has as its foundation State consent. Based on an examination of the evolution, powers of, and limits to the Security Council, the instant paper challenges this view. It begins by outlining the development of the Security Council from its inception at Dumbarton Oaks to its present form (i.e., an entity exercising executive, legislative, and judicial functions). Then, it considers the question of legality. That is, are there any endogenous (i.e., Charter based) or exogenous (i.e., international law based) limits to the powers of the Security Council? Contrary to the orthodox view on the subject, it is contended that a proper application of the law of treaties renders it clear that the Security Council, when acting in its Chapter VII capacity, is unconstrained by law—even ius cogens norms. Further support for this argument is found on the fact that no tribunal—not even the International Court of Justice—may quash, erga omnes, Security Council’s acts. The resulting portrait depicts the Security Council as a Hobbesian Leviathan—an entity holding amorphous powers, unconstrained by law, and unaccountable for its actions. Its sole telos is the maintenance of international peace and security, and it holds the power to do whatever it deems it necessary to accomplish this desideratum. The closing question, then, is what is the Security Council? Surely, it is not—nor claims to be—a State. It also does not fit the international organizations model. All international organizations—even the mighty European Union—abide by the principle of consent. That is, they exercise their powers to the extent that their member States allow it. In contrast, lies the Security Council, which is capable of binding members and non-members, State and non-State actors. Here the paper departs, once again, from convention. It argues that given these unique characteristics, the Security Council should be considered not as an organ of the United Nations but as an autonomous actor related to, but distinct from, the Organization. Lacking any other taxonomical alternatives, and based on the writings of Jean Bodin, it contends that the Security Council should be classified as a sui generis entity holding sovereign powers over matters of international peace and security. A sine qua non for this argument is a reconceptualization of sovereignty from territorial to areal. The latter being characterized by two entities (i.e., States and the Security Council) holding concurrent absolute and perpetual powers over discrete spheres. It follows from the foregoing that no longer are international obligations based solely on States’ consent as the Security Council may override it; our understanding of international law should be revised to account for this finding.

My three-article dissertation examines the consequences of variation in civil-military relations for states’ bargaining behavior when it comes to preventing and resolving domestic as well as international conflicts. State leaders must often decide between negotiating with domestic opposition groups or violently repressing them. Existing bargaining explanations of this decision-making process often assume that states are unitary actors with a singular, coherent set of interests. Breaking with this assumption, my research adopts the perspective that states’ bargaining behavior is often the product of an interplay of competing interests within the state, rather than a rational, centralized process. In my first dissertation essay, I question the dyadic nature of bargaining framework in civil conflicts literature. I contribute to answering a puzzle of why standard bargaining explanations cannot explain some states’ propensity for fighting rather than bargaining. I show that weak civilian control generates state’s preferences towards fighting rather than bargaining because of the military’s hawkish nature, which results in an increase in the likelihood of state repression in the short run and civil war onset in the long run. In the second paper, I explain why many civil conflicts have been particularly intractable in recent decades. I contend that weak civilian control of the state may reduce the likelihood of negotiations with rebel groups by constraining the ability of the government to credibly commit to peace settlements, which makes civil wars last much longer. In addition, weak civilian control limits the range of concessions that states can make to rebel groups, which increases the risk of civil war recurrence. This research contributes to the existing literature by showing the causal effect of weak civilian control of the state on the degree of commitment problems in civil wars and type of peace agreements signed to end those wars. My third dissertation essay focuses on the consequences of the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability on the likelihood of interstate conflicts. I analyze the role of weak civilian control of the state in moderating the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict behavior. Existing studies offer contradictory empirical evidence when it comes to understanding the relationship between nuclear capability and the likelihood of interstate conflicts. I contribute to the discussion by introducing civilian control of the state as a key moderating variable. I show that nuclear capability increases the likelihood of interstate conflict initiation only for countries with weak civilian control.

Background: Global health diplomacy (GHD) has the potential to advance foreign policy objectives, but how GHD impacts outcomes remains unclear. Interestingly, Brazil has started to play a larger role in foreign policy via South-South cooperation (SSC), and these activities correspond to the current thinking on GHD modalities. This dissertation will focus on Brazil’s SSC activities to understand the impacts of GHD. Objective: The primary objectives of this dissertation are: to refine the taxonomy of GHD, and to develop a framework that can be used to measure how GHD can impact trade (e.g. trade balance) and health outcomes (e.g. antiretroviral [ARV] coverage). Methods: Paper 1: We reviewed GHD, SSC and Brazil health cooperation using peer-reviewed journal articles, government documents, white papers, and non-governmental reports (2001- 2015) to refine the taxonomy of GHD and align GHD and SSC activities. Paper 2: We evaluated the impact of GHD on trade balance by comparing available data from Countries of Africa with Portuguese as their Official Language (PALOPs) and select non-PALOPs using non-parametric methods. Paper 3: We evaluated the impact of GHD on ARV coverage by comparing available data from PALOPs and select non-PALOPs using non-parametric methods, similar to Paper 2. Results: Paper 1 refines the definition of GHD and determines how Brazil’s SSC represents an expansion of GHD activities. Paper 2 identified that Brazil’s SSC with PALOP countries is associated with higher trade balance than with select non-PALOP countries. Paper 3 found that although Brazil’s SSC had an impact on trade balance, it did not translate into higher ARV coverage in the PALOP countries, compared to select non-PALOP countries. Conclusion: This dissertation defined how Brazil’s SSC is a form of GHD. These investigations also determined that Brazil’s GHD activities have led to a greater trade balance among PALOP countries but has not led to greater ARV coverage, despite this health metric being a stated goal among PALOP countries. Overall, this dissertation aligns GHD and SSC activities and goals, thus expanding the taxonomy of GHD activities and strengthens the empirical methodology that can be used to evaluate impacts of GHD.

