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In the course of research using Talcott Parsons's papers at the Harvard University Archives, Charles Camic read "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions" in manuscript form. Given sociologists' continuing interest in Parsons's ideas, Camic suggested that ASR make the paper widely available. We are pleased to do so in this issue. Camic's prologue places "Prolegomena" in the historical context of Parsons's work. Both James Coleman and Jeffrey Alexander have previously written about Parsons and were asked to comment on the implications of "Prolegomena" for our understanding of his theoretical contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, an essay by Talcott Parsons first published in the American Sociological Review. Parsons's Prolegomena is an object lesson for those who would read past theoretical work in terms of present-day conceptual categories. Written more than a half century ago, before it became standard sociological practice to differentiate the micro from the macro, a voluntaristic approach from a functionalist approach, a focus on action from an emphasis on social system and social structure, the paper escapes latter-day pigeonholes. Prolegomena shows that the early Parsons upheld a package of ideas that circumvents such polarities by combining what he terms a voluntaristic conception of human action in which the factors of will and effort are central, with a functionalist analysis that views economic, political, educational, and other social institutions as constituting a system that regulates action in relative conformity with the ultimate common values. The goal of the essay is to arrive at social institutions and certain aspects of social structure by beginning with human action, understood subjectively in terms of the means-end schema, and proceeding from there to action systems composed of long and complex [means-end] chains--chains analytically divisible into the conditional factors of heredity and environment, an intermediate sector made up of technological, economic, and political elements, and the sector of ultimate values.

How does one identify a phenomenon as radically new or "unprecedented"? Do, in fact, "unprecedented" phenomena exist at all, as presumably some degree of continuity marks every state of affairs? If however, the idea of continuity is taken too far, are we not at risk of domesticating a radical tendency by conceptually transmuting it into something that is already known? These questions are of pressing importance since September 11th, as commentators warn that America and its allies face radically new enemies in the guise of "rogue" states, movements, and terrorist organizations. Yet sociology has had to grapple with similar issues before. In the 1930s and 1940s, the consolidation of fascist and Nazi movements also taxed sociological understanding and competence to the maximum. This article describes aspects of American sociology's response to that earlier challenge, contrasting it with the approach of Hannah Arendt, who condemned the discipline for systematically failing to appreciate the uniqueness, enormity, and gravity of the events that assailed the epoch. Arendt's critique of sociological methods is followed by a case study--Theodore Abel's investigation into National Socialism--that lends some credence to her misgivings. The work of other sociologists of this period--notably, Talcott Parsons's--is also briefly considered. The concluding section of the paper examines the theoretical problems involved in seeking to conceptualize an "unprecedented" event (movement, institution). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Talcott Parsons's methodological views, particularly as formulated in The Structure of Social Action, have recently become the center of scholarly disagreement, with sociologists portraying his approach as positivist and postpositivist, empiricist and antiempiricist, relativist and nonrelativist. Departing from these interpretations, this paper argues that understanding Parsons's early method requires an understanding of the sociointellectual context of his early writings and the social position he occupied within that context. Parsons's methodological ideas are analyzed in relation to the neoclassicist-institutionalist controversy in early twentieth-century American economics and the methodological views of leading economists and philosophers of science at Harvard during the same period. The position that Parsons occupied at Harvard, moving from the high-status field of economics to the low-status field of sociology, led him to accept the basic methodological argument of neoclassical economists--and to shape from it an equivalent method for sociology. Such an historical analysis produces a systematic and coherent interpretation of Parsons's early methodological work, resolves the major contradictions in the existing scholarship, and reveals the limitations of the Parsonsian method, especially when con wasted to the Weberian approach which it purportedly transcended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents response of the authors on reply of Talcott Parsons, on the comment on his book "The Structure of Social Action." The authors say that Parsons leaves the bulk of their analysis unchallenged. Parsons continues to misread Sociologist Max Weber's usage category. Weber's definition did not mention norms nor did Parsons cite passages in Weber including any such reference. Whereas in his book Parsons cited standards of good taste as an example of usage, he now adds a second example, namely, rules of etiquette. Instead of citing supposedly neglected changes in his viewpoint, he devotes much of his commentary to a reaffirmation of his early argument-most importantly, his very strong emphasis on these normative aspects of Weber. Parsons says that he had special reasons to emphasize the importance of the normative. The question is whether this emphasis can accurately be attributed to Weber. A more serious disagreement between Parsons and them concerns the interpretation of Weber's book.

