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Blockchain technology has brought about profound revolutions in supply chain management. Notably, in the agricultural sector, blockchain-based traceability has become an essential tool to maintain the safety and quality of farm commodities. However, the implementation of blockchain technology in agricultural traceability is not prevalent. In this paper, mathematical modeling and simulation methods were used to investigate the decision making regarding the adoption of blockchain traceability in agriculture, which comprises producers, processors, and governments. This paper provides further analysis of the optimal blockchain-based traceability strategies of the members of the agricultural product supply chain in different scenarios. The results reveal the following: (1) Producers and processors should manage the traceability costs for adopting blockchains to improve their brand image and gain more benefits. (2) The government should encourage supply chain agents to participate in traceability by establishing an effective reward-and-punishment mechanism. In addition, the research will help agricultural supply chain agents to design strategies to implement traceability in agriculture and create a transparent and efficient data-driven agricultural products supply chain. Furthermore, these findings provide guidance to policymakers to develop policies to accelerate the implementation of blockchain-based traceability systems to guarantee fraud-free and sustainable agricultural supply chains.

There are many factors affecting the quality and safety of agricultural products in the supply chain of agricultural products. In order to ensure the quality and safety of agricultural products, suppliers and processors need to take their own quality measures to ensure the quality of agricultural products. Quality inspection departments need to strictly supervise suppliers and processors to ensure the implementation of quality measures by both parties. Within the supply chain, the decisions of these three stakeholders are affected by the initial intention, the cost of quality measures, and the penalty amount of the quality inspection department. Outside the supply chain, they are affected by government regulation and consumer feedback. This paper takes the stakeholders in the agricultural product supply chain as the object, brings suppliers, processors, and quality inspection departments into the evolutionary game model, brings the factors that affect the decision-making of these three stakeholders into the model as parameters to analyze the stability of the model in different situations, and then analyzes the factors that affect the decision-making of stakeholders through mathematical simulation according to specific examples. The results show that the enthusiasm of stakeholders to ensure the quality of agricultural products is most affected by the initial intention of each other and the cost of quality measures. At the same time, the punishment of the quality inspection department, the feedback of consumers, and the supervision of the government also play a good role in promoting quality.