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This paper reviews the major theoretical arguments that link political democracy with economic inequality. is then shows that previous empirical analyses of the linkage have produced inconclusive results because they have suffered from specification. measurement, and sample-composition problems. A non recursive mode! is proposed that overcomes many of these limitations. Using 2SLS and a new weighted 2SLS procedure, we find no evidence of direct effects of political democracy on income inequality, or vice versa. However, economic development influences both variables, while world-system position, Protestantism, and British colonial experience affects political democracy. Population age-structure and systematic measurement error induce changes in income inequality. The paper concludes with a discussion both of the flaws in prior arguments linking democracy with inequality, and of the political processes that undermine any such linkage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does one identify a phenomenon as radically new or "unprecedented"? Do, in fact, "unprecedented" phenomena exist at all, as presumably some degree of continuity marks every state of affairs? If however, the idea of continuity is taken too far, are we not at risk of domesticating a radical tendency by conceptually transmuting it into something that is already known? These questions are of pressing importance since September 11th, as commentators warn that America and its allies face radically new enemies in the guise of "rogue" states, movements, and terrorist organizations. Yet sociology has had to grapple with similar issues before. In the 1930s and 1940s, the consolidation of fascist and Nazi movements also taxed sociological understanding and competence to the maximum. This article describes aspects of American sociology's response to that earlier challenge, contrasting it with the approach of Hannah Arendt, who condemned the discipline for systematically failing to appreciate the uniqueness, enormity, and gravity of the events that assailed the epoch. Arendt's critique of sociological methods is followed by a case study--Theodore Abel's investigation into National Socialism--that lends some credence to her misgivings. The work of other sociologists of this period--notably, Talcott Parsons's--is also briefly considered. The concluding section of the paper examines the theoretical problems involved in seeking to conceptualize an "unprecedented" event (movement, institution). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the effect of political democracy on the stratification systems of non- communist industrial societies, in contrast to previous research, this study assumes that the effect of democracy will be incremental and, therefore, that the historical experience of democracy must be considered rather than the current political situation. Two hypotheses are suggested: that democracy itself will lead to equality and that only the election of socialist legislatures will lead to equality. The historical experience of democracy and that of socialist legislatures is related to five measures of inequality. It is concluded, after taking into account the level of economic development and the growth rate, that although democracy itself has little effect. the experience of democratic socialist parties is significantly related to variations in inequality. The stronger the democratic socialist parties. the more egalitarian is the contemporary class system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the influence of an interstate network created by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on the global diffusion of democracy. We propose that IGOs facilitate democracy’s diffusion by transmitting information between member states and by interpreting that information according to prevailing norms in the world society, where democracy is viewed as the legitimate form of government. We employ a network autocorrelation model to track changes in democracy among all of the world’s countries from 1815 to 2000. We find that democracy does diffuse through the IGO network and that the influence of democratic countries is stronger than that of undemocratic countries. Evidence indicates that the IGO network serves as a basis for normative diffusion. This is an important contribution to sociological accounts of globalization, which tend to emphasize diffusion divorced from network structure or diffusion dependent on the coercive influence of a small set of international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines how the values espoused by social movements become entrenched in political culture and spawn many new kinds of institutions, which in turn shape organizations far from movements' original targets. We demonstrate the diffuse and indirect effects of social movements, and also show that the diffusion of social-movement values is often selective—some are retained, while others are discarded. Our empirical site is the Progressive movement and the early thrift industry in California. We draw on social-movement research and organizational theory to argue that a new ideal of thrift, bureaucratized cooperation among strangers, replaced the original idea of thrift, friendly cooperation among neighbors. This shift was possible only after the modernizing temper of Progressivism gave rise to two institutions, the news media and role-model organizations, that made bureaucracy culturally appropriate. The bureaucratization of thrift occurred even though it resulted in a centralization of power, which clashed with the Progressive ideal of equitably distributing power. Our study provides a compelling example of the fundamental revolution in American social organization in the twentieth century: the replacement of community-based groups by bureaucracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines change over time in sentiments toward out-group populations in European societies. For this purpose data were compiled from four waves of the Eurobarometer surveys for 12 countries that provided detailed and comparable information on attitudes toward foreigners between 1988 and 2000. A series of multilevel hierarchical linear models were estimated to examine change in the effects of individual- and country-level sources of threat on anti-foreigner sentiment. The analysis shows a substantial rise in anti-foreigner sentiment between 1988 and 2000 in all 12 countries. The rise in anti-foreigner sentiment was steep in the early period (between 1988 and 1994), then leveled off after that. Although anti-foreigner sentiment tends to be more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign populations and where economic conditions are less prosperous, the effects of both factors on anti-foreigner sentiment have not changed over time. The analysis also shows that anti-foreigner sentiment is more pronounced in places with greater support for right-wing extreme parties. The impact of individual-level socioeconomic characteristics such as education has remained stable over the years, but the effect of political ideology has increased. The meaning and significance of the findings are discussed within the context of European societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term "globalization" as used by social scientists and in popular discourse has many meanings. We contend that it is important to distinguish between globalization as a contemporary political ideology and what we call structural globalization--the increasing worldwide density of large-scale interaction networks relative to the density of smaller networks. We study one type of economic globalization over the past two centuries: the trajectory of international trade as a proportion of global production. Is trade globalization a recent phenomenon, a long-term upward trend, or a cyclical process? Using an improved measure of trade globalization, we find that there have been three waves since 1795. We discuss the possible causes of these pulsations of global integration and their implications for the early decades of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The