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It is nowadays widely understood that undeclared work cannot be efficiently combated without a holistic view on the mechanisms underlying its existence. However, the question remains whether we possess all the pieces of the holistic puzzle. To fill the gap, in this paper, we test if the features so far known to affect the behaviour of taxpayers are sufficient to detect noncompliance with outstanding precision. This is done by training seven supervised machine learning models on the compilation of data from the 2019 Special Eurobarometer on undeclared work and relevant figures from other sources. The conducted analysis not only does attest to the completeness of our knowledge concerning the drivers of undeclared work but also paves the way for wide usage of artificial intelligence in monitoring and confronting this detrimental practice. The study, however, exposes the necessity of having at disposal considerably larger datasets compared to those currently available if successful real-world applications of machine learning are to be achieved in this field. Alongside the apparent theoretical contribution, this paper is thus also expected to be of particular importance for policymakers, whose efforts to tackle tax evasion will have to be expedited in the period after the COVID-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of magic is frequently used to discuss technology, a practice considered useful by some with others arguing that viewing technology as magic precludes a proper understanding of technology. The concept of magic is especially prominent in discussions of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). Based on an anthropological perspective, this paper juxtaposes ML technology with magic, using descriptions drawn from a project on an ML-powered system for propulsion control of cargo ships. The paper concludes that prior scholarly work on technology has failed to both define magic adequately and use research into magic. It also argues that although the distinction between ML technology and magic is important, recognition of the similarities is useful for understanding ML technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing computational power and improving deep learning methods have made computer vision technologies pervasively common in urban environments. Their applications in policing, traffic management, and documenting public spaces are increasingly common (Ridgeway 2018, Coifman et al. 1998, Sun et al. 2020). Despite the often-discussed biases in the algorithms' training and unequally borne benefits (Khosla et al. 2012), almost all applications similarly reduce urban experiences to simplistic, reductive, and mechanistic measures. There is a lack of context, depth, and specificity in these practices that enables semantic knowledge or analysis within urban contexts, especially within the context of using and occupying urban space. This paper will critique existing uses of artificial intelligence and computer vision in urban practices to propose a new framework for understanding people, action, and public space. This paper revisits Geertz's (1973) use of thick descriptions in generating interpretive theories of culture and activity and uses this lens to establish a framework to approach evaluating the varied uses of computer vision technologies that weigh meaning. By discussing cases of implemented examples of urban computer vision—from LinkNYC and Numina's urban measurements to the Detroit Police's use of DataWorks Plus's facial recognition technology—it proposes a framework for evaluating the thickness of the algorithm's conclusions against the computational method's complexity required to produce that outcome. Further, we discuss how the framework's positioning may differ (and conflict) between different users of the technology, from engineer to urban planner and policymaker, to citizen. This paper also discusses how the current use and training of deep learning algorithms and how this process limits semantic learning and proposes three potential methodologies toward gaining a more contextually specific, urban-semantic, description of urban space relevant to urbanists. This paper contributes to the critical conversations regarding the proliferation of artificial intelligence by challenging the current applications of these technologies in the urban environment by highlighting their failures within this context while also proposing an evolution of these algorithms that may ultimately make them sensitive and useful within this spatial and cultural milieu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing degrees AIs and machines, the need for implementing ethics in AIs is pressing. In this paper, we first survey current approaches to moral AIs and their inherent limitations. Then we propose the pluralist hybrid approach and show how these limitations of moral AIs can be partly alleviated by the pluralist hybrid approach. The core ethical decision-making capacity of an AI based on the pluralist hybrid approach consists of two systems. The first is a deterministic algorithm system that embraces different moral rules for making explicit moral decisions. The second is a machine learning system that accounts for calculating the value of the variables required by the application of moral principles. The pluralist hybrid system is better than the existing proposals as it better addresses the moral disagreement problem of the top-down approach by including distinct moral principles. Besides, the pluralist hybrid system reduces the opacity of ethical decision-making by implementing explicit moral principles for moral decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics stand to change many aspects of our lives, including our values. If trends continue as expected, many industries will undergo automation in the near future, calling into question whether we can still value the sense of identity and security our occupations once provided us with. Likewise, the advent of social robots driven by AI, appears to be shifting the meaning of numerous, long-standing values associated with interpersonal relationships, like friendship. Furthermore, powerful actors' and institutions' increasing reliance on AI to make decisions that may affect how people live their lives may have a significant impact on privacy while also raising issues about algorithmic transparency and human control. In this paper, building and expanding on previous works, we will look at how the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technology may lead to changes in identity, security, and other crucial values (such as friendship, fairness, and privacy). We will discuss what challenges we may face in the process, while critically reflecting on whether such changes may be desirable. Finally, drawing on a series of considerations underlying virtue ethics, we will formulate a set of preliminary suggestions, which—we hope—can be used to more carefully guide the future roll out of AI technologies for human flourishing; that is, for social and moral good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Machine learning algorithms (ML) are increasingly used to support decision-making in the exercise of public authority. Here, we argue that an important consideration has been overlooked in previous discussions: whether the use of ML undermines the democratic legitimacy of public institutions. From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, it is not enough that ML contributes to efficiency and accuracy in the exercise of public authority, which has so far been the focus in the scholarly literature engaging with these developments. According to one influential theory, exercises of administrative and judicial authority are democratically legitimate if and only if administrative and judicial decisions serve the ends of the democratic law maker, are based on reasons that align with these ends and are accessible to the public. These requirements are not satisfied by decisions determined through ML since such decisions are determined by statistical operations that are opaque in several respects. However, not all ML-based decision support systems pose the same risk, and we argue that a considered judgment on the democratic legitimacy of ML in exercises of public authority need take the complexity of the issue into account. This paper outlines considerations that help guide the assessment of whether a ML undermines democratic legitimacy when used to support public decisions. We argue that two main considerations are pertinent to such normative assessment. The first is the extent to which ML is practiced as intended and the extent