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The behavioural sciences are home to controversies that have survived for centuries, notably about the relation between observable behaviour and theoretical constructs addressing out-of-sight processes in the agents' brains. There is no shared definition for cognition, but the very existence of a thriving journal called Animal Cognition proves that such controversies are still live and help to (a) promote research on the complexity of processes leading to action, and (b) nudge scholars to restrict their cognitive models to those that can be falsified experimentally. Here, we illustrate some of these issues in a limited arena, focusing on the construction and expression of subjective value and choice. Using mainly work from our own laboratory, we show that valuation of alternatives is sensitive to options' properties, to subject's state, and to background alternatives. These factors exert their influence at the time the subject learns about individual options, rather than at choice time. We also show that valuation can be experimentally dissociated from the cognitive representation of options' metrics and argue that experimental animals process options independently at the time of choice, without elaborated comparisons along different dimensions. The findings we report are not consistent with the hypothesis that preference is constructed at the time of choice, a prevalent view in human decision-making research. We argue that animal cognition, viewed as a research program at the crossroads of different behavioural sciences rather than as a debate about properties of mental life, is inspiring and solid, and a progressive and progressing paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Impulsivity, in the sense of the extent rewards are devalued as the time until their realization increases, is linked to various negative outcomes in humans, yet understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying it is limited. Variation in the imprecision of interval timing is a possible contributor to variation in impulsivity. We use a numerical model to generate predictions concerning the effect of timing imprecision on impulsivity. We distinguish between fixed imprecision (the imprecision that applies even when timing the very shortest time intervals) and proportional imprecision (the rate at which imprecision increases as the interval becomes longer). The model predicts that impulsivity should increase with increasing fixed imprecision, but decrease with increasing proportional imprecision. We present data from a cohort of European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris, n = 28) in which impulsivity had previously been measured through an intertemporal choice paradigm. We tested interval timing imprecision in the same individuals using a tri-peak temporal reproduction procedure. We found repeatable individual differences in both fixed and proportional imprecision. As predicted, birds with greater proportional imprecision in interval timing made fewer impulsive choices, whilst those with greater fixed imprecision tended to make more. Contradictory observations in the literature regarding the direction of association between timing imprecision and impulsivity might be clarified by distinguishing between fixed and proportional components of imprecision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether animals experience visual illusions is a fertile area of study for examining the evolution and operation of visual cognition across different species. Here, five starlings were tested to examine whether they experienced the Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion. Across two experiments using an absolute target circle size discrimination, the size, similarity, distance, and number of the surrounding flankers were manipulated. The results suggest that this passerine species exhibits behavior inconsistent with the perception of the illusion, neither in a human-like fashion nor, as suggested by the first experiment, a reversed illusion. Instead, the typical training used to investigate this illusion caused the starlings to learn to integrate the irrelevant flankers into their decision process in a manner that precludes the study of illusory perception. The resulting discriminative behavior might best be described using a template-matching account. While illusion perception by animals remains an important comparative question, it requires additional validation to confirm the exact mechanisms of any illusory reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Impulsivity—the extent to which a reward is devalued by the amount of time until it is realized—can be affected by an individual's current energetic state and long-term developmental history. In European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), a previous study found that birds that were lighter for their skeletal size, and birds that had undergone greater shortening of erythrocyte telomeres over the course of development, were more impulsive as adults. Here, we studied the impulsivity of a separate cohort of 29 starlings hand-reared under different combinations of food amount and begging effort. The task involved repeated choice between a key yielding one pellet after 3 s and another key yielding two pellets after 8 s. Impulsivity was operationalised as the proportion of choices for the short-delay option. We found striking variation in impulsivity. We did not replicate the results of the previous study concerning developmental telomere attrition, though combining