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Highlight • The result exists an obvious piecewise phenomenon for individual's aspiration level on promoting cooperation Abstract In real life, everyone is full of yearning and pursuit for future life. The difference between reality and ideals encourage people to constantly adjust the current state, so that they can better adapt to changes in the surrounding environment. Thus, we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model where individuals have expectation towards the payoff obtained from nearest neighbors, and individuals can adaptively adjust their update willingness based on the satisfaction of income. Through numerical calculation, we find that different b values will have an appropriate aspiration level to promote cooperation. In addition, the results have an obvious phase transition phenomenon for individual's aspiration level on promoting cooperation. Moreover, only moderate aspiration level can promote the evolution of cooperative behavior, due to it can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of update willingness, which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In real world, cooperation among unrelated agents remains to represent one open challenge in many disciplines. In some cases, subjects can even change their social dilemmas to ensure their own benefit. Inspired by this fact, here we propose a multigame (composed of prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) and its coevolution mechanism in networked populations: if a player succeeds to study the strategy of its opponent, it also learns the game type of its opponent. Based on numerous computation simulations, it is unveiled that compared with the setup of multigame, coevolution mechanism can effectively resolve the problem of collective cooperation. While for this observation, it is attributed to the fact that vast majority of players changed their games to snowdrift game (i.e. lower social dilemma), where cooperation-defection bistable state guarantees cooperation clusters. We hope our finding can inspire more studies for resolving the social dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper introduces expectation-based reinforcement learning methods in the public goods game. • The results under total population density show that individuals behavior exhibits conditional cooperation and its variant moody conditional cooperation. • In the network with empty nodes, conditional cooperation shows opposite trends. In social dilemmas, individual behavior generally follows the characteristics of conditional cooperation and emotional conditional cooperation. However, it is hard to adequately explain the behavior patterns of conditional cooperation with the evolutionary game theory. This paper introduces expectation-based reinforcement learning methods in the public goods game to investigate and account for the behavior patterns. Instead of letting individuals occupy the entire network as previous studies have done, we focus on studying individual behavior patterns on a network with empty nodes. The results under total population density show the effectivity of our model as they are consistent with those of the previous studies, that is, individuals' behavior exhibits conditional cooperation and its variant moody conditional cooperation. However, in the network with empty nodes, conditional cooperation shows opposite trends. We finally demonstrate that an appropriate population density can facilitate the maintenance and development of cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• In this paper, we establish a two-layered multiplex network model which combines SIR epidemic process and vaccination decision-making. • We discover that imitating behavior would restrain the increase of herd immunity, • The model is verified by Monte Carlo simulations and mean-field equa- tions, respectively. • A suitable quantity of conformity motivated individual could be beneficial to save the social costs. When confronting the epidemics or pandemics, there often exists an interplay between epidemic incidence and the vaccination strategies of individuals. Recently, the characteristics of human behaviors, such as imitating nature or bandwagon effect, have been proven critical to the final herd immunity. In this paper, by establishing a two-layered multiplex network model which combines SIR epidemic process, vaccination decision-making and imitating human nature, we discover that imitating behavior would restrain the increase of herd immunity, which is verified by Monte Carlo simulations and mean-field equations, respectively. Interestingly, a suitable quantity of conformity motivated individual, counter-intuitively, could be beneficial to save the social costs. At the same time, we analytically determine the precise conditions for the minimum total social costs. The current results can help to understand the behavior of social group in depth and then explore public attitudes concerning the vaccine, which usually has a tremendous impact on social vaccine take-up within the population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]