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The article analyzes the Amherst papers in relation to development of Parsons' theory. A careful analysis of the Amherst papers reveals that the basic ideas and philosophical principles that Parsons followed throughout his life were already in place, some more fully developed than others, yet forming an integrally coherent pattern to a surprising degree. The clear existence in Parsons's Amherst papers of a metatheoretical framework predating his later professional writing calls into question some still existing myths about radical breaks in the development of Parsons's theory. In one version of this mythology, Parsons began his theory as a voluntarist, then became a structural-functionalist, later moved on to become a systems-theorist and ended up as a social evolutionist. Despite such claims, Parsons always was a voluntarist, even during his so-called structural-functionalist middle period. The Amherst papers reveal an amazingly complex and logically coherent theoretical system-in the mind of a twenty-year-young man-and testify to an extraordinary scope of philosophical depth, and intellectual maturity.

The article discusses economic and social theory of Talcott Parsons. Parsons's persistent attention to economic theory has been relatively neglected by critics of Parsons who, in attacking the alleged functionalism of Parsonian sociology, concentrated on the issues of value consensus and normative integration, believing that Parsons had relatively little interest in the economic base of society. This neglect of Parsons's economic sociology was probably intensified by the Marxist undercurrent of much so-called conflict theory. In recent years there has fortunately been considerable interest shown in Parsons's analysis of economic theory and more specifically in his economic sociology. At Amherst, Parsons came under the influence of the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, who prompted his students to consider broad questions relating to alternatives to industrial capitalist society and who created an educational environment within which students were involved in a general analysis of the social sciences. It was this engagement with institutional economics that marked Parsons's departure from biology into the social sciences as an academic career. Parsons was introduced to a broad spectrum of social theory relating to cultural and biological dimensions of human existence as explanations of social differentiation.

This paper reflects on the origins and subsequent reception of the paper "Ontological Gerrymandering: The anatomy of social problems explanations", published in 1985. It describes the circumstances of my turning up at McGill University as a Visiting Professor in Sociology and meeting Dorothy, then a graduate student and the TA assigned to an undergraduate course on Social Problems which I was asked to teach. The paper reflects on the twin benefits: of an interloper, from Europe and from Science and Technology Studies (STS), entering the exotic and heady fray of North American social problems; and of Dorothy's steady and resolute guidance in introducing me to a new field. The paper suggests some reasons for the endurance of the paper's arguments, more than 35 years after its publication, drawing on some parallel developments in Social Problems and STS. It asks why has there been rather little mutual interaction between these disciplines, given their common concern with questions, among others, about values, effects and interventions in academic scholarship. The paper concludes that many more of us might have done well to pursue the path of strident agnosticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the participation by sociologists in several major conferences, mostly held in New York, that focused on issues related to science, democracy and faith between the late 1930s and the early post-World War II period. These events offered sociologists an opportunity to showcase the discipline to leading scholars, public figures, and other intellectuals and public audiences outside the discipline. Amidst widespread uncertainty and a quest for answers to significant social and economic problems, sociologists revealed that they were no more adept than other intellectuals to provide definitive pathways out of potential catastrophe. At the same time, the conferences and related events demonstrated that sociologists had analytical tools and insights that could be useful in framing questions and orientations that were of interest not only to scholar bodies, but also served as potential reference points for social policy and community development. These activities, in helping to legitimize the discipline and reinforce the boundaries within which it operated, did so in a manner that also separated and privileged sociologists, as professionals or experts, from broader publics in ways that narrowed the discipline's main foci and lessened its capacity to adopt more democratic public roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a review and discussion of the two most common ways sociologists distinguish sociology from common sense in their constant dental of the perennial charge that "sociology is just common sense" Sociologists routinely exaggerate the differences between sociology and common sense by insisting that common sense is (1) false and (2) contradictory. These responses are unsatisfactory, incomplete, and often untrue. Each of these points is discussed and supported by illustrative examples from a wide range of sociological literature. The paper proposes that sociologists' handling of the sociology/common sense issue is a self-serving ideology designed to mystify their audiences in an effort to monopolize their role as experts on social life and to protect their professional autonomy. The paper ends by referring the reader to published materials' which deal more adequately with the similarities and dissimilarities of sociology and common sense and by supporting the thesis that sociology must combine the two types of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a human rights (in contrast to an ethicist) perspective into sociological investigation. Moreover, it indicates why a human rights orientation is necessary for examining genocide, politicide and other issues of organizational power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her paper, Molm raises whether behavioral sociology is an appropriate perspective for distinctly sociological analysis or does it lead to psychological reductionism. In the first section of the paper, where she distinguishes behavioral sociology from behavioral psychology, Molm adopts a sociological focus that is in agreement with my conception of it. The discussion in the second section of the paper seems to depart from the sociological perspective of the first section. Most of Molm's paper deals with microsociological studies, and her contribution which should be acknowledged is that she recognizes the dangers of psychological reductionism. In concluding her article, she notes that a main difference between behavioral and other sociologists is the methodological one that the former tend to prefer laboratory experiments and the latter research in natural settings. The nature of the explanatory theory depends on the conception of social structure. The theory seeks to explain the pattern of structure of social relations in terms of the structure or distribution of social positions.