This dissertation seeks to highlight the relationship between foreign investment, financial development, and economic institutions in developing countries. The determinants and impact of foreign investment has been of particular scholarly interest over the past two decades, with only recent focus on developing countries. The first two chapters focus on the institutional determinants (domestic and international) of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The third chapter accesses the domestic distributional consequences of foreign investment in developing countries.The first chapter focuses on the domestic institutional determinants of foreign direct investment and financial deepening. Specifically, I create an institutional quality index that addresses investors desire to know more about the institutional environment within developing countries. Building upon and expanding previous theoretical frameworks for determinants of foreign and domestic capital flows, I utilize cross-sectional empirical analysis to assess the role that institutions play in promoting financial development and foreign direct investment. I find that institutional quality has a positive and significant on both foreign direct investment and financial deepening.This second chapter examines the significance of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in promoting FDI between developing (South-South) countries. Drawing on intra-regional investment data from MENA countries, this paper initiates the examination of South-South BITs, their impact on FDI, and the theoretical channels through which changes in FDI occur. The results of my time-series cross-sectional analysis suggest that the signing of South-South BITs have a positive impact on FDI flows, but under different circumstances than North-South agreements.The final chapter considers the distributional consequences of foreign direct investment in developing countries. Specifically, I access the impact of foreign investment on the level of democracy and the level of income inequality. Additionally, I estimate the intervening impact of domestic financial development and how this interacts with FDI and the dependent variables. I find that in a sample of developing countries, FDI increases levels of democracy, as well income inequality, and that domestic financial development has an interactive effect.

This dissertation seeks to highlight the relationship between foreign investment, financial development, and economic institutions in developing countries. The determinants and impact of foreign investment has been of particular scholarly interest over the past two decades, with only recent focus on developing countries. The first two chapters focus on the institutional determinants (domestic and international) of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. The third chapter accesses the domestic distributional consequences of foreign investment in developing countries.The first chapter focuses on the domestic institutional determinants of foreign direct investment and financial deepening. Specifically, I create an institutional quality index that addresses investors desire to know more about the institutional environment within developing countries. Building upon and expanding previous theoretical frameworks for determinants of foreign and domestic capital flows, I utilize cross-sectional empirical analysis to assess the role that institutions play in promoting financial development and foreign direct investment. I find that institutional quality has a positive and significant on both foreign direct investment and financial deepening.This second chapter examines the significance of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in promoting FDI between developing (South-South) countries. Drawing on intra-regional investment data from MENA countries, this paper initiates the examination of South-South BITs, their impact on FDI, and the theoretical channels through which changes in FDI occur. The results of my time-series cross-sectional analysis suggest that the signing of South-South BITs have a positive impact on FDI flows, but under different circumstances than North-South agreements.The final chapter considers the distributional consequences of foreign direct investment in developing countries. Specifically, I access the impact of foreign investment on the level of democracy and the level of income inequality. Additionally, I estimate the intervening impact of domestic financial development and how this interacts with FDI and the dependent variables. I find that in a sample of developing countries, FDI increases levels of democracy, as well income inequality, and that domestic financial development has an interactive effect.

This paper looks at small arms transfers to non-state actors in the Syrian conflict as an under analyzed aspect of intervention in intrastate war that is both globalized and potentially destabilizing. I challenge the dominant narrative that the international community has failed to intervene in Syria, by pointing to the manifold government-funded arms transfers to opposition groups beginning in 2012. I find that there are two significant networks of arms trafficking: one through Jordan with Saudi Arabian and American support; the other through Turkey with Qatari support. These patterns and rivalries between donor countries have contributed to three processes within the transformation from revolution to civil war: militarization, increased sectarianism, and fragmentation of the opposition. I review two mechanisms of international arms control: multilateral embargoes and the recent Arms Trade Treaty. Their weaknesses, as evident in the case of Syria, are related to the problems of self-monitoring and enforcement by states that have contradictory incentives. Next, I address the related issue of surplus arms by looking at how the failure of disarmament measures in Iraq and Libya had a direct impact on arms proliferation in Syria. I conclude with a discussion of the legality of arms transfers to non-state actors and the need to focus on political rather than military solutions to globalized conflict.