contemporary discussions of Parsons `s thought have faltered because they are insufficiently generalized. Only after his theoretical and epistemological logic has been explored, for example, can his more specific, ideological purpose be correctly understood. Parsons's theoretical ambition has been to resolve long-standing antinomies in social thought. His theory, to the degree it succeeds, formulates two central points: the social basis of individual autonomy and the multidimensional basis of social order. These positions present the heart of Parsons's formal theory. In his analysis of historical development as differentiation cultural, structural, and psychological-Parsons combines this formal logic with an ideological commitment to the expansion of individual freedom and conscious control. Incorporating elements of liberal, idealist, and materialist arguments, he outlines a theory of substantive voluntarism that is, potentially, neither conservative nor static considered as a whole, Parsons's theory contains serious contradictory strains. Nevertheless, his analysis of formal and substantive freedom represents a major contribution to social thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most influential interpretations of Max Weber's sociology has been that provided by Talcott Parsons, especially in The Structure of Social Action. We contend that the Parsonian interpretation is erroneous both in many of its particulars add hi the general cast that it gives to Weber's theoretical product. The crux of Parsons' misrepresentation is his overweening emphasis on the category of the normative. A confusion of "factual regularities" with "normative validity" - despite Weber's numerous warnings against such - led Parsons to an exaggeration of the importance Weber assigns to normative orientations of social action, legitimacy and collectivity integration, and, correspondingly, to a severe understatement of the importance of nonnormative aspects of social action and structures of dominance. In consequence, Parsons expanded what was but a part of Weber's sociology and made it very nearly the whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research contends that when Talcott Parsons developed the substantive argument of The Structure of Social Action, he turned away from the theoretical emptiness of American social science and drew on the ideas of four European social thinkers -- Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Marshall. Such research exemplifies the "content-fit model" of predecessor selection, which assumes that intellectual predecessors are chosen on the basis of a fit between their ideas and the project of the thinker who engages them. This model fails to explain Parsons's exclusion of the American institutionalists, most notably his Amherst teachers Walton Hamilton and Clarence Ayres, whose work fit directly with the argument of The Structure of Social Action. Institutionalist work was also characterized, however, by its negative reputation, particularly at Harvard University in the 1920s and 1930s, where Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber were thinkers of growing reputational standing. Examination of Parsons's involvement in the local Harvard network indicates that contemporary reputational judgments decisively affected his choice of intellectual predecessors. This analysis also brings to light the organizational and institutional conditions under which a "reputational model" is required to understand the process of predecessor selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociology today has many burdens and not the least of these is a persistent and somewhat humiliating question of theoretical excursions of sociologist Talcott Parsons. The issue is not so much intellectual disagreement over contrasting views of man and society. It is rather a case of the "Emperor's clothes." The problem of arriving at a reasoned assessment of Parsons' thought is greatly complicated by a remarkable obscurity of structure and style. Even those accustomed to abstract philosophical discussion find it a considerable chore to decide what is being said on any page, let alone also to assess its intellectual worth. Under these conditions, the book "The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination," edited by Max Black, is a welcome contribution. A large part of the book is devoted to a restatement of Parsons' central ideas. In some essays, Parsons is involuntarily guided to analyze mechanisms of social control and socialization by which a social system manages to hold deviance in check and enlist motivations of its participants.

The first business meeting of the American Sociological Society was held at 11:00 A.M. in the Gold Room, The Manhattan Center, on Thursday, December 29, with President Talcott Parsons presiding. Parsons summarized the activities of the Reorganization Committee of 1949 and the formation of the new Reorganization Committee of 1950 together with the grant from the Carnegie Corp. which makes possible the creation of an Executive Office. The minutes of the first three Executive Committee meetings, held in the past two days, were read by the Secretary, and were approved. The President then called upon Carl Taylor to report on proposed changes in the constitution and by-laws and to introduce motions for their acceptance. The first amendment pertaining to Article IV, Section I, was accepted by the Society after brief description by Parsons that such a measure would bring about better continuity in the official personnel of the Society. The second proposed amendment, Article VI, Section 2, had been divided into two parts, a and b, when it was considered by the Executive Committee. Taylor explained that these parts were to be considered separately.

The article discusses sociologist Talcott Parsons' voluntarism. It (voluntarism) is not antithetical to systems analysis, nor, certainly, is it antithetical to normative control. There is a wide range of diverse components in any theory. These components may be viewed as forming a continuum from the most general kinds of commitments to the most specific. Every theory contains general pre-suppositional commitments e.g., theoretic-epistemic, or formal elements, as well as very specific propositional statements which are much more directly derived from empirical observation. Similarly, voluntarism does not depend on whether an actor's choice is preserved, nor does it depend on whether or not an actor is described as a member of a normative system. Every concrete actor has a choice in every concrete situation. Parsons has never denied free will in this limited sense. Parsons certainly does not advocate individualism in the laissez-faire sense of the term, but rather the socially constrained exercise of individual choice.