Search

With the proposed concept of energy blockchain, peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading between prosumers is regarded as a potential way for future power market development. However, existing P2P energy trading often has problems such as low trading efficiency and significant communication losses. This paper presents an energy trading strategy in the blockchain environment to solve the problems of P2P energy trading. First, the type of market is determined based on energy supply and demand. Then, a Stackelberg game is used to establish a two-layer model of the leader (upper) and follower (lower) to determine the price. In addition, we propose an energy trading method based on feasible regions. The trading strategy considers the supply and demand of the market, provides an accurate energy transfer signal, and can help energy blockchain achieve better "self-sufficiency". A case study proves the effectiveness of the strategy. Compared with the existing methods, the strategy proposed in this paper considers the market type and can promote the coordination and complementation of energy in the microgrid, and improve trading efficiency and reduce communication loss without sacrificing privacy. This study demonstrates that P2P power trading has brought benefits to prosumers, has promoted the development of the energy market, and has shown the massive potential of energy blockchain. • A P2P energy trading model and a consensus algorithm in the blockchain are proposed. • An interactive pricing-and-matching P2P energy trading strategy is proposed. • A novel P2P energy trading pricing model based on game theory is proposed. • A P2P energy trading matching method based on the feasible region is proposed. • Results show that the strategy proposed in this paper can optimize the microgrid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) enable integrated community energy systems (ICESs) as emerging techno-economic energy entities at the end-user side. In the deregulated electricity market, the ICESs can actively participate in the distribution electricity market (DEM) to provide active and reactive power dispatched by ICES operator (ICESO). In this context, a strategic active and reactive power scheduling model for ICESs in the day-ahead DEM is proposed in this paper. A novel trading mechanism designed for ICESO and distribution system operator (DSO)'s interaction toward both active and reactive power is represented in the day-ahead DEM, where distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs) for both active and reactive power are introduced as the market settlements. Then, the trading process is formulated as a bi-level programming problem. The upper level describes the combined cooling, heating, and power (CCHP)-dominated ICESO's strategic active and reactive power dispatch, in which the DLMPs for active and reactive power, internal flexibility services, and optimal dispatch for inverter-based distributed generators are considered. The lower level performs a DEM clearing for both active and reactive power. Further, Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, Big-M approach, and duality theory are used to convert the bi-level model from a Mathematical Programing with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) model to a single-level mixed-integer second-order cone programming (MISOCP) model for efficient calculation. Finally, case studies on modified IEEE 33-node and IEEE 123-node distribution systems are adopted to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheduling method. The results show that the proposed scheduling approach can contribute to the renewable energy share and energy efficiency, reduce CCHP-dominated ICESs' operation costs by 38.13% and 13.21% compared to the case where ICESO only acts as a price-taking consumer, and 6.64% and 3.44% compared to the case where ICESO does not consider reactive power bids/offers, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transactive energy systems use dynamic electricity markets to present an improved way to control large numbers of distributed energy resources while maintaining user privacy, autonomy and scalability. However, this access to dynamic electricity prices can introduce negative emergent behavior like high peak loads if not adequately regulated by grid operators. To solve this, this paper proposes a regulated peer-to-peer market structure for residential prosumers. Prosumers bid energy demand or supply curves into a peer-to-peer market, which can then be directly used by the utility to quantify and dispatch demand flexibility. A utility surcharge mechanism can then be employed to dispatch this flexibility, and achieve significant improvements to reliability. This framework is tested in a simulation environment of electrified residential buildings with significantly enhanced fidelity representing the real-world housing stock. New York State and the month of January was chosen for the demonstration purpose, considering that January is one of the most challenging months for fully electrified systems in cold climates as solar production occurs at opposite times of the highest heating load. Results show that the surcharge can reducing peak load and ramp rates by nearly 50%, while also encouraging consumption of locally generated electricity. • Unregulated peer-to-peer electricity markets neglect grid network constraints. • These markets can be regulated by a surcharge imposed by the grid operator. • This surcharge dispatches demand flexibility in a predictable, quantifiable manner. • Decentralized demand flexibility is then quantified by aggregating demand bid curves. • This regulation method is decentralized, scalable, and privacy-preserving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]