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The article asserts that mainstream sociology, or more specifically the nonproblematic sociology found in introductory sociology textbooks treats gender, race and class in profoundly unequal ways. Inequalities of Race, Class and Gender are quantified in Introductory Sociology Textbooks. By the mid-1990s, sociology textbook authors were no longer de-emphasizing gender in comparison to race and class. Discussion of the role of socialization in relation to group differentiation is more common for gender and is discussed in more detail than for either class. While there is on average almost one page more of aggregate cross-societal text on class than on gender, the proportion of texts including a significant amount is identical for class and gender. Thus, the overriding impression about mainstream sociology conveyed by the F&H paper fails to capture the growing impact of feminist questions on research agendas in the field of social stratification in general as well as on introductory textbook authors.

The paper proposes reorienting sociology so as to give special attention to the, discovery, description, and evaluation of social inventions. The significance of this focus is illustrated with cases of social inventions found in the Mondragén system of worker industrial cooperatives in `Spain and in new models for, agricultural research and development in Central America. The paper concludes with reflections on the implications of a social inventions focus for research methods, for social theory, and for applied sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article comments on Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience, a position paper written by Randall Collins. Randall Collins' (1989) recent position paper seeks to defend sociology proper from disparate attacks questioning its status as a science. Interestingly, Collins's citations supporting the premise of external attack on sociology are actually quite limited. His single extensive example involves more the quest of sociobiologists to legitimate themselves through a general critique of all social science rather than a focused assault on sociology itself. Singled out specifically by Collins are approaches that deviate from his version of sociological theory, rather than from the scientific project of sociology per se. In Collins's discussion, Michael Foucault's complex ideas are homogenized and described by a nominalist label that has no basis in his work. Collins characterizes Foucault as a discourse theorist who reduces society to a text and social action to the field of discourse. Collins simply has displaced by Foucault's emphasis on the field of power. Collins reduces the complex work of important theorists to misleading and nominalist labels that compartmentalize and trivialize serious thought. Discourse analysis cannot replace the investigation of, and theorizing about, social action and societal structures. If the above comments are instructive, however, then there is a place for textual analysis when confronted by the obfuscating metatheoretical discussions and the biblical exegesis of the classics that passes for much of sociological theory today.

This paper tries to show that both functionalism and the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic present one-sided, but complementary and reconcilable, views of society. The basic postulates of functionalism and the dialectic reveal strengths and limitations which suggest a reformulation of both approaches in minimal form. Basically, the problem is to arrive at a theory of society that achieves an adequate balance between stability and the various sources of endogenous and exogenous change, between consensus and conflict, and between equilibrium and disequilibrium. After examining Dahrendorf's efforts in that direction, we conclude that convergence and overlap between the two theories show promise of a fruitful synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All sociologists are aware that questionnaire responses are a function of more than the particular value, attitudinal, or behavioral systems being investigated. It is a truism that the wording of an item may have a marked effect on the responses obtained. It is also very likely that alterations in the wording of questionnaire items produce considerably different responses among persons having differential educational or socio-economic backgrounds, or among respondents from various sized communities. These observations are discussed in practically every social research methods textbook. However, it is not always easy to predict bias in wording of questionnaire items. Data are presented in this paper which show considerably different response patterns for slight variations in two questionnaire items. Differential responses associated with rural-urban residence areas were also studied. The rural-urban differences are consistent with differences which are generally predicted from social theory. Rural areas are generally considered to be more conservative than urban areas.

This paper is an attempt to examine the efficacy of the means-end schema, the conceptual core of a voluntaristic theory of action which, it is claimed, emerged from the positivistic tradition in the work of various researchers and from the idealistic tradition in the work of researcher Max Weber. Postulates which underlie the means-end schema may be enumerated briefly. Most of its apologists insist, as rigidly as any positivist, that social science use all of the observational and mensurational techniques available. They claim that they respect the necessity for the objectification of social data and that their results are derived in such a way as to be consistent with the most stringent methodological criteria. They resist attempts to indict them as opponents of whatever objective instruments have been developed for the advancement of sociological research, whether these instruments be observation, measurement, statistics, symbolic logic, or anything else. The conclusion seems inevitable that the means-end schema violates most of the canons and repudiates most of the criteria of objective scientific methodology.

