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Researchers remain divided over the cause of Bernie Sanders' strong appeal in recent Democratic primaries, alternately positing identity or ideology as decisive drivers of Sanders support. Using data from 2020 Nationscape, we conduct linear probability models that show how identity, ideology, and their interaction all explain Sanders support. Demographically, we find that Sanders voters are disproportionately young, Hispanic, and Independent. Sanders voters also differ significantly from other Democratic primary voters across several ideology variables, and are especially supportive of policies that were central to Sanders' campaign, such as providing government-run health insurance to all Americans. Finally, we demonstrate that age cohort, the most important predictor of Sanders support, has an effect that is highly dependent upon key ideology variables. Overall, those who did not vote for Sanders in the 2020 Democratic primary are quite demographically and ideologically distinct from those voters that "felt the Bern." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A survey of 3,441 U.S. social media users showed that a high portion believes in conspiracy theories, and their beliefs vary widely along the party lines and socio-demographic factors. In particular, conservative conspiracy theories were more pronounced than liberal ones, and older White males with high conservatism and Protestantism showed higher endorsement of conservative conspiracy theories. Furthermore, ideological conservatives who frequently discuss politics showed higher association with a conservative conspiracy theory than conservatives who discuss politics less frequently. However, network diversity moderated the interaction of conservative ideology and political discussion such that conservatives who discuss politics frequently in a relatively heterogeneous social media network setting had lower beliefs in a conspiracy theory than conservatives who do so in a more homogeneous network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are campaign contributors to parties and candidates in the United States becoming more ideological? Popular and scholarly accounts suggest that political contributors have disproportionate influence in politics, which suggests an important role for them in shaping party ideology and widening the divide between the major American parties. Using the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series data from 1972 to 2008, we find that although the importance of ideology in motivating donations fluctuates from election to election, there is substantial ideological stability in the donor population over time until 2002 when the proportion of ideological donors sharply increases. Ideological extremism has not become a stronger predictor of contributing money. We conclude that mass donors are not necessarily driving partisan polarization. The implication is that politicians are not so much responsive to ideological extremism as they are strategic in mobilizing ideologues in pursuit of resources and electoral goals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the role that two theoretically distinct conceptions of mass “ideology”—operational and symbolic—play in shaping policy and electoral change in the United States. I consider both types of ideology as aggregate, dynamic concepts, and find that though the public’s operational and symbolic preferences change in broadly similar ways over time, there are consequential differences in how these two types of ideology respond to the political context and in how they intersect with important political and social outcomes. Changes in the public’s operational ideology—the dominant direction of public views on specific policy matters—react systematically to changes in the policy context and are strongly predictive of both electoral outcomes and federal policy change. Changes in the public’s symbolic ideology—the proportion of citizens who identify as liberals or conservatives—are essentially unconnected to changes in policy and only modestly predictive of electoral results. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines citizens who combine liberalism on one of two major issue dimensions with conservatism on the other, assessing whether they are less politically engaged than “consistent” liberals and conservatives and whether this relationship has strengthened over time with elite polarization. It also explores the contributions of cross-pressures, partisanship, and alienation to contemporary ideological differences in political engagement. This article departs from most existing research by defining ideology two dimensionally. Using the 1984-2008 American National Election Studies, it finds that culturally conservative, economically liberal Americans and to a lesser extent culturally liberal, economically conservative Americans are less engaged in elections than “consistent” liberals and conservatives. Different factors explain these differences with liberals and conservatives, but cross-pressures do not demobilize either “two-dimensional ideologue.” Over time, the increased involvement of liberals and conservatives has produced a growing ideological gap in political engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Migration is a significant factor in the composition of U.S. electoral constituencies, including U.S. House districts. Does migration contribute to geographic homogeneity, and does the result contribute to political polarization in a significant way? This article considers this question using the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. To determine individual-level migration patterns, residence information from individual survey respondents is matched to the U.S. Postal Service’s change of address database. This technique provides precise information about respondents’ migration history that follows the preferences expressed in each individual’s survey response. I find support for the claim that migrants are more likely to move into a congressional district that matches their ideological preferences even after controlling for the partisanship in the district of origin. This result emerges for both major parties in two sets of model specifications: multinomial logit models restricted to migrants and a selection model that includes all respondents. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most scholarship on Supreme Court decision making assumes that justices’ ideological preferences exhibit a uniform impact on their choices across a variety of situations. I develop a theoretical framework positing the importance of case-level context in shaping the magnitude of ideological voting on the Court. I hypothesize how issue-related factors influence this magnitude. I test the hypotheses using a multilevel modeling framework on data from the 1953-2004 terms. The results provide support for several of the hypotheses; issue salience, issue attention, the authority for the decision (statutory interpretation versus constitutionality of federal or state laws), intercourt conflict, the presence of a lower court dissent, and mandatory versus discretionary jurisdiction all significantly influence ideological voting. Overall, the article adds significant qualifications to extant theories of judicial decision making by showing how ideological voting on the Court is shaped by the varying situations that confront the justices from case to case. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although classic Downsian theory predicts that candidates should converge to the ideological position of the median voter in the electorate, American elections generally feature major party candidates who offer divergent policy positions. Employing a survey and statistical estimation technique that allows for the estimation of the ideological position of candidates on the same scale as the distribution of voter ideology among voters, the author characterizes the actual degree of candidate divergence in the 2008 presidential election looking at the estimated stances of Barack Obama and John McCain. The results reveal that these candidates took positions that were closer to, and likely even more extreme than, the positions of their partisan and primary constituencies than to the nationwide voter median. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we investigate four attitudinal structures (including liberal, conservative, and libertarian configurations) associated with two ideological dimensions among American voters and demonstrate that these attitudinal structures are related in expected ways to differential preferences for the values of freedom, order, and equality/caring. Liberals are inclined to trade freedom for equality/caring but not for order, whereas conservatives are their opposites—willing to trade freedom for order but not for equality/caring. In contrast, libertarians are generally less willing than others to trade freedom for either order or equality/caring (although they probably prefer order to equality/caring). The fourth ideological type is more willing than the others to relinquish freedom, preferring both order and equality/caring. Depending on how our results are interpreted, this fourth type may be characterized as either communitarian or humanitarian. These findings help close the gap between unidimensional conceptions and multidimensional evidence of ideological organization in political attitudes by demonstrating that value structure and attitudinal structure are strongly related in two ideological dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study utilizes the random assignment of judges to panels in the U.S. courts of appeals to measure how the partisanship of these judges affects whether or not the Supreme Court agrees to hear a case and subsequently overturns the decision of the lower panel. Results from the study provide evidence of partisan behavior in the Supreme Court review process in several politically salient issue areas between 1995 and 2004. Although most lower court decisions are never reviewed at all, in the cases examined, assigning three Democrats to a court of appeals panel, compared to three Republicans, more than quintupled the chances that the Supreme Court would overturn a decision from that panel. Despite the large magnitude of these effects, the estimates of partisan effects would have been even larger without the utilization of random assignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scale limitations, endogeneity problems, and observational equivalence in observational studies render many tests of the proximity and directional models inconclusive. Fortunately, the task of designing experimental tests has proven tractable and the small, but growing, body of experimental evidence sheds new light on directional and proximity motivated behavior. The experiment described in this article was designed to reexamine the role of ideology structuring candidate evaluations in the general population and test the models in two new policy areas: opinion about military spending and opinion about abortion. The results indicate that ideology and opinions about military spending stimulate proximity behavior whereas opinions about abortion stimulate directional behavior. It is also found that abortion-based evaluations are more strongly directional for those who oppose abortion—which is consistent with the notion of policy balancing. The article concludes by considering the possibility that some issues lend themselves to proximity comparisons whereas others lend themselves to directional comparisons and discussing the implications for democratic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the relationship between courts and legislatures in a comparative perspective. Specifically, I examine how (a) the ideological composition of the bench, (b) the propensity of court involvement in a given policy area, and (c) the disposition of court decisions