to which it replaces decisions that were previously accessible and based on reasons. The second is that uses of ML in exercises of public authority should be embedded in an institutional infrastructure that secures reason giving and accessibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the pervasiveness of AI systems and their potential negative effects on people's lives (especially among already marginalised groups), it becomes imperative to comprehend what goes on when an AI system generates a result, and based on what reasons, it is achieved. There are consistent technical efforts for making systems more "explainable" by reducing their opaqueness and increasing their interpretability and explainability. In this paper, we explore an alternative non-technical approach towards explainability that complement existing ones. Leaving aside technical, statistical, or data-related issues, we focus on the very conceptual underpinnings of the design decisions made by developers and other stakeholders during the lifecycle of a machine learning project. For instance, the design and development of an app to track snoring to detect possible health risks presuppose some picture or another of "health", which is a key notion that conceptually underpins the project. We take it as a premise that these key concepts are necessarily present during design and development, albeit perhaps tacitly. We argue that by providing "justificatory explanations" about how the team understands the relevant key concepts behind its design decisions, interested parties could gain valuable insights and make better sense of the workings and outcomes of systems. Using the concept of "health", we illustrate how a particular understanding of it might influence decisions during the design and development stages of a machine learning project, and how making this explicit by incorporating it into ex-post explanations might increase the explanatory and justificatory power of these explanations. We posit that a greater conceptual awareness of the key concepts that underpin design and development decisions may be beneficial to any attempt to develop explainability methods. We recommend that "justificatory explanations" are provided as technical documentation. These are declarative statements that contain at its simplest: (1) a high-level account of the understanding of the relevant key concepts a team possess related to a project's main domain, (2) how these understandings drive decision-making during the life-cycle stages, and (3) it gives reasons (which could be implicit in the account) that the person or persons doing the explanation consider to have plausible justificatory power for the decisions that were made during the project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital cultural assets are often thought to exist in separate spheres based on their two principal points of origin: digitized and born digital. Increasingly, advances in digital curation are blurring this dichotomy, by introducing so-called "collections as data," which regardless of their origination make cultural assets more amenable to the application of new computational tools and methodologies. This paper brings together archivists, scholars, and technologists to demonstrate computational treatments of digital cultural assets using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) techniques that can help unlock hard-to-reach archival content. It describes an extended, iterative study applied to digitized and datafied WWII-era records housed at the FDR Presidential Library, rich content that is regrettably under-utilized by scholars examining American responses to the Holocaust. Authors detail the benefits of interdisciplinary collaboration for evaluating user needs, identifying and applying tools and methodologies (including ML through object detection and AI through Named Entity Recognition or NER), and reaching the real-world outcome of public access to augmented data. They also discuss issues of digital representation, relational context, and interface design to enable new modes of public and scholarly access. While based on a case study, we believe that this work is a substantial contribution to revealing the strengths and weaknesses of using AI/ML systems in cultural organizations. We give particular care to lessons learned, and generalize the approach taken across broad classes of collections with a focus on responsive iterations, reproducibility, and the relevance of data and its structures to users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focused on city-scale automation, and using self-driving cars (SDCs) as a case study, this article reflects on the role of AI—and in particular, computer vision systems used for mapping and navigation—as a catalyst for urban transformation. Urban research commonly presents AI and cities as having a one-way cause-and-effect relationship, giving undue weight to AI's impact on cities and overlooking the role of cities in shaping AI. Working at the intersection of data science and social research, this paper aims to counter this trend by exploring the reverse perspective: how do cities affect the development, and expose the present limits, of SDCs? The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by comparing urban and nonurban environments and thoroughly examining the relationship between computer vision and city-specific sociality and form, it defines machine autonomy/automation as a function of the sociotechnical milieu in which an AI system operates. Second, and related, the paper problematizes the notion of SDCs as autonomous technologies and the role it plays in envisioning contending policy arrangements and technical solutions for achieving full driving automation. Finally, the article offers insight into a materialist and spatialized understanding of AI—namely, not as an abstract quality susceptible to replication within discrete machines, but rather as a distributed property emerging through embodied interactions among a multiplicity of agents (human, non-human, and technological) within/with their environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the problem of ensuring the political stability of a democratic social system with a shortage of a vital commodity (like vaccine against COVID-19). In such a system, members of society citizens assess the authorities. Thus, actions by the authorities to increase the supply of this commodity can contribute to citizens' approval and hence political stability. However, this supply is influenced by random factors, the actions of competitors, etc. Therefore, citizens do not have sufficient information about all the possibilities of supplying, and it is difficult for them to make the right decisions. Such citizen unawareness can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians to achieve personal targets. Therefore, it is necessary to organize public control to motivate politicians to use all available opportunities in supplying. The goal of the paper is to build such a digital mechanism of public control of the politicians by citizens, which would best assess and stimulate the activities of the authorities to improve the supply of a vital commodity. In the age of artificial intelligence, such digital public control in the face of uncertainty can be based on digital machine learning. In addition, it is necessary to take into account and model the activities of politicians associated with the presence of their own targets that do not coincide with public ones. Such politicians can use the learning of citizens for their own targets. The objective of the article is to build an optimal digital mechanism of public control in a two-level model of a democratic social system—a digital society. At its top level, there is the Citizen, who gives an assessment for the Politico located at the lower level. In turn, the Politico can influence the supplying of a vital commodity. Political stability is guaranteed if the Citizen regularly approves of the Politico's actions to increase this supply. However, the Politico may not use the opportunities available to him to offer a commodity to achieve a personal target. To avoid this, the Politico's control mechanism is proposed. It includes the procedure for digital learning of the Citizen, as well as a procedure for assessing the Politico activity. Sufficient conditions have been found for the synthesis of such the Politico's control mechanism, at which stochastic possibilities of increasing the supply of a vital commodity are used. The example of such the Politico's control mechanism is considered on the case of supply of the COVID-19 vaccine in England. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current developments in fields such as quantum physics, fine arts, robotics, cognitive sciences or defense and security indicate the emergence of creative systems capable of producing new and innovative solutions through combinations of machine learning algorithms. These systems, called machine invention systems, challenge the established invention paradigm in promising the automation of – at least parts of – the innovation process. This paper's main contribution is twofold. Based on the identified state-of-the-art examples in the above mentioned fields, key components for machine invention systems and their relations are identified, creating a conceptual model as well as proposing a working definition for machine invention systems. The differences and delimitations to other concepts in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence, such as machine discovery systems are discussed as well. Furthermore, the paper briefly addresses the social and societal implications and limitations that come with the adoption of the technology. Because of their revolutionizing potential, there are widespread implications to consider from ethical and moral implications to policymaking and societal changes, like changes in the job structure. The discussion part approaches some of these implications, as well as solutions to some of the proposed challenges. The paper concludes by discussing some of the systemic benefits that can be accessed through machine invention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Certain research strands can yield "forbidden knowledge". This term refers to knowledge that is considered too sensitive, dangerous or taboo to be produced or shared. Discourses about such publication restrictions are already entrenched in scientific fields like IT security, synthetic biology or nuclear physics research. This paper makes the case for transferring this discourse to machine learning research. Some machine learning applications can very easily be misused and unfold harmful consequences, for instance, with regard to generative video or text synthesis, personality analysis, behavior manipulation, software vulnerability detection and the like. Up till now, the machine learning research community embraces the idea of open access. However, this is opposed to precautionary efforts to prevent the malicious use of machine learning applications. Information about or from such applications may, if improperly disclosed, cause harm to people, organizations or whole societies. Hence, the goal of this work is to outline deliberations on how to deal with questions concerning the dissemination of such information. It proposes a tentative ethical framework for the machine learning community on how to deal with forbidden knowledge and dual-use applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to how AI has defined itself from its beginning, thinking in non-living matter, i.e., without life, is possible. The premise of symbolic AI is that operating on representations of reality machines can understand it. When this assumption did not work as expected, the mathematical model of the neuron became the engine of artificial "brains." Connectionism followed. Currently, in the context of Machine Learning success, attempts are made at integrating the symbolic and connectionist paths. There is hope that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) performance can be achieved. As encouraging as neuro-symbolic AI seems to be, it remains unclear whether AGI is actually a moving target as long as AI itself remains ambiguously defined. This paper makes the argument that the intelligence of machines, expressed in their performance, reflects how adequate the means used for achieving it are. Therefore, energy use and the amount of data necessary qualify as a good metric for comparing natural and artificial performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we outline a new method for evaluating the human impact of machine-learning (ML) applications. In partnership with Underwriters Laboratories Inc., we have developed a framework to evaluate the impacts of a particular use of machine learning that is based on the goals and values of the domain in which that application is deployed. By examining the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in particular domains, such as journalism, criminal justice, or law, we can develop more nuanced and practically relevant understandings of key ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence. By decoupling the extraction of the facts of the matter from the evaluation of the impact of the resulting systems, we create a framework for the process of assessing impact that has two distinctly different phases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an increased focus within the AI ethics literature on questions of power, reflected in the ideal of accountability supported by many Responsible AI guidelines. While this recent debate points towards the power asymmetry between those who shape AI systems and those affected by them, the literature lacks normative grounding and misses conceptual clarity on how these power dynamics take shape. In this paper, I develop a workable conceptualization of said power dynamics according to Cristiano Castelfranchi's conceptual framework of power and argue that end-users depend on a system's developers and users, because end-users rely on these systems to satisfy their goals, constituting a power asymmetry between developers, users and end-users. I ground my analysis in the neo-republican moral wrong of domination, drawing attention to legitimacy concerns of the power-dependence relation following from the current lack of accountability mechanisms. I illustrate my claims on the basis of a risk-prediction machine learning system, and propose institutional (external auditing) and project-specific solutions (increase contestability through design-for-values approaches) to mitigate domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In popular discussions, the nuances of AI are often abridged as "the algorithm", as the specific arrangements of machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL) and automated decision-making on social media platforms are typically shrouded in proprietary secrecy punctuated by press releases and transparency initiatives. What is clear, however, is that AI embedded on social media functions to recommend content, personalize ads, aggregate news stories, and moderate problematic material. It is also increasingly apparent that individuals are concerned with the uses, implications, and fairness of algorithmic systems. Perhaps in response to concerns about "the algorithm" by individuals and governments, social media platforms utilize transparency initiatives and official statements, in part, to deflect official regulation. In the following paper, I draw from transparency initiatives and statements from representatives of Facebook and TikTok as case studies of how AI is embedded in these platforms, with attention to the promotion of AI content moderation as a solution to the circulation of problematic material and misinformation. This examination considers the complexity of embedded AI as a material-discursive apparatus, predicated on discursive techniques—what is seeable, sayable, knowable in a given time period—as well as the material arrangements—algorithms, datasets, users, platforms, infrastructures, moderators, etc. As such, the use of AI as part of the immensely popular platforms Facebook and TikTok demonstrates that AI does not exist in isolation, instead functioning as human–machine ensemble reliant on strategies of acceptance via discursive techniques and the changing material arrangements of everyday embeddedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of predictive systems has become wider with the development of related computational methods, and the evolution of the sciences in which these methods are applied Solon and Selbst (Calif L REV 104: 671–732, 2016) and Pedreschi et al. (2007). The referred methods include machine learning techniques, face and/or voice recognition, temperature mapping, and other, within the artificial intelligence domain. These techniques are being applied to solve problems in socially and politically sensitive areas such as crime prevention and justice management, crowd management, and emotion analysis, just to mention a few. However, dissimilar predictions can be found nowadays as the result of the application of these methods resulting in misclassification, for example for the case of conviction risk assessment Office of Probation and Pretrial Services (2011) or decision-making process