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This article argues that economic evaluations of optimal antitrust rules ought to fully recognize antitrust predictability as a relevant factor. It discusses the differences between the direct and indirect mechanism of preventing anticompetitive conduct and between the roles assumed by accuracy and predictability of antitrust adjudication within these mechanisms. While operation of the direct mechanism depends only on accuracy, the indirect mechanism in addition requires predictability to work well. Since a great majority of anticompetitive conduct is prevented indirectly rather than directly, predictability is indispensable for the overall effectiveness of antitrust. Consequently, economic evaluations of optimal antitrust rules need to search for the most effective attainable combination of accuracy and predictability, inevitably sacrificing some of the former for the sake of the latter in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resurrection of the free trade–fair trade debate at the international level parallels a renewed pressure to incorporate fairness considerations within domestic competition policies, originating from a perceived reduction in the level of competition in various industries. Both supporters and critics of notions of fairness, however, have failed to advance a normatively persuasive case in their favor, neglecting the multifaceted nature of fairness in the competition policy domain. In this article, we disaggregate and evaluate four specific notions of fairness that are pertinent to domestic markets: vertical fairness between producers and consumers, horizontal fairness on the demand side, horizontal fairness on the supply side, and procedural fairness. We defend a narrow dimension of horizontal fairness on the supply side consistent with efficiency goals and of procedural fairness in the enforcement of competition laws. We conclude by comparing the free trade–fair trade debate with the return of fairness in competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The antitrust world before 1890 looks barren when compared with today’s global antitrust industry. The most common antitrust laws in pre-modern societies condemned practices that had the perceived tendency to raise prices: forestalling, hoarding and price fixing. Enforcement was focused on retail markets and trade in essential foodstuffs, like grain. Laws intended to ensure fair prices are common throughout history. Rules prohibiting unfair or excessive prices raise the more general question of price controls in pre-industrial societies. The historical evidence is ambiguous. Laws prohibiting monopolistic or abusive conduct are less clearly evident than anti-cartel laws in pre-industrial societies, although a few references exist. Before the 20th century, courts and authorities lacked the tools of modern economic analysis, like mathematics-based theories of harm. This absence of modern economics meant that there was no clear distinction among “economic,” “social,” “moral” and “political” policy objectives. Laws concerning product quality, consumer fraud and misrepresentations are commonly found in pre-modern societies. Although consumer protection rules were based on notions of fair dealing and justice, the rules were consistent with modern economic notions of transaction cost efficiencies, asymmetric market information and imperfect market information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]