The article focuses on the comment upon the new social philosophy which has emerged from the ruins of a noisily disintegrating and over-ripe sensate culture. The sheer magnitude of Social and Cultural Dynamics, together with the prodigious research Professor Sorokin displays in analyzing all the compartments of culture over a period of twenty-five centuries without overlooking any part of the contemporary civilization, demands that a critic proceed warily. It is unfortunate in one respect that these pontifical tomes cannot be considered in their entirety, for such a possibility would relieve the impression that a few weak points have been singled out for attack. The purview of this paper is stringently confined to an examination of the author's contribution to the methodology of sociology. After a cursory discussion and definition of "culture" Professor Sorokin classifies the interrelations of the elements and traits of culture into four basic types, spatial or mechanical adjacency, association due to an external factor, functional or causal integration, and internal or logic meaningful unity.

The field of social anthropology or comparative sociology, as rests upon sociological conceptualizations and anthropological data. The problem is more than interdisciplinary: the sociologist's penchant for broad general theory is contrasted to the ethnologist's concern with detailed cultural data. The immediate need is for more modest theory on one hand, and more conceptualized comparative ethnography on the other. The purpose of the present article is to discuss this intermediate area with respect to one very crucial element, namely the analysis of values. This article attempts to show the two ways in which social anthropology should contribute to the development of general sociological theory. These are the establishment of (1) general social imperatives, and (2) requisite functional relationships between certain cultural forms in different departments of social life. To fulfill this broad purpose, empirically based examples are offered. This article introduces substantive theoretical analysis through the comparative examination of cultural systems.

For the purpose of the sociological theory it seems best not to attempt a critical survey of relatively recent contributions to sociological theory. This decision is further justified by the fact that there have been relatively few publication of first rate theoretical significance in recent years. This is of course, largely a consequence of the war and of the fact that so many people in the field have been preoccupied with work outside their normal professional interests. Rather than attempting such a critical survey, it seems more fruitful to present the outline of a positive orientation to the problem of sociological theory and a broad program for its development over the next few years. This is a wholly tentative attempt but can, it is hoped, serve as a focus for discussion and clarification of the fundamental methodological and theoretical problems involved. It seems possible to lay down a few fundamental propositions which can serve as general guiding lines for the more technical task of building a systematic treatment of sociological theory. Systematic theory itself is of fundamental importance to any science. There is, of course, no intention to deny that work which can be quite legitimately called scientific can develop without systematic theory. Morphologies, classifications and empirical generalizations of various sorts have played very important parts in the development of a variety of sciences.

This article presents views of the author on an article on social theory by sociologist Theodore Abel, that appeared in the April 1952 issue of the periodical "American Sociological Review." According to the author, Abel is well aware that his view of theory is uncommon and unpopular within a discipline now marked by a preponderant interest in specific empirical investigations where conceptualization is admitted only in the full-dress uniform of the "heuristic device" or the timid hypothesis bordering on a tautological statement about trivia. Respect is due the courage with which he undertakes a defense of theory in the "grand style." Abel's practical point of departure seems to lie in the observation that while current research interests are dictated largely by basic ideas inherited from several sociologists, insufficient attention is paid to the kind of theoretical activity in which such men were engaged and to the need for a continuation of that activity. While the debt to them is acknowledged, researchers fail to recognize their responsibilities in carrying on the kind of work they did.

This article presents the author's views on Social Theory. The author believe that sociological theory should henceforth be stricken from the list of subject topics of annual meetings. It doubtless served a purpose of sorts in the salad days of sociology when lip-service to the canons of science would legitimize many a soaring flight of philosophical speculation. But to continue to list theory as it is done today, simply as one more field of sociological interest and endeavor, ignores one of the crucial developments in sociology during the last generation. This is the accelerating tendency of theory to permeate all research that is worthy of the name. A growing recognition of the inevitable linkage between "fact" and "theory" has made sociologists realize that even the simplest descriptive statement has its quota of theory. Every sociologist worthy of the designation of scientist, no matter what may be the subject of his research, will shape his work in terms of the best and most relevant theory known to him and will then try to improve upon it.

