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We evaluate the impact of a producer organization avocado contract farming intervention in Kenya that included (1) an agreement to sell to an avocado exporting company, (2) access to training, and (3) support to gain group‐level Global Good Agricultural Practices (GLOBALG.A.P.) certification as main activities. Using a (nonexperimental) doubly robust difference‐in‐differences design with farm‐level panel data from 2015 and 2017, we show that farmers began selling to the contracted company, were recently trained and received the GLOBALG.A.P. certification. However, the intervention's uptake was less than perfect, especially concerning the procurement aspect of the contract, suggesting widespread side selling. In terms of outcomes, contract farming nevertheless significantly improved sales prices and reported quality, increased direct sales to companies, and led to more planted trees, but also increased total production costs. The effects are driven by the Hass avocado variety, which is in higher demand in export markets and the contracted avocado variety. No significant income and other welfare effects were found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We identify factors influencing farmers' decision‐making on various production contracts and are explicitly concerned with whether managing market risk or profit orientation promotes contract farming (CF). After controlling for potential endogeneity, the IV‐Tobit regression results indicate that farmers' risk behavior and profit orientation are vital factors driving CF participation decisions. However, we observed that the impact of profit orientation is relatively more substantial than the risk management motive, suggesting that earning a higher profit, rather than managing market risks, is the primary objective of CF adoption. In addition, other factors such as farm size, mean contract price, education, age, and extension services play a significant role in CF participation. The major policy implications, based on results, call for enhancing the CF network and encouraging farmers to commercialize agriculture as it facilitates access to the market and higher profits. Further, agribusiness firms should share more market risks with farmers to invite risk‐averse smallholders into the fold of commercial farming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contractual agreements between smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies have gained in importance in many developing countries. While productivity and income effects of contracting in the small farm sector were analyzed in many previous studies, labor market and employment effects are not yet well understood. This is an important research gap, especially against the background of continued population growth and structural transformation. Here, we investigate the effects of two types of contractual agreements between large international processing companies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use, household labor allocation, and hired labor demand in Ghana's palm oil sector. We use cross‐sectional survey data and a willingness‐to‐pay approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity between farmers with and without contracts. We find that agricultural labor intensity is substantially reduced through the contracts, because contracting in Ghana is associated with the adoption of labor‐saving procedures and technologies. Simple marketing contracts lead to reallocation of the saved household labor to off‐farm employment, whereas resource‐providing contracts lead to a stronger reallocation of labor within the farming enterprise. Household labor is more affected by labor savings than hired labor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjective probabilities as well as risk and uncertainty preferences influence many farmers' decisions. Few contextualized field experiments were recently conducted to elicit farmers' risk preferences. Contextualized field experiments use nonabstract framings that are familiar to subjects. Despite adding of context can undermine internal validity, such experiments are increasingly used in applied economics. Contextualized field experiments were never used to elicit farmers' uncertainty preferences. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. This required the development of a new approach in which uncertainty preferences were estimated while controlling for farmers' subjective probabilities regarding future agricultural outcomes. The experiment involves Scottish farmers' decisions to plant traditional or new potato varieties. Monetary incentives and incentive compatible elicitation techniques, such as quadratic scoring rules and certainty equivalent multiple price lists, were used. Results from the estimation of Fechner models using maximum likelihood estimation procedures show that failure to control for subjective probabilities generates an underestimation of estimated uncertainty preferences. Farmers are more averse to uncertainty than risk, and their choices are noisier under uncertainty than risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global demand for cashew nuts continues to increase steadily. However, many African countries face difficulties in marketing and adding value to the product. Using recent survey data of 391 cashew farmers in Ghana, this paper contributes to the growing evidence on the significance of contract farming (CF) in improving the welfare of rural households in developing countries. Specifically, the paper analyzes the factors that influence cashew farmers' decisions to participate in CF, and the impact of participation on farmers' performance. We employ a recently developed switching regression model with endogenous explanatory variables and endogenous switching to control for selection bias caused by observable and unobservable factors. The empirical results show that participation in CF significantly increases labor productivity and price margins, as well as cashew yields, and net revenues. A disaggregated analysis of the sample into farm size categories reveals that small‐sized cashew farms tend to benefit more through CF, compared to medium‐ and large‐sized farms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: An important literature has established that participation in contract farming leads to higher incomes and has a number of other beneficial effects on the welfare of participating households. Yet no one has looked at the opportunity cost of and the various trade‐offs involved in participating in contract farming. I look at the relationship between participation in contract farming and income from (i) livestock, (ii) labor markets, (iii) nonfarm businesses, and (iv) agricultural sources other than livestock and contract farming and (v) unearned income. Using data from Madagascar, I find that participation in contract farming is associated with a 79% decrease in how much income per capita the average household derives from labor markets and a 47% decrease in how much income per capita it derives from nonfarm businesses, but also with a 51% increase in how much income per capita the average household derives from agricultural sources other than livestock and contract farming, possibly due to technological spillovers. Thus, even though contract farming has been shown to improve welfare in multiple ways in this context, it looks as though those gains come at the cost of an “agricultural involution” on the part of participating households, who seem to turn away from non‐agricultural activities. This has important implications for structural transformation narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an original dataset from the Vietnamese catfish sector, I analyze the impact of vertical coordination options, namely, contract farming and vertical integration, on farm performance, which is measured in terms of yields and revenue per hectare. The effects of vertical coordination are estimated using a maximum simulated likelihood estimator and a two-stage least square regression with instrumental variables to account for endogenous farm and household characteristics and selection on unobservable characteristics. The results show that vertically integrated farms have substantially higher yields and revenue per hectare than nonintegrated farms. The levels of gains that can be attributed to integration are large and consistent under different estimation procedures, and there is no difference between nonintegrated and contract farms in terms of farm performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In emerging markets for high-value food products in developing countries, processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context. We use the example of the Vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers' investment in quality-improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use, resulting in better output quality. The bonus payment generates even higher quality milk. We also find that input choice levels depend on farmers' socio-economic characteristics such as wealth, while individual risk preferences seem to be less important. Implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect supervision-conflated here into the number of visits by a technical assistant- increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrangements between a processing firm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the number of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown on a given plot by a specific grower, thereby accounting for district-, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies between 1.3 and 1.7. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Food and agricultural commodity value chains in developing and transition countries have undergone tremendous changes in the past decades. Companies and property rights have been privatized, markets liberalized, and economies integrated into global food systems. The liberalization and privatization initially caused the collapse of state-controlled vertical coordination. More recently, private vertical coordination systems have emerged and are growing rapidly as a response to consumer demand for food quality and safety on the one hand and the farms' production constraints caused by factor market imperfections. In this article we (1) demonstrate the importance of these changes, (2) discuss the implications for efficiency and equity, and (3) provide empirical evidence on the effects in several developing and transition countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the emergence and benefits of contract farming in East Java, Bali, and Lombok, Indonesia. After a general review of contract farming in these regions, three contracts, for seed corn in East Java, seed rice in Bali, and broilers in Lombok are described and analyzed using key informant interviews and household survey data. A review of the contracts suggest that there is a wide array of contract types and this is related to the technical requirements of production and the associated costs. Probit analysis is used to identify factors contributing to smallholder participation in farm contracts and a two-stage estimation process used to measure the effects of farm contracts on gross margins and labor use. Results indicate participation in contracts is influenced by farm size and other factors such as smallholder's age, education, and participation in farm groups. Contracts increased returns to capital for the seed corn and broiler contracts but not for the seed rice contract. All three contracts influenced the types of labor used; however, none of them influenced total farm employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]