when designing public policies Lange (2015). The goal of this paper is to identify current gaps on fairness achievement within the context of predictive systems in artificial intelligence by analyzing available academic and scientific literature up to 2020. To achieve this goal, we have gathered available materials at the Web of Science and Scopus from last 5 years and analyzed the different proposed methods and their results in relation to the bias as an emergent issue in the Artificial Intelligence field of study. Our tentative conclusions indicate that machine learning has some intrinsic limitations which are leading to automate the bias when designing predictive algorithms. Consequently, other methods should be explored; or we should redefine the way current machine learning approaches are being used when building decision making/decision support systems for crucial institutions of our political systems such as the judicial system, just to mention one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current "AI Summer" is marked by scientific breakthroughs and economic successes in the fields of research, development, and application of systems with artificial intelligence. But, aside from the great hopes and promises associated with artificial intelligence, there are a number of challenges, shortcomings and even limitations of the technology. For one, these challenges arise from methodological and epistemological misconceptions about the capabilities of artificial intelligence. Secondly, they result from restrictions of the social context in which the development of applications of machine learning is embedded. And third, they are a consequence of current technical limitations in the development and use of artificial intelligence. The paper intends to provide an overview of current challenges which the research and development of applications in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning have to face, whereas all three mentioned areas are to be further explored in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper shows how statistical learning theory and machine learning models can be used to enhance understanding of AI-related epistemological issues regarding inductive reasoning and reliability of generalisations. Towards this aim, the paper proceeds as follows. First, it expounds Price's dual image of representation in terms of the notions of e-representations and i-representations that constitute subject naturalism. For Price, this is not a strictly anti-representationalist position but rather a dualist one (e- and i-representations). Second, the paper links this debate with machine learning in terms of statistical learning theory becoming more viable epistemological tool when it abandons the perspective of object naturalism. The paper then argues that machine learning grounds a form of knowing that can be understood in terms of e- and i-representation learning. Third, this synthesis shows a way of analysing inductive reasoning in terms of reliability of generalisations stemming from a structure of e- and i-representations. In the age of Artificial Intelligence, connecting Price's dual view of representation with Deep Learning provides an epistemological way forward and even perhaps an approach to how knowing is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses two methodological paths in Artificial Intelligence: the paths of Babbage and anti-Cartesianism. While those researchers who have followed the latter have attempted to reverse the Cartesian dictum according to which machines cannot think in principle, Babbage's path, which has been partially neglected, implies that the replacement of humans—and not the creation of minds—should provide the foundation of AI. In view of the examined paths, the claim that we support here is this: in line with Babbage, AI researchers have recently concentrated upon the replacement of human labour, and thus upon the creation of Machine Learning systems. After presenting and analysing the paths, we characterise Machine Learning via its developments and an illustrative example. Then, we put forward an argument that shows that total replacement of human labour will not be feasible for practical and conceptual reasons despite the successful developments in recent AI systems. Our discussion finally leads to optimism and awareness: AI's advances allow humans to dedicate themselves to higher level tasks, but these advances also require that we be vigilant about the responsibilities granted to ML-based systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) experts are currently divided into “presentist” and “futurist” factions that call for attention to near-term and long-term AI, respectively. This paper argues that the presentist-futurist dispute is not the best focus of attention. Instead, the paper proposes a reconciliation between the two factions based on a mutual interest in AI. The paper further proposes realignment to two new factions: an “intellectualist” faction that seeks to develop AI for intellectual reasons (as found in the traditional norms of computer science) and a “societalist faction” that seeks to develop AI for the benefit of society. The paper argues in favor of societalism and offers three means of concurrently addressing societal impacts from near-term and long-term AI: (1) advancing societalist social norms, thereby increasing the portion of AI researchers who seek to benefit society; (2) technical research on how to make any AI more beneficial to society; and (3) policy to improve the societal benefits of all AI. In practice, it will often be advantageous to emphasize near-term AI due to the greater interest in near-term AI among AI and policy communities alike. However, presentist and futurist societalists alike can benefit from each others’ advocacy for attention to the societal impacts of AI. The reconciliation between the presentist and futurist factions can improve both near-term and long-term societal impacts of AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we look at the possibility of a machine having a sense of humour. In particular, we focus on actual machine utterances in Turing test discourses. In doing so, we do not consider the Turing test in depth and what this might mean for humanity, rather we merely look at cases in conversations when the output from a machine can be considered to be humorous. We link such outpourings with Turing's 'arguments from various disabilities' used against the concept of a machine being able to think, taken from his seminal work of 1950. Finally we consider the role that humour might play in adding to the deception, integral to the Turing test, that a machine in practice appears to be a human. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the gastronomy industry has increased the demand for rigorous and reliable tools to evaluate culinary creativity; but conceptually, creativity is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. In this paper, we propose an AI-based method for assessing culinary product creativity by using the renowned high cuisine restaurant elBulli as a case study to understand the proliferation and scale of an entity's creativity and innovation. To achieve so, we trained a Random Forest Classifier to assess the level of creativity within the restaurant's recipes. The application of this model to elBulli's recipes allowed us to answer the following questions: how can creativity in a culinary product be characterized? Is there a single trait that is the key to culinary creativity? Is the creative culinary product a truly original outcome? Our key findings are (1) although ingredients and preparation techniques prove to be suitable attributes to characterize creativity in a recipe, none of them nor an elite subset clearly identifies creative cuisine, (2) new products are not radically novel with respect to previous creations, (3) creativity is more related to new uses and combinations of existing ingredients and techniques rather than to new ingredients or techniques. We believe that our method can find practical applications in supporting and guiding the creation of culinary products, identifying their strengths and weaknesses, and helping restaurants maintain a sustainable competitive advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2018, as part of a research project funded by the Deviant Practice Grant, artist Bruno Moreschi and digital media researcher Gabriel Pereira worked with the Van Abbemuseum collection (Eindhoven, NL), reading their artworks through commercial image-recognition (computer vision) artificial intelligences from leading tech companies. The main takeaways were: somewhat as expected, AI is constructed through a capitalist and product-focused reading of the world (values that are embedded in this sociotechnical system); and that this process of using AI is an innovative way for doing institutional critique, as AI offers an untrained eye that reveals the inner workings of the art system through its glitches. This paper aims to regard these glitches as potentially revealing of the art system, and even poetic at times. We also look at them as a way of revealing the inherent fallibility of the commercial use of AI and machine learning to catalogue the world: it cannot comprehend other ways of knowing about the world, outside the logic of the algorithm. But, at the same time, due to their "glitchy" capacity to level and reimagine, these faulty readings can also serve as a new way of reading art; a new way for thinking critically about the art image in a moment when visual culture has changed form to hybrids of human–machine cognition and "machine-to-machine seeing". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to present some philosophical considerations about the supposed AI emergence in the future. However, the predicted timeline of this process is uncertain. To avoid any kind of speculations on the proposed analysis from a scientific point of view, a metaphysical approach is undertaken as a modal context of the discussion. I argue that modal claim about possible AI emergence at a certain point of time in the future is justified from a temporal perspective. Therefore, worldwide society must be prepared for possible AI emergence and the expected profound impact of such an event on the existential status of humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to calls for greater interdisciplinary involvement from the social sciences and humanities in the development, governance, and study of artificial intelligence systems, this paper presents one sociologist's view on the problem of algorithmic bias and the reproduction of societal bias. Discussions of bias in AI cover much of the same conceptual terrain that sociologists studying inequality have long understood using more specific terms and theories. Concerns over reproducing societal bias should be informed by an understanding of the ways that inequality is continually reproduced in society—processes that AI systems are either complicit in, or can be designed to disrupt and counter. The contrast presented here is between conservative and radical approaches to AI, with conservatism referring to dominant tendencies that reproduce and strengthen the status quo, while radical approaches work to disrupt systemic forms of inequality. The limitations of a conservative approach to racial bias are discussed through the specific example of biased criminal risk assessments and Indigenous overrepresentation in Canada's criminal justice system. This illustrates the dangers of treating racial bias as a generalizable problem and equality as a generalizable solution, emphasizing the importance of considering inequality in context. Societal issues can no longer be out of scope for AI and machine learning, given the impact of these systems on human lives. This requires engagement with a growing body of critical AI scholarship that goes beyond biased data to analyze structured ways of perpetuating inequality, opening up the possibility for interdisciplinary engagement and radical alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some recent developments in Artificial Intelligence—especially the use of machine learning systems, trained on big data sets and deployed in socially significant and ethically weighty contexts—have led to a number of calls for "transparency". This paper explores the epistemological and ethical dimensions of that concept, as well as surveying and taxonomising the variety of ways in which it has been invoked in recent discussions. Whilst "outward" forms of transparency (concerning the relationship between an AI system, its developers, users and the media) may be straightforwardly achieved, what I call "functional" transparency about the inner workings of a system is, in many cases, much harder to attain. In those situations, I argue that contestability may be a possible, acceptable, and useful alternative so that even if we cannot understand how a system came up with a particular output, we at least have the means to challenge it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the main drivers of what has been described as the "Fourth Industrial Revolution", as well as the most innovative technology developed to date. It is a pervasive transformative innovation, which needs a new approach. In 2017, the European Parliament introduced the notion of the "electronic person", which sparked huge debates in philosophical, legal, technological, and other academic settings. The issues related to AI should be examined from an interdisciplinary perspective. In this paper, we examine this legal innovation—that has been proposed by the European Parliament—from not only legal but also technological points of view. In the first section, we define AI and analyse its main characteristics. We argue that, from a technical perspective, it appears premature and probably inappropriate to introduce AI personhood now. In the second section, justifications for the European Parliament's proposals are explored in contrast with the opposing arguments that have been presented. As the existing mechanisms of liability could be insufficient in scenarios where AI systems cause harm, especially when algorithms of AI learn and evolve on their own, there is a need to depart from traditional liability theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The artificial intelligence models with machine learning that exhibit the best predictive accuracy, and therefore, the most powerful ones, are, paradoxically, those with the most opaque black-box architectures. At the same time, the unstoppable computerization of advanced industrial societies demands the use of these machines in a growing number of domains. The conjunction of both phenomena gives rise to a control problem on AI that in this paper we analyze by dividing the issue into two. First, we carry out an epistemological examination of the AI's opacity in light of the latest techniques to remedy it. And second, we evaluate the rationality of delegating tasks in opaque agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper undertakes a comparative legal study to analyze the challenges of privacy and personal data protection posed by Artificial Intelligence ("AI") embedded in Robots, and to offer policy suggestions. After identifying the benefits from various AI usages and the risks posed by AI-related technologies, I then analyze legal frameworks and relevant discussions in the EU, USA, Canada, and Japan, and further consider the efforts of Privacy by Design ("PbD") originating in Ontario, Canada. While various AI usages provide great convenience, many issues, including profiling, discriminatory decisions, lack of transparency, and impeding consent, have emerged. The unpredictability arising from the AI machine learning function poses further difficulties, which have only been partially addressed by legal frameworks in the aforementioned jurisdictions. However, analyzing the relevant discussions yielded several suggestions. The first priority is adopting PbD as the most flexible, soft-legal, and preferable approach toward AI-oriented issues. Implementing PbD will protect individual privacy and personal data without specific efforts, and achieve both the development of AI and the advancement of privacy and personal data protection. Technical measures that can adapt to an individual's dynamic choices according to the "context" should be further developed. Furthermore, alternative technical measures, including those to solve the "algorithmic black box" or achieve differential privacy, warrant thorough examination. If AI surpasses human intelligence, a terminating function, such as a "kill switch" will be the last resort to preserve individual choice. Despite numerous difficulties, we must prepare for the coming AI-prevalent society by taking a flexible approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Co-authored by a Computer Scientist and a Digital Humanist, this article examines the challenges faced by cultural heritage institutions in the digital age, which have led to the closure of the vast majority of born-digital archival collections. It focuses particularly on cultural organizations such as libraries, museums and archives, used by historians, literary scholars and other Humanities scholars. Most born-digital records held by cultural organizations are inaccessible