This study applies cross-level network analysis to modify the Two-Step Model of communication flow, focusing on marginally positioned individuals and pointing out the "bridging function" of marginals in the flow of information between groups. The hypotheses examined derive from the concepts of the Balance Theory, applied to network analysis, suggesting that the "Strength of Weak Ties" and the related tendency toward intransivity are the structural advantages of marginals in the process of communication flow. By and large, the findings support the claimed importance of marginals, suggesting the ability of network analysis to provide a micro-macro bridge in current sociological theory and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents authors' response to comments made by sociologist George Ritzer's on paradigm analysis in sociology. Ritzer, according to the authors, doesn't try to indicate directly that they are wrong. The authors state that Ritzer criticizes them for supposedly claiming that political socialization, status attainment, and ethnic relations are examples of "at least potential exemplars (paradigms) in sociology," but he himself considers job satisfaction, alienation and role conflict as paradigms. The authors say that Ritzer does not understand their position when he relates to the difference of their positions in the study of sociology. The authors declare Ritzer as one who cites sociologist Thomas S. Kuhn as a source without taking seriously the implications of his position. They say that Ritzer's argument that exemplars are not useful when one is interested in metasociology is not true. They maintain that if Kuhn's argument is accepted, it must be based on the exemplar idea to be coherent.

This article comments on the concept of moral freedom by understanding the theories proposed by Emile Durkheim. It is opined that Whitney Pope appears to be taking an ultra "strict constructionist" stance concerning Durkheim's work. He will have nothing of reinterpretations which put Durkheim's ideas in a frame of reference different from Durkheim's. Pope's position overlooks the unquestionable theoretical tensions present in Durkheim's work. Pope asserts that Durkheim was never a positivist, implying that this proposition holds in every sense of the concept of positivism. It is opined that from the beginning, Durkheirn had a strong concern for the role of morality in human societies. From the beginning, Durkheim also entertained the idea of the internalization of cultural components. In the course of his career, Durkheim improved on this idea. It is further informed that Pope links the concept of the voluntaristic characteristics of action with a religious or metaphysical entity called free will. The belief in free will may have been a feature of theology and philosophy in the history of Western thought, but it is not the only position which is tenable.

This article presents a case for the usefulness of the concept of basic human needs. The author suggests that it is fruitful to assume that there is a universal set of basic human needs which have attributes of their own, not determined by the social structure, cultural patterns, or socialization processes. Ways are shown in which propositions which use the concept could be tested empirically. Restoration of the concept of basic human needs into sociological theory corrects the "over-socialized" conception of man, identifies a central distinction between the industrial and the emergent post-industrial society, and bridges two divergent traditions in sociology: structural-functional analysis and alienation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary American sociology, there exists no unified and comprehensive theoretical system that could serve as an instrument for coordinating and integrating existing sociological knowledge. Present-day American sociology represents a multiverse of theories and approaches. For the purpose of bringing at least some external order into a rather chaotic situation, the author suggests a classificatory system that distinguishes three main categories of sociological theory on the basis of general methodological criteria: positive or natural-science theories; interpretative sociologies treating sociology as a science sui generis, and non-scientific or evaluative social theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the role of the category of ignorance in the sociological theory. Concern with the category of ignorance, whether implicit or explicit, has constantly appeared in the work of sociological theorists. "Heuristic" bias towards exploring ignorance as "eufunctional" phenomenon leads to a tentative presentation of some conditions under which ignorance may be agreed to be eufunctional by the "democratically" inclined. Given the variety of concerns with ignorance, it is not possible to say that there is any unitary, highly self-consistent preoccupation with ignorance that points to the problem of ignorance in sociological theory. Some of the strongest intimations of the significance of the category of ignorance in sociological theory come from the tradition of functional analysis, particularly as that analysis has to do with religion and magic. Functional theory suggests a perspective on ignorance and a conceptual apparatus for its analysis in institutional context that have not been made explicit.