This article focuses on the sociology of sociology. Persons working in the sociology of sociology are allegedly groping for some model or means by which to understand and measure changes in dominant sociological perspectives. In addition to attending primarily to the making and maintaining of meanings, rather than the functional integration of institutions, one approach tends more toward field work or participant-observation as a research style. To view a social theory from its own perspective can allegedly be an interesting index of sociological self-consciousness. It seems that any thoroughing reality constructionist would analyze the shifts in the perspectives that dominate sociology in terms of the process of conversion. It should be made clear at the outset that a distinction is made between the moral careers of good and bad converts. The distinction comes from various sources within establishment sociology but is also accepted by some of the more pure converts. A bad convert is a person who has taken on the new sociology and defined it as pleasurable, yet has failed first to undergo the necessary personal and intellectual struggle with the old sociology. In addition, the morality of the moral career of the bad convert is somewhat questionable.

In response to the recent The American Sociologist special issue on Canadian sociology, this rejoinder dialogues with some of the perspectives offered there on the discipline north of the border with an eye towards lessons that American sociologists might learn from the Canadian experience. My reflections build on a larger analytic piece entitled "Canada's Impossible Science: The Historical and Institutional Origins of the Coming Crisis of Anglo-Canadian Sociology" to be published soon in The Canadian Journal Sociology. Particular attention is paid to the different institutional arrangements of higher education in Canada and the United States, Anglo-Canadian reliance on the particularly English "weakness as strength" strategy for sociology, tensions between the cultural values of populism, egalitarianism, and excellence, and the trade-offs between professional and public intellectual work. A critique is offered of the "origin myth" of Canadian sociology as a particularly vibrant "critical sociology," with discussion of Dorothy Smith's influence on sociology in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the 20th century comes to a close, sociologists remain mired in the long-standing debate surrounding facts and values. The tensions between value-neutral and value-relevant sociologists have raged for decades and no resolution appears likely; at least no resolution is likely within the parameters of the existing debate. This essay is an introduction to the work of social thinker Leo Strauss, whose orientation provides a different perspective on the issue. It was Strauss's conviction that sociologists were fiddling Neros, oblivious to the crisis of value they helped engender, but excused on grounds that they did not know they fiddled and that they did not know Rome burned. A value-flee social science that denied the possibility of reasoned discourse on value, while surreptitiously advancing a vision of the good, created little but confusion while undermining the basis on which any vision of the good could be defended. A value-driven social science, animated by what Strauss called the “historical sense,” likewise undermined the legitimacy of the value this social science was designed to serve while casting suspicion on all subsequent value claims. Works by Bellah, Wallerstein and Alexander, Seidman, Collins and Denzin, among others, are used for illustrative purposes. Following Strauss, it is suggested that evaluation and explanation cannot be divorced; theirs was a natural relationship that modern philosophy, beginning with Machiavelli, had unwittingly denied. Strauss advocated a social science that understood value as something to quest for, rather than something to be assumed, and he judged theory to be a guide for action, rather than its substitute. It is suggested that Strauss's reading of the classics could be of benefit to sociologists seeking resolution to the crisis of facts and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike philosophy, a sociological theory of cumulation cannot legislate the logical or metaphysical criteria which make cumulation in science universally possible. Instead, sociology must explain under which structural conditions cumulation events are more likely to occur than different varieties of change. Organizationally, cumulation events are rational myths, which tend to surface on ritual and