due to privacy, copyright, commercial and technical issues. Even when born-digital data are publicly available (as in the case of web archives), users often need to physically travel to repositories such as the British Library or the Bibliothèque Nationale de France to consult web pages. Provided with enough sample data from which to learn and train their models, AI, and more specifically machine learning algorithms, offer the opportunity to improve and ease the access to digital archives by learning to perform complex human tasks. These vary from providing intelligent support for searching the archives to automate tedious and time-consuming tasks. In this article, we focus on sensitivity review as a practical solution to unlock digital archives that would allow archival institutions to make non-sensitive information available. This promise to make archives more accessible does not come free of warnings for potential pitfalls and risks: inherent errors, "black box" approaches that make the algorithm inscrutable, and risks related to bias, fake, or partial information. Our central argument is that AI can deliver its promise to make digital archival collections more accessible, but it also creates new challenges - particularly in terms of ethics. In the conclusion, we insist on the importance of fairness, accountability and transparency in the process of making digital archives more accessible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advocates for a hermeneutic model for children-AI (age group 7–11 years) interactions in which the desirable purpose of children's interaction with artificial intelligence (AI) systems is children's growth. The article perceives AI systems with machine-learning components as having a recursive element when interacting with children. They can learn from an encounter with children and incorporate data from interaction, not only from prior programming. Given the purpose of growth and this recursive element of AI, the article argues for distinguishing the interpretation of bias within the artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and responsible AI discourse. Interpreting bias as a preference and distinguishing between positive (pro-diversity) and negative (discriminative) bias is needed as this would serve children's healthy psychological and moral development. The human-centric AI discourse advocates for an alignment of capacities of humans and capabilities of machines by a focus both on the purpose of humans and on the purpose of machines for humans. The emphasis on mitigating negative biases through data protection, AI law, and certain value-sensitive design frameworks demonstrates that the purpose of the machine for humans is prioritized over the purpose of humans. These top–down frameworks often narrow down the purpose of machines to do-no-harm and they miss accounting for the bottom-up views and developmental needs of children. Therefore, applying a growth model for children-AI interactions that incorporates learning from negative AI-mediated biases and amplifying positive ones would positively benefit children's development and children-centric AI innovation. Consequently, the article explores: What challenges arise from mitigating negative biases and amplifying positive biases in children-AI interactions and how can a growth model address these? To answer this, the article recommends applying a growth model in open AI co-creational spaces with and for children. In such spaces human–machine and human–human value alignment methods can be collectively applied in such a manner that children can (1) become sensitized toward the effects of AI-mediated negative biases on themselves and others; (2) enable children to appropriate and imbue top-down values of diversity, and non-discrimination with their meanings; (3) enforce children's right to identity and non-discrimination; (4) guide children in developing an inclusive mindset; (5) inform top-down normative AI frameworks by children's bottom-up views; (6) contribute to design criteria for children-centric AI. Applying such methods under a growth model in AI co-creational spaces with children could yield an inclusive co-evolution between responsible young humans in the loop and children-centric AI systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we investigate origins of several cases of failure of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems employing machine learning and deep learning. We focus on omission and commission errors in (a) the inputs to the AI system, (b) the processing logic, and (c) the outputs from the AI system. Our framework yields a set of 28 factors that can be used for reconstructing the path of AI failures and for determining corrective action. Our research helps identify emerging themes of inquiry necessary for developing more robust AI-ML systems. We are hopeful that our work will help strengthen the use of machine-learning AI by enhancing the rates of true positive and true negative judgements from AI systems, and by lowering the probabilities of false positive and false negative judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the emergence of the innovative field of artificial intelligence (AI) in the 1960s, the late Hubert Dreyfus insisted on the ontological distinction between man and machine, human and artificial intelligence. In the different editions of his classic and influential book What computers can't do (1972), he posits that an algorithmic machine can never fully simulate the complex functioning of the human mind—not now, nor in the future. Dreyfus' categorical distinctions between man and machine are still relevant today, but their relation has become more complex in our increasingly data-driven society. We, humans, are continuously immersed within a technological universe, while at the same time ubiquitous computing, in the words of computer scientist Mark Weiser, "forces computers to live out here in the world with people" (De Souza e Silva in Interfaces of hybrid spaces. In: Kavoori AP, Arceneaux N (eds) The cell phone reader. Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2006, p 20). Dreyfus' ideas are therefore challenged by thinkers such as Weiser, Kevin Kelly, Bruno Latour, Philip Agre, and Peter Paul Verbeek, who all argue that humans are much more intrinsically linked to machines than the original dichotomy suggests—they have evolved in concert. Through a discussion of the classical concepts of individuum and 'authenticity' within Western civilization, this paper argues that within the ever-expanding data-sphere of the twenty-first century, a new concept of man as 'aggregate of data' has emerged, which further erodes and undermines the categorical distinction between man and machine. This raises political and ethical questions beyond the confines of technology and artificial intelligence. Moreover, this seemingly never-ending debate on what computers should (or should not) do provokes the philosophical necessity to once again define the concept of what it is to be 'human.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As AI is linked to more and more aspects of our lives, the need for algorithms that can take decisions that are not only accurate but also fair becomes apparent. It can be seen both in discussions of future trends such as autonomous vehicles or the issue of superintelligence, as well as actual implementations of machine learning used to decide whether a person should be admitted in certain university or will be able to return a credit. In this paper, we will use Dreyfus' account on ethical expertise to show that, to give an AI some ability to make ethical judgements, a pure symbolic, conceptual approach is not enough. We also need the ability to make sense of the surroundings to reframe and define situations in a dynamic way, using multiple perspectives in a pre-reflective way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adds another argument to the rising tide of panic about robots and AI. The argument is intended to have broad civilization-level significance, but to involve less fanciful speculation about the likely future intelligence of machines than is common among many AI-doomsayers. The argument claims that the rise of the robots will create a crisis of moral patiency. That is to say, it will reduce the ability and willingness of humans to act in the world as responsible moral agents, and thereby reduce them to moral patients. Since that ability and willingness is central to the value system in modern liberal democratic states, the crisis of moral patiency has a broad civilization-level significance: it threatens something that is foundational to and presupposed in much