In advocating suitably vitalized sociological theory as a remedy for the perennial ailments of sociology, those people committed to the theoretical enterprise run the risk of being likened to the Tennessee mountain physician. Differences between sociologists in the amount of attention that they pay to procedures and techniques of investigation, on the other hand, are easy to see. Some of them known primarily as sociological theorists have for decades deplored such differences, particularly where what they regard as undue concentration on measurement is concerned. Now it may be granted that in American sociology, at least, there has been, is, and will be much measurement faddism. Indeed, the assertion may be risked that one of the conspicuous characteristics as a people is a yen for gadgets, and some measurement devices unquestionably are handled by the more fad-obsessed American sociologists as though they were gadgets or even gimmicks. But after all, scientists other than sociologists and peoples other than Americans demonstrably generate crazes about trick devices of one kind or another. Consequently, dealing directly or by imputation with the more obviously irrational aspects of measurement-mania as topics for sociology of knowledge analysis of American sociology only would represent a sadly limited perspective. The focus should take in at least several other contemporary societies in various parts of the world that are also secularizing rapidly.

The ascription of low status to Social Theory is a passing phase in the history of sociology. When the change in the status of Social Theory occurs, it will not mean that Social Theory will return to the position it occupied in the nineteenth century when it held a virtual monopoly on sociological interest. Social Theory will be cultivated as one of the major interests of sociology closely integrated with other fields. It will not mean that every aspiring sociologist will have to try his hand at it. Each generation cannot be expected to produce more than a limited number of creative minds who possess the special gifts required for the construction of general theory. It will mean, however, that each generation will provide opportunities for creative work in Social Theory. It will seek to maintain Social Theory as a going concern by attracting and cultivating potential candidates for this task. This is not the case today when the prevailing emphasis on rapid specialization and the pressure of the demand for technically trained personnel discourages brilliant and creative minds from joining the profession on the one hand and on the other, diverts talented students by giving them neither time nor encouragement to test their abilities for the construction of general theories.

The purpose of this article is to study the role of empirical research in the development of social theory. This article is devoted exclusively to four impacts of research upon the development of social theory: the initiation, reformulation, refocusing and clarification of theory. Doubtless there are others. Doubtless, too, the emphasis of this article lends itself to misunderstanding. It may be inferred that some invidious distinction has been drawn at the expense of theory and the theorist. The author has suggested that an explicitly formulated theory does not invariably precede empirical inquiry, that as a matter of plain fact the theorist is not inevitably the lamp lighting the way to new observations. The sequence is often reversed. Nor is it enough to say that research and theory must be married if sociology is to bear legitimate fruit. They must not only exchange solemn vows they must know bow to carry on from there. Their reciprocal roles must be clearly defined. This article is a brief essay toward that definition.

This article focuses on the relationship between sociological theory and race relations. The sociological theories of the founders of American sociology as an academic discipline were only implicitly related to the concrete problems of race relations. Their theories concerning race relations were derived from European scholars who were concerned with the universal phenomenon of race contact. Sociological theories relating to the concrete problems of race relations in the U.S. were implicit in the sociological analysis of the Negro problem as a social problem. The analysis of the Negro problem was based upon several fairly clear assumptions, that the Negro is an inferior race because of either biological or social heredity or both, that the Negro because of his physical character cannot be assimilated and that physical amalgamation is bad and undesirable. The sociological theories implicit in the studies of the Negro problem were developed during the period when the nation held that the attempt to make the Negro a citizen was a mistake and a new accommodation of the races was being achieved in the South under a system of segregation.

The article examines the sociological aspects of the origin of religion. The basic assumption of this study is that religion comes from human nature. Religion is the interaction between man and a supernatural order which he believes to exist and which he defines in terms derived from his social experience, together with whatever is implicated in such interaction. The local ideas are "interaction," "super-natural," and "social." Religion is not belief by itself, or emotion, or anything else short of a process of interaction. It is a two-way process, a give-and-take, a mutual influencing, not infrequently a transaction. It goes on, within man's experience, and the question of an objective counterpart is irrelevant from the standpoint of the scientific observer. Religious quality is conferred upon objects and situations by what men do with them. Therefore, what is religious in one culture may not be in another. Objects may be implicitly religious before they are explicitly defined as such. Universals in human nature rather than historical accident and diffusion explain the wide distribution of religious phenomena, which is not true of particular religious systems, nor of all specific traits.

