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Can those in charge of redistricting foster electoral competitiveness by targeting some congressional incumbents while protecting others from potent competition? We provide an answer by presenting the dynamic redistricting thesis, which holds that the type of redistricting plan and the time passed since its enactment affect the emergence of high-quality congressional candidates. We demonstrate that the effect of redistricting on competition depends on whether incumbents belong to the party that controlled the redistricting process. We show that partisan plans have predictable systematic effects, with incumbents in the minority more likely to face strong opponents. Moreover, the effect of redistricting on competition is highest at the beginning of the 10-year redistricting cycle and diminishes in a nonlinear fashion over the course of the cycle. The implications of our theory and findings for democracy are apparent: Institutions are an important determinant of the variation of electoral competition across time and space. Keywords: congressional elections; electoral competition; incumbency; apportionment; gerrymandering; redistricting; representation; dynamic redistricting thesis 10.1177/1532673X08326385

What are the causal effects of legislative party switching on campaign fundraising? Using a selection-on-observables strategy (a first in the study of U.S. party switchers), we demonstrate that relative to other similarly situated legislators, party switchers rely more heavily on partisan and ideological, out-of-district individual donors, and direct party contributions. In short, switchers—in trying to alleviate the electoral costs of switching—rely disproportionately on donors motivated to protect vulnerable incumbents of a particular party. We conclude with a discussion of how these dynamics reinforce partisan polarization and raise normative questions about representation and the role of the "surrogate constituency." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]