contemporary moral and political discourse. I defend this argument in three parts. I start with a brief analysis of an analogous argument made (or implied) in pop culture. Though those arguments turn out to be hyperbolic and satirical, they do prove instructive as they illustrates a way in which the rise of robots could impact upon civilization, even when the robots themselves are neither malicious nor powerful enough to bring about our doom. I then introduce the argument from the crisis of moral patiency, defend its main premises and address objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari argues that technological advances of the twenty-first century will usher in a significant shift in how humans make important life decisions. Instead of turning to the Bible or the Quran, to the heart or to our therapists, parents, and mentors, people will turn to Big Data recommendation algorithms to make these choices for them. Much as we rely on Spotify to recommend music to us, we will soon rely on algorithms to decide our careers, spouses, and commitments. Harari also predicts that next, the state will take away individuals’ rights to make their own choices about their lives. If Google knows where your children would flourish best in school, why should the state allow a fallible human parent to decide? Liberalism—which, as Harari uses this term, refers to a state of society in which human freedom to choose is respected and championed—will collapse. In this paper, I argue that Harari’s conception of the future implications of recommendation algorithms is deeply flawed, for two reasons. First, users will not rely on algorithms to make decisions for them because they have no reason to trust algorithms, which are developed by companies with their own incentives, such as profit. Second, for most of our life decisions, algorithms will not be able to be developed, because the factors relevant to the decisions we face are unique to our situation. I present an alternative depiction of the future: instead of relying on algorithms to make decisions for us, humans will use algorithms to enhance our decision-making by helping us consider the most relevant choices first and notice information we might not otherwise. Finally, I will also argue that even if computers could make many of our decisions for us, liberalism as a political system would emerge unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robots are increasingly being studied for use in education. It is expected that robots will have the potential to facilitate children's learning and function autonomously within real classrooms in the near future. Previous research has raised the importance of designing acceptable robots for different practices. In parallel, scholars have raised ethical concerns surrounding children interacting with robots. Drawing on a Responsible Research and Innovation perspective, our goal is to move away from research concerned with designing features that will render robots more socially acceptable by end users toward a reflective dialogue whose goal is to consider the key ethical issues and long-term consequences of implementing classroom robots for teachers and children in primary education. This paper presents the results from several focus groups conducted with teachers in three European countries. Through a thematic analysis, we provide a theoretical account of teachers' perspectives on classroom robots pertaining to privacy, robot role, effects on children and responsibility. Implications for the field of educational robotics are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies investigating the relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and science tend to adopt a partial view. There is no broad and holistic view that synthesizes the channels through which this interaction occurs. Our goal is to systematically map the influence of the latest AI techniques (machine learning, ML and its sub-category, deep learning, DL) on science. We draw on the work of Nathan Rosenberg to develop a taxonomy of the effects of technology on science. The proposed framework comprises four categories of technology effects on science: intellectual, economic, experimental and instrumental. The application of the framework in the relationship between ML/DL and science allowed the identification of multiple triggers activated by the new techniques in the scientific field. Visualizing these different channels of influence allows us to identify two pressing, emerging issues. The first is the concentration of experimental effects in a few companies, which indicates a reinforcement effect between more data on the phenomenon (experimental effects) and more capacity to commercialize the technique (economic effects). The second is the diffusion of new techniques lacking in explanation (intellectual effect) throughout the fabric of science (instrumental effects). The value of this article is twofold. First, it provides a simple framework to assess the relations between technology and science. Second, it provides this broad and holistic view of the influence of new AI techniques on science. More specifically, the article details the channels through which this relationship occurs, the nature of these channels and the loci in which the potential effects on science unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the myriad of technical approaches and abstract guidelines proposed to the topic of AI bias, there has been an urgent call to translate the principle of fairness into the operational AI reality with the involvement of social sciences specialists to analyse the context of specific types of bias, since there is not a generalizable solution. This article offers an interdisciplinary contribution to the topic of AI and societal bias, in particular against the poor, providing a conceptual framework of the issue and a tailor-made model from which meaningful data are obtained using Natural Language Processing word vectors in pretrained Google Word2Vec, Twitter and Wikipedia GloVe word embeddings. The results of the study offer the first set of data that evidences the existence of bias against the poor and suggest that Google Word2vec shows a higher degree of bias when the terms are related to beliefs, whereas bias is higher in Twitter GloVe when the terms express behaviour. This article contributes to the body of work on bias, both from and AI and a social sciences perspective, by providing evidence of a transversal aggravating factor for historical types of discrimination. The evidence of bias against the poor also has important consequences in terms of human development, since it often leads to discrimination, which constitutes an obstacle for the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of action tend to require agents to have mental representations. A common trope in discussions of artificial intelligence (AI) is that they do not, and so cannot be agents. Properly understood there may be something to the requirement, but the trope is badly misguided. Here we provide an account of representation for AI that is sufficient to underwrite attributions to these systems of ownership, action, and responsibility. Existing accounts of mental representation tend to be too demanding and unparsimonious. We offer instead a minimalist account of representation that ascribes only those features necessary for explaining action, trimming the "extra" features in existing accounts (e.g., representation as a "mental" phenomenon). Our account makes 'representation' whatever it is that, for example, the thermostat is doing with the thermometer. The thermostat is disposed to act as long as the thermometer is outside a given range of parameters.. Our account allows us to offer a new perspective on the 'responsibility gap', a problem raised by the actions of sophisticated machines: because nobody has enough control over the machine's actions to be able to assume responsibility, conventional approaches to responsibility ascription are inappropriate. We argue that there is a distinction between finding responsible and holding responsible and, in order to resolve the responsibility gap, we must first clarify the conceptual terrain on which agent is in fact responsible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpretation of utterances affects an interrogator's determination of human from machine during live Turing tests. Here, we consider transcripts realised as a result of a series of practical Turing tests that were held on 23 June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. The focus in this paper is to consider the effects of lying and truth-telling on the human judges by the hidden entities, whether