ceremonial frontstages directed at concerned and skeptical outsiders. Historically, cumulation presupposes the retrospective closure and coherent periodization of episodes. Structurally, cumulation tends to occur when the intellectual and design spaces of a network or specialty are highly focussed on narrow and isolated dimensions of performance. Technically, much as in natural evolution, cumulative advances are more likely when experimental controls allow for restrictive tinkering on machines and machine-like devices. Cumulation is local, not global; it occurs in the short, not the long, run, and prefers non-turbulent environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the simplifications in Neil Smelser's vision for sociological theory. Smelser gazes over the cycles and trends in sociology and offers the comforting opinion that the future of sociology will witness increasing synthesis and integration of theory. His vision clearly is optimistic. It is suggested the Smelser's vision should be regarded in the context of ongoing struggle and that his voice in fact joins others rather than being a lone and marginal one as he suggests. Smelser's argument rests on at least three assumptions: first, diversity, especially if confrontationally expressed, is divisive and creates disciplinary crises while consensus is intellectually healthy; second, integrative syntheses lead to growth in high quality work; and third, sociology is in charge of its own intellectual fate. These assumptions permeate his fairly simply cyclical model of change in sociological theory and scholarship. On the basis of that linear model, he makes the standard observation that the 1960s and 1970s were a divisive period in sociology and then predicts that a new period of synthesis is emerging. He cautions that this synthesis will take a while to appear and may not reach full domination because of the growth of subfields and the greater complexity of existing theoretical perspectives. In short this is Smelser's position and the reasons he offers in support of it.

The article comments on the issue concerning the future of sociological theory. Betting on the future of sociological theory is a hazardous affair. Parsons, late in life, admitted one of his smaller predictive errors when he conceded that Merton's middle range theory idea had been a better strategy for the time than the one he had himself recommended. But he did not admit his most spectacular and comprehensive error: in 1945 he insisted that we stand on the threshold of a definitely new era in sociology and the neighboring social science fields because of the availability and common acceptance and employment of a well-articulated generalized theoretical system. In the fifties and sixties the work of these persons became constitutive of good sociology in the eyes of funding agencies, wealthy universities and ambitious graduate students. American sociological theory is now marginalized. The ideas discussed are mostly the ideas of others who are outside of sociology, notably public-choice economists, decision theorists and game theorists, such as Mancur Olsen, Gary Becker and John Elster, or anthropologists. Sociology is today in a dependent one, responding to challenges to its turf or assimilating those ideas of the challengers that it can without losing its claims to a distinctive subject matter altogether. It is cruel to say so, but the conferences Smelser describes sound to me less like a portent of future synthesis than delusions of empire lost. We lost our empire because our bid for empire itself was defective.

The article comments on the views of sociologists on optimism and pessimism in sociological analysis. The labels "optimistic" and "pessimistic" are often applied to works of sociological analysis. Sociologist Parson's alleged optimism is held to be related to the domain assumption that the existing social system is, at the least, viable, given some reforms, and that this is a happy circumstance. There is a kind of pessimism that is based on the assumption that whether an existing social system endures or is replaced by a new one, the collective condition of mankind will be no better and, from the standpoint of both liberal and radical sociologists, may become even worse. Sociology was born and developed in an era of optimism. The early American sociologists, grand theorists all of them, dealt explicitly with the concept of progress, and in doing so most of them reflected various kinds of optimism. The optimism that fertilized the soil out of which sociology grew also nourished in literature and theology visions of unending human progress.