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In three studies, we examined whether beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia could be changed. Participants provided agreement ratings to statements related to repressed memory and dissociative amnesia. Then, they received a university course which included education on the science of memory. Following this, participants had to re-rate the statements. In Study 3, at Times 1 and 2, participants also received a case vignette on a therapy-induced recovered memory and rated several statements related to this case. Participants who received education on the science of memory were less likely to agree with statements endorsing repressed memory and dissociative amnesia-and participants were more likely to state that the case vignette involved a false memory. Providing education on the science of memory can help people (e.g., legal professionals, people from the general population) to use critical thinking on the topic of repressed memory and dissociative amnesia.

The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory. Participants will be assigned to a “strong-incentive to cheat” or “weak-incentive to cheat” condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. Specifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player A's die roll outcome. Participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition are not punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two-days later, memory for the die-rolling event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die-rolling event and will report more errors than participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition.

A suspect of a crime can avoid legal repercussions by creating a false alibi. We examined whether creating such a false alibi can have adverse effects on memory. To do so, participants watched a mock crime video and were either instructed to create a false alibi or to provide an honest account for what they actually saw in the video. After a 2-day and 1-month delay, all participants were instructed to come forward with the truth using a free recall task. Participants who initially created a false alibi had more commission errors after a 2-day and 1-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Moreover, participants who created a false alibi reported fewer correct details after a 2-day and 1-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Our study suggests that like other types of deception, creating a false alibi can elicit memory undermining effects in the form of commission and omission errors.

In the present study, we used a new approach to establish the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI) for false memory research by asking memory researchers what they considered to be the SESOI in false memory research. They were presented with three hypothetical and three influential paper scenarios. These scenarios depicted studies examining the effects of certain manipulations (e.g., therapy) on false memory formation using well-known false memory paradigms: Deese/Roediger-McDermott, misinformation, and forced fabrication. Subsequently, they were asked for each scenario what they would consider to be the SESOI for practical and theoretical purposes and justify their decisions. We found that there was no clear consensus for the SESOI. However, memory researchers tended to accept smaller SESOIs or "any difference that leads to a p < .05," especially for theoretical ends. We argue that the lack of a general consensus is acceptable as long as proper justification is used. We discuss such rationales and provide recommendations for setting the SESOI.

In the Netherlands, there is currently no quality standard for conducting child forensic interviews in Child Protective Services (CPS) . The lack of such standard causes concern regarding the quality of these interviews, which are used to determine the child's safety and implementing treatment. In the current study, we implemented the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol at Safe Home, the Dutch national reporting agency for child abuse and domestic violence. Professionals at Safe Home received a three-day training in the NICHD protocol with regular follow-up feedback sessions. We compared 38 NICHD interviews with 30 control interviews on variables such as the type of questions asked, number of reported words, and children's mood state. NICHD interviews contained more invitations and fewer suggestive questions compared to non-standardized interviews. Furthermore, children reported more information related to the reported incident when they were interviewed with the NICHD protocol compared to control interviews. After being interviewed, children reported a more positive mood state independent of how they were interviewed (NICHD or control interview). Finally, children interviewed with the NICHD protocol were less likely to succumb to suggestive probes provided after the interview than children in the control group. We argue that child protection professionals need training in an evidence-based interview protocol to improve fact-finding in CPS.

Expert witnesses and scholars sometimes disagree on whether suggestibility and compliance are related to people's tendency to falsely confess. Hence, the principal aim of this review was to amass the available evidence on the link between suggestibility and compliance and false confessions. We reviewed experimental data in which false confessions were experimentally evoked and suggestibility and compliance were measured. Furthermore, we reviewed field data of potential false confessions and their relationship with suggestibility and compliance. These diverse databases converge to the same conclusion. We unequivocally found that high levels of suggestibility (and to a lesser extent compliance) were associated with an increased vulnerability to falsely confess. Suggestibility measurements might be informative for expert witnesses who must evaluate the false confession potential in legal cases.

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.