human or a machine. Turing test transcripts provide a glimpse into short text communication, the type that occurs in emails: how does the reader determine truth from the content of a stranger's textual message? Different types of lying in the conversations are explored, and the judge's attribution of human or machine is investigated in each test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence poses a particular challenge in its application to finance/treasury management because most treasury functions are no longer physical processes, but rather virtual processes that are increasingly highly automated. Most finance/treasury teams are knowledge workers who make decisions and conduct analytics within often dynamic frameworks that must incorporate environmental considerations (foreign exchange rates, GDP forecasts), internal considerations (growth needs, business trends), as well as the impact of any actions on related corporate decisions which are also highly complex (e.g., hedging, investing, capital structure, liquidity levels). Artificial intelligence in finance and treasury is thus most analogous to the complexity of a human nervous system as it encompasses far more than the automation of tasks. Similar to the human nervous system, AI systems in finance/treasury must manage data quickly and accurately, including the capture and classification of data and its integration into larger datasets. At present, the AI network neural system has been gradually improved and is widely used in many fields of treasury management, such as early warning of potential financial crisis, diagnosis of financial risk, control of financial information data quality and mining of hidden financial data, information, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human-centered AI approach posits a future in which the work done by humans and machines will become ever more interactive and integrated. This article takes human-centered AI one step further. It argues that the integration of human and machine intelligence is achievable only if human organizations—not just individual human workers—are kept "in the loop." We support this argument with evidence of two case studies in the area of predictive maintenance, by which we show how organizational practices are needed and shape the use of AI/ML. Specifically, organizational processes and outputs such as decision-making workflows, etc. directly influence how AI/ML affects the workplace, and they are crucial for answering our first and second research questions, which address the pre-conditions for keeping humans in the loop and for supporting continuous and reliable functioning of AI-based socio-technical processes. From the empirical cases, we extrapolate a concept of "keeping the organization in the loop" that integrates four different kinds of loops: AI use, AI customization, AI-supported original tasks, and taking contextual changes into account. The analysis culminates in a systematic framework of keeping the organization in the loop look based on interacting organizational practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biases in cognition are ubiquitous. Social psychologists suggested biases and stereotypes serve a multifarious set of cognitive goals, while at the same time stressing their potential harmfulness. Recently, biases and stereotypes became the purview of heated debates in the machine learning community too. Researchers and developers are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that some biases, like gender and race biases, are entrenched in the algorithms some AI applications rely upon. Here, taking into account several existing approaches that address the problem of implicit biases and stereotypes, we propose that a strategy to cope with this phenomenon is to unmask those found in AI systems by understanding their cognitive dimension, rather than simply trying to correct algorithms. To this extent, we present a discussion bridging together findings from cognitive science and insights from machine learning that can be integrated in a state-of-the-art semantic network. Remarkably, this resource can be of assistance to scholars (e.g., cognitive and computer scientists) while at the same time contributing to refine AI regulations affecting social life. We show how only through a thorough understanding of the cognitive processes leading to biases, and through an interdisciplinary effort, we can make the best of AI technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Big data and Machine learning Techniques are reshaping the way in which food safety risk assessment is conducted. The ongoing 'datafication' of food safety risk assessment activities and the progressive deployment of probabilistic models in their practices requires a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of these advances. In particular, the low level of trust in EU food safety risk assessment framework highlighted in 2019 by an EU-funded survey could be exacerbated by novel methods of analysis. The variety of processed data raises unique questions regarding the interplay of multiple regulatory systems alongside food safety legislation. Provisions aiming to preserve the confidentiality of data and protect personal information are juxtaposed to norms prescribing the public disclosure of scientific information. This research is intended to provide guidance for data governance and data ownership issues that unfold from the ongoing transformation of the technical and legal domains of food safety risk assessment. Following the reconstruction of technological advances in data collection and analysis and the description of recent amendments to food safety legislation, emerging concerns are discussed in light of the individual, collective and social implications of the deployment of cutting-edge Big Data collection and analysis techniques. Then, a set of principle-based recommendations is proposed by adapting high-level principles enshrined in institutional documents about Artificial Intelligence to the realm of food safety risk assessment. The proposed set of recommendations adopts Safety, Accountability, Fairness, Explainability, Transparency as core principles (SAFETY), whereas Privacy and data protection are used as a meta-principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perceived autonomy is thus related to not only how autonomy is perceived but also how working with human-machine aggregates from a broader perspective of interactional and situational outcomes, socio-cognitive organization, culture and, thus, of the ethical issues that are central to AI. Whilst the media is intrigued by the humanoid robot Ai-Da addressing the British House of Lords committee on the future of the arts, design, fashion and music industries, telling a committee that artificial intelligence can be a "threat and opportunity" to artists (The Guardian [8]), we also note concerns of the media on the risk of creating a generation of racist and sexist robots'. In the end, it is not important how the AI machine can be aligned with human values or visualising as how human values are fully aligned with the AI machine, converging to the post-human world, what it is important to know is that human values are diverse, social, cultural and contextual, and they do not fit into the logic of the AI machine. [Extracted from the article]

Research on the ethics of algorithms has grown substantially over the past decade. Alongside the exponential development and application of machine learning algorithms, new ethical problems and solutions relating to their ubiquitous use in society have been proposed. This article builds on a review of the ethics of algorithms published in 2016 (Mittelstadt et al. Big Data Soc 3(2), 2016). The goals are to contribute to the debate on the identification and analysis of the ethical implications of algorithms, to provide an updated analysis of epistemic and normative concerns, and to offer actionable guidance for the governance of the design, development and deployment of algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some enlightenment regarding the project to mechanise reason. The assembly line of machine learning: data, algorithm, model. The training dataset: the social origins of machine intelligence. The history of AI as the automation of perception. The learning algorithm: compressing the world into a statistical model. All models are wrong, but some are useful. World to vector: the society of classification and prediction bots. Faults of a statistical instrument: the undetection of the new. Adversarial intelligence vs. statistical intelligence: labour in the age of AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]