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Recently, there have been several attempts to use the kind of reasoning found in Fitch's knowability paradox to argue for rather sweeping metaphysical claims: Jago (2020) uses such reasoning to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and Loss (2021) does so to argue that every fact is grounded. This strategy has been criticized by Trueman (2021) , who points out that the same kind of reasoning could be used to establish entirely opposite conclusions. In response, Jago (2021) has offered a revised argument that is meant to avoid Trueman's objection. I argue that this revised argument is in fact undermined by an objection quite similar to Trueman's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that the A-theorist's argument from experience is undermined by a commitment to 'experiential punctivism' - the view that instantaneous (or near-instantaneous) experiences are metaphysically prior to durative ones. The experiences to which the A-theorist's argument appeals are those of processual events. For these experiences to constitute perceptions of temporal passage it would be necessary to perceive such processes qua processes; but, if experiential punctivism were true, this would be impossible. We could only ever perceive those processes qua temporal variation, which merely amounts to an awareness of change as described by the B-theory. If there is such a phenomenon as the passing of time, it could not be an object of our experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a new response to the regress argument against pure powers ontologies. This involves rejecting an overlooked premiss, which is that a power's manifestation is exhaustively accounted for by the powers involved in it. Rejection of this premiss not only answers the regress argument, but also brings with it wider metaphysical consequences, including a shift away from one-category ontologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article, Murali Ramachandran endorses a principle that he thinks can help us solve the surprise test puzzle and cause problems for a Williamsonian argument against KK principles. But in this paper I argue that his principle is false and as a result it cannot do either. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on an argument made by D. H. Mellor that a certain position in the temporal case is inconsistent where the analogous modal position is not. A list of claims based on the doctrine against which Mellor's argument is successful but the analogous modal argument is not is presented. An assumption made by the authors was that the argument of Mellor was intended to apply to an A-theorist who does not assume.

The article demonstrates that the alleged proof of G. Rodriguez-Pereyra rests on a false assumption. In this assumption, it stated that if there are no concrete objects, then there are no concrete objects. A definition of metaphysical nihilism is presented, referring to a thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. The three premises for the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism is listed.