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During World War I (1914–1918) the birth rate in France fell by 50%. The corresponding deficit of births is estimated at 1.4 million, while military losses are estimated at 1.4 million too. Thus, the fertility decline doubled the demographic impact of the war. I construct a model of fertility choices where a household faces three shocks in a war: (i) an increased probability that its wife remains alone after the war; (ii) a partially-compensated loss of its husband’s income; and (iii) a decline in labor productivity followed by faster growth. I calibrate the model’s parameters to the time series of fertility before the war. I use military casualties and income data to calibrate the war. The model accounts for 91% of the observed decline, and overpredicts the subsequent rebound in fertility by 4%. The increased probability of a husband dying is the leading force behind the results.

Research increasingly stresses the role of human capital in modern economic development. Existing historical evidence—mostly from British textile industries—however, rejects that formal education was important for the Industrial Revolution. Our new evidence from technological follower Prussia uses a unique school enrollment and factory employment database linking 334 counties from pre-industrial 1816 to two industrial phases in 1849 and 1882. Using pre-industrial education as instrument for later education and controlling extensively for pre-industrial development, we find that basic education is significantly associated with nontextile industrialization in both phases of the Industrial Revolution. Panel data models with county fixed effects confirm the results. (JEL I20, J24, N13, N33, N63)