in a given policy area influence the ideology of bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. By examining HMO regulation and education policy in the American states during the 1990s, I find evidence that judicial influence does affect legislative policymaking, in both the introduction and enactment stages, across both policy areas. Although traditional scholarship has depicted the judicial branch as having minimal effect on policy formation, and subsequently social change, the findings of this study suggest that we have overlooked an important policymaking role of the judicial branch. Furthermore, state policy research has not given adequate attention to judicial influence as an explanation for policy formation in the American states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses a fresh approach to measure social welfare ambivalence, addressing the question of who is more ambivalent about such policies—liberals or conservatives. The findings presented here challenge previous assertions that liberals are typically more ambivalent. I argue that conservatives are now more ambivalent than liberals because a change in the tone of elite discourse altered the priming of the potential sources of such ambivalence. The models of ambivalence presented suggest that these primed sources are conflicting thoughts or beliefs (cognitive conflict), conflicting feelings (affective conflict), or beliefs in conflict with feelings (cognitive-affective conflict). The implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The elevated levels of party polarization observed in the contemporary Congress have been attributed to a variety of factors. One of the more commonly recurring themes among observers of congressional politics is that changes in district boundaries resulting from the redistricting process are a root cause. Using a new data set linking congressional districts from 1962 to 2002, we offer a direct test of this claim. Our results show that although there is an overall trend of increasing polarization, districts that have undergone significant changes as a result of redistricting have become even more polarized. Although the effect is relatively modest, it suggests that redistricting is one among other factors that produce party polarization in the House and may help to explain the elevated levels of polarization in the House relative to the Senate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines trial court rulings concerning the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the trial judge's role as a "gatekeeper" and gave trial judges substantial discretion over their scrutiny of expert testimony. Because the external constraints on admissibility rulings are minimal, one might expect that if trial judges' ideology were to play some role in their decision making, it might do so here. To test this expectation, I perform a binomial logit analysis of federal district court Daubert rulings in tort cases from 1983 to 2003. I find substantial support for the claim that trial judges' ideology can predict decisions on admissibility. I find less support, however, for the claim that Daubert affected trial judges' willingness to admit such testimony, and no evidence that such decisions are affected by the prospect of reversal on appeal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on differences in judicial ideology as an explanation of judicial consensus or disagreement in state supreme court decision making. First, state methods of judicial selection (election vs. appointment) are posited to influence the ideological composition of state supreme courts. Second, variations in ideological composition are related to the degree of consensus among judges on cases in the area of capital punishment. Factors other than selection mechanism and judicial ideology are considered as alternative explanations for differences in ideological composition and for the degree of judicial consensus. More broadly, state institutional characteristics, notably judicial selection mechanisms (election or appointment) are found to influence the authoritative presence of state supreme courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it has been long established that ideology influences the decisions of American voters, scholars have begun more recently to delineate which voters under what conditions will vote ideologically. Although these studies have been illuminating, most analyses have failed to account for one critical contextual factor: candidate ideological divergence. Using a random-effects probit model and data from the 1988 to 1992 American Senate Election Studies, I show that the ideological divergence among Senate candidates conditions the influence of ideology on vote choice, at least among the more politically knowledgeable segment of the population. This reinforces and extends the findings of Wright and Berkman that ideologically polarized candidates produce ideological voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effect of cultural values on voting behavior in elections below the presidential level. Using data from the American National Election Studies, the article examines the effect of moral traditionalism on individual-level vote choice in U.S. House elections. Findings indicate that a new front has been opened in the culture war, with moral traditionalism exerting an indirect effect on vote choice through party identification and, most importantly, a direct effect since the mid- to late 1990s, one that was hitherto not evident. This suggests that a greater emphasis placed on cultural issues by candidates and other political elites, or possibly changes in the images held by the electorate of both parties, has resulted in a moral traditionalism cleavage being driven down to voting behavior at the congressional level. Overall, these findings suggest a widening and deepening of a cultural values-based realignment of the American electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]