Two fundamental approaches, that can be exemplified by the scientific study of a culture would either be theoretical or monographic in nature. The two approaches may be distinguished, first, on the philosophical-methodological level and, second, on what may be called the contextual level. Philosophically and therefore methodologically, the first approach proceeds on the assumption that a person can and should study a culture as the natural scientist studies nature. Many students of sociology are aware of the "personal equation," which refers to the investigator's biases, emotions, prejudgments, or even to his own cultural "mold." Yet this personal equation is considered merely a flaw which each individual student must try his best to eliminate so that objectivity may be preserved as much as possible. On the philosophical-methodological level, the contrast between the two can be pointedly summarized as follows, for the former, the objective approach, the relation between the student and the culture which he examines is taken for granted, and the central concept is that of scientific procedure, under which aspects of the relation between student and culture under study which have become problematical are subsumed as technicalities. For the latter, the cultural approach, the scientific procedure is taken for granted, and the central concept is that of cultural equation, under which aspects of scientific procedure which have become problematical are subsumed as technicalities.

This article seeks to make an addition to sociological theory by proposing a conceptual framework for attacking the problem of distance. The theory is offered as a key which may open at least an outer door, although like any simple abstract theory it may require considerable elaboration and modification if it is to explain a wide variety of actual events. The writer believes that what sociology most needs is basic theories which can be so stated that verification in particular cases is possible. Therefore, painstaking effort has been made to test the theory in a particular case. The ultimate utility of the abstract theory will be determined by the variety and abundance of concrete situations in which it proves helpful in providing at least an initial ordering of thinking and of data. The theory here proposed and studied empirically assumes that there is no necessary relationship between mobility and distance. Instead, it introduces the concept of intervening opportunities. It proposes that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Another way of stating the same hypothesis is that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the percentage increase in opportunities at that distance.

The article focuses on the controversy related to the ideas of sociology. There are two conflicting beliefs, one that sociology must adopt principles and methods of the physical and biological sciences, and the other that sociology must use its own methods, since these are best adapted to its subject matter. The author here argues that if attention is shifted from science to scientific progress, the basis of the controversy will no longer exist. Scientific progress consists of the extension of the universe of knowledge. The basic postulate of the scientific form is the one which becomes the epistemological condition for enlarging its universe. The analysis of the scientific form represents a crystallization of the point of view of science. It is above all a logical description of what is meaningful among the beliefs maintained by scientists as to what they do. According to the author the admission to the scientific scene of the directly and undefined perceiving mind results in the superimposition of questions of verbal meaning and psychological perception on any scientific endeavor, especially in sociology.

The success and usefulness of the American Sociological Society depend first upon the members and second upon the committees and their chairmen. In planning the program for the annual meeting, which is of course the principal activity of the Society, it is very important that all the members should be fully informed as early as possible with reference to the character and scope of the meeting, and that as many of them as possible should participate in the plans, at least through suggestions as to different items of the program. So, the author inform that the next annual meeting will be held in Chicago, Illinois from December 28-to 30 inclusive. Professor Thomas D. Eliot is chairman of the sociology group, which is cooperating with representatives of the allied societies in planning the local arrangements. The general topic of the session is "The Applications of Sociological Theory." This theme has been chosen in recognition of the outstanding importance of the relation between sociological theory and the disturbed and highly dynamic character of social relations the world over, and particularly in accordance with the vote passed at the last annual meeting, that special attention should be given to some aspects of the present depression.

This article presents comments on sociologist Edward A. Tiryakian's recent discussion of a number of sociological figures in his "Existential Phenomenology and the Sociological Tradition." Tiryakian conveys the impression that "existential phenomenology" is an accepted entity in modern philosophy. Tiryakian's argument does not rest on an exposition of a phenomenological "school" in sociology. Rather, he wishes to show the implicit presence of "phenomenological" or "existential-phenomenological" aspects (the two terms are virtually interchangeable in Tiryakian's use) in sociological figures not commonly associated with either phenomenology or existentialism. Tiryakian does not explicate systematically just what the distinctive features of an "existential-phenomenological" perspective in sociology are supposed to be. One has this perspective if one emphasizes the importance of "structure" and "meaning" in social phenomena. Since, in one way or another, most sociological thought has employed one or both of these notions, it is not difficult for Tiryakian to baptize almost everybody as an "existential phenomenologist." However, the remarkable interpretations of the subjects of this procedure merit some attention.