Research suggests that both internal (i.e., lying) and external (i.e., misinformation) factors can affect memory for a crime. We aimed to explore the effects of post‐event misinformation on crime‐related amnesia claims. We showed participants a mock crime and asked them to either simulate amnesia (simulators) or confess to it (confessors). Next, some participants were provided with misinformation. Finally, all participants were requested to genuinely recollect the crime. Overall, simulators reported less correct information than confessors. Moreover, these two groups were equally vulnerable to misinformation. In addition, exploratory analyses on strategies adopted by simulators revealed that those who previously, mostly omitted information while simulating amnesia exhibited the lowest amount of correct details. Simulators who instead used a mixed strategy disclosed more fabricated memory errors. Findings suggest that legal professionals and jurors should take into account that even offenders, irrespective of confessing or simulating memory loss for a crime, can be susceptible to post‐event misinformation.

Witnesses are frequently questioned immediately following a crime. The effects of such testing on false recall are inconclusive: Testing may inoculate against subsequent misinformation or enhance false memory formation. We examined whether different types of processing can account for these discrepancies. Drawing from Fuzzy-trace and Associative-activation theories, immediate questions that trigger the processing of the global understanding of the event can heighten false memory rates. However, questions that trigger the processing of specific details can inoculate memories against subsequent misinformation. These effects were hypothesized to be more pronounced in children than in adults. Seven/eight-, 11/12-, 14/15-year-olds, and adults (N = 220) saw a mock-theft film and were tested immediately with meaning or item-specific questions. Test results on the succeeding day replicated classic misinformation and testing effects, although our processing hypothesis was not supported. Only adults who received meaning questions benefited from immediate testing and, across all ages, testing led to retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. © 2016 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Summary: The present study examined whether repeatedly providing additional script knowledge of an event would boost the development of children’s implanted false memories. Seventy-two 7- to 9-year-old children listened to a true narrative about their first day at school and a false narrative describing that they went to a burns centre when they were four years old. Children were randomly allocated to one of three groups: one group without additional script knowledge and two groups that received a video about the two events to promote additional event-related script knowledge of which one group had to view the video repeatedly (i.e. once a day). Across two interviews, children were encouraged to tell everything they remembered about the events. Results showed that at the second interview, children who were presented with the additional script knowledge were more likely to develop a false memory than the children who did not receive additional script knowledge. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Several studies have shown that it is possible to implant false memories in children as well as in adults (e.g. Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). The interest in this false-memory research was inspired by several high-profile cases in which the authenticity

Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, the NetherlandsSummary: Studies show that engaging in self‐control results in deteriorated performance on subsequent tasks. In legal settings,witnesses and/or suspects are probably involved in self‐control (e.g. controlling their emotions). The current study tested whethersuch involvement in self‐control would lead to increased suggestibility levels. We found direct evidence for this. Forty‐fourparticipants were randomly divided into a high level of depletion condition (regulation of attention) or a low level of depletioncondition (no regulation of attention). Also, they were presented with a suggestibility measure (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale).We showed that depleted participants were significantly more suggestible than non‐depleted participants. Our findings arerelevant in situations in which suggestive practices may take place. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This study examined whether prevalence information promotes children's false memories for an implausible event. Forty-four 7-8 and forty-seven 11-12 year old children heard a true narrative about their first school day and a false narrative about either an implausible event (abducted by a UFO) or a plausible event (almost choking on a candy). Moreover, half of the children in each condition received prevalence information in the form of a false newspaper article while listening to the narratives. Across two interviews, children were asked to report everything they remembered about the events. In both age groups, plausible and implausible events were equally likely to give rise to false memories. Prevalence information increased the number of false memories in 7-8 year olds, but not in 11-12 year olds at Interview 1. Our findings demonstrate that young children can easily develop false memories of a highly implausible event. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Summary Brewin and Andrews recently argued that expert witnesses should be cautious when informing the legal arena about the potential for false memories. We argue that memory researchers—whose studies often were inspired by miscarriages of justice due to erroneous statements provided by witnesses, victims, or defendants—can and should emphasize the base rates of false memories. After all, even if Brewin and Andrews' estimate of 15% is an accurate higher bound estimate of false memories in real life cases, neglecting the science of false memories could lead to many more unnecessary miscarriages of justice.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Brewin and Andrews (2016) reviewed the literature on false memory propensity for childhood events. In this commentary, we critically evaluate their basic claim that proneness to false memories of childhood experiences is more limited than has been articulated in the literature. We show that Brewin and Andrews were selective in their inclusion of false memory studies, thereby ignoring relevant research related to autobiographical false memories. Equally important, and in contrast to what Brewin and Andrews claim, we show that implanted false memories elicited by misinformation are characterized by high confidence.