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Recently, there have been several attempts to use the kind of reasoning found in Fitch's knowability paradox to argue for rather sweeping metaphysical claims: Jago (2020) uses such reasoning to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and Loss (2021) does so to argue that every fact is grounded. This strategy has been criticized by Trueman (2021) , who points out that the same kind of reasoning could be used to establish entirely opposite conclusions. In response, Jago (2021) has offered a revised argument that is meant to avoid Trueman's objection. I argue that this revised argument is in fact undermined by an objection quite similar to Trueman's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that the A-theorist's argument from experience is undermined by a commitment to 'experiential punctivism' - the view that instantaneous (or near-instantaneous) experiences are metaphysically prior to durative ones. The experiences to which the A-theorist's argument appeals are those of processual events. For these experiences to constitute perceptions of temporal passage it would be necessary to perceive such processes qua processes; but, if experiential punctivism were true, this would be impossible. We could only ever perceive those processes qua temporal variation, which merely amounts to an awareness of change as described by the B-theory. If there is such a phenomenon as the passing of time, it could not be an object of our experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a new response to the regress argument against pure powers ontologies. This involves rejecting an overlooked premiss, which is that a power's manifestation is exhaustively accounted for by the powers involved in it. Rejection of this premiss not only answers the regress argument, but also brings with it wider metaphysical consequences, including a shift away from one-category ontologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]