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Many sociologists believe that behavioral sociology is alien to traditional sociological thought, and some have questioned its legitimacy as a sociological perspective. This paper takes the position that behavioral sociology is very much in accord with basic tenets of sociology. The belief that it is not results from misunderstanding and confusion about the foundations and practice of behavioral sociology. Three key concerns about behavioral sociology are addressed: (1) the subject matter of behavioral sociology and its distinction from behavioral psychology; (2) the unexplained "givens" of behavioral sociology (the origins of existing reward systems), and (3) the concern that behaviorists view human behavior as mechanistic and unfeeling. The paper concludes that many differences between behavioral sociology and other sociological perspectives have been exaggerated, that behavioral sociology does exhibit most traditional characteristics of the discipline, and that the concern with the legitimacy of behavioral theory in sociology has obscured the one significant difference that does exist disagreement over the goals and conduct of a science of human behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relations between George Herbert Mead's pragmatism and Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutics have been examined in recent years in a new light: based on the former's close contact with the latter during the course of his studies in Germany in the 1880s–90s. These relations seem to vanish afterward, with Mead's return to the United States. Yet the common interests they share in the formation of a new social science keeps their respective developments in parallel; from psychology to history, they both share common interests in the reformulation of the concepts of Geist or Mind of the Hegelian legacy, through an interest in meaning and symbols as keys to the interpretation of the social world. Although there are important differences in their evaluation of the definition of the scientific enterprise that keeps natural sciences and Geisteswissenschaften apart for Dilthey, but are rather seen in their continuity for Mead, there are numerous points of intersection in their views. This article seeks to highlight those similarities, without neglecting the differences between Mead and Dilthey, in order to bring hermeneutics and pragmatism closer in their capacity to shed light on each other, and on the requirements of sociological analysis in contemporary society to be widened and deepened by adding the psychological and historical dimensions to its perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In view of the revanchist ideology that often passes under the rubric of sociobiology, a perspective that insists on the learned nature of social behavior is welcome. Undoubtedly, a search for the causes and careers of human behavior is a legitimate enterprise in sociology, but in the context of Molm's paper, a different question must be raised regarding behaviorist sociology. The root criticism of behavioral sociology, it seems to me, is the one she attributes to symbolic interactionism. The view that human emit behavior, Molm contends, is not a mechanistic theory at all because operant behaviors are not automatically elicited by any prior stimulus, they simply occur not elicited by a stimulus. If something that is yet to happen is the cause of the behavior that is about to be emitted, then surely it is the anticipation of receiving the reinforcement that is causing the behavior. I am sure Molm is correct that the argument about behavioral sociology is really about behavioral sociology is really about the goals and aims of science.

Behavioral sociology has developed unique features which have caused controversy and confusion in the discipline. In this paper, we briefly describe the history of behavioral sociology, and show how its major forms have been applied to behavioral analysts in complex organizations, laboratory experimental analysis of social exchange and social process, and behavioral macrosociology and theoretical extensions We also briefly examine criticisms of behavioral sociology on grounds of tautology, reduction, the omission of internal states as relevant data, and behavior control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The long-standing divide between sociology as an activist discipline vs. sociology as a science is examined in light of the current trend for American sociology focus on a limited set of justice issues resulting from inequalities and discrimination against certain categories of persons. Increasingly, this trend is pushing sociology toward become an activist discipline and, as a result, an ideologically-oriented discipline in its teaching and research activities. The outcome of this trend is the growing marginalization of those committed to sociology as a science in departments and academic meetings, resulting in demoralization of sociology's scientists and their escalating concern over their fate in a discipline increasingly mimicking a social movement organization. Even more damaging to sociology will be a loss of respect inside academia and a loss of relevance among publics not sharing American sociology's political biases. Furthermore, the chance for sociology to use its vast store of knowledge to help clients of all types solve their organizational problems will be lost if sociology is defined as a political rather than scientific enterprise. Sociology will thus willingly leave the vast resource niche for applications of social science knowledge to disciplines that know little about social organization (i.e., economics and psychology). Sociology will endure, of course, but it will not realize its enormous potential for reshaping societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]