empirical study of the causes and consequences of political democracy has been the subject of considerable research. Yet cumulative development of this research is hampered by the controversial aspects and limitations of the existing indices of political democracy. Th issues concern the validity of the indicators, the unknown reliability, and the limited sample and temporal coverage of these indices. After a discussion of these issues, a revised index of political democracy that overcomes some of these limitations is presented. The indicators of the revised index are analyzed by means of confirmatory factor analysis and the reliability of the measure is discussed. The index is generally better than existing measures in reliability, sample size, and temporal coverage; but the remaining limitations of the index are reviewed. The moderate to high correlations of this index with other democracy indices support its externa( validity. Yet, the differences in empirical results possible by using different indices are demonstrated. Finally, there are two appendices. The first provides the technical details of the confirmatory factor analysis. The second appendix lists the values of the political democracy index. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A distinguishing feature of the black position in advanced capitalism lies in relatively high unemployment and underemployment, a phenomenon that emerged in the 1930s and became firmly entrenched in the mid-1950s. To explain this we examined the black/white split labor market between World War 1 and the New Deal, showing how blacks were used to undermine white workers and their unions. The conflict was resolved with New Deal Labor legislation. protecting the unions and outlawing undercutting. This permitted a coalition to emerge between black and white workers. But in the long run the rising cost of labor drove capital to seek cheaper labor overseas, to make use of internal pockets of unprotected labor or to automate. All three processes hurt black industrial workers disproportionately, leaving a group of hard- core unemployed in the ghettos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both new-left and neo-conservative theorists argue that poor state performance can lead to a legitimation crisis, but they neglect distinctions among different forms of political support and objective conditions that citizens evaluate. I propose a theoretical model that distinguishes between (a) confidence in institutions and legitimation of democracy and (b) state performance and the structure of opposition (party systems, governing coalitions). I test the model with data located in an extensive new search of survey archives in six Western countries. The results show that poor state performance leads to a decline of confidence, but not a softening of support for democracy. Problems in the structure of opposition lead to a decline of both confidence and support for democracy. In the conclusion, I speculate whether state performance might affect democratic legitimacy in a less straightforward fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An early debate in the empirical study of political democracy concerned the measurement of democracy. Initial work employed dichotomous indicators and incorporated stability into political democracy measures. Evidence accumulated showing that this approach could adversely affect analyses, particularly in the study of income inequality. Despite this, some recent studies have renewed the flawed practices. We draw upon recent work to highlight the confusion that can result when democracy and stability are confounded and the problems with dichotomous indicators. We propose that stability is analytically distinct from political democracy and should be treated as such empirically, and we suggest ways to estimate incremental effects of political democracy. We further argue that political democracy is continuous and that measures of it should reflect this. It is important that the measurement history of this construct not repeat itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Metatheory makes sociopolitical analyses of "stability" and "crisis" more empirically and theoretically comprehensive. Multidimensional yet parsimonious presuppositions and models reside at the core of metatheory. Power and viability are political sociology's pivotal presuppositional topics . A multidimensional view of power permits a more valid study of such issues as the interaction of capitalism and the state and the autonomy and transformative potential of the latter. Multidimensional analyses of viability encourage a tiered image of politics in which activity and passivity can coexist and the rejection of the binary interpretation of "stability" and "crisis. " A model of the polity with a minimum of four tiers is presented. The state tier is modeled as a complex organization. An organizational, but "nonmanagerialist" perspective opposes a monogoaled view of state effectiveness. Moreover, viability is understood as entailing lot merely state effectiveness but the efficiency of participation and the legitimacy of institution as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though researchers have begun to prefer cohort and period-cohort accounts of generational differences to life-cycle accounts, clear and unambiguous empirical support for either has been rare. Mannheim's theory of generations suggests that this failure may result from seeking cohort or period-cohort effects where the historical events that generate them do not have sufficient impact. Therefore, the aftermath of a revolutionary event is investigated-Nazism in Germany. Cohort and period-cohort effects without life-cycle effects were found in opinions on democracy and Nazism in West Germany in the decades following World War II. The "Nazi generation" lagged initially in embracing the new West German democracy, but its views subsequently converged with those of other cohorts. Transitions to democracy in several other countries are discussed briefly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents response of the author on comments made by scholars Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta on his article "Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935." Posed before the reader are two models of welfare state development: my own, in which I suggest, as Skocpol and Amenta correctly state, that political structures must be considered in terms of their underlying economic dimensions; and that of Skocpol and her collaborators, which asserts that pre-existing state policies explain programmatic variations and that policy outcomes and struggles are rooted at the intersections of state structure and social relations. The first two criticisms of my thesis allege that my empirical data do not support my theoretical conclusions, while the other two criticisms point to what Skocpol and Amenta argue are conceptual flaws in my model. The essence of Skocpol and Amenta's first comment is that I vastly overrate the extent of monopoly-capitalist influence on social security legislation. According to their evidence, all politically active business leaders and organizations were opposed to both national and state-level pensions and were not willing by the 1930s to transfer experiments in corporate employee pensions to public social insurance.

Max Weber's explanation of the rise of Western progress remains the best available. it needs to be blended with an awareness that geographic coincidence and medieval class conflict were instrumental in allowing strong, bourgeois-dominated towns to emerge from feudalism. This, and the very long-lasting political stalemate between contending forces in the Middle Ages and early modern Europe were the key elements in the development of Western rationality. Proof comes from comparing Europe to other major agrarian civilizations, particularly China. Twentieth-century historical scholarship confirms Weber more than it supports some recent, fashionable sociological theories about the rise of the West such as "world system theory." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]