Search

This paper explores the role of the concept of rationality in (especially classical) sociological theory. This exploration is prompted by widely held views, especially among economists and rational choice theorists, that classical sociology is the science of the irrational lacking a conception of rationality. By using pertinent examples (mostly) from classical and post-classical (or early contemporary) sociological theory, the paper casts serious doubt on such claims. Specifically, classical sociological theory is characterized by the following features in analyzing rationality: conceptual and methodological pluralism, theoretical and empirical richness, treating rationality as a complex social phenomenon, differentiating economic and noneconomic rationality, acknowledging the social character and foundation of (economic) rationality, and contrasting epistemological or scientific rationality and ontological or real-life irrationality, including the revelation of the irrationality of extreme (economic) rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses its attention upon the relationship between the dominant ideas in American sociology and the receptivity, opposition, or indifference to the ideas of Karl Marx. It documents that early American sociology basically ignored Marx's ideas. When his ideas were addressed, the modal response was overwhelmingly negative, and typically along ideological lines. A classificatory scheme is developed to identify the ideological nature of the treatment of Karl Marx in early American sociology. In effect, Marx was defined as beyond the limits of valid inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand Marx's unique approach to the empirical study of socioeconomic phenomena, it is necessary to delineate the roles played by both philosophic speculation and scientific inquiry in his work. In this paper, Marxism as both "philosophy" and "science" will be considered in some detail, in order to illuminate the strengths and shortcomings of each approach for the understanding of social change The notion of praxis will be introduced as a way of bridging the two concerns I shall argue that the various equations that comprise Marx's economic framework do not permit predictions concerning inevitable outcomes of capitalist economic production This is because Marx's economic categories are at the same time reflections of social and political relationships, the values assigned to the former result in part from the latter, while themselves determining the limits within which the latter operate To understand Marx as a scientist reducing capitalism to formal economic equations is to misread him as an economic determinist, to regard him as a philosopher focusing on reification and false consciousness is to ignore his central concern with necessary economic processes Thus, I shall argue that Marx's work---as exemplified in Capital---constitutes a methodology capable of combining science's concern with lawful necessity, and philosophy's insistence on the possibilities for human freedom from external constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short paper presents a few of the issues which divide contemporary Marxists and shows how their debates relate to Marx's original work In the first part, I discuss the family, law and the world system in the light of two notions of social structure. In the second part, I consider the dynamics of capitalism and the struggles between classes, races and genders as potential motors of change. This is followed by an outline of Marx's understanding of the persistence of capitalism, the notion of reproduction of social relations, and how the state becomes involved in the organization of struggles and in the preservation of the conditions of accumulation In the final part, the past is examined for the light it may shed on the future Has history a prior purpose, or telos? How did Marx and how do Marxists conceive of the transition from one period of history to another? What can we say about the transition to socialism based on the experience of the last hundred years? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Polanyi's defense of freedom in science and society conflicts in major ways with Weber (process of rationalization, value neutrality of sociologists), Popper (objective knowledge, open society), and technological or oppositional sociology. Polanyi rejects positivism, utilitarianism, and Marxism, and defends freedom as a necessary condition for pursuit of spiritual ideals such as truth, justice, charity, and tolerance. Half truths about science seen as rejecting tradition, faith, authority, values, and the subjective, have helped bring valuable social results, but in the form taken by radical philosophical skepticism (doubt), also called objectivism, they also threaten freedom itself. A more truthful account is needed. Scientists and citizens who would maintain a free society are morally responsible persons, joined together in quest of truth and certain other ideals, demanding of themselves and each other that they be faithful to that quest. Polanyi's thought has connections with that of Shils, and has implications for what Shils calls a consensual sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]