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The consequence argument purports to show that determinism is true only if no one has free will. Judgments about whether the argument is sound depend on how one understands locutions of the form 'p and no one can render p false'. The main interpretation on offer appeals to counterfactual sufficiency: s can render p false just in case there is something s can do such that, were s to do it, p would be false; otherwise, s cannot render p false. Here I show that, in the context of the consequence argument, this interpretation conflicts with widely endorsed principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for 'actually'. I also consider many possible responses to the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be generally called nondeterminacy. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that 'better than' is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, that is, impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the strengthened consequence argument for incompatibilism. It aims to show the truth of determinism from the remote past and the laws of nature with argument that relies on two inference rules. It explores the relationship between unavoidability and logical necessity represented by material implication.

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powersTherefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this article is to show that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier counter-examples can solve the Russell case of the stopped clock (other standard cases have already been analysed). The solution amounts to this: the truthmaker for the claim that it is, say, 2.00 pm, is a combination of natural and non-natural determinants. The latter are created by stipulation, but having been so made make it is a perfectly objective matter as to whether it is 2.00 o'clock. To know that it is 2.00 pm is to have the evidence for one's belief evidence of the very state of affairs that make the belief true. Thus, in the Russell case one does not have knowledge, in accord with intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses views on the Zygote Argument. It believes that there are positive reasons to adopt compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. It notes that some have thought that the Zygote Argument and other arguments such as the Four-Case Argument and other Manipulation Arguments bring out decisive objections to compatibilism. It concludes that the Zygote Argument does not provide strong support for the idea that compatibilism comes with a high price.

The author comments on claims made by I. Phillips in his article "Morgenbesser Cases and Closet Determinism." The first of his claims was that the problematic intuitions are wrong. His second claim stated that rejecting intuition and counterfactuals does not disrupt purposes in using counterfactuals. An objection presented by the author is that there is an intuitive route that does not presuppose determinism.

The article offers analysis of a paper by M. McKinsey about incompatibilism and the MC form. A definition of incompatibilism is presented, referring to the view that privileged access is incompatible with semantic externalism. One of the strategies deployed by incompatibilists is the consequence problem. Several types of compatibilist responses to the incompatibilist (MC) response include the soundness response and the apriority response.

The article looks at a flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument. Specifically, it argues that the conception of determinism used in various versions of Consequence Argument is not plausible. In the context of Consequence Argument, determinism implies that the existence of God is logically impossible. A 1983 version of the Consequence Argument is illustrated.

The article offers an analysis on incompatibilism and fatalism in which it states that free will thesis is incompatible with determinism. It defines free will thesis as the possession of free will. Included in the discussions are the oscillating Adam and weak incompatibilism, and the article's response to the argument by Roberto Loss.

The article discusses Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument. It cites the opinion of Joseph Keim Campbell on Inwagen's argument against compatibilism for its dependence on the existence of a remote past. It also presents Anthony Brueckner's new version of the Third Argument, which showed that determinism and free will are perpetually incompatible. It exploits Brueckner's new concept to establish another version of van Inwagen's original view that does not depend on the existence of the past.

The article discusses the philosophical claim that the free will thesis is incompatible with determinism, as argued by Peter van Inwagen. The author critiques the notion on the basis of the claim that the past is in some sense necessary. Having a remote past is said not be an essential feature of deterministic worlds. The author urges caution in the distinction between whether one can change the past versus whether anyone in the past ever had a choice about the truth of a proposition in the past.

The article discusses deterministic philosophical viewpoints brought about through hindsight, referring to philosophical cases from Sidney Morgenbesser. The author finds that these Morgenbesser cases are not in objection to suppositional accounts of the subjunctive conditional. He discusses the use of counterfactuals in empirical reasoning.

Studies the view that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities and that it is compatible with causal determinism. Rejection of the contention that causal determinism is compatible with judgments employing obligation; Asymmetry in the entailments.

Describes the consequence argument which starts from the characterization of determinism as the claim that what happens in the past, together with the laws of nature, entails what happens in the present. Belief on the improbability of determinism; Denial of the fixity of the laws; Terminological proposal that the laws of nature should not include psychological of voluntaristic propositions.

Discusses the consequentialism argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. Relation to third strand of mind argument; Consequence of determinism; Principle of agglomeration; Fixity of past and laws.

The article presents a reply to the argument of Joseph Keim Campbell which states that the Third Argument (TA) or Incompatibilism has failed to prove that determinism is incompatible with the free will thesis since the remote past is contingent to our world. It proposes a new version of the TA in which it does not rely on the existence of a part but on the necessity of the present.

The article examines the philosophical issue of compatibilism and whether or not that ideology contains that of prepunishment. The article examines prepunishment as the punishment of people before they commit a crime and compatibilism as the belief that all actions are predetermined, or are supported by determinism. Philosophical arguments are presented which result in the conclusion that compatibilism does condone prepunishment.