all the evidence to date in a meta-analysis did support that robustness of that association. We also found that early-life conditions and mass for skeletal size interacted in predicting impulsivity. Specifically, birds that had experienced the combination of high begging effort and low food amount were less impulsive than other groups, and the usual negative relationship between impulsivity and body mass was abolished in birds that had experienced high begging effort. We discuss methodological differences between our study and studies that measure impulsivity using an adjusting-delay procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judgement bias tasks are designed to provide markers of affective states. A recent study of European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) demonstrated modest familial effects on judgement bias performance, and found that adverse early experience and developmental telomere attrition (an integrative marker of biological age) both affected judgement bias. Other research has shown that corticosterone levels affect judgement bias. Here, we investigated judgement bias using a modified Go/No Go task in a new cohort of starlings (n = 31) hand-reared under different early-life conditions. We also measured baseline corticosterone and the corticosterone response to acute stress in the same individuals. We found evidence for familial effects on judgement bias, of a similar magnitude to the previous study. We found no evidence that developmental treatments or developmental telomere attrition were related to judgement bias per se. We did, however, find that birds that experienced the most benign developmental conditions, and birds with the greatest developmental telomere attrition, were significantly faster to probe the learned unrewarded stimulus. We also found that the birds whose corticosterone levels were faster to return towards baseline after an acute stressor were slower to probe the learned unrewarded stimulus. Our results illustrate the potential complexities of relationships between early-life experience, stress and affectively mediated decision making. For judgement bias tasks, they demonstrate the importance of clearly distinguishing factors that affect patterns of responding to the learned stimuli (i.e. response inhibition in the case of the Go/No Go design) from factors that influence judgements under ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sequential patterning of complex acoustic elements is a salient feature of bird song and other forms of vocal communication. For European starlings ( Sturnus vulgaris), a songbird species, individual vocal recognition is improved when the temporal organization of song components (called motifs) follows the normal patterns of each singer. This sensitivity to natural motif sequences may underlie observations that starlings can also learn more complex, unnatural motif patterns. Alternatively, it has been proposed that the apparent acquisition of abstract motif patterning rules instead reflects idiosyncrasies of the training conditions used in prior experiments. That is, that motif patterns are learned not by recognizing differences in temporal structures between patterns, but by identifying serendipitous features (e.g., acoustical cues) in the small sets of training and testing stimuli used. Here, we investigate this possibility, by asking whether starlings can learn to discriminate between two arbitrary motif patterns, when unique examples of each pattern are presented on every trial. Our results demonstrate that abstract motif patterning rules can be acquired from trial-unique stimuli and suggest that such training leads to better pattern generalization compared with training with much smaller stimulus subsets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negative affect in humans and animals is known to cause individuals to interpret ambiguous stimuli pessimistically, a phenomenon termed ‘cognitive bias’. Here, we used captive European starlings ( Sturnus vulgaris) to test the hypothesis that a reduction in environmental conditions, from enriched to non-enriched cages, would engender negative affect, and hence ‘pessimistic’ biases. We also explored whether individual differences in stereotypic behaviour (repetitive somersaulting) predicted ‘pessimism’. Eight birds were trained on a novel conditional discrimination task with differential rewards, in which background shade (light or dark) determined which of two covered dishes contained a food reward. The reward was small when the background was light, but large when the background was dark. We then presented background shades intermediate between those trained to assess the birds’ bias to choose the dish associated with the smaller food reward (a ‘pessimistic’ judgement) when the discriminative stimulus was ambiguous. Contrary to predictions, changes in the level of cage enrichment had no effect on ‘pessimism’. However, changes in the latency to choose and probability of expressing a choice suggested that birds learnt rapidly that trials with ambiguous stimuli were unreinforced. Individual differences in performance of stereotypies did predict ‘pessimism’. Specifically, birds that somersaulted were more likely to choose the dish associated with the smaller food reward in the presence of the most ambiguous discriminative stimulus. We propose that somersaulting is part of a wider suite of behavioural traits indicative of a stress response to captive conditions that is symptomatic of a negative affective state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]